Is the ALTO Proposal Fundamentally Flawed?
A discussion document presenting common themes emerging from community groups regarding the ALTO High Speed Rail Project.
There appears to be a common view that we do need investment in improved rail service — but the ALTO proposal is deeply flawed. A higher speed rail service that is lower risk, lower cost, can be implemented quickly, and will benefit many Canadians is a worthy objective. The question is not whether to improve rail — it is whether ALTO, as currently designed, is the right way to do it.
Seven problems this document identifies
~30 min
Time saved vs. 200 km/h option
At a cost premium estimated at $50–80 billion for the extra 100 km/h of speed
$115–200B
Projected cost with Flyvbjerg overrun
Baseline $79.8B + median 44.7% rail overrun factor; HS2 trajectory implies $200B+
2037
Earliest public benefit
Ottawa–Montréal segment. Full network: 2041–2044. VIA decline accelerates in the interim
0
Public cost-benefit analyses released
No comparative business case between ALTO and 200 km/h alternatives has been disclosed
Introduction
Last year there was broad national support for high speed rail (HSR). A June 2025 Privy Council Office (PCO) poll found that 70% of Canadians support high-speed railways. That support was even higher in the provinces directly impacted by the current Alto project. Polling from May 2025 showed 76% support in Quebec and 71% in Ontario for a high-speed link between Toronto and Quebec City. This support mirrored long-term trends; a 2009 EKOS Research Associates survey found 86% support for establishing HSR in Canada.
However, public consultations undertaken in early 2026 by ALTO have highlighted significant opposition and specific concerns. Issues raised in both social and legacy media include: station locations, property expropriation, environmental concerns, noise, and the potential impact on existing VIA Rail services in smaller communities like Brockville and Belleville.
Other broader concerns have emerged about the project delivery method, including a lengthy schedule before benefits are realized, potential for future governments to cancel the project due to its projected $80–$120 billion cost, risk of serious cost escalation, and the presence of alternative routes that present less risk, lower cost, and significant service improvement.
The consultation regarding the choice between a ‘northern’ route following Hwy 7 versus a ‘southern’ route through the Rideau Lakes towards Napanee has precipitated vigorous opposition from residents and municipalities who may be potentially impacted. This paper provides an overview of the common issues that have become evident regarding the ALTO project consultation. The intent is to provide an opportunity to take corrective action before irreversible harm is done.
There appears to be a common view that we do need investment in improved rail service — but the ALTO proposal is deeply flawed. A higher speed rail service that is lower risk, lower cost, can be implemented quickly, and will benefit many Canadians is a worthy objective.
Background
The majority of passenger rail service in Canada has historically been provided by Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific (CP). In 1977, VIA became a separate Crown corporation. Although VIA is an independent federal Crown corporation mandated to operate as a business, it was created by an order in council — not legislation — leaving it vulnerable to federal budget cuts and restricting its business autonomy.
By 2018, freight traffic on the heavily used CN lines had become a significant obstacle to maintaining on-time service. In 2015, a proposal for a “high-frequency rail (HFR)” line on the Quebec City–Windsor Corridor was announced as VIA HFR. The issues it was intended to address include: VIA Rail’s limited track capacity shared with CN freight; inability to meet existing travel demand; forty years of limited government investment; and congestion-related delays associated with combined freight traffic.
An investigation by the Canadian Press revealed that VIA HFR was concerned about “widespread disinterest” in the high-frequency concept, and a Communications Consultant was hired to emphasize speed.1 The result was an announcement in February 2025 that VIA HFR would be rebranded as ALTO, shifting from high-frequency to high-speed.
The shift from High Frequency Rail to High Speed Rail was driven by marketing concerns, not evidence. The proposed route did not change. What is not accessible is the cost-benefit analyses and comparative business cases that reflect a rigorous examination of options that ultimately led to the ALTO mandate. This information needs to be made available in full and unredacted form.
ALTO’s seven government-mandated outcomes
- Significantly increase intercity rail passengers
- Enhance passenger experience in the Corridor
- Provide meaningful environmental benefits to support Canada’s net-zero commitment
- Significantly increase availability of accessible and affordable services
- Enable safe intercity journeys
- Minimize financial costs to taxpayers
- Contribute positively to the Government of Canada’s commitment to reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples
The Missing Link
The chronology described thus far takes us from the problem — an underfunded passenger rail service conflicted with freight trains on track it does not own — to a solution involving a new dedicated track, high-speed train on a new corridor removed from current population centres.
On the surface, the benefits of the proposed solution are compelling. However, a more rigorous examination raises fundamental questions:
- What were the options considered in determining that the proposed solution is optimal?
- What supporting studies and decision criteria led to the determination that the proposed solution is the best choice?
- What consultation was undertaken to seek public input into these decisions?
- What expert peer review studies were undertaken to confirm the conclusions?
The 2015 VIA HFR study concluded that the optimal approach was a dedicated track taking a more direct route between Toronto and Ottawa, reconnecting Peterborough to the railway network while also preserving service on the existing route through Kingston. The government’s decision after 2022 was to rebrand High Frequency Rail as High Speed Rail — but the proposed route did not change.
What is not accessible
The cost-benefit analyses and comparative business cases that reflect a rigorous examination of options that ultimately led to the ALTO mandate are not publicly available. This information needs to be made available in full and unredacted form before any preferred alignment is confirmed.
The Options
The lack of comparative studies and basic information about alternatives has led many community groups and individuals to ask: Why this route? Options that could be superior to what is being proposed include:
Dedicated double track — existing CN corridor
Using existing infrastructure including multiple bridge overpasses and stations already serving established communities. Bypasses the expropriation, greenfield geology, and ecological disruption of a new corridor entirely.
Freight displacement — CPKC route
Moving most CN freight to the CPKC route through Perth — requiring full double-tracking and other improvements — allowing the existing VIA CN route to be upgraded for passenger services at up to 200 km/h, with travel times of approximately 3.5 hours between Toronto and Montréal or Ottawa.
New corridor parallel to Highway 401
Moving CN freight or VIA Rail to a new corridor parallel to the 401. This route follows existing transportation infrastructure and minimizes greenfield impacts while achieving the core objective of separating freight from passenger operations.
Higher Speed (200 km/h) approach
Adopting a Class 7 approach allows consideration of existing routes. While not without challenges, this offers higher construction predictability, lower risk, and the ability to see immediate impact as track sections are constructed. Class 7 also has greater flexibility in utilizing existing corridors, significantly reducing expropriation costs and public opposition.
The ALTO dedicated high-speed approach will require significant expropriation, disruption of homes, businesses, farms, and recreational assets. The proposed ALTO options threaten significant ecological areas such as the sensitive Frontenac Arch region. No comparative study showing why this approach was selected over the alternatives has been publicly released.
High Cost for Little Gain
ALTO proposes dedicated, electrified twin tracks capable of supporting trains at up to 300 km/h, with predicted times of Toronto–Montréal in approximately 3 hours and Toronto–Ottawa in about 2 hours. Current VIA travel times are approximately 5 hours (Montréal–Toronto) and 3.5–4 hours (Ottawa–Toronto).
Simplistic modelling suggests that increasing the frequency of trains while reducing stops could achieve Toronto–Montréal in approximately 3.5 hours, Toronto–Ottawa in about 2.5 hours, and Ottawa–Montréal in about 1.5 hours at 200 km/h.3 The actual time difference between the ALTO 300 km/h proposal and a much less expensive 200 km/h proposal could be in the range of half an hour.
“The actual time difference between the ALTO High Speed Proposal and a much less expensive Higher Speed Proposal could be in the range of half an hour. What’s the hurry?”
Canada has not developed regulations to specify requirements for high speed or higher speed trains. The U.S. has additional classifications: Class 7 (200 km/h) and Class 9 (300 km/h). The cost difference between these two standards is significant.
| Class of Track | Maximum Speed (km/h) |
|---|---|
| Class 1 | 25 |
| Class 2 | 50 |
| Class 3 | 100 |
| Class 4 | 130 |
| Class 5 | 150 |
| Class 6 | 175 |
| Class 7 (U.S.) — Higher Speed | 200 |
| Class 9 (U.S.) — High Speed | 300+ |
Class 7 track requires fully grade-separated crossings, specialized signaling, and high-quality infrastructure with concrete ties. Curve radii can be 1,800–2,000 m (tilting trains can reduce this to ~1,300 m). Class 9 additionally requires electrified, concrete slab, non-ballasted track with large curve radii of 4,000–7,000 m. The cost differential between Class 7 and Class 9 rail could be in the range of 10 to 20 times more.
The current ALTO plan is estimated to cost in the range of $90 billion. Why are we potentially spending an $80 billion premium to save 30 minutes of travel time? Where are the studies that show the comparative costs and benefits? Where is the business case for the current proposed route, transportation mode, and project delivery method?
What is the Financial Risk?
Key findings of the 2025/2026 McGill TRAM (Transportation Research at McGill) Report5 found that: the high-speed rail line may struggle to be profitable, with projections suggesting it could lose money for nearly five decades after becoming operational; the feasibility of the project is tied to a potentially risky Land Value Capture strategy; and a high probability of construction cost overruns — sometimes exceeding 30% — is consistent with projects of this magnitude.
The TRAM report established a baseline capital cost of CAD $79.8 billion for the ALTO corridor. The Citizen Research Initiative6 has subjected this figure to parametric stress-testing using the reference-class forecasting methodology developed by Professor Bent Flyvbjerg at the University of Oxford. Flyvbjerg’s studies demonstrate that rail projects exhibit the highest average cost overrun of any infrastructure category — approximately 44.7% above initial estimates in real terms. For high-speed rail specifically, the record is worse.
The potential for cost overruns is not hypothetical — it is demonstrated by recent Ontario experience:
Eglinton Crosstown LRT
Tendered at $5.3 billion. Current estimate exceeds $12.5 billion. The P3 consortium is in contractual dispute with Metrolinx. A 135%+ cost increase under exactly the same DBFOM P3 structure proposed for ALTO.
Ottawa Confederation LRT Stage 1
Delivered persistent technical failures and cost overruns under the Rideau Transit Group P3 structure. Multiple public inquiries. The Trillium Commission found systemic governance failures baked into the P3 model.
As the final route for the ALTO project is not known, the project scope is not known, the Canadian regulatory requirements are not known, ridership projections are without substantiation, the proposed route is planned on extremely challenging geology, and the revenue projections appear to be dependent on land speculation — the current cost, ridership, and revenue projections are essentially without value.
Who benefits — and what happens to VIA Rail?
The ALTO proposal will benefit people travelling from Toronto, Peterborough, Ottawa, Montréal and the other stops in Quebec. It does not directly benefit people who live in south eastern Ontario including Port Hope, Cobourg, Belleville, Kingston, Brockville, or Cornwall who are currently served by VIA. Although it is suggested that VIA will continue to service the Cornwall to Oshawa corridor, without the Montréal, Ottawa, Toronto passenger volumes, this service will no longer be viable.
There is also an opportunity cost. If a more cost-effective option were selected that achieved the core objective of higher-speed, lower travel time, higher frequency rail service, there would be financial resources to fund other higher-speed rail projects in Canada. Peterborough should have a dedicated rail service; Metrolinx is the obvious solution with a connection to Oshawa and/or Uxbridge.
The risk is that the current ALTO plan will be branded as an extraordinary investment designed to benefit elite urban travellers in Montréal, Ottawa, and Toronto, while removing current VIA service, harming the environment, and disrupting the lives of rural and small-town Canadians.
What will happen to VIA Rail?
It can be reasonably predicted that the ALTO proposal will result in the cessation of VIA Rail. Without the passenger volumes associated with Montréal, Ottawa, Toronto service, funding will decline, service levels will be reduced, and further passenger decline will follow. The Federal Government has already expressed a vote of non-confidence in VIA by creating ALTO as a separate Crown corporation. By selecting CADENCE as the Project Partner with responsibility to Design, Build, Operate, and Maintain the new ALTO train system, the future of VIA becomes clear. CADENCE will be the natural successor to VIA.
Public opinion of VIA is compromised by high ticket prices and frequent delays. Nonetheless, in the 2022 Canadian Reputation study published by Leger,7 VIA Rail was ranked first in two categories among transportation companies: as an employer of choice and as the most trusted carrier. However, by early 2025, on-time performance had dropped to 30% in Q1 2025, leading to reduced customer confidence.
The risk of a death spiral
The risk that the ALTO project presents, as currently constructed, is that the corollary effect on VIA — the loss of confidence and funding — may begin a death spiral that could threaten the ongoing viability of VIA. Should it happen, the loss of VIA could very well be regarded over time in the same light as the cancellation of the Avro Arrow.
What can we learn from international experience?
Canada is the only G-7 country without High Speed Rail. There are several success stories of high speed rail operation in countries that have geology and climate challenges similar to Canada — Sweden, Finland, and China among them. Many countries that have high speed rail have built their systems incrementally and have decades of experience.
The British Experience
Britain has one true High-Speed Service, HS1, completed in 2007 — a 108 km line connecting London to the Channel Tunnel at 300 km/h. It has also upgraded numerous legacy lines to higher speed service of 200 km/h, including the East Coast Main Line, West Coast Main Line, and Great Western Main Line.
HS2, a second high-speed service, became one of the most controversial and expensive infrastructure projects in British history. Originally planned as a “Y” network connecting London to Birmingham, Manchester, and Leeds, the government cancelled all sections north of Birmingham in October 2023. Estimates for the full project reached £106 billion (approximately $194 billion CDN). Construction costs in Britain are significantly higher than in mainland Europe — often double those in France or Germany.
The California Experience
The California High-Speed Rail project, authorized by a 2008 statewide ballot, is designed to connect San Francisco and Los Angeles in 2 hours 40 minutes. Seventeen years later, as of July 2025, only 280 km (35%) of Phase I has advanced to construction, with Phase I not expected to be operational until 2032. The project has experienced significant delays and cost overruns caused by management issues, legal challenges, and inadequate funding.
HSR Projects are high-cost and high-risk. There should be full disclosure of the risk assessment designed to ensure that cost overruns and project delays associated with other HSR projects are avoided.
Environmental concerns and implementation timeline
The environmental concerns are numerous and significant. Many environmental groups have responded through the ALTO consultation process. The divide-and-conquer tactic of identifying a North and South option has failed: many environmental groups, including Conservation Authorities, have expressed serious issues with both options.
Both southern and northern routes will intersect and impact wetlands, significant woodlands, agricultural lands, source water protection areas, lakes, rivers and ecologically sensitive shoreline systems. Both corridor routes could adversely impact conservation properties, provincial park lands, and natural heritage features such as the Cataraqui Trail.
The ALTO HSR project assumes a 4-year pre-construction phase (2025–2029), with construction starting in 2029. The first segment, Ottawa–Montréal, is slated to be operational around 2037, with the full network completed by 2041–2044. Assuming a best-case scenario, the public will not actually see tangible results until 2037.
In the interim, the current VIA service has already started to decline, and this decline will likely accelerate as capital and operating funding for VIA no longer is a priority. The Federal Government will face accelerating public discontent as reports of poor VIA service become more frequent, there are reports of ALTO cost overruns and delays, and there is no actual realized benefit for 10, 15, 20+ years.
The alternative delivers immediate benefits
The option of Higher Speed improvements to the existing corridor — in addition to being lower cost and lower risk — has the advantage of immediate and incremental benefits that the public will feel. Showing confidence that VIA is the solution, not the problem, will immediately boost morale, create incentive for VIA leadership and employees to be creative and proactive, and encourage CN to work collaboratively.
Media reaction
As of late March 2026, media reporting on the Alto high-speed rail project is heavily dominated by opposition and concerns regarding its impact on rural communities in Eastern Ontario.
Against — high volume
Numerous articles, reports, and editorials focusing on opposition from municipalities (South Frontenac, Rideau Lakes, Township of Stone Mills) and agricultural groups (Ontario Federation of Agriculture, UPA). Concerns include farmland severance, property expropriation, high costs ($60–90 billion), and noise, often described by residents as causing “severe stress and anxiety.”
Neutral/Informational — moderate volume
Media reports detailing public consultation meetings, Alto’s technical studies, and updates from Crown corporation CEO Martin Imbleau.
For / Proponents — low volume
Coverage highlighting the potential 50,000 jobs, economic growth, and faster travel times, often featuring comments from project supporters, federal officials, or cities seeking to be included on the route.
Several Facebook groups opposing the project have garnered more than 14,000 members in total. Without complete transparency regarding the analysis that underpins the decisions to invest in the ALTO HSR Project, the Government will continue to need to defend the project.
Formal Recommendations to the Minister of Transport
Release all studies and briefing notes
That the Minister of Transportation immediately release all studies, reports, requests for proposals and briefing notes related to High Speed Rail, VIA HFR, and ALTO.
Commission an independent third-party review
That the Minister initiate an independent third-party review of the ALTO Project to determine if the options to the current mandate have been adequately identified and studied — and if the current ALTO mandate represents the optimal value for money proposition to improve affordable, frequent, and faster rail travel times for Canadians.
Stay land acquisition activities
That the Minister stay land acquisition activities by ALTO until such time that Recommendation 2 has been completed.
Sources cited in this document
This article is published as submitted by E. L. Darby. Published March 2026.