Tag: fares

  • One line then the next

    One Line, Then the Next

    What Spain’s high-speed rail experience does, and does not, tell us about ALTO.

    The Commentary

    On October 18, 2026, Fareed Zakaria closed his CNN programme with a segment presenting Spain’s high-speed rail network as evidence that a democracy can still build large infrastructure. He credits Spain’s result to six conditions: building one line first, public finance, low construction cost, routing through less populated land, cross-party support and, since 2021, competition between train operators. He also notes two caveats: low use of parts of the network, and the cost of keeping it safe. CNN transcript

    Spain is the example most often offered for what a Toronto–Québec City line could become. This brief sets each of those conditions beside what has been published about ALTO.

    Key Finding

    On the sources set out here, ALTO shares few of the conditions the commentary identifies. Spain opened a single 471 km line in 1992 and did not open its second until 2003. ALTO’s published plan is a 1,000 km network, with property acquisition on its first segment, Ottawa–Montréal, reported to begin in late 2026 or early 2027.

    Spain’s average construction cost has been reported at €17.7 million per kilometre. ALTO’s $60–90 billion working assumption, divided by 1,000 km and converted at the October 1, 2026 rate, comes to about €38–56 million per kilometre, an Initiative calculation set out below with its limits. Spain financed its network publicly, with a substantial share from the European Union; ALTO is structured as a public-private partnership with no comparable outside funder.

    The Spanish case also carries findings that bear directly on ALTO: Spain’s fiscal authority and the European Court of Auditors have both found that much of the network carries few passengers relative to its cost, and the January 2026 derailment at Adamuz, on the original 1992 line, has made track maintenance a national question. Research also finds the network’s gains concentrated in the largest cities and at stations, with none of the studies reviewed finding that it reversed rural decline between them. These are findings about a network that was built cheaply. The comparison implies that a network costing two to three times as much per kilometre would face the same questions with a narrower margin.

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    One Line, Then the Next — Full Brief (PDF)
    Comparative brief with cost tables, the Spanish build sequence, and 32 numbered sources
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    The Numbers

    Three figures that frame the comparison

    11 years
    between Spain’s first high-speed line (1992) and its second (2003)
    ADIF / Renfe opening dates
    2.1–3.2×
    ALTO’s working-assumption cost per km against Spain’s reported average
    Initiative calculation
    46
    deaths reported at Adamuz, January 18, 2026, on Spain’s first line
    Final investigation report pending

    The commentary is a summary rather than a study, and its figures are round ones. Each is checked here against the underlying sources. Where the sources give a different number, the source figure is used: later reporting puts the Adamuz toll at 46, against the segment’s “more than 40,” and ADIF, Spain’s infrastructure manager, gives the network length as 3,973 km as of March 2026, consistent with the segment’s “nearly 2,500 miles.” ADIF Inspain

    Sequence

    One line at a time

    The Madrid–Seville line was inaugurated on April 14, 1992, timed to Seville’s Expo 92, with stops at Ciudad Real, Puertollano and Córdoba. The next new line, the first section of Madrid–Barcelona, did not open until 2003. The network then grew line by line over two decades. ADIF / Renfe via Wikipedia

    1992
    Madrid–Córdoba–Seville (471 km). The first line, opened for Expo 92.
    2003
    Madrid–Zaragoza–Lleida. First section of Madrid–Barcelona.
    2007–08
    Córdoba–Málaga; Madrid–Valladolid; Madrid–Barcelona completed (621 km).
    2010–13
    Madrid–Valencia, Albacete, Alicante; Barcelona–Figueres, linking to the French network.
    2015–22
    León, Zamora, Granada, Galicia, Burgos, Murcia, Badajoz. Madrid–Galicia took about 20 years of works; Plasencia–Badajoz was built for 200 km/h.

    Spain’s record is incremental, but it is not uniformly fast. Construction of the Basque high-speed line began in 2006 with completion forecast for 2016; completion is now forecast for 2027. Part of the network also consists of lines built or upgraded for 200–250 km/h rather than 300 km/h.

    ALTO’s sequence runs the other way. The federal government chose a high-speed option and selected Cadence in February 2025, and co-development began in March 2025. The plan is for a 1,000 km network. On the first segment, Ottawa–Montréal, ALTO’s chief executive has estimated about 1,700 property acquisitions, about 500 of them farms, with construction in 2029. Ridership has been forecast to 2084. Transport Canada Five Hundred Farms

    What this implies. Spain’s decision to build its second line was taken with years of operating evidence from the first. ALTO’s structure commits to a network before any segment has carried a passenger. On this sequence, the evidence the commentary credits with building support in Spain would not exist for ALTO until after the network’s scope, delivery model and land acquisition are settled.

    Cost

    Cost per kilometre, in the same units

    Four published sources give Spanish construction costs. They use different methods and periods, but each places Spain well below other European builders: an ADIF study gives €6–19 million per km by line; Spain’s fiscal authority, AIReF, €14.7 million (€15.3 million including stations); the engineering firm Ineco €17.7 million, against €45.5 million in other high-speed countries; and the European Court of Auditors €25 million as the average of ten audited lines across six member states. ADIF via Next City AIReF Ineco ECA

    ALTO’s published range is $60–90 billion in 2024 dollars, which its chief executive told a Senate committee is a class 5 internal working assumption rather than a cost estimate. Divided by 1,000 km and converted at 0.62526 euro per Canadian dollar (October 1, 2026), it compares as follows. Senate NFFN

    Initiative calculationLowHigh
    ALTO per route-km (C$)$60M$90M
    In euros at 0.62526€37.5M€56.3M
    Ratio to Spain, Ineco (€17.7M)2.1×3.2×
    Ratio to Spain incl. stations, AIReF (€15.3M)2.5×3.7×
    Ratio to ECA audited average (€25M)1.5×2.3×
    Ratio to other countries, Ineco (€45.5M)0.8×1.2×

    On this arithmetic, ALTO’s range is two to three times Spain’s average and close to the average Ineco reports for other high-speed countries. Spain is the low outlier; ALTO’s range is not an outlier against the international figures. The question the Spanish example raises is whether the conditions that let Spain build at half the international average are present in ALTO’s corridor.

    Limits. The Spanish figures cover construction from 1992 onward and are not stated in a single current price year; in 2024 prices they would be higher and the ratios lower. The published ALTO sources reviewed do not say what the $60–90 billion range includes, and the Spanish sources do not define their scope in the same terms. ALTO’s figure is a class 5 working assumption. The ratios indicate an order of magnitude, not a measured gap.

    Condition by Condition

    What made Spain work, and whether it transfers

    SpainALTO, as published
    Who pays. AIReF reported more than €55.89 billion spent on high-speed lines over 35 years, €14.09 billion (25.2%) of it from EU funds. As reported, Spain received 47.3% of the EU’s high-speed rail co-financing between 2000 and 2017.A public-private partnership that Transport Canada describes as among the largest the Government of Canada has sponsored. ALTO is funded by appropriations during development ($597 million in 2025–26). Canada has no outside funder in the EU’s position, and the terms of construction financing are not set out in the published sources reviewed.
    Transfers to ALTO:No
    Who builds. ADIF, the state infrastructure manager, has built line after line since the early 1990s, carrying its experience from one to the next.A first line, with no domestic high-speed construction programme behind it. The private partner develops and designs the project with ALTO during co-development. Cadence comprises CDPQ Infra, AtkinsRéalis, SYSTRA, Keolis, SNCF Voyageurs and Air Canada.
    Transfers to ALTO:No
    Where the line runs. Routing through less populated land lowered cost. Spain’s first line stopped at Ciudad Real and Puertollano, and the commentary describes the network as connecting urban and rural Spain.In Eastern Ontario, less populated land means farmland: about 500 farms on the first segment, under a statute that removes the standard attempt-to-purchase step and the public hearing on objections. Seven stations on 1,000 km, four of them in Québec; none between Peterborough and Ottawa.
    Transfers to ALTO:No
    Consensus. The commentary describes high-speed rail as a rare subject of cross-party agreement. The European Court of Auditors found, however, that decisions to build were often political and that cost-benefit analysis was not generally used.Consensus has not formed. OFA and UPA, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and Beef Farmers of Ontario have each called for the project to be halted or suspended pending assessment. In February 2026, senators asked whether a cost-benefit analysis had been done.
    Transfers to ALTO:Not yet
    Fares and competition. Ouigo entered in 2021 and Iryo in 2022. Spain’s competition authority reports Madrid–Barcelona tickets about €25 cheaper after liberalisation, fares on the main routes about 40% below 2019 in real terms, and 44.5 million passengers in 2025.One consortium develops and operates. The sources reviewed do not describe other operators competing on the new line. Air Canada, which operates air services between the corridor’s cities, is a consortium member.
    Transfers to ALTO:Not in published structure
    Demand. AIReF found Spain’s network the least used of the large networks, with socio-economic returns between zero and minimal in all four corridors it evaluated. Per-kilometre use was about a quarter of France’s.A forecast of 24 million trips a year by 2055 would exceed the Court’s nine-million benchmark for a successful line, and the corridor has about 18 million residents. Spain’s demand record is observed; ALTO’s is a forecast made before a cost estimate exists.
    Comparison:ALTO’s strongest point, unproven
    Upkeep

    Adamuz and the cost of keeping a line safe

    On January 18, 2026, an Iryo train derailed near Adamuz, Córdoba, on the Madrid–Seville line, and collided with an oncoming Renfe train; 46 deaths have been reported. The railway accident investigation commission, CIAF, stated in an interim note that its working hypothesis was a rail fracture at a weld that occurred before the Iryo train passed. Spain’s transport minister said the section had been renovated in May 2025. The train drivers’ union had written to ADIF in August 2025 about wear on that section, and the CIAF has reported inconsistencies in the documentation on the welds. As of the most recent reporting found, the final report has not been published. This brief makes no finding on the cause. CIAF Reuters

    The line involved was Spain’s first, 34 years old at the time. Maintenance is a lifecycle cost that grows as a network ages, and it is the cost least visible when a project is announced. The Initiative’s earlier operating-cost work estimates ALTO’s recurring lifecycle cost at about $1.8 billion a year at ALTO’s 3.5% discount rate. Cost of Running the Train

    Who Gains

    Who gains, and who does not

    Rural depopulation in Spain predates the high-speed network by most of a century. The share of Spaniards living in municipalities under 2,000 inhabitants fell from 27.5% in 1900 to 5.7% in 2021, though such places still make up 72.2% of all municipalities. Of 5,678 small municipalities studied, 56.9% lost population in both post-crisis periods examined, about 404,000 people combined, and the authors judge that around 3,300 face a bleak outlook. Gil-Alonso et al. 2023

    On 2018 INE data, 53% of Spain’s area holds about 5% of its population at under 12.5 inhabitants per km². elDiario.es The evidence reviewed does not show that high-speed rail caused this decline. The question it can answer is narrower: whether the network changed the pattern, and for whom.

    Gains concentrate at the ends

    On Madrid–Seville, population growth and land development concentrated “mostly towards the two largest cities.” Ciudad Real, within commuting range of Madrid, gained; Puertollano, one stop further, seldom did. Shen et al. 2015 Shen et al. 2016

    Stations matter

    Provinces with stops on Madrid–Barcelona saw on average about 2.4% higher output and 3.3% more firms. Across Spain, service has been associated with population growth overall, but not in every case: a required condition for development, not a guarantee of it. Carbo et al. 2019 Miralles i Garcia 2019

    The places in between

    The coverage gap is greatest for smaller, peripheral municipalities and those between lines, and strengthening links among the largest places could further isolate the smallest. Activity concentrates in the most developed nodes, and areas without a station can see service degradation. None of the studies reviewed finds that high-speed rail reversed rural decline between stations. Naranjo Gómez et al. 2020 Albalate & Bel 2026

    Local evidence from those places is mostly advocacy and press reporting. A users’ association reports Linares-Baeza station fell from 56 passenger trains a day before 1992 to 14. Soria, reported to be the only province the high-speed line crosses without a stop, has had no operating rail service since April 2025. In May 2025, farm unions in Sanabria, Zamora, protested a proposal to remove high-speed stops to shorten journeys to Vigo, citing depopulation and access to medical care. Each intermediate stop slows the trains for everyone travelling end to end, so the stops that provide access are the first to come under pressure. Moncloa El Debate Agronews

    What this implies for ALTO. ALTO’s published plan has seven stations on 1,000 km, none between Peterborough and Ottawa. On the Spanish evidence, gains would concentrate in the end cities and at those stations, while the rural communities between them carry the land acquisition without a station of their own. Transport Canada’s 2025 briefing records funding for the planning and eventual transfer of VIA Rail’s Québec City–Windsor corridor services to the private partner; the published sources reviewed do not say what service would continue at VIA’s intermediate stations. On the Spanish record, that is the question that decides whether the places between the stations gain or lose. Transport Canada

    Implications for ALTO

    What the Spanish case supports, and what it does not

    What it supports

    Democracies can build A democracy can build an extensive high-speed network at a cost per kilometre well below the international average. On the sources here, the commentary’s central point holds.
    Stages produce evidence Building in stages lets each later decision use evidence from the lines already running.
    Competition lowers fares Independent operators competing on publicly owned track can lower fares and raise use.

    What it does not support

    That ALTO would cost what Spain cost The conditions behind Spain’s costs are largely absent from ALTO’s corridor and delivery model.
    That high-speed lines fill wherever built Spain’s own fiscal authority and the EU’s auditors found otherwise on much of the network.
    That construction is the whole story The Adamuz investigation concerns the upkeep of Spain’s oldest line.
    That benefits spread evenly Research finds gains concentrated in the largest cities and at stations; none finds it reversed rural decline between them.

    On the arithmetic and sources set out here, the Spanish case is better read as a description of a method than as evidence for a particular project. ALTO’s published plan differs from that method in sequence, cost, finance, routing, station spacing and market structure. The comparison implies that whether Canada can build depends less on whether high-speed rail is built than on how it is built.

    Status of the Figures

    Published figures on this page are quoted from the named sources and can be checked there. All other figures, including every per-kilometre figure and ratio for ALTO, are Initiative calculations from those inputs: ALTO’s published range, a 1,000 km route length and the October 1, 2026 exchange rate. Reconstructions are estimates rather than measurements. Where ALTO has not published something, such as a breakdown of its cost range or the terms of construction financing, the text says so rather than inferring it. No claim is made about why any particular figure was or was not published.

    Download Full Brief
    One Line, Then the Next (PDF, 12 pages)
    Full comparison with the Spanish build sequence, four cost sources, the per-kilometre calculation and its limits, and 32 numbered sources
    Download PDF
    Sources

    Primary documents and reporting

    1.
    CNN, Fareed Zakaria GPS, transcript, aired October 18, 2026. transcripts.cnn.com
    2.
    ADIF, “Red de alta velocidad” (network length 3,973 km, March 2026). adifaltavelocidad.es
    3.
    Wikipedia, “High-speed rail in Spain” (opening dates, speeds, construction delays; drawing on ADIF and Renfe), accessed October 19, 2026. wikipedia.org
    4.
    Associated Press, report on the Adamuz collision, January 19, 2026, citing EU figures of more than 3,100 km of Spanish line above 250 km/h. gpb.org
    5.
    Next City, “New Starts: Spain’s Dirt-Cheap High-Speed Rail,” reporting an ADIF study of cost per kilometre by line. nextcity.org
    6.
    Ineco, Efficiency of the Spanish Sector in High-Speed Rail Development, as reported by Global Railway Review and Forbes España. globalrailwayreview.com
    7.
    AIReF, spending review of transport infrastructure (2020), as reported by International Railway Journal. railjournal.com
    8.
    European Court of Auditors, Special Report 19/2018, A European high-speed rail network: not a reality but an ineffective patchwork. op.europa.eu
    9.
    Reporting of ECA Special Report 19/2018 figures for Spain: Ara, June 27, 2018; Catalan News, June 26, 2018. ara.cat · catalannews.com
    10.
    CNMC data as reported by Railway Pro (2026) and International Railway Journal (2023); Frontier Economics on liberalisation; Hosteltur on the transport minister’s comments. railwaypro.com · frontier-economics.com · hosteltur.com
    11.
    CIAF, note on the investigation of the Adamuz accident, January 2026; Railway Gazette International, January 27, 2026. transportes.gob.es · railwaygazette.com
    12.
    Adamuz reporting: The Citizen (Reuters), January 19, 2026; Ara, on weld documentation (March 2026); Inspain (September 2026). thecitizen.co.tz · ara.cat · inspain.news
    13.
    Transport Canada, Committee of the Whole briefing binder, “VIA HFR – VIA TGF Inc. (Alto),” June 2025. tc.canada.ca
    14.
    Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, evidence, February 24, 2026. sencanada.ca
    15.
    Library of Parliament, HillStudy, VIA Rail: Its Past, Its Present and the High-Speed Rail Project, executive summary, May 4, 2026. hillnotes.ca
    16.
    OpenCouncil, “Alto High-Speed Rail” project summary, January 2026. opencouncil.ca
    17.
    Millstone News, “Alto: Coming soon to a neighbourhood near you?”, July 21, 2026. millstonenews.com
    18.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, Five Hundred Farms (May 2026), and the sources cited there. citizenresearch.ca
    19.
    Exchange-rates.org, CAD/EUR rate for October 1, 2026 (1 CAD = 0.62526 EUR). exchange-rates.org
    20.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, earlier briefs: North American vs. European Regulation of High-Speed Rail; Three Claims, One Fare; Cost of Running the Train (all August 2026). citizenresearch.ca
    21.
    Gil-Alonso, Bayona-i-Carrasco & Pujadas-Rúbies, “Is Spanish depopulation irreversible?”, Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 21(1), 2023. austriaca.at
    22.
    elDiario.es, “Radiografía de la España vacía,” March 29, 2019 (INE data for 2018). eldiario.es
    23.
    Shen, Zhao, de Abreu e Silva & Martínez, Madrid–Seville HSR and population growth, TRB 2016. mit.edu
    24.
    Shen, de Abreu e Silva, Zhao & Martínez, 15 years’ impacts of Madrid–Seville HSR, TRB 2015. mit.edu
    25.
    Carbo, Graham, Anupriya, Casas & Melo, causal economic impacts of the Madrid–Barcelona HSR corridor, 2019. figshare.com
    26.
    Miralles i Garcia, “High-speed rail services in Spain and their relationship to population growth,” WIT Transactions on the Built Environment 182, 2019. witpress.com
    27.
    Naranjo Gómez et al., “Assessment of high-speed rail service coverage in municipalities of peninsular Spain,” Infrastructures 5(2), 2020. mdpi.com
    28.
    Albalate & Bel, When Speed Outruns Demand, ADBI Policy Brief 2026-6, March 2026. adb.org
    29.
    Moncloa.com, “El AVE y la España vaciada de trenes convencionales,” July 2019 (union and users’ association figures). moncloa.com
    30.
    El Debate, on Soria’s rail isolation lasting until 2027, July 20, 2026. eldebate.com
    31.
    Agronews Castilla y León, Sanabria protest against removal of high-speed stops, May 21, 2025. agronewscastillayleon.com
    32.
    Transport Canada, Minister’s briefing binder, “High-Speed Rail,” June 2025. tc.canada.ca
  • Nina’s commute

    Nina’s Commute

    ALTO’s economic report introduces a semi-retired nurse from Peterborough to show what high-speed rail changes. The corridor’s own ridership and fare data says otherwise.

    ⚠ The scenario under examination

    On page 17 of Canada’s Moment, under the heading “What changes for Canadians,” ALTO introduces Nina — a semi-retired nurse living in Peterborough, invited to help train nursing students in Toronto. The report describes it as “an opportunity she would have declined in the past” because of the burden and unpredictability of commuting. With ALTO, it says, “that constraint is reduced” — letting her travel into the city twice a week without significant disruption to her routine, supplement her income, and pass on her expertise.

    It is a well-drawn illustration and the kind of person it describes certainly exists. This brief tests whether the journey it describes actually works, using the only published numbers available for that journey.

    Critical Finding

    On the only published assumption about ALTO’s service span — departures from 6 am — the first train of the day leaves Peterborough roughly 35 minutes too late to get Nina to a clinical placement. Nursing students take handover on the ward at 06:45. To be there, she needs to leave Peterborough around 05:25. She drives, exactly as she does today, which is the constraint the vignette says ALTO removes.

    On cost, the corridor’s own survey data puts willingness to pay for a Peterborough–Toronto trip at C$31 — the lowest value of any city pair on the entire route. Applying the published fare rule, two return trips a week comes to roughly $149–$178 weekly, or somewhere between a quarter and a half of what a part-time clinical teaching post pays after tax. ALTO itself discloses no fare anywhere in its 83 pages.

    And Nina is already inside the forecast she is meant to justify. The same research programme projects 269 daily boardings from Peterborough in every direction combined — about one fifth of a single 1,300-seat departure.

    The document under examination
    Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail
    ALTO, August 2026 — 83 pages. The Nina vignette appears at page 17.
    Read ALTO’s report
    The Market

    How many people make Nina’s trip?

    The most-cited independent study of corridor demand — High-Speed Rail in Canada, from Transportation Research at McGill — publishes a station-by-station table of projected daily boardings. It is the only public breakdown of its kind.

    The Peterborough row reads: 181 people a day to Toronto, 36 to Ottawa, 27 to Montréal, 9 to Trois-Rivières, 16 to Québec City. Total: 269 daily boardings — every direction, every trip purpose, everyone.

    269
    projected daily boardings at Peterborough, all destinations combined
    McGill, Prospective Daily Boarding table
    C$31
    willingness to pay, Peterborough to Toronto — the lowest of any pair on the corridor
    McGill, Willingness to Pay table
    35 min
    how much too late the first train is for a 7 am clinical start
    Initiative calculation, see below

    For scale: an ALTO departure of two coupled eight-car trainsets seats 1,300 people. Peterborough’s entire daily outbound demand is about one fifth of a single departure.

    Peterborough council was told the corridor would carry up to 72 trains a day. That is a corridor figure, not a Peterborough figure — and McGill’s own service design runs an express Toronto–Montréal train that does not stop at Peterborough at all. But even if a third of those 72 trains stopped, 269 boardings spread across 24 stopping trains works out to about eleven people per train.

    Three things should be said about this number before it is used. It is survey-derived stated preference, not observed demand — people saying what they think they would do. It is McGill’s projection, not ALTO’s: ALTO forecasts roughly 2.7 times McGill’s corridor total, and scaling Peterborough proportionally would give around 480 a day to Toronto rather than 181. And the source table contains a visible oddity — 886 people arriving in Peterborough from Toronto against 181 leaving for it, a fivefold asymmetry that is almost certainly a survey artefact rather than a real pattern. None of that changes the order of magnitude, and none of it is what breaks the scenario.

    The Timetable

    Clinical teaching starts at seven in the morning

    This is the part of the scenario that cannot be rescued, and it has nothing to do with money.

    Nursing students on a day-shift clinical placement take handover on the ward at 07:00. They are expected there at about 06:45. An instructor supervising them arrives before that. This is not a detail of one hospital’s policy — it is how bedside clinical education works, because it follows the shift.

    ALTO has published no timetable at all. The only public assumption about its service span is in the McGill financial analysis, which models departures between 6 am and 9 pm. Work backwards from a 06:45 ward start on that assumption:

    What the job requiresWhat the service offers
    06:45 — on the ward for handover
    06:15 — leave Union Station by transit
    06:10 — train arrives Toronto
    05:25 — train must leave Peterborough
    06:00 — earliest assumed departure

    On a 6 am train she reaches Union around 06:50 and a downtown hospital around 07:15 — a quarter of an hour after her students have taken handover without her.
    The first train of the day Leaves 35 minutes too late

    To teach a morning clinical placement, Nina drives — leaving Peterborough around five, exactly as she would today. The constraint the vignette says ALTO removes is the one thing ALTO doesn’t touch.

    One honest qualification. If Nina were teaching classroom or simulation-lab sessions rather than bedside clinical supervision, later start times are possible and this objection weakens considerably. The report describes a nurse with decades of experience in clinical practice, invited to help train the next generation — which in nursing education means supervision on a unit, at shift change.

    The Fare

    What the trip costs, and what the job pays

    ALTO discloses no fare, no average ticket price, and no revenue per passenger anywhere in Canada’s Moment. The only published basis for estimating one is McGill’s: a willingness-to-pay survey, with the financial analysis setting the standard fare at 1.2 times willingness to pay.

    For Peterborough–Toronto, willingness to pay is C$31 — the lowest single value in the entire matrix, lower than every other city pair on the corridor. Applying the published rule:

    Nina’s faresNina’s pay
    Round trip: $74–$89
    Two return trips a week: $149–$178
    A 26-week teaching year: $3,870–$4,620

    Before parking at the station, driving to it, or two TTC fares a day.
    An eight-hour clinical day at Ontario rates: $280–$440 gross
    Two days a week: $560–$880 gross

    Pay figures are from salary aggregators and are indicative only.
    Fare as a share of take-home pay Roughly one quarter to one half

    The vignette describes someone taking a part-time post to supplement her income. On the corridor’s own published fare basis, getting to the job would consume between a quarter and a half of what the job pays. For the person described, that is the difference between an offer worth accepting and one that isn’t.

    And it isn’t cheaper than driving

    Driving
    Fuel alone, 280 km round trip: about $36. Fuel plus wear at roughly 25¢/km: about $70. Hospital-district parking: $15–$25. All in: $50–$95.
    ALTO
    Fare $74–$89, plus station parking and two TTC fares. All in: $85–$110.

    The train costs more than the car for this journey, arrives too late for the shift, and still requires the car to reach the station.

    The Journey

    Door to door, the saving is ten to thirty minutes

    The corridor headline — journey times cut in half — is calculated on long city pairs, where the train’s cruising speed dominates the trip. Peterborough to Toronto is about 140 kilometres. On a leg that short, getting to and from the stations dominates instead.

    Driving todayWith ALTO
    Peterborough to a downtown Toronto hospital, door to door:

    1 hour 45 minutes to 2 hours 30, depending on the 401.
    Drive to station 15–25 min · park, walk, wait 15–20 min · train 40–50 min · Union to hospital 20–30 min

    1 hour 30 minutes to 2 hours 05
    Door-to-door saving About 10 to 30 minutes each way

    Real, but not a transformation — and it disappears entirely if she has to drive anyway to make a seven o’clock start.

    Station siting makes it worse rather than better. ALTO’s own materials point to a site outside Peterborough’s built-up area, and the McGill survey found that Peterborough respondents themselves prefer a car-accessible station away from downtown, near a highway or park-and-ride. Wherever it lands, Nina keeps the car. (Siting is unresolved; a downtown station would improve these timings.)

    The Pricing

    Revenue management points straight at her

    ALTO’s published FAQ states that the project plans to use revenue management — as most airlines and high-speed operators do — to match fares with demand and available seats, with the objective of maximising seat occupancy.

    Yield management prices Nina highest

    Airline-style pricing charges the most for peak, predictable, inflexible travel. Nina travels at peak, on fixed days, to a timetable set by a teaching term she cannot move. She is not the traveller who gets the cheap seat — she is the traveller the cheap seat is withheld from.

    Her city pair is the least valuable on the corridor

    An operator facing a $31 willingness to pay on a short leg and $110 on Toronto–Québec City has an obvious commercial answer, and it is not more Peterborough stops. The scenario depends on a pricing decision that runs against the operator’s stated pricing strategy.

    The Circle

    Nina is already inside the forecast she is meant to justify

    The vignette is offered as an illustration of what high-speed rail makes possible — a benefit the project would create. But the 181 figure comes from asking Peterborough residents how often they would use high-speed rail if it existed.

    The model has already counted the Ninas. There are 181 of them a day, in every trip purpose combined: commuters, visitors, shoppers, students, patients, people going to appointments, people going to the airport, tourists. The illustration does not add to the forecast. It is a description of one person inside it.

    That matters for how the vignette should be read. It is not evidence of demand. It is a portrait of a member of a demand estimate that the same body of research puts at a fifth of one trainload.

    In Fairness

    What this brief is not saying

    The vignette isn’t dishonest

    People like Nina existA faster, more reliable connection would genuinely help some of them. The objection is to the weight a single illustration is asked to carry in an economic case.
    A Peterborough station may be justified on other groundsRegional equity, development around the station, network structure. This brief addresses only whether this scenario demonstrates what it is offered to demonstrate.
    The report is candid elsewhereIts ridership figures are labelled “up to,” and its own tables are headed “upper estimate.” The vignette is where those qualifiers stop applying.

    And the limits of what we can show

    The fares are McGill’s, not ALTO’sALTO has published no fare. If its eventual fare is lower, the affordability arithmetic changes — and nobody can check, because the number does not exist.
    The 6 am service span is an assumptionIt is McGill’s modelling assumption, not an ALTO commitment. ALTO has published no timetable, so the clock test uses the only published assumption available.
    The pay range is indicativeOntario clinical instructor rates here come from salary aggregators and should be replaced with a collective-agreement figure.
    What Would Settle It

    Four questions

    1. What time does the first train leave Peterborough?

    Any service beginning at 6 am cannot deliver anyone to a seven o’clock shift change anywhere in Toronto. Hospitals, factories and construction sites all start before the corridor does.

    2. How many of the 72 daily trains stop at Peterborough?

    The figure given to Peterborough council was a corridor total. The station’s actual frequency has never been published.

    3. What is the fare?

    The scenario’s plausibility rests entirely on a number that appears nowhere in the 83 pages that contain the scenario.

    4. Was this scenario tested against the ridership model, or written independently of it?

    The corridor’s own survey data puts Nina’s entire market — Peterborough to Toronto, all purposes — at 181 people a day.

    Sources

    Primary documents

    1.
    ALTO, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026, 83 pp. The Nina vignette appears at p. 17 under “What changes for Canadians.” Ridership and route described in the executive summary; benefit tables at pp. 60 and 72. altotrain.ca (PDF)
    2.
    Zhang, B., Negm, H., & El-Geneidy, A. (2026). High-Speed Rail in Canada: Insights from a corridorwide survey and a financial analysis. Transportation Research at McGill, McGill University. Daily boardings at section I.3; willingness to pay at section I.4; fare rule, service span and fleet assumptions at section II. tram.mcgill.ca (PDF)
    3.
    ALTO, “Frequently Asked Questions,” altotrain.ca — statement of intent to use revenue management to match fares with demand and available seats. altotrain.ca
    4.
    Deny Sullivan, “High Speed Rail: Ridership forecasting,” 30 April 2026 — secondary commentary that first drew attention to the Peterborough rows and the directional asymmetry in the McGill boarding table. Substack
    5.
    Peterborough City Council resolution coverage, kawarthaNOW, 24 March 2026 — source of the “up to 72 trains per day” figure presented to council. kawarthanow.com
  • Would an Alto stop help kingston

    Would an ALTO Stop Help Kingston?

    Kingston has one of the busiest stations on the network. The question that matters is not whether it gets a stop, but whether a stop would leave more people riding the train, or fewer.

    ⚠ What has been said, and what has not been published

    On 22 July 2026 ALTO’s chief executive, Martin Imbleau, told CBC Radio’s Ottawa Morning that Kingston will probably get a station, and that most ALTO trains would pass through without stopping.1 Neither the timetable nor the location of the station has been published.

    Those two missing facts are exactly the ones that decide the outcome. This brief therefore tests the range: today’s railway, a faster conventional railway using the existing station, and ALTO with a station either inside the city or a twenty‑seven‑minute drive north of it, at normal fares and at fares 25 per cent higher. Every number that goes into the model is listed, so any of them can be argued with.

    The short answer

    Of the options tested, only one leaves Kingston with more rail trips than it has today: a faster conventional railway serving the existing station, at about 12 per cent more. The best ALTO case — a station inside the city, at normal fares — roughly matches today. Every other ALTO case comes out below today’s service, by 8 to 17 per cent.

    The reason is simple. Speed is only one part of what makes a train trip worth taking. ALTO’s faster run to Toronto is worth about 10 per cent more trips on its own. But cutting the number of daily stops from eighteen to eight gives that back. Charging 25 per cent more gives it back again. Moving the station twenty‑seven minutes north of the city costs another 6 to 8 points on top.

    Running more trains cannot rescue it by itself. Even at eighteen stops a day, matching what Kingston has now, an out‑of‑town station at a premium fare still comes out around 9 per cent below today. And about 8 per cent of Kingston’s trips — Belleville, Brockville, Cobourg, Napanee, Oshawa — have no ALTO equivalent at any frequency, because high‑speed trains do not stop at those places.

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    Kingston’s ALTO Ridership Analysis — Full Brief (PDF)
    Full method, all parameters, sensitivity ranges and break‑even tables
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    The Comparison

    Six versions of Kingston’s railway

    The table below is the whole brief in one place. The first row is what Kingston has today. The second is a faster conventional railway from the same station. The last four are ALTO, differing only in where the station sits and what the ticket costs.

    +12%
    faster conventional railway, existing station, same number of trains, normal fares
    the only option that grows ridership
    0%
    best ALTO case: station in town, normal fares, eight stops a day
    matches today, does not beat it
    −17%
    ALTO station 27 minutes north, eight stops a day, fares 25% higher
    central case for an out‑of‑town station

    Table 1 · Headline comparison

    OptionTo TorontoStops a dayFare premiumAnnual tripsChange
    Today’s service135 min18none450,000—
    Faster conventional railway, existing station95 min18none502,000+12%
    ALTO, station in town80 min8none449,0000%
    ALTO, station in town80 min8+25%403,000−10%
    ALTO, 27 min north80 min8none416,000−8%
    ALTO, 27 min north80 min8+25%376,000−17%

    All four ALTO rows assume eight stops a day and that today’s conventional service is withdrawn. They differ only in where the station is and what the ticket costs. No fare structure for intermediate stations has been published, so both possibilities are shown rather than assumed. The faster conventional railway is the 240 km/h new‑build line proposed under the High Performance Rail framework, serving the existing station.

    Starting Point

    Why Kingston already rides the train

    Kingston’s place among the busiest stations on the network gets cited as the reason it should have a high‑speed stop. But what produces that ridership decides whether a different kind of station would reproduce it. Four things do most of the work, and a high‑speed alignment north of the city removes two of them.

    It gets two sets of trains, not one

    Kingston sits halfway along the Toronto–Montréal mainline, and the Toronto–Ottawa trains use the same track as far as Brockville. So Kingston collects two timetables instead of one, and ends up with a level of service beaten only by the three biggest cities on the corridor. Frequency matters to ridership on its own, quite apart from speed: in intercity rail, a 10 per cent increase in service typically brings 4 to 7 per cent more trips.

    The station serves a region, not a city

    Napanee, Gananoque, Amherstview and the western Thousand Islands have no intercity rail of their own, so people drive to Kingston to catch the train. Ridership credited to a city of 132,485 is actually generated by an area several times larger; the Kingston census metropolitan area is 172,546.6

    The population is unusually inclined to take the train

    Some thirty‑nine thousand post‑secondary students study in a city of 132,485: Queen’s enrols 32,585, St. Lawrence College about 4,000 full‑time equivalents at its Kingston campus, and the Royal Military College of Canada 2,418.5 That is about twenty‑nine students for every hundred residents — against roughly twenty‑three in Sherbrooke and twenty‑one in Guelph, the two Canadian cities most often set beside Kingston on this measure.7 Many come from the Toronto and Ottawa regions and travel without a car. Kingston also has a large retired population, for whom avoiding the highway is the point of the trip, and an unusually high share of hospital, university, military and public‑sector jobs where travel is expensed and defaults to rail.

    But that ridership is hard to charge a premium for

    This travel is not spread evenly. It piles up at term boundaries, Thursday and Sunday afternoons, reading weeks and holidays, and it creates a matching flow of families travelling to Kingston. These are the travellers most sensitive to how often trains run and how far the station is from where they are going, and the least able to just drive instead. They are also the least profitable: peaked, price‑sensitive, and largely outside the weekday business hours a high‑speed operation’s revenue depends on.

    Two things worth being clear about

    The ridership figure itself is not published. Kingston’s standing as one of the busiest stations rests on statements by the operator and the Minister, not on released station‑level data. That is the first item on the list of things that should be published, at the end of this brief.

    Existing demand is not the same as new demand. Busy today proves Kingston already travels by train. It does not prove that a different station would generate additional trips. Only new trips add ridership to the corridor.

    There is also no flight from Kingston to Toronto. Elsewhere, high‑speed rail wins its premium passengers off aircraft. In Kingston those passengers are already on the train, so there is nobody to convert. Extra trips can only come out of cars, or be created from nothing.

    Both of the things that built Kingston’s ridership — frequent trains, and a station within the city, roughly ten minutes from the core and the university — are the two things a high‑speed alignment north of the city takes away. That is what the model is built to test.

    Method

    How the numbers were worked out

    Every trip is priced in minutes. Add up the time on the train, the time getting to and from the station at each end, the waiting created by having fewer trains, and the fare converted into minutes using what an hour is worth to that kind of traveller. Time spent driving to a station or standing on a platform counts for more than time sitting on a moving train, because people dislike it more. Journeys that involve changing trains carry an allowance for the change. That matters for one market in particular: ALTO reaches Montréal from Kingston by way of Ottawa, so some of those journeys involve a change, where a direct lakeshore railway does not.

    That total is the real cost of the trip. If it goes up, fewer people travel. If it goes down, more do. The response used here is roughly one for one: make the total 10 per cent better and you get about 10 per cent more trips.

    Travellers are split into four destinations and four types, each divided by whether they have a car available: thirty‑two groups, each worked out separately and then added up. That matters because a student without a car and an expensed public‑sector traveller react to a distant station in completely different ways.

    Table 2 · Everything the model assumes

    InputValue used
    Trips today450,000 a year through the station (tested from 400,000 to 550,000)
    Where people goToronto 58%, Ottawa 22%, Montréal 12%, other corridor stations 8%
    Who travelsStudents 30%, seniors and leisure 25%, public sector 20%, other 25%
    Share without a carStudents 85%, seniors and leisure 50%, public sector 15%, other 20%
    Worth of an hour$14, $20, $48 and $24 respectively, in the same order
    Time on the trainToday 135 / 120 / 160 min; ALTO 80 / 45 / 105 min (Toronto / Ottawa / Montréal)
    Getting to the stationExisting station 10 min by car, 20 by transit; ALTO 27 by car, 35 by shuttle
    How that time is weighted1.5 times if a car is available, 2.0 times if not
    WaitingHalf the gap between trains, weighted at 0.5, across a fifteen‑hour day
    ALTO fare premium25% in the central case; 0% and 40% also tested
    Sensitivity of demandOne for one in the central case (tested from 0.8 to 1.2)

    Far‑end access time is held identical in every scenario, which is a conservative choice: it gives ALTO the benefit of the doubt at the Toronto and Ottawa ends.

    Two possible futures for today’s trains

    Every service level is tested twice, because the answer depends less on ALTO than on what happens to the service Kingston already has.

    Replacement

    ALTO becomes Kingston’s rail service to Toronto, Ottawa and Montréal, and conventional service is withdrawn or cut below a useful level. Trips to Belleville, Brockville, Cobourg, Napanee and Oshawa lose their train altogether.

    Both together

    Today’s service keeps running at present frequency and ALTO is added on top. Travellers pick whichever is cheaper in total, and only the improvement over the better of the two creates new trips.

    What is assumed rather than known

    Four inputs are estimates, not published data: the number of trips today, where those trips go, ALTO’s journey times (the alignment for this stretch has not been published), and where the station would be. All four appear on the list at the end of this brief. The model also applies a constant response to a very large change in trip cost, which is at the outer edge of where this method behaves well. The direction of the results is solid. The exact sizes are indicative.

    Result One

    Where the speed gain goes

    Start with today’s service and change one thing at a time. This is the clearest way to see why a faster train can still end up with fewer passengers.

    Table 3 · One change at a time

    StepAnnual tripsChangeEffect of this step
    Today’s service, as it runs450,000——
    Cut the Toronto run to 80 minutes, change nothing else496,000+10%+10 pts
    Cut stops from 18 a day to 8449,0000%−10 pts
    Add a 25 per cent fare premium403,000−10%−10 pts
    Move the station 27 minutes north376,000−17%−6 pts

    The second row is the entire value of high‑speed running time at Kingston: about 10 per cent. Each of the three things that come with it takes back as much or more. This calculation already leaves out trips to other corridor stations, which a high‑speed line cannot serve at any frequency.

    Result Two

    More trains cannot fix it on its own

    Suppose the number of stops is the thing that gets negotiated. Hold the station twenty‑seven minutes north and the fare 25 per cent higher, and vary how often ALTO calls.

    Table 4 · ALTO at a station 27 minutes north

    Stops a dayAnnual tripsChangeRangeIf today’s trains stay
    6359,000−20%−17% to −24%0%
    8376,000−17%−13% to −21%0%
    10387,000−14%−10% to −18%+0.2%
    18408,000−9%−4% to −14%+1.6%
    12 (six each way)394,000−12%−9% to −17%+0.5%
    16 (eight each way)404,000−10%−6% to −15%+1.3%
    20 (ten each way)411,000−9%−3% to −14%+1.9%

    The range covers the whole plausible span of the model’s assumptions, at a 25 per cent fare premium. The bottom three rows read six, eight and ten as stops each way, which is the most generous reading available. It improves the result without changing the sign. The last column is the “both together” case, where today’s service survives: ALTO then adds almost nothing, because travellers only switch when it is genuinely better for them.

    The fare premium matters more than the timetable

    Table 5 · What moves the answer

    Stops a dayNormal faresFares +25%Fares +40%Station 25 min outStation 45 min out
    6−12%−20%−24%−17%−23%
    8−8%−17%−21%−13%−20%
    10−5%−14%−19%−10%−17%

    The last two columns hold the fare premium at 25 per cent and vary the drive from the station to downtown; the central case is 27 minutes. Notice that going from normal fares to a 25 per cent premium costs more than doubling the distance to the station.

    How many trains would it actually take?

    The more useful question is what it would take for an out‑of‑town ALTO station to be no worse for Kingston than the service it already has. At normal fares the answer is nine stops a day for everyone. At a 25 per cent premium, the answer falls apart.

    Table 6 · Daily stops needed just to match today, Toronto trips

    Who is travellingAt normal faresAt a 25% premium
    Public sector and institutional (expensed)913
    Other business and leisure927
    Seniors, leisure, visiting family948
    Students and young adults9no number works

    Forty‑eight stops a day is a train every twenty minutes all day. For students, no frequency at all makes up for a distant station plus a premium ticket, because their time is worth less than the fare increase costs them.

    One case runs the other way and should be said plainly: expensed public‑sector travel between Kingston and Ottawa is better off under ALTO in every scenario tested, because today’s service on that pair is slow and indirect. It is a real gain, and it is a small share of the total.

    Under the friendliest assumptions available — normal fares, a station twenty‑five minutes out, today’s trains kept running alongside, ten stops a day — the best figure the model will produce for an out‑of‑town Kingston station is about +8 per cent. Getting there means giving up the premium pricing the revenue case depends on everywhere else.

    Result Three

    What if you just made today’s trains faster?

    Now reverse the test. Keep the existing station, keep eighteen stops a day, keep normal fares, and change nothing but speed on the existing route.

    Table 7 · Speed alone, from the existing station

    Toronto journey timeTime savedAnnual tripsChange
    135 min, as it runs today—450,000—
    118 min, reliable 160 to 177 km/h13%471,000+4.6%
    95 min, a 240 km/h conventional railway30%502,000+11.6%
    80 min, upper bound for this station41%525,000+16.6%

    The last row applies high‑speed running time to the existing station. It is there to separate speed from station location, frequency and fare, not as a proposal.

    The comparison that matters

    Eighty minutes to Toronto from the existing station, eighteen stops a day, normal fares: about +17 per cent. The same eighty minutes from a station twenty‑seven minutes out of town, eight stops a day, fares 25 per cent higher: about −17 per cent.

    The time on the train is identical. The two outcomes are thirty‑four points apart, and every one of those points is station location, frequency and fare.

    Speed gives diminishing returns

    Roughly speaking, every 1 per cent cut in journey time buys about 0.4 per cent more trips. A 30 per cent time saving buys about 12 per cent more passengers. For most of Kingston’s travellers, time on the train is a minority of what the trip really costs them — fare, getting to the station and waiting make up the rest, and speed does nothing about any of those. The gain concentrates where an hour is worth most: on a 95‑minute conventional railway, public‑sector travel grows about 17 per cent, business and leisure 13, seniors and leisure 12, students 10.

    A conservative figure, and a warning

    These figures are cautious. The response to journey time implied here is weaker than the rail literature usually finds, because the fare term in the calculation dampens it. Using a more standard figure, the same 30 per cent time saving would give about +22 per cent rather than +12. Table 7 should be read as a floor, with the 95‑minute case plausibly worth anywhere from +10 to +25 per cent. The comparisons earlier in the brief are unaffected, because they compare like with like.

    The warning is that fares erode the gain fast in either direction. Raising tickets 10 per cent to help pay for an upgrade cuts the benefit from about +12 per cent to about +7 — two‑fifths of the speed gain eaten by a 10 per cent fare rise. That is the same mechanism that sinks the high‑speed cases, working here on the alternative. It is an argument for funding an upgrade from capital rather than from the farebox.

    What It Means

    A stop is not the same as service

    Three things set whether Kingston gains or loses, and speed is not one of them: how far the station is from where people are actually going, what the ticket costs, and whether today’s trains survive. Frequency cannot rescue the result on its own. At eighteen stops a day, matching today, an out‑of‑town station at a premium fare still comes out around 9 per cent down.

    A public debate about whether Kingston gets a station, and how many trains stop there, is a debate about the wrong variables.

    The two things ALTO has said do not fit together

    A station justified by strong ridership, but served by a minority of trains, has its timetable set by the express service rather than by the demand used to justify it. Table 6 shows why that is not a workable compromise: the frequency needed to make the station work at a premium fare is far above what an express pattern tolerates. The usual international answer is two tiers, express and semi‑fast, which needs somewhere for fast trains to overtake at the intermediate station. Whether the cost estimate includes that overtaking capacity is a question with two possible answers, and both are informative.

    A conventional railway does better here

    A new conventional railway built for 240 km/h, running typically at 200, serves Kingston without moving the station, without the fare premium high‑speed operation needs, and without cutting the number of trains that stop. It captures a smaller share of the theoretical time saving and a larger share of the ridership. That is the trade the tables above quantify.

    What Would Change the Answer

    Three commitments, and four documents

    None of this is a prediction that a Kingston station must fail. The results turn on assumptions, and those assumptions are all things the project could settle.

    Would help
    A station much closer to the core, or a frequent connection to it that is committed and timed to the trains rather than hoped for.
    Would help most
    Normal fares on Kingston journeys. Table 6 shows this is the single decisive variable. A premium fare is what makes the arithmetic unrecoverable for students, seniors and leisure travellers.
    Would help
    A binding commitment that service on the existing line is maintained, which turns the replacement case into the both‑together case, plus a published timetable, so frequency becomes a fact instead of an assumption.

    Four things that should be published

    Before any of these figures are treated as more than an order of magnitude, four inputs should be replaced with real data:

    Not published
    Station‑level boardings and destinations. This alone would settle both the number of trips today and where they go. A matter for the operator.
    Not published
    The calling pattern assumed for the Toronto–Ottawa segment — how many trains actually stop, and where.
    Not published
    The fare structure for intermediate stations. On the evidence above, this matters more than anything else on the list.
    Not published
    The station location, with the assumed travel time from it to downtown Kingston.

    The first sits with the operator. The other three sit with the project and its joint project office, whose report and business case remain unpublished.

    The finding that matters

    It is not that a Kingston station would fail. It is that the service Kingston already has is the benchmark the project has never been asked to beat — and on the assumptions set out here, it does not beat it.

    How to read the numbers on this page

    Every number here other than the two quoted statements is output from our own model, built on the parameters listed in the full brief. Those parameters are assumptions, not measurements, and the four listed above as needing publication are the ones that move the result. The model is set out so that any parameter can be replaced and the arithmetic re-run: the direction of the findings holds across the ranges tested, the exact magnitudes are indicative.

    Where ALTO has not published something — a timetable, a station location, a fare — we say so rather than inferring it, and we make no claim about why it has not been published.

    Sources
    1.
    CBC News, “Kingston probably getting high-speed rail stop, says Alto CEO,” 22 July 2026 — interview with Martin Imbleau on CBC Radio’s Ottawa Morning. He says Kingston will probably receive a station, citing ridership, and that most ALTO trains would pass through without stopping, along with Laval and Trois-Rivières, to preserve express service between the larger cities. cbc.ca
    2.
    City of Kingston, Council Meeting Minutes 2026-06, 17 February 2026, Resolution 2026-73, carried as amended 9–2 — support for a southern route contingent on Highway 401 corridor development and on a stop being added in Kingston, as close to the urban core as possible. Examined in the companion brief Which Trains Stop in Kingston?
    3.
    Elasticity ranges: intercity frequency elasticities of +0.4 to +0.7 and journey-time elasticities of −0.6 to −0.9 are the conventional ranges in the rail demand literature, used here as reference values rather than as findings of this brief. The generalised-cost elasticity of −1.0 central, banded −0.8 to −1.2, is our own choice and is tested across that band throughout.
    4.
    Current journey times are as timetabled by VIA Rail. ALTO journey times are our assumption, since no alignment has been published for the Toronto–Ottawa segment.
    5.
    Queen’s University, 2025–26 Enrolment Report, as at 1 November 2025 — 28,561 full-time students, plus 1,704 part-time undergraduate, 1,389 part-time graduate and 931 online undergraduate, giving 32,585 in total. St. Lawrence College reports about 4,000 full-time equivalents at its Kingston campus. Royal Military College of Canada: 1,209 full-time and 587 part-time undergraduate, 276 full-time and 346 part-time graduate students, giving 2,418 in total. RMC’s part-time and graduate enrolment includes serving officers studying at a distance, so it is counted here on the same all-enrolment basis as Queen’s rather than as a resident population; on full-time enrolment alone the city total is about 38,000, and the ratio is about twenty-nine per hundred either way. macleans.ca queensu.ca (PDF)
    6.
    Statistics Canada, 2021 Census of Population — City of Kingston (census subdivision) 132,485; Kingston census metropolitan area 172,546, comprising the City of Kingston, South Frontenac, Frontenac Islands and Loyalist Township. statcan.gc.ca
    7.
    Comparators, on the same all-institutions basis where the data allow. Sherbrooke: about 40,000 students across eight institutions in a city of 172,950, roughly twenty-three per hundred residents. Guelph: 29,617 full-time equivalents at the University of Guelph in a city of 143,740, roughly twenty-one per hundred — a figure that excludes the Conestoga College campus and is therefore a floor. ocul.on.ca
    Download Full Brief
    Kingston’s ALTO Ridership Analysis (PDF)
    Full method, all thirty‑two market segments, sensitivity bands and break‑even calculations
    Download PDF
  • Urban concerns

    Three hours, downtown to downtown?

    It sounds wonderful — a fast train at French or Japanese speeds, the airport hassle gone. The plan being sold isn’t that plan.

    ⚠ What ALTO Is Selling, And What Has Actually Been Promised

    ALTO is marketed as a three-hour, downtown-to-downtown high-speed train between Toronto and Montréal, equivalent to French TGV or Japanese Shinkansen service. The federal government has approved a $3.9 billion design phase, with construction projected at $60–90 billion over twelve to fourteen years and operating speeds of up to 300 km/h. Wikipedia   ALTO consultation

    What is not in the marketing: the “three hours” is train-in-motion time only; none of the three terminus cities has a contractually committed downtown station; ALTO has not published a single projected fare; and the corridor is being graded for the entire 1,000 km through Class 1 and 2 agricultural land that took millennia to form.

    Critical Finding

    ALTO has obvious urban appeal: civilised, fast, no airport, no security line. The case against it is not ideological and is not rural nostalgia. It is structural. With realistic station locations, door-to-door times grow by 60–90 minutes — Toronto–Montréal becomes essentially identical to flying, and Toronto–Québec City becomes slower. ALTO’s own internal Benefit-Cost Ratio is approximately 0.4, well below the viability threshold of 1.0. The CEO has publicly committed that the service will operate without government subsidy, which is mathematically incompatible with fares comparable to subsidised European or Japanese services.

    The alternative is High Performance Rail on existing alignments — dedicated passenger track at 200 km/h alongside the 401 highway or on the CN Kingston Subdivision. Under $10 billion. Operational in five to seven years. Real downtown stations preserved. Serves all eleven existing corridor communities rather than bypassing them. The federal government has never produced a public evaluation of this option.

    Download One-Pager
    Three Hours, Downtown to Downtown? — Urban Reader’s Brief (PDF)
    Single-page summary for distribution to MPs, municipal councils, and constituents in Toronto, Ottawa, Montréal, and Québec City
    Download PDF
    The Time

    The “three hours” is the train, not your trip

    0 of 3
    terminus cities with a contractually committed downtown station
    Toronto, Montréal, Québec City
    10+ km
    Mount Royal tunnel required for direct Montréal Gare Centrale access
    McGill engineering analysis
    60–90 min
    added door-to-door time once realistic station locations and the Montréal reversal are accounted for
    CRI analysis

    ALTO’s published travel times — the “three hours” from Toronto to Montréal, the “under two hours” from Toronto to Ottawa — are train-in-motion only. They exclude getting to the station, through it, and from the terminus to your actual destination. The marketed times assume true downtown stations at every end. None has been contractually committed.

    In April 2026, ALTO CEO Martin Imbleau publicly conceded that Toronto’s first station will be a suburb — the downtown station, if it is built at all, would come in a later phase. Even the eventual “downtown” candidate, East Harbour, sits approximately 3 km east of Union Station. Montréal’s downtown station depends on a 10+ km tunnel under Mount Royal at over a billion dollars per kilometre (McGill engineering estimate); the P3 partner has every incentive to shorten or omit the tunnel. Québec City favours suburban Sainte-Foy. Globe and Mail

    Toronto–Montréal at realistic times

    With a suburban Toronto first stop, the unavoidable Montréal reversal at Gare Centrale (the existing terminus configuration), and surface transit at both ends, door-to-door times grow by 60 to 90 minutes. Toronto–Montréal becomes essentially identical to flying, point to point. Toronto–Québec City becomes 45 minutes slower than flying. The civilised, no-airport advantage is the marketing’s strongest emotional claim — and the part that least survives realistic stations.

    The Geography

    We’re not France or Japan. The geography isn’t comparable.

    1,000+ km
    ALTO corridor length, three meaningful destinations
    Toronto, Montréal, Québec City
    465 km
    TGV Paris–Lyon, the canonical HSR success
    SNCF Voyageurs
    515 km
    Tokaido Shinkansen, four metro areas of 5M+ each
    JR Central

    The TGV connects Paris and Lyon — two of Europe’s largest cities — in 465 km. The Tokaido Shinkansen connects four metropolitan areas of five million people or more in 515 km. These are short, dense corridors with multiple major hubs. They are the cases where high-speed rail demonstrably outperforms air and conventional rail in both ridership and economics.

    The ALTO corridor is 1,000 kilometres or more between only three destinations with meaningful ridership demand. The intermediate stops — Peterborough, Laval, Trois-Rivières — are too small to sustain frequent HSR service in their own right. Ontario’s own 2016 high-speed rail business case, prepared for the more densely populated Toronto–Windsor corridor, found explicitly that “speeds of up to 300 km/h do not deliver a significant increase in benefits” over 250 km/h. The geography of southern Ontario and Quebec does not deliver the conditions that make HSR work elsewhere.

    The federal government’s own number

    ALTO’s internal Benefit-Cost Ratio is approximately 0.4. The viability threshold for federal infrastructure investment is 1.0. A BCR below 1.0 means the project’s costs exceed its measurable benefits, even on the project’s own assumptions. The federal government has not publicly disputed the figure. It has proceeded with the project regardless.

    The Price

    ALTO won’t tell you what a ticket will cost. Here’s why.

    $0
    government operating subsidy committed by ALTO
    Imbleau, public statements
    $200–400
    typical Acela fare in Canadian dollars on the New York–Washington corridor
    Amtrak published fares
    $275+
    typical Eurostar London–Paris fare in Canadian dollars
    Eurostar published fares

    Four years into procurement, ALTO has not published a single projected fare. Its public FAQ says fares “cannot be set” until the route is finalised. At the same time, the CEO has publicly committed that the service will operate without any government subsidy. These two positions are mathematically incompatible with low fares. A $60–90 billion design-build-finance-operate-maintain project — private profit, debt service, and operating costs all recovered from the farebox — must price like one. ALTO FAQ

    International benchmarks are the closest available proxies. In Canadian dollars: Amtrak’s Acela on the Northeast Corridor typically prices between $200 and $400 one-way; Eurostar between London and Paris starts around $275 and rises sharply at peak times. Both services are operated on networks that receive substantial state support. ALTO is committing to the opposite: full-cost recovery from passengers. CRI analysis indicates ALTO fares are likely to run higher than these benchmarks rather than lower — most international HSR is state-subsidised; ALTO has committed not to be.

    The civilised, affordable train is not what is being built

    ALTO’s own published FAQ concedes the answer most plainly: “VIA Rail may remain the more economical option for travellers with time but tighter budgets.” The civilised, affordable, no-airport train urban Canadians imagine is a French- or Japanese-style public service operating under social-rate fare regulation. ALTO, as procured, is the opposite financial structure: a privately operated profit centre with no fare ceiling, expected to recover its full $60–90 billion capital cost from passengers.

    The Land

    The farmland we lose doesn’t come back. Your grocery bill does.

    ~5%
    share of Canada’s total land base classified as Class 1 or 2 agricultural soil
    Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
    60 m
    width of the fenced, level-crossing-free ALTO right-of-way
    ALTO published specifications
    1,000+ km
    of new greenfield corridor through the St. Lawrence Lowlands
    Network total length

    The proposed greenfield corridor crosses some of Canada’s most productive agricultural land — Class 1 and 2 soils in Eastern Ontario and the St. Lawrence Lowlands that took millennia to form. Canada has only about 5% of its land base in this top agricultural category. Once expropriated and graded for a 300 km/h alignment — fenced, unscalable three-metre security walls, no level crossings, severed fields, viaducts — it is no longer farmland. The loss is permanent and irreversible.

    ALTO’s chief executive has publicly estimated that the Ottawa–Montréal first segment alone will cross approximately 1,700 properties, including roughly 500 farms. The Toronto and Québec segments have not yet been quantified in equivalent terms, but the agricultural footprint of the full 1,000 km network is necessarily substantially larger. CBC News

    This is not a sentimental rural concern

    The food on grocery shelves and farmers’ market stalls along this corridor comes from this land. Less farmland nearby means higher prices and a longer, more fragile import chain — at the exact moment trade with the United States has become unreliable. The four major Canadian farm associations — OFA, UPA, CFA, and BFO — have unanimously called for a halt to the project to allow for independent agricultural impact assessment before route selection. The federal government has declined to do so.

    The Alternative

    High Performance Rail on existing corridors

    There is a credible alternative that delivers the substantive benefits ALTO is meant to provide — faster trains, more frequent service, real downtown access, intercity rail competitive with driving and flying — without the cost, the timeline, or the irreversible disruption. High Performance Rail: new dedicated passenger track at 200 km/h, alongside the 401 highway or on the existing CN Kingston Subdivision, integrated with VIA Rail’s existing fleet and stations. The federal government has commissioned twenty-eight studies into ALTO’s 300 km/h vision. None into this.

     ALTO HSR (Planned)HPR Alternative
    Top speed300 km/h dedicated200 km/h dedicated
    Toronto–Montréal, train only~3h projected~3.5h projected
    Toronto–Montréal, door-to-door~4h (suburban Toronto stop)~4h (existing downtown stations)
    Capital cost$60–90 billion (working assumption)Under $10 billion (CRI estimate)
    Years to operation12–14 years (full network)5–7 years
    InfrastructureNew 1,000 km greenfield corridorExisting 401 and CN Kingston Sub alignments
    Downtown stationsNone contractually committedPreserved at all existing VIA terminals
    Corridor communities served7-station network; bypasses major existing VIA stops including Belleville, Kingston, Brockville, CornwallAll eleven existing corridor communities preserved
    Rolling stockNew procurementVIA’s already-purchased Siemens Venture fleet
    VIA national networkCorridor cross-subsidy diverted to private operatorNational network revenue preserved

    Premier Doug Ford has stated his preference for the 401 alignment over the ALTO greenfield route. The Eastern Ontario Wardens’ Caucus, representing 103 municipalities along the corridor, has supported it. The Coalition for Better Rail and the four major Canadian farm associations have all called for an independent comparative evaluation before construction commitments are made. The federal government has not produced one.

    The integrated-network case

    HPR is not a single project; it is a network upgrade. Existing VIA-owned segments (the Alexandria Subdivision between Ottawa and Coteau Junction; the Brockville and Smiths Falls subdivisions on the Toronto–Ottawa route) already deliver corridor-best reliability. Targeted new construction along the 401 and on the CN Kingston Subdivision addresses the remaining bottlenecks. The result is faster, more reliable service on every existing corridor route — not a single greenfield HSR line bypassing the network that exists.

    Take Action

    Three questions for the Minister of Transport

    Construction is scheduled to begin in 2029–30. The window in which the federal government can be compelled to produce, and publish, a credible comparative evaluation of HSR against HPR is the period before that date. Three questions, the kind that must be answered or visibly declined, are sufficient to make the case for that evaluation politically unavoidable.

    1. Release the comparative analysis between 200, 250, and 300 km/h options that preceded the rebrand from VIA HFR to ALTO. The decision to commit to 300 km/h dedicated HSR was not transparently justified against alternatives.
    2. Publish a public evaluation of dedicated passenger track along the 401 and the CN Kingston Subdivision before construction commitments are made — time, cost, disruption, and timeline side by side, with methodology disclosed.
    3. Refer ALTO to the Parliamentary Budget Officer for independent review of fiscal, ridership, and station-location assumptions before construction commitments are made.

    Also write to your Member of Parliament. The decision to refer the project to the Parliamentary Budget Officer for independent review can be initiated through any MP. Urban-riding MPs, in particular, have an interest in establishing whether the procurement that has been authorised will deliver the service their constituents have been told to expect.

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    Sources

    Primary documents and statements

    1.
    Alto Project, “Shaping the Canada of tomorrow with high-speed rail” consultation site — project scope, timeline, $60–90 billion cost range, 300 km/h speed, “reduce travel times by half” framing, FAQ on fares. altotrain.ca
    2.
    Alto (high-speed rail), Wikipedia — project history, $3.9 billion design phase, Cadence consortium, 12–14 year timeline, intermediate station list. en.wikipedia.org
    3.
    Bill Curry, “Ottawa train station isn’t ideal location for high-speed rail terminal, Transport Minister says,” The Globe and Mail, May 1, 2026 — carries the Imbleau / MacKinnon concession on station locations. theglobeandmail.com
    4.
    Benjamin Shingler, “Ottawa-Montreal chosen as 1st segment of promised high-speed rail line,” CBC News, December 12, 2025 — project costing context, MacKinnon and Imbleau statements. cbc.ca
    5.
    Mathieu Berger, “Montreal–Ottawa high-speed rail line could cross 1,700 properties, Alto predicts,” CBC News / Radio-Canada, May 5, 2026 — the 1,700 properties / 500 farms figure for the Ottawa–Montréal first segment. cbc.ca
    6.
    Ontario Ministry of Transportation, High Speed Rail Business Case Toronto–Windsor (2016) — on the 250 vs 300 km/h marginal benefit analysis. Referenced in subsequent federal procurement documentation.
    7.
    VIA Rail Canada — published schedules, fleet composition (Siemens Venture procurement), and corridor track ownership disclosed in annual reporting. viarail.ca
    8.
    Ontario Federation of Agriculture and l’Union des producteurs agricoles, joint press release, February 27, 2026; Canadian Federation of Agriculture AGM resolution, February 25, 2026; Beef Farmers of Ontario statement, March 3, 2026 — the four-association call for project halt and independent agricultural impact assessment. ofa.on.ca
    9.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative — supporting research notes on door-to-door travel time analysis, the High Performance Rail alternative framework, and the Benefit-Cost Ratio assessment are available at citizenresearch.ca. citizenresearch.ca