The Wrong Answer to the Right Question
The corridor genuinely needs better trains. What it got instead was a project that grew far beyond its original plan during procurement — and that can’t be fixed with tweaks, because its problems come from how it was chosen, not how it’s being built.
This chapter doesn’t dispute that the Windsor–Toronto–Ottawa–Montréal corridor needs better intercity rail. It does. What it disputes is ALTO — on grounds that are about method and evidence, not politics. We trace how a modest upgrade of a largely existing, disused rail corridor turned into a 300 km/h greenfield megaproject during a competitive bidding process, lay out four structural problems with the project as designed, and explain why none of it can be patched from the inside.
Much of this chapter draws on documents obtained through Access to Information requests — internal board and executive records, procurement files, and the independent fairness monitor’s final report — along with the Initiative’s own independent cost, ridership, and route-friction models. Specific releases are cited by their file numbers throughout. Some key documents, including the internal slide where the project’s scope was reframed, remain withheld.
The corridor genuinely needs better trains
The Windsor–Toronto–Ottawa–Montréal corridor connects Canada’s two largest metro areas and the national capital, and generates roughly half the country’s GDP. Despite that, intercity rail service on it is among the worst in any comparable wealthy country. VIA Rail shares track with CN freight, and freight trains get priority — when both need the same stretch of track, the passenger train waits in a siding. The result is slow, unreliable, and infrequent service.
Schedules are padded with hours of slack to absorb the delays that freight priority makes routine. The result isn’t competitive with driving or flying, and VIA can’t simply add more trains without bumping freight that has the contractual and legal right of way. So the question this report asks isn’t whether the corridor needs investment. It’s what kind of investment actually delivers it — at what cost, on what timeline, with what risk.
A modest upgrade grew into a much bigger, much pricier project — during the bidding process
ALTO’s cost and ambition problems didn’t come from ordinary planning drift. Records obtained through Access to Information show the project’s scope escalating in the middle of the bidding process itself — not through any public announcement or debate. Understanding how that happened explains why ALTO costs what it costs today.
One thing to be clear about up front: this is not a claim that the procurement was run improperly. BDO Canada, the independent fairness monitor appointed in 2022, concluded in its final report of May 2025 that the process it observed was carried out in a fair, open and transparent manner, and recorded no fairness concerns at any stage. The problem is not that rules were broken. It is that a process run properly within its own terms produced a project no one had put to Parliament.
What was on the table originally
The project ALTO replaced was VIA Rail’s High Frequency Rail (HFR) plan: a dedicated-track plan running at up to 177 km/h, largely reviving a long-disused rail right-of-way through Peterborough, Havelock, and Smiths Falls — a separate, more direct route away from the CN Kingston Subdivision VIA still shares with freight today — delivered incrementally, segment by segment. Its own 2021 business case projected about 13.5 million riders a year, at a capital cost roughly a quarter to a third of what ALTO now proposes. That’s the baseline the public was never shown as a discrete choice against what came next.
An open-ended bidding process
The request for proposals went out in October 2023 without a settled route — internal records show the route was still being debated at the executive and board level as late as March 2024, five months after bidding opened. It also asked every bidder for two designs: one topping out at 200 km/h, and a second, more ambitious one with high-speed sections. The process then included 36 structured private meetings between the government and each bidder over eight and a half months.
All three bidders proposed something bigger
A Privy Council Office briefing note of 20 February 2025, released under access to information, records that as the bidding progressed all three shortlisted consortia put forward designs more ambitious than the high-frequency plan — new routes on largely new land, above 250 km/h. The jump in scope did not come from any one bidder. The winning consortium, Cadence — CDPQ Infra, AtkinsRéalis, Keolis, SYSTRA Canada, SNCF Voyageurs, and Air Canada — brings substantial experience in dedicated, higher-speed rail: its members built Montréal’s REM and operate France’s TGV network. What has never been published is the comparison the bidding process was set up to produce. The same briefing note credits an unnamed third party with concluding those bigger proposals would deliver greater benefits, and that analysis has not appeared in any release to date.
Billions committed before the plan was finished
The government committed $3.9 billion in the 2024 Fall Economic Statement before the business case was finalized and before a route was chosen. The internal slide that appears to document the scope escalation — titled “Level of Ambition Supported by Business Case” — remains withheld from public release. Once the funding commitment was public, there was effectively no way back to the smaller project.
Selling the bigger, pricier version
With the scope already locked in, the government faced a communications problem: a project that started as “VIA HFR” was now something much closer to European-style high-speed rail. Internal records show “high frequency” tested poorly with Ontario audiences, while the name “Alto” tested well with 18–34-year-olds and worked bilingually. A national ad campaign promoting the project’s benefits ran while the business case and route documents were still being withheld from information requesters.
A project that entered the bidding process as a $9–12 billion, 177 km/h upgrade of a largely disused rail corridor came out the other side as a $60–90 billion (on the government’s own published figures — our independent estimate is materially higher), 300 km/h greenfield railway. That change in scope was never put to Parliament or the public as a choice. It emerged from the mechanics of the procurement itself.
Route, math, price tag, ridership — each one falls short
Having won a mandate for a much bigger project than the one that went to bid, ALTO’s proponents faced four separate problems: a route through sensitive land, a business case that has to clear a federal investment bar, a cost estimate that has to hold up, and a ridership forecast that has to be believable. None of the four holds up well under independent scrutiny.
2.3.1 · The route runs through some of the most sensitive land in the corridor
ALTO’s proposed new corridor crosses the Frontenac Arch Biosphere Reserve — a UNESCO-designated ecological corridor — the Napanee Limestone Plain, habitat for several species at risk, and Leda clay deposits south of Ottawa with known engineering hazards at high speed. This wasn’t a routing choice made for technical reasons; it reflects a decision to build an entirely new, 300 km/h-optimized corridor rather than follow existing, already-disturbed infrastructure. In our Participant Experience Survey, only 2% of respondents received direct notification about ALTO, and 88% found the information they did get inadequate. Our Community Friction Index — which scores corridors on land conflict, municipal pushback, expropriation exposure, ecological sensitivity, and public mobilisation — puts ALTO’s corridor at 54 out of 100, in the high-friction range. That matters financially, not just politically: in our statistical model, community friction is a significant predictor of cost overruns.
2.3.2 · The math doesn’t clear the government’s own bar
The only published economic appraisal of this corridor is the December 2021 business case for the predecessor project. It puts the benefit-cost ratio at about 0.13 over a 30-year period — about thirteen cents of measured value for every dollar spent — rising to about 0.4 once two newer and less established benefit categories are added in. A separate calculation in the same document shows a net loss of $21.1 billion in present-value terms. These are the government’s own figures. A ratio of 1.0 is simply break-even, the point where benefits equal costs. Our independent analysis, which grounds every input in how comparable projects have actually performed rather than project-specific projections, finds the ratio is likely far worse still.
| Scenario | What it shows |
|---|---|
| Published (Dec 2021 appraisal) 30-year evaluation period | Benefit-cost ratio ~0.13, or ~0.40 on the expanded basis |
| Initiative reference-class estimate Cost assumed: ~$143B | Benefit-cost ratio ~0.03–0.11 |
| Break-even | Benefit-cost ratio of 1.0 — benefits equal costs |
ALTO fails its own government’s investment test on the government’s own numbers. Checking those numbers against how similar projects have actually performed makes the gap worse, not better.
2.3.3 · The price tag is very likely too low
ALTO’s published cost range of $60–90 billion comes from an early-stage estimate — the type quantity surveyors flag as accurate only to within roughly ±50%, which makes it a planning figure, not a firm commitment. Our own cost model, built from 16 comparable rail megaprojects worldwide and calibrated to those projects’ actual outcomes, puts ALTO’s realistic central cost at around $143 billion, with a worst-case scenario approaching $200 billion or more once cold-climate engineering risk (frost-susceptible clay, karst terrain, freeze-thaw cycles at high-speed tolerances) is factored in.
2.3.4 · No independent study backs the ridership numbers
ALTO projects 24 million riders a year by 2055. No car-dependent North American corridor without existing high-speed rail has ever come close to that. Research on transportation megaprojects generally finds ridership forecasts overstate actual results by about 51% on average. Our own bottom-up model — built from corridor population, trip-making patterns, and VIA’s own ridership data, tested under three different fare and subsidy scenarios — puts 2055 ridership at 3.7 to 17.2 million, with 9.2 million as the central estimate. ALTO’s 24-million target sits 40% above even our upper bound.
| Source | 2055 ridership estimate |
|---|---|
| ALTO’s public target | 24 million |
| ALTO’s internal Corporate Plan figure (by 2059) | 17 million — about 30% below the public figure |
| McGill TRAM stated-preference study | ~19.7 million (year 50) |
| Munk School (U of T) model | 18–19 million (year 30) |
| Standard bias correction applied to ALTO’s own figure | 8.4 million |
| Initiative bottom-up model, central case | 9.2 million (range: 3.7–17.2 million) |
Every independent forecast built from a published methodology lands within or close to our range. ALTO’s own public target is the outlier — and it’s the one figure whose methodology has never been disclosed.
These aren’t execution problems — they’re the project’s founding choices
A different route doesn’t fix the business case. A revised ridership forecast doesn’t fix the cost problem. Tighter project management doesn’t undo the fact that funding was committed before the business case was finished, on a specification set by the bidding process rather than by public need. Four reasons why this can’t be corrected from within:
It’s been treated as one-of-a-kind, so nothing gets checked against it
ALTO’s documentation consistently describes the corridor as having no real comparator, which is exactly the reasoning pattern researchers have found opens the door to over-optimistic numbers. Every genuinely comparable project elsewhere in the world gets waved away as not relevant — leaving the project’s own estimate as the only “evidence” available.
The most optimistic version of the numbers is the one that won
In competitive funding processes, the most optimistic projection tends to win, because optimism produces a better-looking business case than realism does. A version built on our reference-class numbers — a benefit-cost ratio of 0.03–0.11 — could never have survived the funding decision. The optimistic version did, but only because the more realistic numbers weren’t available yet when the commitment was made.
The first segment is too weak to stand alone — which is exactly the point
The planned first segment, Ottawa–Montréal, is the corridor’s weakest market: roughly 98% of that travel is currently by road, and there’s barely any competing flight traffic for a speed premium to beat. It can’t pay for itself. Its economics only work if the network keeps extending toward Toronto — which locks in a public commitment to the rest of the corridor before its full price has ever been disclosed. Britain’s HS2 project shows how badly this can go if it doesn’t: two legs cancelled, leaving a line more than double its original budget serving less than half the original network. HS2 at least stranded into its strongest market. If ALTO’s later phases stall, it strands into its weakest.
The alternative is quietly being closed off while this proceeds
The report’s proposed alternative, HPR, would run alongside the existing Highway 401 corridor. Ontario’s ongoing 401 widening is already consuming the road margin that alternative would need, section by section. Every year ALTO’s planning phase continues is a year in which that door narrows further — a real cost that doesn’t show up in any of ALTO’s published figures.
What’s in the rest of this report
This chapter has traced one argument in four parts: the corridor’s need is real (2.1); a modest upgrade became a much bigger project during procurement (2.2); the resulting project has four structural problems (2.3); and none of it can be fixed by refinement (2.4). The chapters that follow set out the alternative.