Section 1Introduction

There is broad national support for high speed rail (HSR). A June 2025 Privy Council Office (PCO) poll found that 70% of Canadians support high-speed railways.

That support is even higher in the provinces directly impacted by the current Alto project. Polling from May 2025 showed 76% support in Quebec and 71% in Ontario for a high-speed link between Toronto and Quebec City. This support mirrors long-term trends; for instance, a 2009 EKOS Research Associates survey found 86% support for establishing HSR in Canada.

However, public consultations undertaken in early 2026 by ALTO have highlighted significant opposition and specific concerns. Issues raised in both social and legacy media include: station locations, property expropriation, environmental concerns, noise, and the potential impact on existing VIA Rail services in smaller communities like Brockville and Belleville.

Other broader concerns have emerged about the project delivery method, including a lengthy schedule before benefits are realized, potential for future governments to cancel the project due to its projected $80–$120 billion cost, risk of serious cost escalation, and the presence of alternative routes that present less risk, lower cost, and significant service improvement.

The consultation regarding the choice between a ‘northern’ route following Hwy 7 from Smith Falls to Peterborough versus a ‘southern’ route through the Rideau Lakes towards Napanee has precipitated vigorous opposition from residents and municipalities who may be potentially impacted.

This paper attempts to provide an overview of the common issues that have become evident regarding the ALTO project consultation. The intent is to provide an opportunity to take corrective action before irreversible harm is done.

Section 2Background

The majority of passenger rail service in Canada has historically been provided by Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific (CP). Yearly passenger levels on Canada’s passenger trains peaked at 60 million during World War II. Following the war, the growth of air travel and the personal automobile caused significant loss of market share. By the 1960s, CN and CP found that passenger trains were no longer economically viable.

CN, being a Crown corporation at that time, was encouraged by the federal government to invest in passenger service. In 1976, CN began branding its passenger services with the bilingual name VIA. In 1977, VIA became a separate Crown corporation. Although VIA is an independent federal Crown corporation mandated to operate as a business, it was created by an order in council — not legislation — leaving it vulnerable to federal budget cuts and restricting its business autonomy.

By 2018, freight traffic on the heavily used CN lines had become a significant obstacle to maintaining on-time service. In 2015, a proposal for a “high-frequency rail (HFR)” line on the Quebec City–Windsor Corridor was announced. This project — VIA HFR — was created as a Crown corporation and as a subsidiary of Via Rail.

The issues that VIA HFR was intended to address include: VIA Rail’s limited track capacity shared with CN freight; inability to meet existing travel demand; forty years of limited government investment; and congestion-related delays associated with combined freight traffic.

An investigation by the Canadian Press revealed that VIA HFR was concerned about “widespread disinterest” in the high-frequency concept, and a Communications Consultant was hired to emphasize speed.¹ The result was an announcement in February 2025 that VIA HFR would be rebranded as ALTO, shifting from high-frequency to high-speed.

ALTO

The mandate of ALTO, incorporated as VIA HFR–VIA TGF Inc., is to develop and implement the High-Speed Rail Network project through one or more agreements with the private sector.² The Government of Canada has set seven project outcomes:

1. Significantly increase intercity rail passengers
2. Enhance passenger experience in the Corridor
3. Provide meaningful environmental benefits to support Canada’s net-zero commitment
4. Significantly increase availability of accessible and affordable services
5. Enable safe intercity journeys
6. Minimize financial costs to taxpayers
7. Contribute positively to the Government of Canada’s commitment to reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples

A Pre-Development Agreement (PDA) between ALTO and CADENCE has been executed and the co-development phase has been launched.

Section 3The Missing Link

The chronology described thus far takes us from the problem — an underfunded passenger rail service conflicted with freight trains on track it does not own — to a solution involving a new dedicated track, high-speed train on a new corridor removed from current population centres.

On the surface, the benefits of the proposed solution are compelling. However, a more rigorous examination raises fundamental questions:

• What were the options considered in determining that the proposed solution is optimal?
• What supporting studies and decision criteria led to the determination that the proposed solution is the best choice?
• What consultation was undertaken to seek public input into these decisions?
• What expert peer review studies were undertaken to confirm the conclusions?

The 2015 VIA HFR study concluded that the optimal approach was a dedicated track taking a more direct route between Toronto and Ottawa, reconnecting Peterborough to the railway network while also preserving service on the existing route through Kingston.

The government’s decision after 2022 was to rebrand High Frequency Rail as High Speed Rail — but the proposed route did not change. What is not accessible, however, is the cost-benefit analyses and comparative business cases that reflect a rigorous examination of options that ultimately led to the ALTO mandate. This information needs to be made available in full and unredacted form.

Section 4The Options

The lack of comparative studies and basic information about alternatives has led many community groups and individuals to ask: Why this route? Options that could be superior to what is being proposed include:

• Dedicated double track along the existing CN corridor, using existing infrastructure including multiple bridge overpasses and stations already serving established communities.
• An arrangement with freight railways such as moving most CN freight to the CPKC route through Perth — which would require full double-tracking and other improvements — allowing the existing VIA CN route to be upgraded for passenger services at up to 200 km/h, with travel times of around 3.5 hours between Toronto and Montreal or Ottawa.
• Moving CN Freight or VIA Rail to a new corridor parallel to the 401.

Section 5High Cost for Little Gain

ALTO proposes dedicated, electrified twin tracks capable of supporting trains at up to 300 km/h, with predicted times of Toronto–Montreal in approximately 3 hours and Toronto–Ottawa in about 2 hours. Current VIA travel times are approximately 5 hours (Montréal–Toronto) and 3.5–4 hours (Ottawa–Toronto).

Simplistic modelling suggests that increasing the frequency of trains while reducing stops could achieve Toronto–Montreal in approximately 3.5 hours, Toronto–Ottawa in about 2.5 hours, and Ottawa–Montreal in about 1.5 hours at 200 km/h.³

Canada has not developed regulations to specify requirements for high speed or higher speed trains. The U.S. has additional classifications: Class 7 (200 km/h) and Class 9 (300 km/h). The cost difference between these two standards is significant:

Class 7 track requires fully grade-separated crossings, specialized signaling, and high-quality infrastructure with concrete ties. Curve radii can be 1,800–2,000 m (tilting trains can reduce this to ~1,300 m). Class 9 additionally requires electrified, concrete slab, non-ballasted track with large curve radii of 4,000–7,000 m.

The cost differential between Class 7 and Class 9 rail could be in the range of 10 to 20 times more. A Class 7 project also provides greater flexibility in utilizing existing corridors, significantly reducing expropriation costs and public opposition.

Section 6What is the Financial Risk?

Key findings of the 2025/2026 McGill TRAM (Transportation Research at McGill) Report⁵ found that:

• The high-speed rail line may struggle to be profitable, with projections suggesting it could lose money for nearly five decades after becoming operational.
• The feasibility of the project is tied to a potentially risky Land Value Capture strategy.
• A high probability of construction cost overruns — sometimes exceeding 30% — is consistent with projects of this magnitude.

The TRAM report established a baseline capital cost of CAD $79.8 billion for the ALTO corridor. The Citizen Research Initiative⁶ has subjected this figure to parametric stress-testing using the reference-class forecasting methodology developed by Professor Bent Flyvbjerg at the University of Oxford.

Flyvbjerg’s studies demonstrate that rail projects exhibit the highest average cost overrun of any infrastructure category — approximately 44.7% above initial estimates in real terms. For high-speed rail specifically, the record is worse. The UK’s HS2 project, commissioned at £33 billion, reached a revised estimate exceeding £100 billion before significant scope reduction.

Applied to ALTO’s $79.8 billion baseline, even the median rail overrun factor implies a delivered cost of approximately $115 billion. At HS2’s observed overrun trajectory, total exposure could reach $200 billion or more.

The potential for cost overruns is not hypothetical — it is demonstrated by recent Ontario experience:

• The Eglinton Crosstown LRT was tendered at $5.3 billion and has a current estimate exceeding $12.5 billion, with the P3 consortium in contractual dispute with Metrolinx.
• The Ottawa Confederation LRT Stage 1 delivered persistent technical failures and cost overruns under the Rideau Transit Group P3 structure.
• The Ontario Line, still under procurement, has already seen revised cost projections increase substantially.

ALTO’s proposed Cadence consortium P3 model is precisely the structure that produced these failures. There is no evidence that the governance lessons of Eglinton and Ottawa have been incorporated into ALTO’s procurement design.

Section 7Who Benefits from the ALTO Proposal?

The ALTO proposal will benefit people travelling from Toronto, Peterborough, Ottawa, Montreal and the other stops in Quebec. It does not directly benefit people who live in south eastern Ontario including Port Hope, Cobourg, Belleville, Kingston, Brockville, or Cornwall who are currently served by VIA.

Although it is suggested that VIA will continue to service the Cornwall to Oshawa corridor, without the Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto passenger volumes, this service will no longer be viable.

There is also an opportunity cost. If a more cost-effective option were selected that achieved the core objective of higher-speed, lower travel time, higher frequency rail service, there would be financial resources to fund other higher-speed rail projects in Canada. Peterborough should have a dedicated rail service; Metrolinx is the obvious solution with a connection to Oshawa and/or Uxbridge.

Section 8What Will Happen to VIA Rail?

It can be reasonably predicted that the ALTO proposal will result in the cessation of VIA Rail. Without the passenger volumes associated with Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto service, funding will decline, service levels will be reduced, and further passenger decline will follow. The cycle continues until VIA is no longer financially viable.

The Federal Government has already expressed a vote of non-confidence in VIA by creating ALTO as a separate Crown corporation with its own Board. By selecting CADENCE as the Project Partner with responsibility to Design, Build, Operate, and Maintain the new ALTO train system, the future of VIA becomes clear. CADENCE will be the natural successor to VIA.

Public opinion of VIA is compromised by high ticket prices and frequent delays. Nonetheless, in the 2022 Canadian Reputation study published by Leger,⁷ VIA Rail was ranked first in two categories among transportation companies: as an employer of choice and as the most trusted carrier. However, by early 2025, on-time performance had dropped to 30% in Q1 2025, leading to reduced customer confidence.

Section 9What Can We Learn from International Experience?

Canada is the only G-7 country without High Speed Rail. There are several success stories of high speed rail operation in countries that have geology and climate challenges similar to Canada — Sweden, Finland, and China among them. Many countries that have high speed rail have built their systems incrementally and have decades of experience.

The British Experience

Britain has one true High-Speed Service, HS1, completed in 2007 — a 108 km line connecting London to the Channel Tunnel at speeds of 300 km/h. It has also upgraded numerous legacy lines to higher speed service of 200 km/h, including the East Coast Main Line, West Coast Main Line, and Great Western Main Line.

HS2, a second high-speed service, has become one of the most controversial and expensive infrastructure projects in British history. Originally planned as a “Y” network connecting London to Birmingham, Manchester, and Leeds, the government cancelled all sections north of Birmingham in October 2023. Estimates for the full project reached £106 billion (approximately $194 billion CDN). Construction costs in Britain are significantly higher than in mainland Europe — often double those in France or Germany.

The California Experience

The California High-Speed Rail project, authorized by a 2008 statewide ballot, is designed to connect San Francisco and Los Angeles in 2 hours 40 minutes. Seventeen years later, as of July 2025, only 280 km (35%) of Phase I has advanced to construction, with Phase I not expected to be operational until 2032. The project has experienced significant delays and cost overruns caused by management issues, legal challenges, and inadequate funding.

Section 10Environmental Concerns

The environmental concerns are numerous and significant. Many environmental groups have responded through the ALTO consultation process. The divide-and-conquer tactic of identifying a North and South option has failed: many environmental groups, including Conservation Authorities, have expressed serious issues with both options.

Both southern and northern routes will intersect and impact wetlands, significant woodlands, agricultural lands, source water protection areas, lakes, rivers and ecologically sensitive shoreline systems. Both corridor routes could adversely impact conservation properties, provincial park lands, and natural heritage features such as the Cataraqui Trail.

Section 11Implementation

The ALTO HSR project assumes a 4-year pre-construction phase (2025–2029), with construction starting in 2029. The first segment, Ottawa–Montréal, is slated to be operational around 2037, with the full network completed by 2041–2044. Assuming a best-case scenario, the public will not actually see tangible results until 2037.

In the interim, the current VIA service has already started to decline, and this decline will likely accelerate as capital and operating funding for VIA no longer is a priority. The Federal Government will face accelerating public discontent as reports of poor VIA service become more frequent, there are reports of ALTO cost overruns and delays, and there is no actual realized benefit for 10, 15, 20+ years.

Section 12Media Reaction

As of late March 2026, media reporting on the Alto high-speed rail project is heavily dominated by opposition and concerns regarding its impact on rural communities in Eastern Ontario. Based on reported coverage in early 2026:

• Against (High Volume): Numerous articles, reports, and editorials focusing on opposition from municipalities (e.g., South Frontenac, Rideau Lakes, Township of Stone Mills) and agricultural groups (Ontario Federation of Agriculture, UPA). Concerns include farmland severance, property expropriation, high costs ($60–90 billion), and noise, often described by residents as causing “severe stress and anxiety.”
• Neutral/Informational (Moderate Volume): Media reports detailing public consultation meetings, Alto’s technical studies, and updates from Crown corporation CEO Martin Imbleau.
• For/Proponents (Low Volume): Coverage highlighting the potential 50,000 jobs, economic growth, and faster travel times, often featuring comments from project supporters, federal officials, or cities seeking to be included on the route.

Several Facebook groups opposing the project have garnered more than 14,000 members in total. Without complete transparency regarding the analysis that underpins the decisions to invest in the ALTO HSR Project, the Government will continue to need to defend the project.

Section 13Recommendations