Tag: CN Rail

  • The options nobody priced

    The Option Nobody Priced

    ALTO’s same-day reply to the UPA’s existing-corridor study, measured against ALTO’s own published record.

    ⚠ Same-Day Response: ALTO Replies Within Hours

    On November 12, 2026, the Union des producteurs agricoles released a study by Vision Transport estimating that the existing Québec City–Toronto rail corridor could be modernised for about $11 billion, or $24–30 billion with additional crossing work and electrification. Vision Transport

    At 2:26 p.m. the same day, ALTO issued a formal French-language release rejecting the approach. The release contained no new cost figure, no benefit-cost ratio, and no costing of an upgrade to the existing corridor. For a comparison of high-frequency and high-speed rail, it gave a contact email address. Newswire

    Later that afternoon, ALTO’s CEO Martin Imbleau told The Canadian Press the proposal was “unfeasible” and that if it were feasible it would have been done decades ago. On the Québec radio programme La commission, he said ALTO cannot build a crossing for every farm, put the Montréal–Ottawa segment at just under 2,000 properties, including 500 or 600 agricultural owners, and offered to resume talks with the UPA without a confidentiality agreement. Canadian Press / L’actualité

    Critical Finding

    ALTO’s central claim, that high-speed rail would generate about five times the economic benefit of high-frequency rail, compares high-speed rail with a new $45–75 billion, 200 km/h railway that no one has proposed. The option the study actually puts forward, modernising the corridor that already exists, has not been costed or appraised by ALTO in any published document.

    On ALTO’s own published table, “five times” holds on one row only. On the row a standard transport appraisal is built on, direct benefits to travellers, high-speed rail delivers 1.47 times the slower option’s benefits. ALTO’s freight objection describes how the corridor is run today, not a physical limit, and ALTO’s own freight consultant describes the alternative: significant investment in the existing corridor.

    The reply asserts the conclusion of a comparison ALTO has not published. The farm associations’ request was for that comparison.

    Download
    The Option Nobody Priced — Full Brief (PDF)
    ALTO’s November 12 reply and the CEO’s interviews, claim by claim, against Canada’s Moment, ALTO’s freight study and the Vision Transport report
    Download PDF
    What Was Released

    A study of the corridor that already exists

    The Vision Transport study, prepared by Vincent Duguay with an expert opinion from Pierre DuSablon, a track engineering consultant who formerly ran CN operations between Montréal and Québec City, does not propose a new railway. It asks how fast a passenger train could run on the tracks that already exist if they were modernised, and what that would cost. Its answer rests on five actions: a second track on the 37% of the corridor that is single-track today; in-cab train control allowing 177 km/h; a standing power for the Canadian Transportation Agency to set train priority in favour of passengers; full gates at level crossings in the faster sections; and tilting trains on curves. Vision Transport

    ~$11B
    five actions on the existing corridor, 20% contingency included
    2025 dollars; $24–30B with all options
    6h51
    Québec City–Toronto with all 22 stations served, down from 8h50 today
    6h00 as an express
    924
    existing level crossings kept open, 569 of them private or farm crossings
    none required to close

    On the upgraded corridor, Montréal–Toronto would take 4h14 with all stops or 3h42 as an express, against 5h18 today and ALTO’s announced 3h. Montréal–Québec City would take 2h26, or 2h08 express, against 3h22 today. Every time includes a 10% scheduling cushion. The study attributes almost half of the 120 minutes saved end to end to fixing how passenger trains share the line with freight, rather than to higher speed.

    ALTO’s Release

    What the reply says, and what it brings

    ALTO’s release, Alto réaffirme l’importance du train à grande vitesse pour le Canada et ses engagements envers le milieu agricole, makes four points: freight priority rules out more passenger trains on CN, CPKC and CFQG track; high-speed rail would cut travel times about 50% and generate about five times the economic benefit of high-frequency rail ($24.5 billion a year in added GDP against $4.9 billion); about twenty countries, including France and Morocco, have invested in fast passenger rail; and ALTO restates its five commitments to farmers.

    The release links ALTO’s economic-benefits analysis, its June 2026 consultation report, its rural commitments page and its property-acquisition page. It does not link a comparison of high-frequency and high-speed rail. For that comparison, it provides an email address.

    In the release, ALTO’s president and CEO Martin Imbleau says the UPA has chosen to stop talking to ALTO. The public record shows that five farm organisations met on June 4, 2026 to consider ALTO’s invitation to sign a collaboration agreement and declined to sign it, and that the UPA, OFA and CFA have since asked Ottawa to release the analyses behind the choice of high-speed rail and to commission an independent comparison. OFA   Radio-Canada

    Claim by Claim

    ALTO’s reply against its own published record

    Each claim in the release, and in the CEO’s interviews with The Canadian Press and on radio the same afternoon, is set below against what ALTO and its commissioned consultants have already published. Radio remarks are from an app-assisted English translation posted by Stone Mills Against Alto; all interview remarks are translations from French.

    What ALTO’s Release SaysWhat the Published Record Shows
    1. High-speed rail generates about five times the economic benefit of high-frequency rail: $24.5 billion a year in added GDP against $4.9 billion.The comparison appears in ALTO’s Canada’s Moment, Table 2. The “high-frequency rail” it prices is a new 200 km/h railway costing $45–75 billion, a figure that carries no footnote or source. That is not the $11–30 billion existing-corridor option the study proposes. On the same table, direct benefits to travellers are $49.5 billion against $33.6 billion: 1.47 times, not five.
    Status:Holds on one row, against a different option
    2. Passenger trains cannot be added to CN, CPKC and CFQG track because freight has priority, and slowing freight would harm exporters including farmers; a new network is needed.Freight priority on the corridor is a default, not a law: no G7 country gives freight priority over passengers in statute. ALTO’s own freight study states ALTO “is not assumed to result in the discontinuation of local passenger rail services”, so ALTO’s plan keeps passenger trains on the freight line. The same study says accommodating freight growth without degrading passenger service “would imply significant investments in the absence of Alto.” The release gives no figure for the harm to exporters.
    Status:Describes today’s rules, not a physical limit
    3. High-speed rail would cut travel times by about 50%.On ALTO’s announced times, Québec City–Toronto falls from 8h50 to about 4h30, a 49% cut. Those times are spreadsheet estimates: the government’s own journey-time record shows only the 177 km/h case was simulated. ALTO has not said whether they include a scheduling margin, and they run between seven stations on a new alignment, none on the existing VIA line between Montréal and Québec City or through Kingston.
    Status:Holds on estimates, without qualification
    4. About twenty countries have invested in fast passenger rail, including France and Morocco.Morocco’s Al Boraq runs 186 km on a new high-speed line, then 137 km on the upgraded existing line into Casablanca at 160 km/h. It is an example of new construction combined with the existing corridor. The release does not say so.
    Status:Cited example is a hybrid
    5. ALTO restates its five commitments to farmers: limiting impacts, negotiated agreements, fair compensation, maintaining farm access through safe crossings, and supporting succession.Above 201 km/h a railway can have no level crossings at all, and Canadian rules already prohibit any new crossing on a line above 177 km/h. Every farm crossing on a 300 km/h alignment becomes a structure or a closure. On radio the same day, ALTO’s CEO said ALTO cannot build a crossing for every farm and that detours are “possible, even probable,” with compensation for decades of lost production; how that would be calculated has not been published. The existing-corridor option keeps all 924 crossings open. The release does not address the difference.
    Status:Difference between options not addressed
    6. “The UPA has chosen to stop talking to us.” The CEO told The Canadian Press he had never heard the confidentiality criticism before that morning, and that it was “absolutely not the reason” discussions broke down.Five farm organisations declined ALTO’s collaboration agreement on June 4, 2026, stating that signing would not be in their members’ best interests and citing the need for greater transparency and open communication with their memberships. The UPA, OFA and CFA have since asked for the analyses behind the choice of high-speed rail and for an independent comparison. The CEO’s offer to continue working with the UPA without a confidentiality agreement, and his statement that he needs the UPA’s members to help design crossings and detours, are new, and a constructive step if taken up.
    Status:Request for analysis not answered
    7. “A TGF doesn’t exist” and the concept is “unfeasible.” On radio, the CEO described high-frequency rail as a conventional train that goes a little faster. To The Canadian Press, he said that if it were feasible it would have been done 40, 30, 20 or 10 years ago, and that Ottawa’s original high-frequency project used new tracks independent of freight.ALTO began as VIA HFR–VIA TGF, the Crown subsidiary created to develop high-frequency rail. ALTO’s release the same day assigns high-frequency rail an annual GDP effect of $4.9 billion, and its Canada’s Moment report prices it at $45–75 billion. The CEO’s own account confirms that the high-frequency project ALTO compares against was a new line, not the existing-corridor option. No published ALTO analysis shows that option to be infeasible; ALTO’s own freight consultant refers to “expansions to the CN corridor that may no longer be needed due to Alto being built”, an investment it treats as one ALTO would avoid, not one that cannot be made.
    Status:Inconsistent with ALTO’s own release and freight study
    8. A second track would mean closing the CN and CP lines for several years and buying “thousands and thousands of properties”, because the existing right-of-way is too narrow in most places. Electrifying lines used by double-stacked trains would be prohibitively expensive.None of the three statements is accompanied by a figure: no closure period, no property count, no electrification cost. The study’s core $11 billion package is diesel; electrification is an optional add-on. For comparison, ALTO’s CEO put the Montréal–Ottawa first segment of the new line at just under 2,000 properties.
    Status:Asserted without figures
    The Comparison

    Which “high-frequency rail”?

    The Alto Files has traced both the $24.5 billion and the $4.9 billion to a September 2024 slide deck shown to deputy ministers and released under Access to Information, where the slower option was priced at $58.9 billion on a new route. Its article sets out how the two figures are built; this brief does not repeat that work. The Alto Files

    The comparator is a different railway

    A 200 km/h option costing $45–75 billion is a new dedicated line. In September 2026 ALTO told Radio-Canada that high-speed rail costs only about 20–30% more than its high-frequency alternative, which is consistent with that range. The existing-corridor package costs $11–30 billion, uses a 177 km/h ceiling, and keeps all 22 intermediate stations. No published ALTO document costs or appraises an option of that kind.

    “Five times” is true on one row only

    ALTO’s Table 2 gives annual GDP effects of 0.2% and 1.1%, which is the “five times”. The same table gives direct benefits to travellers of $33.6 billion and $49.5 billion, or 1.47 times. The Alto Files notes the C.D. Howe Institute reached a similar 1.4 to 1.6 times in 2025.

    Per dollar, ALTO’s two options are close

    Dividing direct benefits by the midpoint of each capital range gives about 0.66 for high-speed rail and 0.56 for the slower option. On the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s $75–113 billion range, the high-speed figure falls to about 0.44–0.66. That range covers construction of the baseline route only, excludes a Kingston routing, and assumes European-level cost efficiency; the PBO puts the chance of costs reaching $243 billion or more at about 1 in 40. These are Initiative calculations from ALTO’s and the PBO’s published numbers. ALTO has said it will not publish a benefit-cost ratio at this stage.

    The $24.5 billion has its own limits

    It is 1.1% of Canada’s 2019 GDP from a static model; the commissioned study’s own range runs from $14.8 to $41.0 billion; about 86% of it rests on one productivity assumption; and the model leaves out construction and operating costs. These are set out in the Initiative’s earlier brief Two Point Two Trillion.

    The Freight Objection

    A rule, not a property of the track

    ALTO is right that freight goes first on the corridor today. That describes how the line is run. ALTO’s own commissioned freight study, High-Speed Rail and Freight Capacity (CPCS with HDR, June 2026), supplies the figures that bear on whether it must stay that way.

    8–13
    CN freight trains a day on Toronto–Montréal, a mix close to 50-50 with passenger trains
    CPCS, p. 8
    3–5
    CN freight trains a day on Montréal–Québec City
    CPCS, p. 8
    8am–8pm
    when freight volumes are lowest and passenger volumes highest
    CPCS, Table 1, p. 10

    Priority is a default

    The Initiative’s brief Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism found that no G7 country gives freight statutory priority over passenger trains, and that the United States legislates the opposite. Canada has none of the usual passenger protections, so freight goes first by default. The study’s third action is aimed at that gap.

    The timetable shows where the time goes

    On single track, VIA’s schedule carries about half the padding where VIA owns the track (29%) as where CN owns it (60%). Montréal–Ottawa, mostly on VIA’s own track, already runs with 8%. Montréal–Québec City, with the fewest freight trains on CPCS’s count, is where the study finds its largest gain from fixing how the two share the line.

    ALTO’s consultant describes the alternative

    CPCS finds “little ability to expand passenger services on lines shared with freight without adding substantial new capacity” (p. 11), and that accommodating freight growth without degrading passenger service “would imply significant investments in the absence of Alto” (p. 6). That investment in the existing corridor is the option the study proposes. The comparison that would settle the question is its cost against the cost of a new line. ALTO has not published it.

    What a response with numbers would contain

    What the reply does not include

    A same-day reply cannot be expected to carry a full appraisal. It can be measured against what ALTO already holds and has not published, and against what the farm associations have asked for.

    Already in ALTO’s hands

    The inputs behind the $4.9 billion Travel times, ridership and productivity assumptions for the slower option. The economic summary ALTO has published models high-speed rail only.
    A source for the $45–75 billion The “high-frequency rail” cost in Canada’s Moment carries no footnote.
    The September 2024 business case Released under Access to Information (A-2026-00195) with most of its pages withheld.
    A figure for the freight harm the release describes The release asserts harm to exporters without a number; ALTO’s freight study does not estimate one.

    Requires an independent process

    An appraisal of the existing-corridor option On the same basis as high-speed rail: cost, ridership, benefits, land, and the added capacity both ALTO’s freight consultant and Vision Transport say is needed. (UPA / OFA / CFA)
    Timing ALTO says a more detailed business case is coming in 2027. Landowners are being asked to make decisions before then. The comparison would need to precede corridor narrowing to inform it.
    Where things stand · November 2026

    Summary ledger

    ALTO’s November 12 reply and the CEO’s interviews, claim by claim, against ALTO’s own published record:

    Not supported
    “Five times the economic benefit”: holds on the GDP row only, and against a $45–75 billion new railway rather than the existing-corridor option. Traveller benefits on the same table: 1.47 times.
    Not published
    A costing of the existing-corridor option: none in any published ALTO document; the release offers an email address.
    Incomplete
    Freight priority: accurate as a description of current operation; ALTO’s own plan keeps passenger trains on the freight line, and its consultant describes the investment alternative.
    Incomplete
    50% faster: holds on ALTO’s estimated times, which are unsimulated, station to station, and serve seven stations rather than twenty-two.
    Incomplete
    Morocco: cited as a high-speed example; operates as a hybrid of new line and upgraded existing line.
    Not addressed
    Five commitments to farmers: the release does not address the difference between a fully grade-separated new line and an option that keeps all 924 existing crossings.
    Inconsistent
    “A TGF doesn’t exist” (CEO, radio): ALTO’s own release the same day puts a $4.9 billion figure on high-frequency rail, and ALTO began as VIA HFR–VIA TGF.
    No figures
    Line closures and “thousands and thousands of properties” (CEO, Canadian Press): no closure period, property count or cost given; the new line’s first segment alone involves just under 2,000 properties.
    Acknowledged
    Farm detours (CEO, radio): no crossing for every farm; detours possible, even probable; compensation method for decades of lost production not published.
    New
    Offer to talk without a confidentiality agreement (CEO, radio): a constructive step if taken up.
    Not answered
    The farm associations’ request for the analyses behind the choice of high-speed rail and an independent comparison.

    Until ALTO publishes otherwise, its comparison is between high-speed rail and a $45–75 billion new railway. The option on the table on November 12 is an $11–30 billion modernisation of a railway that already exists. That is the option nobody has priced.

    Status of the figures

    Published figures on this page are quoted from the named sources and can be checked there. All other figures are Initiative calculations from those inputs, and the inputs are named where each calculation appears. Reconstructions are estimates, not measurements. Where ALTO has not published something, we say so rather than infer its contents, and we make no claim about why any figure was or was not published.

    Download Full Brief
    The Option Nobody Priced (PDF, 10 pages)
    ALTO’s November 12 reply set against Canada’s Moment, ALTO’s freight study and the Vision Transport report
    Download PDF
    Sources

    Primary documents and statements

    1.
    ALTO, “Alto réaffirme l’importance du train à grande vitesse pour le Canada et ses engagements envers le milieu agricole,” Canada Newswire, November 12, 2026. newswire.ca
    2.
    Vision Transport (V. Duguay, with P. DuSablon), Corridor Québec-Toronto : ce que la voie existante permet, November 2026, with presentation and data visualiser. tgf.corda.consulting
    3.
    ALTO, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026, Table 2 and p. 62.
    4.
    CPCS with HDR for ALTO, High-Speed Rail and Freight Capacity: Potential Freight Benefits of Alto, June 2026, pp. 5, 6, 8, 10, 11.
    5.
    The Alto Files, “Five Times What?: Alto’s UPA response,” November 12, 2026, citing ATI release A-2026-00195 and C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 676. thealtofiles.substack.com
    6.
    Ontario Federation of Agriculture, “Farm groups meet to discuss the Alto high-speed rail project,” June 17, 2026. ofa.on.ca
    7.
    P. Saint-Arnaud, “Le PDG d’Alto affirme que le projet de TGF présenté par l’UPA ne tient pas la route,” The Canadian Press, in L’actualité, November 12, 2026. lactualite.com
    8.
    Stone Mills Against Alto, Facebook post, November 12, 2026, with an app-assisted English translation of Martin Imbleau’s interview on La commission (French). CBC News, “Montreal–Ottawa high-speed rail line could cross 1,700 properties, Alto predicts,” May 5, 2026. CBC News
    9.
    Radio-Canada, “TGV d’Alto : « On fait face à des vendeurs de chars », lance l’UPA,” September 2026. ici.radio-canada.ca
    10.
    International Railway Journal, “ONCF completes study into first phase of new Morocco high-speed line.” railjournal.com
    11.
    Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Canada’s Eastern Corridor High-Speed Rail: A Cost Analysis using Global Data, RP-2627-009-C, October 1, 2026.
    12.
    Initiative briefs: Two Point Two Trillion (July 2026); Estimated, Not Simulated (June 2026); Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism (2026); Counting the Crossings (August 2026).
  • Canada’s rail exceptionalism

    Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism

    Why Canada’s passenger trains keep pulling over to let freight go by — and why almost no other wealthy country works this way.

    ⚠ New this week: Ottawa’s $1.95-billion train order

    On July 29, 2026, the federal government announced $1.95 billion to buy 45 new hybrid locomotives for VIA Rail, most of them to be assembled in Montréal. It is welcome news for jobs and for an aging fleet — but every dollar of it is about the train, not the track. Transport Canada   CBC

    A new locomotive doesn’t change who owns the rails or who goes first. On the routes this fleet will serve, VIA runs on tracks owned by the freight railways — and its shiny new trains will keep pulling into sidings to wait for freight, just as the last batch of new trains does today.

    The bottom line

    No G7 country has a law that makes freight trains more important than passenger trains. Where a law on the question exists at all, it does the opposite — it puts passengers first. The other big democracies reach the same result another way: a neutral company owns the tracks, or an independent referee decides who goes when, or freight is simply the guest on passenger-owned lines.

    Canada is the only G7 country with none of these protections. VIA Rail owns less than 3% of the track it runs on and travels as a guest on lines owned by the freight railways CN and CPKC, under private contracts, with no law giving passengers priority, no neutral track owner, and no independent referee. Freight priority isn’t written into Canadian law — it is simply what happens when nothing protects passengers. That is what makes Canada the outlier.

    Download
    Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism — Full Brief (PDF)
    The complete comparison of freight-versus-passenger priority across the G7 and other high-income countries, with sources
    Download PDF
    The problem

    Canada’s passenger trains are guests on someone else’s railway

    Most people assume VIA Rail runs on its own tracks. It doesn’t. VIA owns under 3% of the track it uses. CN owns about 83%, and the rest belongs to CPKC and commuter agencies like Metrolinx. So across almost its whole network, VIA is a tenant — and when a VIA passenger train and a CN freight train want the same stretch of track, the freight company that owns and controls that track decides who waits.

    <3%
    of the track it runs on is actually owned by VIA Rail
    CBC News, 2024
    ~83%
    of VIA’s tracks are owned by the freight railway CN
    CBC News, 2024
    57%
    of VIA trains arrived on time in 2022
    CBC News, 2024

    You can see the result on the timetable. In 2022, only about 57% of VIA trains arrived on time. But on the one short stretch VIA actually owns, between Ottawa and Montréal, on-time performance jumps to roughly 90%. Same country, same trains — the difference is who owns the track. That is the whole story of this brief in a single comparison.

    A quick distinction

    Three different things people call “priority”

    Arguments about rail priority get tangled because “priority” can mean three different things. Keeping them separate is the key to an honest comparison.

    1. Priority written into law

    An actual law saying which kind of train goes first. This is rare. Where it exists — in the United States — it favours passengers, not freight.

    2. A neutral referee decides

    A neutral company owns the tracks and an independent regulator hands out timetable slots by published rules. This is how Europe and Japan work. Passenger trains are protected; freight gets fair, guaranteed access — but not the whip hand.

    3. Whoever owns the track wins

    What actually happens minute-to-minute when a dispatcher chooses. On freight-owned track, freight tends to win. Canada has only this third kind — with nothing above it.

    The comparison

    How Canada stacks up against the G7

    0 of 7
    G7 countries that put freight ahead of passengers by law
    it’s a null set
    6 of 7
    protect passengers — by law, a neutral track owner, or a referee
    every G7 member except one
    1
    the number of G7 countries with none of those protections: Canada
    the outlier

    Read down the list. Every other G7 country has at least one thing standing between passengers and the commercial interests of freight — a law, a neutral owner, or an independent referee. Canada has none.

    Passengers first
    United States — Federal law has put passenger trains ahead of freight since 1973. (Freight railroads often ignore it in practice, which is why the U.S. keeps trying to enforce it — but the law is clear.)
    Passengers first
    Japan — The passenger companies own the tracks; the freight operator is the guest and pays to use them. Bullet-train lines carry no freight at all.
    Neutral referee
    United Kingdom — A neutral company owns the track and an independent regulator hands out the slots. Neither passengers nor freight can simply push the other aside.
    Neutral referee
    France — A neutral track owner and an independent regulator allocate capacity under published EU rules; express passenger trains rank at the top.
    Neutral referee
    Germany — Same European model: neutral track owner, independent regulator, no freight-over-passenger rule.
    Neutral referee
    Italy — Same European model again: neutral track owner and independent regulator.
    No protection
    Canada — No law giving passengers priority, no neutral track owner, no independent referee. Freight wins by default.

    Widening the lens beyond the G7 only makes the point sharper. Nearly every wealthy country runs on the neutral, refereed model. Switzerland is the clearest contrast: it builds its entire national timetable around passengers — freight is scheduled around passenger service, not ahead of it. The only rich country that really resembles Canada is Australia, and even there an economic regulator oversees track access, and there is almost no long-distance passenger service on the freight lines. Canada is alone in running a national passenger railway carrying millions of trips a year with none of these safeguards.

    The $1.95-billion question

    Why new trains won’t fix this

    This week’s investment is real and worthwhile. But it buys a better machine; it does nothing about the track — which is where Canada’s problem actually lives.

    What the $1.95 billion buysWhat it leaves untouched
    45 new hybrid locomotives, most assembled in Montréal, plus a new maintenance facility and about 1,200 jobs. Who owns the track. The routes these trains will run on still belong to CN and CPKC.
    A cleaner, more modern fleet to replace aging equipment on long-distance and remote routes. Who goes first. A new locomotive still pulls into the siding to let the freight train pass.
    The promise of better reliability from newer, more capable trains. The real cause of delay. On freight-owned track, punctuality is capped by freight priority — no train upgrade can override it.

    We already know how this ends, because Canada has run the experiment. The last new fleet — the Siemens Venture trains bought for the busy Québec City–Windsor corridor — is today slowed by speed restrictions CN imposes on its own track, a dispute now before the Federal Court. New trains, same track, same problem.

    There’s an irony worth noting: the new locomotives are Swiss-built. Switzerland is exactly the country whose trains run on time — because it built its whole timetable around passengers. Canada is importing the Swiss hardware without the Swiss idea. It is buying the train, not the timetable.

    The real obstacle

    This is a political choice, not a technical one

    None of this is destiny. Every tool Canada is missing already exists and is used routinely by its neighbours — and adopting any one of them would cost a tiny fraction of a single locomotive order. What is missing isn’t money or engineering. It’s political will.

    The fix has been put to Parliament again and again — and set aside every time. Since 2013, at least half a dozen bills have tried to give passengers priority or put VIA Rail on a proper legal footing:

    Defeated 2015
    Bill C-640 (and its earlier version C-614), the VIA Rail Canada Act — Philip Toone. Would have given passenger service preference over freight. Voted down.
    Died 2019
    Bill C-370, VIA Rail Canada Act — Irene Mathyssen. Never debated to a vote; died when Parliament ended.
    Never voted
    Bills C-251 and C-236, VIA Rail Canada Act — Elizabeth May, reintroduced across two Parliaments.
    Never advanced
    Bill C-371, the Rail Passenger Priority Act — Taylor Bachrach, 2023. Would have required freight to give way to passengers, with fines up to $250,000 per violation.

    The pattern is telling. Every one of these bills came from an opposition member; not one was ever taken up as government legislation; and the only one to reach a vote was voted down. The freight railways and their shippers have lobbied against each attempt — one shippers’ group dismissed passenger priority as “the tail wagging the dog” — even as VIA Rail’s own CEO has publicly asked Ottawa for exactly the U.S.-style priority these bills propose. The tools are drafted and the precedent is understood. What’s missing is a government willing to enact them.

    What would actually fix it

    Three tools — any one would help

    Canada doesn’t need to invent anything. It can pick from the same toolkit every comparable country already uses. Each of these is cheaper than a single locomotive order.

    A law that puts passengers first

    Like the United States since 1973 — a statutory right for passenger trains to go ahead of freight, with penalties for ignoring it.

    A neutral track owner

    Like the UK and the EU — so the company running the trains isn’t also the company deciding who waits.

    An independent referee

    A regulator that hands out timetable slots by published rules and can enforce on-time performance.

    The high-speed corridor project (ALTO) is, in part, a workaround for all of this — building brand-new, dedicated passenger track precisely because passengers can’t get priority on freight-owned lines. But dedicated track for one corridor doesn’t fix the national problem. The exceptionalism this brief documents is a policy choice, not a constraint — and closing it is a matter of political will, not engineering.

    Read the full brief

    The complete comparison, with sources

    The full brief works through the G7 country by country, the other high-income comparisons, the corridor evidence, and the decade of failed legislation — with every claim sourced.

    Download Full Brief
    Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism (PDF)
    Comparative analysis for policymakers, MPs, journalists, and anyone following the passenger-rail file
    Download PDF
    Sources

    Key sources

    1.
    Transport Canada, news release, “Passenger Rail Locomotive Assembly Returns to Canada Through a $1.95 Billion Government of Canada Investment,” July 29, 2026. canada.ca
    2.
    CBC News, “Feds announce almost $2B for 45 hybrid battery-diesel Via Rail passenger locomotives,” July 29, 2026. CBC News
    3.
    CBC News, “Work’s chugging along to try to prioritize people over freight on Canada’s rail lines,” December 23, 2023 — source for VIA owning under 3% of its track, CN owning about 83%, and 57% on-time performance in 2022. CBC News
    4.
    The Canadian Press, November 26, 2024 — on VIA’s application to the Canadian Transportation Agency and CN’s freight prioritization as the leading cause of VIA delay, with the Montréal–Toronto scheduled time lengthening to 5 h 33 m.
    5.
    Railway Age, November 2022 — noting that, unlike Amtrak, VIA Rail holds no government-mandated priority over freight.
    6.
    United States: 49 U.S.C. §24308(c), the statutory passenger preference originating in the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973.
    7.
    European Union: Directive 2012/34/EU establishing a single European railway area (neutral infrastructure managers and independent regulators).
    8.
    Passenger-priority bills in Parliament — Bill C-640 / C-614 (Philip Toone), defeated 2015; Bill C-370 (Irene Mathyssen), 2017; Bills C-251 / C-236 (Elizabeth May); Bill C-371, the Rail Passenger Priority Act (Taylor Bachrach), 2023. parl.ca   openparliament.ca
    9.
    Transport Action Canada, “Taylor Bachrach Proposes Rail Passenger Priority Act,” and coverage in Trains (February 2, 2024), including VIA CEO Mario Péloquin’s call for Amtrak-style priority and freight-sector opposition. transportaction.ca
  • Freight and the Vanishing train

    The Freight Dividend and the Vanishing Train

    Alto’s own freight report builds its economic case on removing passenger trains from the shared Toronto–Montreal corridor — the same line VIA Rail runs through Eastern Ontario.

    ⚠ Companion to “VIA Rail on the Kingston Subdivision”

    In April 2026 we set out how Alto would foreseeably erode intercity passenger service on the Kingston Subdivision. Alto’s own June 2026 freight report now supplies the missing piece from the proponent’s side: a business case in which that erosion is not a risk to be managed but a source of value to be captured. Read the April brief →

    The finding in brief

    In June 2026 Alto published a report, High-Speed Rail and Freight Capacity (CPCS in association with HDR), whose central benefit is the capacity freed by lowering the number of passenger trains on the shared CN corridor between Toronto and Montreal — the Kingston Subdivision that carries VIA Rail through Oshawa, Cobourg, Belleville, Kingston, Brockville and Cornwall.

    The benefit grows as passenger service shrinks. In the report’s own words it “would be shared between passenger and freight, depending on the level of passenger rail services that may be maintained on the CN corridor.” The party positioned to decide how much survives is Alto’s own development partner, the Cadence consortium — also slated to operate the corridor’s existing passenger trains. The risk falls squarely on VIA Rail.

    The report is right about one thing: separating passenger and freight traffic relieves both. But Alto achieves that separation by removing the passengers. A dedicated passenger spine along the same corridor achieves the same separation while keeping the lakeshore served — the constructive alternative set out below.

    ↓ Download the full brief (PDF)

    The Freight Report

    What the report claims

    The report’s stated purpose is to show how Alto could “generate economic and strategic benefits for freight rail by lowering passenger traffic on the shared corridor.” It documents that the Toronto–Montreal segment runs on CN-owned track with a passenger-to-freight mix close to 50-50, and that passenger trains — because of higher speeds and precise scheduling — consume more track capacity than freight trains.

    From this it assembles a set of claimed freight benefits: deferred or avoided capital investment in the CN corridor; headroom to “protect for” 55 per cent higher freight volumes over 30 years; induced freight demand and mode shift; new rail-adjacent industrial development; and roughly $90 million a year in avoided societal costs from shifting one daily intermodal train off Highway 401. Every one of these flows from the same source: fewer passenger trains on the shared line.

    The Mechanism

    The benefit is the removal of passenger trains

    The report is explicit that the enabling condition is fewer passenger trains, and it ties the size of the avoided-investment benefit directly to how much passenger service is cut: the benefit “would be shared between passenger and freight, depending on the level of passenger rail services that may be maintained on the CN corridor.” Read plainly, the fewer passenger paths retained on the Kingston Subdivision, the larger the freight benefit Alto can claim.

    The report then treats the retreat of passenger rail as an inducement to development, suggesting that reducing the volume of passenger trains may signal to industry that rail-adjacent parcels have become more desirable. Yet the same report opens with a disclaimer that its introduction is “not assumed to result in the discontinuation of local passenger rail services.” These two positions cannot both hold at full strength: the benefit is defined as the capacity released by removing passenger trains, while the disclaimer promises they will not be removed. The gap is bridged only by soft language — and by recasting intercity trains as “local offerings” that feed the high-speed line.

    Who Benefits, and How

    Who gains from fewer VIA trains

    Freight does gain — that much is the report’s central claim: CN, the freight railway, avoids the spending it would otherwise need to expand its own line. But CN does not decide how much VIA service survives, and it is not the only party that gains. The consortium positioned to make that decision, Cadence, runs no freight and earns nothing from it — its stake is in Alto. So the pressure to thin VIA’s service comes not from freight alone, but from four further interests the report’s framing keeps in the background.

    Alto’s ridership depends on it

    Cadence is paid to fill Alto, whose business case rests on very high ridership: a target of 24 million passengers a year by 2055 — roughly eight times the three million or so the corridor carries today. The only independent modelling of the route (University of Toronto’s Munk School) projects about 9 to 10 million, and a reference-class adjustment for the ~65 per cent overstatement typical of rail forecasts lands near 8 million. As a single concessionaire with no open-access competition, Cadence has every reason to price for yield, not volume — making a cheaper conventional train on the same corridor competition to be minimized, not preserved.

    It makes the case for building Alto look better

    The report’s headline “avoided investment” benefit is explicitly larger the more passenger service is cut, inflating the benefit-cost ratio used to justify the project — the very project that gives the consortium’s contract its reason to exist.

    It lowers the subsidy the government pays

    VIA Rail’s Toronto–Montreal corridor service ran an operating shortfall of about $117 million in 2025 — roughly $50 of public subsidy per passenger, at a corridor cost-recovery ratio near two-thirds (VIA Rail, 2025 Annual Report). Shrinking that service, or folding it into the Alto concession, reduces what the federal funder pays; the party deciding the corridor’s future is also the party writing that cheque.

    It sheds the cost of using CN’s track

    Passenger trains on the Kingston Subdivision run on CN-owned track under access and cost-sharing arrangements — including, as the report notes, payments to CN to maintain track at passenger speeds. Moving intercity trains onto Alto’s dedicated line sheds those payments.

    The gains flow to Cadence, to CN, and to the federal treasury. VIA Rail — and the passengers between Toronto and Montreal — bear the loss.

    The Consequence

    The risk to VIA Rail

    What Alto describes is two passenger railways on one corridor. A dedicated high-speed line, built and operated by Cadence, would carry the fast intercity market. What remains on the Kingston Subdivision — the trains that serve Oshawa through Cornwall — is left as a residual “local” service, running between freight trains on CN-owned track, with no committed frequency and no protected floor.

    Under the project’s public-private structure, even that residual service is not assured to remain with VIA Rail: the existing corridor passenger operations, designated the “Local Services” in the procurement, are slated to pass to the same Cadence consortium as feeders to the high-speed line. And this is not a distant hypothetical. VIA Rail’s corridor on-time performance has already collapsed — from 72 per cent to 30 per cent inside a single year — as passenger trains are squeezed on infrastructure the operator does not own.

    The National Dimension

    The risk reaches the whole network

    The danger does not stop at the lakeshore. The Quebec City–Windsor corridor is not merely VIA Rail’s busiest route — it is the financial engine of the entire national network. More than 90 per cent of VIA’s passengers, and about 80 per cent of its revenue, come from this one corridor (VIA Rail, 2025 Annual Report). That revenue is what helps sustain the long-distance and regional trains connecting the rest of the country — Vancouver and Prince Rupert, the Prairies, Churchill, and the Maritimes.

    Hand the corridor’s ridership and revenue to a private consortium, and VIA is left, in the words of the federal NDP transport critic Taylor Bachrach, with “the crumbs” — a fraction of the revenue it uses to operate rail across Canada. Alto’s own answer is that corridor services will “eventually” be “integrated with Alto services into a single network”; asked what the loss of that revenue would mean for VIA, the proponent did not say. The choice being made on the busiest corridor, in other words, quietly decides the future of passenger trains in places thousands of kilometres away. CBC News reported the warning.

    A Constructive Alternative

    A straighter, quieter line

    The freight report identifies a real prize: separating passenger and freight traffic on the Toronto–Montreal corridor relieves the mixed-traffic conflict that degrades both. The question is how that separation is achieved. Alto achieves it by removing the passengers — routing a 300 km/h greenfield line inland through Peterborough and Ottawa, past the lakeshore communities entirely, and leaving VIA’s corridor service to wither.

    There is a straighter, quieter way to reach the same result. Build a dedicated, lower-speed passenger spine along the existing Toronto–Montreal transportation corridor — the lakeshore route the CN Kingston Subdivision and Highway 401 already follow. Give passengers their own tracks, engineered for reliable service at conventional-to-higher-performance speeds (up to about 200 km/h), and the passenger–freight conflict is resolved the same way — by separation — but without deleting the service the corridor’s communities depend on. The strong Toronto–Montreal market runs fast and reliably on the direct line; Ottawa and Quebec City are reached on upgraded existing track; and Kingston, Cobourg, Belleville, Brockville and Cornwall stay on the intercity network rather than being bypassed. The routing and demand-density case for this spine is set out in our companion brief, A Straighter Line. And because the spine stays in public hands, the fare revenue from the country’s busiest corridor keeps flowing to VIA rather than to a private concession — sustaining, rather than starving, the national network it helps fund.

    Alto as plannedA dedicated passenger spine
    A 300 km/h greenfield line detouring inland via Peterborough and Ottawa, roughly 900 km of all-new track.A direct passenger line along the existing lakeshore corridor, far less new build, largely alongside the rail line and Highway 401 already there.
    Cobourg, Belleville, Kingston, Brockville and Cornwall are bypassed entirely.The lakeshore communities stay on the intercity network, served on the way through.
    Today’s VIA corridor service is demoted to a residual “Local Service,” slated to the private concession, with no protected floor.The corridor service is the spine — upgraded, reliable, and kept in the public interest.
    Freight relief is delivered by removing passenger trains from the shared line.Freight relief is delivered by giving passengers their own dedicated line within the existing corridor.
    Operated by a single private consortium pricing for premium yield, with a $60–90 billion cost baseline.Operated in the public interest at affordable conventional fares, at a fraction of the greenfield cost.
    Corridor fare revenue flows to the private concession, weakening the cross-subsidy that helps fund VIA’s national network.Corridor revenue stays in the public system, where it can keep supporting long-distance and regional service across Canada.
    In plain language

    The freight report is right that passengers and freight should not have to fight over the same tracks. But there are two ways to end that fight: take the passengers away, or give them their own line. Alto takes them away — and prices the loss as a benefit.

    The alternative keeps the trains and separates the traffic: a dedicated passenger spine down the existing Toronto–Montreal corridor, reliable and affordable, serving the lakeshore towns Alto would leave behind. It delivers the genuine freight dividend the report identifies — without the vanishing train.

    Sources

    Primary sources

    1
    High-Speed Rail and Freight Capacity: Potential Freight Benefits of Alto (June 2026). Prepared for Alto by CPCS in association with HDR. Cited pages: 5, 6, 8, 11, 18, 19. Read the report.
    2
    VIA Rail on the Kingston Subdivision: Service Erosion, Funding Collapse, and the National Rail Risk from ALTO HSR (April 2026). ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative. Read the brief.
    3
    VIA Rail Canada, 2025 Annual Report — Toronto–Montreal corridor operating shortfall of roughly $117 million, per-passenger subsidy of about $50, and corridor cost recovery near two-thirds.
    4
    On the ridership targets: this Initiative’s ridership analysis, setting Alto’s stated 24 million (2055) and 43 million (2084) figures against the corridor’s current ridership of roughly three million; the University of Toronto Munk School (Global Economic Policy Lab) independent projection of about 9 to 10 million; and the reference-class forecasting literature (Flyvbjerg) finding rail ridership overstated by an average of 65 per cent.
    5
    On the operating model and the transfer of corridor “Local Services” to the private consortium: Government of Canada, “Canada is getting high-speed rail” (news release, 19 February 2025); Transport Action Canada, “Cadence wins $3.9B High-Speed Rail development contract” (2025).
    6
    On the national-network risk: A. Kurjata, “NDP warns privatizing high-speed rail from Toronto to Quebec could kill passenger trains in rest of Canada,” CBC News (19 February 2025) — corridor revenue as roughly 80 per cent of VIA’s total; MP Taylor Bachrach’s warning on cross-subsidy of national service.
    7
    A Straighter Line (June 2026). ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative — routing and reference-class demand-density analysis for the dedicated passenger spine.