Tag: track access

  • One line then the next

    One Line, Then the Next

    What Spain’s high-speed rail experience does, and does not, tell us about ALTO.

    The Commentary

    On October 18, 2026, Fareed Zakaria closed his CNN programme with a segment presenting Spain’s high-speed rail network as evidence that a democracy can still build large infrastructure. He credits Spain’s result to six conditions: building one line first, public finance, low construction cost, routing through less populated land, cross-party support and, since 2021, competition between train operators. He also notes two caveats: low use of parts of the network, and the cost of keeping it safe. CNN transcript

    Spain is the example most often offered for what a Toronto–Québec City line could become. This brief sets each of those conditions beside what has been published about ALTO.

    Key Finding

    On the sources set out here, ALTO shares few of the conditions the commentary identifies. Spain opened a single 471 km line in 1992 and did not open its second until 2003. ALTO’s published plan is a 1,000 km network, with property acquisition on its first segment, Ottawa–Montréal, reported to begin in late 2026 or early 2027.

    Spain’s average construction cost has been reported at €17.7 million per kilometre. ALTO’s $60–90 billion working assumption, divided by 1,000 km and converted at the October 1, 2026 rate, comes to about €38–56 million per kilometre, an Initiative calculation set out below with its limits. Spain financed its network publicly, with a substantial share from the European Union; ALTO is structured as a public-private partnership with no comparable outside funder.

    The Spanish case also carries findings that bear directly on ALTO: Spain’s fiscal authority and the European Court of Auditors have both found that much of the network carries few passengers relative to its cost, and the January 2026 derailment at Adamuz, on the original 1992 line, has made track maintenance a national question. Research also finds the network’s gains concentrated in the largest cities and at stations, with none of the studies reviewed finding that it reversed rural decline between them. These are findings about a network that was built cheaply. The comparison implies that a network costing two to three times as much per kilometre would face the same questions with a narrower margin.

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    One Line, Then the Next — Full Brief (PDF)
    Comparative brief with cost tables, the Spanish build sequence, and 32 numbered sources
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    The Numbers

    Three figures that frame the comparison

    11 years
    between Spain’s first high-speed line (1992) and its second (2003)
    ADIF / Renfe opening dates
    2.1–3.2×
    ALTO’s working-assumption cost per km against Spain’s reported average
    Initiative calculation
    46
    deaths reported at Adamuz, January 18, 2026, on Spain’s first line
    Final investigation report pending

    The commentary is a summary rather than a study, and its figures are round ones. Each is checked here against the underlying sources. Where the sources give a different number, the source figure is used: later reporting puts the Adamuz toll at 46, against the segment’s “more than 40,” and ADIF, Spain’s infrastructure manager, gives the network length as 3,973 km as of March 2026, consistent with the segment’s “nearly 2,500 miles.” ADIF Inspain

    Sequence

    One line at a time

    The Madrid–Seville line was inaugurated on April 14, 1992, timed to Seville’s Expo 92, with stops at Ciudad Real, Puertollano and Córdoba. The next new line, the first section of Madrid–Barcelona, did not open until 2003. The network then grew line by line over two decades. ADIF / Renfe via Wikipedia

    1992
    Madrid–Córdoba–Seville (471 km). The first line, opened for Expo 92.
    2003
    Madrid–Zaragoza–Lleida. First section of Madrid–Barcelona.
    2007–08
    Córdoba–Málaga; Madrid–Valladolid; Madrid–Barcelona completed (621 km).
    2010–13
    Madrid–Valencia, Albacete, Alicante; Barcelona–Figueres, linking to the French network.
    2015–22
    León, Zamora, Granada, Galicia, Burgos, Murcia, Badajoz. Madrid–Galicia took about 20 years of works; Plasencia–Badajoz was built for 200 km/h.

    Spain’s record is incremental, but it is not uniformly fast. Construction of the Basque high-speed line began in 2006 with completion forecast for 2016; completion is now forecast for 2027. Part of the network also consists of lines built or upgraded for 200–250 km/h rather than 300 km/h.

    ALTO’s sequence runs the other way. The federal government chose a high-speed option and selected Cadence in February 2025, and co-development began in March 2025. The plan is for a 1,000 km network. On the first segment, Ottawa–Montréal, ALTO’s chief executive has estimated about 1,700 property acquisitions, about 500 of them farms, with construction in 2029. Ridership has been forecast to 2084. Transport Canada Five Hundred Farms

    What this implies. Spain’s decision to build its second line was taken with years of operating evidence from the first. ALTO’s structure commits to a network before any segment has carried a passenger. On this sequence, the evidence the commentary credits with building support in Spain would not exist for ALTO until after the network’s scope, delivery model and land acquisition are settled.

    Cost

    Cost per kilometre, in the same units

    Four published sources give Spanish construction costs. They use different methods and periods, but each places Spain well below other European builders: an ADIF study gives €6–19 million per km by line; Spain’s fiscal authority, AIReF, €14.7 million (€15.3 million including stations); the engineering firm Ineco €17.7 million, against €45.5 million in other high-speed countries; and the European Court of Auditors €25 million as the average of ten audited lines across six member states. ADIF via Next City AIReF Ineco ECA

    ALTO’s published range is $60–90 billion in 2024 dollars, which its chief executive told a Senate committee is a class 5 internal working assumption rather than a cost estimate. Divided by 1,000 km and converted at 0.62526 euro per Canadian dollar (October 1, 2026), it compares as follows. Senate NFFN

    Initiative calculationLowHigh
    ALTO per route-km (C$)$60M$90M
    In euros at 0.62526€37.5M€56.3M
    Ratio to Spain, Ineco (€17.7M)2.1×3.2×
    Ratio to Spain incl. stations, AIReF (€15.3M)2.5×3.7×
    Ratio to ECA audited average (€25M)1.5×2.3×
    Ratio to other countries, Ineco (€45.5M)0.8×1.2×

    On this arithmetic, ALTO’s range is two to three times Spain’s average and close to the average Ineco reports for other high-speed countries. Spain is the low outlier; ALTO’s range is not an outlier against the international figures. The question the Spanish example raises is whether the conditions that let Spain build at half the international average are present in ALTO’s corridor.

    Limits. The Spanish figures cover construction from 1992 onward and are not stated in a single current price year; in 2024 prices they would be higher and the ratios lower. The published ALTO sources reviewed do not say what the $60–90 billion range includes, and the Spanish sources do not define their scope in the same terms. ALTO’s figure is a class 5 working assumption. The ratios indicate an order of magnitude, not a measured gap.

    Condition by Condition

    What made Spain work, and whether it transfers

    SpainALTO, as published
    Who pays. AIReF reported more than €55.89 billion spent on high-speed lines over 35 years, €14.09 billion (25.2%) of it from EU funds. As reported, Spain received 47.3% of the EU’s high-speed rail co-financing between 2000 and 2017.A public-private partnership that Transport Canada describes as among the largest the Government of Canada has sponsored. ALTO is funded by appropriations during development ($597 million in 2025–26). Canada has no outside funder in the EU’s position, and the terms of construction financing are not set out in the published sources reviewed.
    Transfers to ALTO:No
    Who builds. ADIF, the state infrastructure manager, has built line after line since the early 1990s, carrying its experience from one to the next.A first line, with no domestic high-speed construction programme behind it. The private partner develops and designs the project with ALTO during co-development. Cadence comprises CDPQ Infra, AtkinsRéalis, SYSTRA, Keolis, SNCF Voyageurs and Air Canada.
    Transfers to ALTO:No
    Where the line runs. Routing through less populated land lowered cost. Spain’s first line stopped at Ciudad Real and Puertollano, and the commentary describes the network as connecting urban and rural Spain.In Eastern Ontario, less populated land means farmland: about 500 farms on the first segment, under a statute that removes the standard attempt-to-purchase step and the public hearing on objections. Seven stations on 1,000 km, four of them in Québec; none between Peterborough and Ottawa.
    Transfers to ALTO:No
    Consensus. The commentary describes high-speed rail as a rare subject of cross-party agreement. The European Court of Auditors found, however, that decisions to build were often political and that cost-benefit analysis was not generally used.Consensus has not formed. OFA and UPA, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and Beef Farmers of Ontario have each called for the project to be halted or suspended pending assessment. In February 2026, senators asked whether a cost-benefit analysis had been done.
    Transfers to ALTO:Not yet
    Fares and competition. Ouigo entered in 2021 and Iryo in 2022. Spain’s competition authority reports Madrid–Barcelona tickets about €25 cheaper after liberalisation, fares on the main routes about 40% below 2019 in real terms, and 44.5 million passengers in 2025.One consortium develops and operates. The sources reviewed do not describe other operators competing on the new line. Air Canada, which operates air services between the corridor’s cities, is a consortium member.
    Transfers to ALTO:Not in published structure
    Demand. AIReF found Spain’s network the least used of the large networks, with socio-economic returns between zero and minimal in all four corridors it evaluated. Per-kilometre use was about a quarter of France’s.A forecast of 24 million trips a year by 2055 would exceed the Court’s nine-million benchmark for a successful line, and the corridor has about 18 million residents. Spain’s demand record is observed; ALTO’s is a forecast made before a cost estimate exists.
    Comparison:ALTO’s strongest point, unproven
    Upkeep

    Adamuz and the cost of keeping a line safe

    On January 18, 2026, an Iryo train derailed near Adamuz, Córdoba, on the Madrid–Seville line, and collided with an oncoming Renfe train; 46 deaths have been reported. The railway accident investigation commission, CIAF, stated in an interim note that its working hypothesis was a rail fracture at a weld that occurred before the Iryo train passed. Spain’s transport minister said the section had been renovated in May 2025. The train drivers’ union had written to ADIF in August 2025 about wear on that section, and the CIAF has reported inconsistencies in the documentation on the welds. As of the most recent reporting found, the final report has not been published. This brief makes no finding on the cause. CIAF Reuters

    The line involved was Spain’s first, 34 years old at the time. Maintenance is a lifecycle cost that grows as a network ages, and it is the cost least visible when a project is announced. The Initiative’s earlier operating-cost work estimates ALTO’s recurring lifecycle cost at about $1.8 billion a year at ALTO’s 3.5% discount rate. Cost of Running the Train

    Who Gains

    Who gains, and who does not

    Rural depopulation in Spain predates the high-speed network by most of a century. The share of Spaniards living in municipalities under 2,000 inhabitants fell from 27.5% in 1900 to 5.7% in 2021, though such places still make up 72.2% of all municipalities. Of 5,678 small municipalities studied, 56.9% lost population in both post-crisis periods examined, about 404,000 people combined, and the authors judge that around 3,300 face a bleak outlook. Gil-Alonso et al. 2023

    On 2018 INE data, 53% of Spain’s area holds about 5% of its population at under 12.5 inhabitants per km². elDiario.es The evidence reviewed does not show that high-speed rail caused this decline. The question it can answer is narrower: whether the network changed the pattern, and for whom.

    Gains concentrate at the ends

    On Madrid–Seville, population growth and land development concentrated “mostly towards the two largest cities.” Ciudad Real, within commuting range of Madrid, gained; Puertollano, one stop further, seldom did. Shen et al. 2015 Shen et al. 2016

    Stations matter

    Provinces with stops on Madrid–Barcelona saw on average about 2.4% higher output and 3.3% more firms. Across Spain, service has been associated with population growth overall, but not in every case: a required condition for development, not a guarantee of it. Carbo et al. 2019 Miralles i Garcia 2019

    The places in between

    The coverage gap is greatest for smaller, peripheral municipalities and those between lines, and strengthening links among the largest places could further isolate the smallest. Activity concentrates in the most developed nodes, and areas without a station can see service degradation. None of the studies reviewed finds that high-speed rail reversed rural decline between stations. Naranjo Gómez et al. 2020 Albalate & Bel 2026

    Local evidence from those places is mostly advocacy and press reporting. A users’ association reports Linares-Baeza station fell from 56 passenger trains a day before 1992 to 14. Soria, reported to be the only province the high-speed line crosses without a stop, has had no operating rail service since April 2025. In May 2025, farm unions in Sanabria, Zamora, protested a proposal to remove high-speed stops to shorten journeys to Vigo, citing depopulation and access to medical care. Each intermediate stop slows the trains for everyone travelling end to end, so the stops that provide access are the first to come under pressure. Moncloa El Debate Agronews

    What this implies for ALTO. ALTO’s published plan has seven stations on 1,000 km, none between Peterborough and Ottawa. On the Spanish evidence, gains would concentrate in the end cities and at those stations, while the rural communities between them carry the land acquisition without a station of their own. Transport Canada’s 2025 briefing records funding for the planning and eventual transfer of VIA Rail’s Québec City–Windsor corridor services to the private partner; the published sources reviewed do not say what service would continue at VIA’s intermediate stations. On the Spanish record, that is the question that decides whether the places between the stations gain or lose. Transport Canada

    Implications for ALTO

    What the Spanish case supports, and what it does not

    What it supports

    Democracies can build A democracy can build an extensive high-speed network at a cost per kilometre well below the international average. On the sources here, the commentary’s central point holds.
    Stages produce evidence Building in stages lets each later decision use evidence from the lines already running.
    Competition lowers fares Independent operators competing on publicly owned track can lower fares and raise use.

    What it does not support

    That ALTO would cost what Spain cost The conditions behind Spain’s costs are largely absent from ALTO’s corridor and delivery model.
    That high-speed lines fill wherever built Spain’s own fiscal authority and the EU’s auditors found otherwise on much of the network.
    That construction is the whole story The Adamuz investigation concerns the upkeep of Spain’s oldest line.
    That benefits spread evenly Research finds gains concentrated in the largest cities and at stations; none finds it reversed rural decline between them.

    On the arithmetic and sources set out here, the Spanish case is better read as a description of a method than as evidence for a particular project. ALTO’s published plan differs from that method in sequence, cost, finance, routing, station spacing and market structure. The comparison implies that whether Canada can build depends less on whether high-speed rail is built than on how it is built.

    Status of the Figures

    Published figures on this page are quoted from the named sources and can be checked there. All other figures, including every per-kilometre figure and ratio for ALTO, are Initiative calculations from those inputs: ALTO’s published range, a 1,000 km route length and the October 1, 2026 exchange rate. Reconstructions are estimates rather than measurements. Where ALTO has not published something, such as a breakdown of its cost range or the terms of construction financing, the text says so rather than inferring it. No claim is made about why any particular figure was or was not published.

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    One Line, Then the Next (PDF, 12 pages)
    Full comparison with the Spanish build sequence, four cost sources, the per-kilometre calculation and its limits, and 32 numbered sources
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    Sources

    Primary documents and reporting

    1.
    CNN, Fareed Zakaria GPS, transcript, aired October 18, 2026. transcripts.cnn.com
    2.
    ADIF, “Red de alta velocidad” (network length 3,973 km, March 2026). adifaltavelocidad.es
    3.
    Wikipedia, “High-speed rail in Spain” (opening dates, speeds, construction delays; drawing on ADIF and Renfe), accessed October 19, 2026. wikipedia.org
    4.
    Associated Press, report on the Adamuz collision, January 19, 2026, citing EU figures of more than 3,100 km of Spanish line above 250 km/h. gpb.org
    5.
    Next City, “New Starts: Spain’s Dirt-Cheap High-Speed Rail,” reporting an ADIF study of cost per kilometre by line. nextcity.org
    6.
    Ineco, Efficiency of the Spanish Sector in High-Speed Rail Development, as reported by Global Railway Review and Forbes España. globalrailwayreview.com
    7.
    AIReF, spending review of transport infrastructure (2020), as reported by International Railway Journal. railjournal.com
    8.
    European Court of Auditors, Special Report 19/2018, A European high-speed rail network: not a reality but an ineffective patchwork. op.europa.eu
    9.
    Reporting of ECA Special Report 19/2018 figures for Spain: Ara, June 27, 2018; Catalan News, June 26, 2018. ara.cat · catalannews.com
    10.
    CNMC data as reported by Railway Pro (2026) and International Railway Journal (2023); Frontier Economics on liberalisation; Hosteltur on the transport minister’s comments. railwaypro.com · frontier-economics.com · hosteltur.com
    11.
    CIAF, note on the investigation of the Adamuz accident, January 2026; Railway Gazette International, January 27, 2026. transportes.gob.es · railwaygazette.com
    12.
    Adamuz reporting: The Citizen (Reuters), January 19, 2026; Ara, on weld documentation (March 2026); Inspain (September 2026). thecitizen.co.tz · ara.cat · inspain.news
    13.
    Transport Canada, Committee of the Whole briefing binder, “VIA HFR – VIA TGF Inc. (Alto),” June 2025. tc.canada.ca
    14.
    Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, evidence, February 24, 2026. sencanada.ca
    15.
    Library of Parliament, HillStudy, VIA Rail: Its Past, Its Present and the High-Speed Rail Project, executive summary, May 4, 2026. hillnotes.ca
    16.
    OpenCouncil, “Alto High-Speed Rail” project summary, January 2026. opencouncil.ca
    17.
    Millstone News, “Alto: Coming soon to a neighbourhood near you?”, July 21, 2026. millstonenews.com
    18.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, Five Hundred Farms (May 2026), and the sources cited there. citizenresearch.ca
    19.
    Exchange-rates.org, CAD/EUR rate for October 1, 2026 (1 CAD = 0.62526 EUR). exchange-rates.org
    20.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, earlier briefs: North American vs. European Regulation of High-Speed Rail; Three Claims, One Fare; Cost of Running the Train (all August 2026). citizenresearch.ca
    21.
    Gil-Alonso, Bayona-i-Carrasco & Pujadas-Rúbies, “Is Spanish depopulation irreversible?”, Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 21(1), 2023. austriaca.at
    22.
    elDiario.es, “Radiografía de la España vacía,” March 29, 2019 (INE data for 2018). eldiario.es
    23.
    Shen, Zhao, de Abreu e Silva & Martínez, Madrid–Seville HSR and population growth, TRB 2016. mit.edu
    24.
    Shen, de Abreu e Silva, Zhao & Martínez, 15 years’ impacts of Madrid–Seville HSR, TRB 2015. mit.edu
    25.
    Carbo, Graham, Anupriya, Casas & Melo, causal economic impacts of the Madrid–Barcelona HSR corridor, 2019. figshare.com
    26.
    Miralles i Garcia, “High-speed rail services in Spain and their relationship to population growth,” WIT Transactions on the Built Environment 182, 2019. witpress.com
    27.
    Naranjo Gómez et al., “Assessment of high-speed rail service coverage in municipalities of peninsular Spain,” Infrastructures 5(2), 2020. mdpi.com
    28.
    Albalate & Bel, When Speed Outruns Demand, ADBI Policy Brief 2026-6, March 2026. adb.org
    29.
    Moncloa.com, “El AVE y la España vaciada de trenes convencionales,” July 2019 (union and users’ association figures). moncloa.com
    30.
    El Debate, on Soria’s rail isolation lasting until 2027, July 20, 2026. eldebate.com
    31.
    Agronews Castilla y León, Sanabria protest against removal of high-speed stops, May 21, 2025. agronewscastillayleon.com
    32.
    Transport Canada, Minister’s briefing binder, “High-Speed Rail,” June 2025. tc.canada.ca
  • Incompatible traffic types

    Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · The HPR Research Report

    Two incompatible traffic types share one corridor

    Why North America’s freight railways work the opposite way from Europe’s—and what that means for the passenger problem.

    The Toronto–Montréal corridor’s passenger problem has a single physical cause: intercity passenger trains and heavy freight trains are competing for the same tracks. This chapter explains why that conflict is the real problem—and why the solution isn’t to build a new line somewhere else, but to separate the traffic on the corridor that already exists.

    Status of the figures

    Figures attributed to a source are quoted from the named published source and can be checked there. Every other figure on this page is a calculation or estimate by the ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative from those inputs. Market and operating figures for CN and CPKC are as reported at the dates given and will move. The quantitative work behind this chapter is carried in Chapters 4 to 8; the figures quoted here are summaries of those chapters rather than independent estimates. Where ALTO has not published something — a freight benefit in its appraisal, for instance — the text says so rather than inferring it.

    3.1 · The Opposing Models

    North America and Europe run railways in opposite ways

    Europe’s model: Railways are run by the state or with heavy state support. The network is built around passenger service first—high-speed trains get priority over freight. Freight competes for capacity on a passenger-focused network and often loses money or relies on subsidies.

    North America’s model: Railways are private companies that own their own tracks. Freight is the core business, and it comes first. Intercity passenger trains are tenants that run in between freight movements. The freight railways have spent 30 years optimizing for moving more tonnage at lower cost.

    What the freight model bought. The clearest physical expression of the North American model is the size of the trains it runs. Because crew and locomotive costs are largely fixed per departure, length is leverage. North American freight trains routinely run beyond three kilometres and the longest exceed four, against a European standard of roughly 740 metres. The second and larger efficiency is double-stack, introduced in North America in 1984 and now carrying the majority of US intermodal traffic: two containers stacked vertically in a single well car, roughly doubling the container payload of a train of a given length. Europe cannot do either, because siding lengths, signalling design and overhead electrification on a passenger-first network cap both train length and loading gauge.

    The numbers tell the story. In the United States, freight carries roughly 40 percent of long-distance goods movement by weight—among the world’s highest. In Europe, it’s fallen to about 17 percent and still dropping. Why? Because Europe invested in passenger railways, and freight became the secondary user. North America invested in freight railways, and passenger service became secondary.

    This matters because

    Canada’s proposed Toronto–Montréal corridor would run on North American freight railway tracks owned by Canadian National Railway. That means it’s joining a corridor governed by North American logic: the freight railway owns the track, and its tonnage comes first. A passenger plan modelled on Europe won’t work here.

    3.2 · The Incumbent Railway

    CN is constrained, and its problem is capacity—not speed

    Canadian National Railway (CN) owns and operates the Kingston Subdivision, the main freight line through the Toronto–Montréal corridor. CN’s story over the past three decades is a master class in what makes private railways valuable: squeezing more output from existing track without building new infrastructure.

    When CN was privatized in 1995, it was a struggling Crown corporation. By the 2000s, under new leadership, CN adopted “Precision Scheduled Railroading”—moving individual cars on fixed schedules, cutting dwell time in rail yards, and lengthening trains. The operating ratio—the industry’s efficiency measure, where lower is better—fell from 76 percent to 56 percent. CN’s share price went up roughly 60 times.

    Chart of CN market capitalisation against operating ratio from 1995 to 2025, showing market capitalisation rising as the operating ratio falls
    Figure 3.1. CN market capitalisation versus operating ratio since privatisation, 1995–2025. Market capitalisation in CAD billions; operating ratio expressed ×100. As the operating ratio fell, market capitalisation compounded. The claim this chapter carries forward is the narrower one the series supports: CN’s value creation over this period tracked operating discipline on existing track rather than network construction. Sources: CN annual reports; Bloomberg; Railway Age.

    The lesson: The market rewarded CN not for building new railways but for extracting more value from the railway it already owned. This is the capital-light path to rail value: efficiency on assets in the ground, not greenfield construction.

    Why this matters to the corridor

    CN’s problem today is not speed—it’s capacity. Its three main intermodal terminals in the Greater Toronto Area are running at full capacity. It proposed a new terminal at Milton in 2015 and met a decade of local opposition, environmental assessment and litigation before construction could start; the approval was ultimately upheld on appeal and the terminal is now being built. This tells us something crucial: the cost of building new capacity in a populated landscape is measured in years, not just dollars — Milton took roughly a decade from proposal to construction on a facility of about $250 million — and community resistance is as big a factor as engineering difficulty.

    3.3 · The Other Railway

    What about CP? It runs on its own track

    CN isn’t the only major freight railway on the Toronto–Montréal axis. Canadian Pacific—since its 2023 merger with Kansas City Southern, now Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC)—also runs a line through the corridor. It’s reasonable to ask whether CPKC changes the picture. It doesn’t, and the reason is geographic.

    CPKC runs west out of Toronto on its Galt Subdivision. Its main Toronto–Montréal line is the Belleville Subdivision, which runs roughly parallel to CN’s Kingston Subdivision through the central part of the corridor, then turns north toward Smiths Falls and continues to Montréal on CPKC’s own tracks. CPKC’s eastern freight travels on its own metals, not on CN’s. Since the KCS merger, CPKC’s strategic focus has shifted decisively north–south—to the continental Canada–US–Mexico network that is now its primary growth story.

    Why this matters

    The passenger–freight conflict is specific to CN’s Kingston Subdivision, where VIA’s trains share track with CN’s freight. CPKC, on its separate Belleville Subdivision, is not a party to it—so the freight capacity that separation liberates accrues to CN, the line’s owner. The Belleville Subdivision matters in one further respect: it’s a second existing rail right-of-way running parallel to the CN line and Highway 401 through the corridor’s central section—further evidence that the ground HPR would follow is already a multi-track transport spine rather than open country.

    3.4 · The Root Problem

    Entanglement: two traffic types, one track

    VIA’s intercity passenger trains and CN’s freight trains share the Kingston Subdivision. They have opposite operating needs.

    Freight trains

    Long, heavy, slow to accelerate. Can tolerate delays. Run to commercial schedules. Need to be as long as possible to spread fixed locomotive costs across more cargo.

    Passenger trains

    Short, light, quick to accelerate. Cannot tolerate delays. Need frequent, reliable service. Need short platforms and quick turnarounds.

    Under the “host railway priority” rules that govern shared track across North America, when a freight train and a passenger train want the same track at the same time, the freight train proceeds and the passenger train waits in a siding. VIA cannot unilaterally add frequency because every additional passenger train needs to be negotiated around CN’s freight schedule. CN controls the dispatcher, and under this ownership structure nothing requires the track owner to give up freight capacity to improve passenger reliability.

    This creates a two-sided failure: every passenger path is capacity CN cannot use for freight; every siding meet is friction on a network built and operated to move tonnage without interruption. They are entangled—neither can be optimized without degrading the other. And the owner of the track whose traffic comes first has no incentive to give ground.

    The corridor’s real problem

    It’s not a shortage of speed. It’s not an engineering problem. It’s a structural conflict over who owns the capacity and whose traffic comes first. No schedule adjustment solves this while the two traffic types remain on one set of rails.

    3.5 · The Solution

    Separation: give each traffic type its own path

    If entanglement is the disease, separation is the cure—and it’s the single design principle behind HPR.

    The idea is simple: build a dedicated passenger path engineered for passenger requirements, and hand the shared corridor back to freight. Each traffic type then runs on infrastructure suited to it. The capacity conflict that produces the corridor’s present failure simply ceases to exist. This doesn’t ask a private freight railway to subordinate its tonnage to passenger priority—it removes the passenger trains from the freight railway’s tracks altogether.

    Separation can be achieved cheaply or expensively. The difference between the two approaches is the difference between HPR and ALTO.

    HPR pursues separation through a brownfield-led philosophy: Build the dedicated passenger path along the geometry of corridors that are already disturbed—Highway 401 and the existing rail right-of-way. Upgrade and reuse infrastructure wherever engineering permits; build new only where geometry or capacity genuinely demands it. This keeps the new passenger alignment adjacent to the freight corridor it is relieving.

    What that means in practice: a roughly 479 km new-build passenger spine from Pickering Junction to Dorval, designed for a 177–240 km/h operating band with 240 km/h the design maximum on the straightest stretches, plus about 200 km of upgrade on the VIA-owned Smiths Falls and Alexandria Subdivisions. The spine is the capital project; the upgrades extend it using track already in public hands.

    ALTO pursues separation through greenfield construction: Build a new high-speed line through Eastern Ontario, engineered for 300 km/h, away from the existing freight corridor. This imports the European passenger-first model—a dedicated high-speed line as an end in itself—into a North American freight corridor whose economics it doesn’t engage.

    3.6 · The Insight

    Build one, make one free: the dual-asset structure

    This is where HPR differs fundamentally from ALTO, and where the economics become positive-sum rather than single-purpose.

    When HPR moves passenger trains onto their own dedicated path, they vacate the Kingston Subdivision. The capacity they were consuming—the paths, the priority negotiations, the siding meets—reverts to CN as liberated freight capacity on the line it owns. That capacity bears on the operating ratio and the terminal congestion CN’s own public reporting identifies as central. CN has taken no public position on HPR, and none should be inferred here — the point is that the incentives run in the same direction.

    Think of it this way:

    • “Build one” is High Performance Passenger Rail (HPPR)—the dedicated passenger path. That’s the capital project.
    • “Make one free” is High Performance Freight Rail (HPFR)—the freight capacity liberated on the shared corridor the moment passenger trains vacate it. No additional construction is required to create the liberated paths: they fall out of the geometry of the build. Double-stack capability is a separate matter — it depends on vertical clearance work, which is a distinct category of capital investment with its own cost and its own return, and is not claimed here as free.

    One capital project produces two separable outputs. The passenger business case needs only to justify itself on passenger benefits. The freight-capacity dividend is surplus—untouched by any reference-class reduction of passenger ridership forecasts. This is a deliberate bias countermeasure against the benefit-shortfall failure mode that sinks megaprojects.

    Why this structure matters

    ALTO builds one thing — a passenger-only line — at about $142M/km, taken from its own published midpoint, and captures one benefit stream. HPR builds one thing at about $40M/km as specified, or $54M/km once its own estimate is adjusted against the overrun record, and captures two. The difference isn’t in execution quality; it’s in whether the design is aligned with the corridor’s actual economics and incentives.

    3.7 · Who Gains

    The freight dividend: how the freed capacity translates to real benefits

    The liberated freight capacity is not abstract. It lands on named, motivated beneficiaries:

    The host railway (CN)

    Recovers paths previously consumed by passenger service. Uncongested freight paths translate to higher network fluidity, more predictable transit times, and the ability to grow tonnage without hitting a capacity ceiling. Where clearance is addressed, it enables double-stack container operation—which roughly halves the per-container cost of moving goods by rail. A freight railway that no longer dispatches around passenger priority is materially more valuable on the same physical asset.

    Shippers and supply chain

    Reliable, uncongested rail capacity on the busiest goods corridor in the country is a resilience asset. It raises the ceiling on how much freight moves by rail and reduces variability that pushes shippers toward more expensive or higher-emission alternatives. Combined with on-dock terminal design of the kind the Montréal Port Authority is building at Contrecœur, it extends competitive intermodal service to a larger share of corridor flows.

    The public

    Freight capacity that would otherwise be unavailable on rail is capacity that can absorb goods movement currently carried by road. Each tonne shifted from truck to rail reduces highway congestion, road wear, and—most consequentially—carbon emissions, given the substantial per-tonne-kilometre advantage of rail over road haulage.

    3.8 · The Contrast

    Why ALTO cannot capture the freight dividend

    ALTO is also a separation scheme—it too gives passenger trains a dedicated line. But the freight dividend is not equally available to it, and the reasons are fundamental.

    First, routing: ALTO’s dedicated line runs away from the existing freight corridor, through new terrain in Eastern Ontario. It doesn’t reorganize the freight corridor; it builds a parallel facility through different ground and leaves the freight network’s configuration, congestion, and clearance constraints essentially as it found them.

    Second, design: ALTO is a single-purpose asset—a passenger-only line engineered for 300 km/h. It cannot carry freight and is not designed to. The only benefit it can capture is the passenger benefit.

    Third, accounting: ALTO’s own business case books no freight benefit at all. The freight dividend does not appear in ALTO’s appraisal because ALTO’s design does not produce it.

    Fourth, cost: ALTO solves the single problem it addresses — passenger throughput — at the maximum per-kilometre cost the corridor admits: a new greenfield high-speed alignment through sensitive terrain. The capital cost analysis in Chapter 4 places HPPR at roughly $40 million per kilometre as specified and about $54 million per kilometre on the de-biased central estimate, some $19.0B to $26.1B for the 479 km spine, against ALTO at approximately $142 million per kilometre, taken from ALTO’s own published midpoint of roughly $75 billion.

    Compared on the same un-adjusted basis — the Initiative’s own estimate against ALTO’s own published figure — ALTO costs about three and a half times as much per kilometre. Set against HPPR’s de-biased $54 million the ratio is roughly two and a half times, and that is the conservative reading, because HPPR’s estimate has been adjusted against the overrun record and ALTO’s has not. On either basis ALTO costs several times as much per kilometre to produce one benefit stream — and considerably more in total, once its far longer corridor is counted. HPR’s lower-cost, corridor-aligned build produces two benefits, and leaves CN’s capacity and clearance problems measurably better than it found them.

    The core difference

    ALTO builds one and makes nothing free. HPR builds one and makes one free, at roughly a third the per-kilometre cost as specified. The difference is not in how well each is executed; it is in whether the concept is aligned with the corridor’s actual economics and the incentives of the parties who own and operate it.

    Key Findings · Chapter 3

    The concept in eight parts

    3.1 — North America runs the opposite railway

    North American freight railways are private, profitable, vertically integrated, and freight-priority. Rail’s freight share is far higher in North America (~40% of US long-distance ton-miles vs ~17% of EU inland tonne-km). A passenger plan modelled on Europe imports passenger-first assumptions into a freight-first corridor.

    3.2 — CN is the incumbent, and it is constrained

    CN’s extraordinary returns came largely from efficiency on existing track, not construction. Its valuation has stalled; it struggles to add capacity (Milton took a decade from proposal to construction); and its corridor economics improve on uncongested paths and double-stack clearance.

    3.3 — CP is not a party to the conflict

    CPKC runs its own Belleville Subdivision on the Toronto–Montréal axis, parallel to the CN Kingston Sub, and shares no track with VIA. The entanglement, and the freight dividend, are CN’s. CPKC’s parallel line is also a second disturbed right-of-way in the corridor.

    3.4 — Entanglement is the root cause

    Passenger and freight share the Kingston Subdivision with opposite operating characteristics. The corridor’s failure—sub-64% on-time performance, four-hour schedules, low frequency—is one capacity conflict seen from two sides, on track owned by the party whose tonnage comes first.

    3.5 — Separation is the design principle

    Give passenger service its own dedicated path and hand the shared corridor back to freight—resolving the conflict with the North American model, not against it. HPR does this brownfield-led, along Highway 401 and existing rail geometry: a ~479 km Pickering Junction–Dorval spine plus ~200 km of upgrade on the VIA-owned Smiths Falls and Alexandria Subdivisions.

    3.6 — Build one, make one free

    One capital project—HPR—produces two separable assets: HPPR (the dedicated passenger path) and HPFR (the freight capacity liberated on the shared corridor), the liberated paths created at no incremental cost by the geometry of the build; double-stack capability is a separate, costed clearance investment.

    3.7 — HPFR lands on a motivated beneficiary

    The liberated freight corridor benefits the host railway (fluidity, operating-ratio gains, double-stack where cleared), shippers (resilience, Contrecœur-style reach), and the public (road freight diverted to rail, with emissions and safety gains). It is carried as a measured quantity: a Chapter 8 benefit-cost stream and Chapter 5 emissions.

    3.8 — ALTO cannot capture it

    ALTO builds a greenfield passenger-only line at ~$142M/km, from ALTO’s own published midpoint, against HPPR’s ~$40M/km as specified — about three and a half times on the same un-adjusted basis, and roughly two and a half times against HPPR’s de-biased ~$54M/km, which is the conservative reading — and captures one benefit. HPR captures two. ALTO builds one at maximum cost and makes nothing free.

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    The HPR Concept: Untangling the Corridor
    PDF · Full technical chapter with figures and tables
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  • Canada’s rail exceptionalism

    Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism

    Why Canada’s passenger trains keep pulling over to let freight go by — and why almost no other wealthy country works this way.

    ⚠ New this week: Ottawa’s $1.95-billion train order

    On July 29, 2026, the federal government announced $1.95 billion to buy 45 new hybrid locomotives for VIA Rail, most of them to be assembled in Montréal. It is welcome news for jobs and for an aging fleet — but every dollar of it is about the train, not the track. Transport Canada   CBC

    A new locomotive doesn’t change who owns the rails or who goes first. On the routes this fleet will serve, VIA runs on tracks owned by the freight railways — and its shiny new trains will keep pulling into sidings to wait for freight, just as the last batch of new trains does today.

    The bottom line

    No G7 country has a law that makes freight trains more important than passenger trains. Where a law on the question exists at all, it does the opposite — it puts passengers first. The other big democracies reach the same result another way: a neutral company owns the tracks, or an independent referee decides who goes when, or freight is simply the guest on passenger-owned lines.

    Canada is the only G7 country with none of these protections. VIA Rail owns less than 3% of the track it runs on and travels as a guest on lines owned by the freight railways CN and CPKC, under private contracts, with no law giving passengers priority, no neutral track owner, and no independent referee. Freight priority isn’t written into Canadian law — it is simply what happens when nothing protects passengers. That is what makes Canada the outlier.

    Download
    Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism — Full Brief (PDF)
    The complete comparison of freight-versus-passenger priority across the G7 and other high-income countries, with sources
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    The problem

    Canada’s passenger trains are guests on someone else’s railway

    Most people assume VIA Rail runs on its own tracks. It doesn’t. VIA owns under 3% of the track it uses. CN owns about 83%, and the rest belongs to CPKC and commuter agencies like Metrolinx. So across almost its whole network, VIA is a tenant — and when a VIA passenger train and a CN freight train want the same stretch of track, the freight company that owns and controls that track decides who waits.

    <3%
    of the track it runs on is actually owned by VIA Rail
    CBC News, 2024
    ~83%
    of VIA’s tracks are owned by the freight railway CN
    CBC News, 2024
    57%
    of VIA trains arrived on time in 2022
    CBC News, 2024

    You can see the result on the timetable. In 2022, only about 57% of VIA trains arrived on time. But on the one short stretch VIA actually owns, between Ottawa and Montréal, on-time performance jumps to roughly 90%. Same country, same trains — the difference is who owns the track. That is the whole story of this brief in a single comparison.

    A quick distinction

    Three different things people call “priority”

    Arguments about rail priority get tangled because “priority” can mean three different things. Keeping them separate is the key to an honest comparison.

    1. Priority written into law

    An actual law saying which kind of train goes first. This is rare. Where it exists — in the United States — it favours passengers, not freight.

    2. A neutral referee decides

    A neutral company owns the tracks and an independent regulator hands out timetable slots by published rules. This is how Europe and Japan work. Passenger trains are protected; freight gets fair, guaranteed access — but not the whip hand.

    3. Whoever owns the track wins

    What actually happens minute-to-minute when a dispatcher chooses. On freight-owned track, freight tends to win. Canada has only this third kind — with nothing above it.

    The comparison

    How Canada stacks up against the G7

    0 of 7
    G7 countries that put freight ahead of passengers by law
    it’s a null set
    6 of 7
    protect passengers — by law, a neutral track owner, or a referee
    every G7 member except one
    1
    the number of G7 countries with none of those protections: Canada
    the outlier

    Read down the list. Every other G7 country has at least one thing standing between passengers and the commercial interests of freight — a law, a neutral owner, or an independent referee. Canada has none.

    Passengers first
    United States — Federal law has put passenger trains ahead of freight since 1973. (Freight railroads often ignore it in practice, which is why the U.S. keeps trying to enforce it — but the law is clear.)
    Passengers first
    Japan — The passenger companies own the tracks; the freight operator is the guest and pays to use them. Bullet-train lines carry no freight at all.
    Neutral referee
    United Kingdom — A neutral company owns the track and an independent regulator hands out the slots. Neither passengers nor freight can simply push the other aside.
    Neutral referee
    France — A neutral track owner and an independent regulator allocate capacity under published EU rules; express passenger trains rank at the top.
    Neutral referee
    Germany — Same European model: neutral track owner, independent regulator, no freight-over-passenger rule.
    Neutral referee
    Italy — Same European model again: neutral track owner and independent regulator.
    No protection
    Canada — No law giving passengers priority, no neutral track owner, no independent referee. Freight wins by default.

    Widening the lens beyond the G7 only makes the point sharper. Nearly every wealthy country runs on the neutral, refereed model. Switzerland is the clearest contrast: it builds its entire national timetable around passengers — freight is scheduled around passenger service, not ahead of it. The only rich country that really resembles Canada is Australia, and even there an economic regulator oversees track access, and there is almost no long-distance passenger service on the freight lines. Canada is alone in running a national passenger railway carrying millions of trips a year with none of these safeguards.

    The $1.95-billion question

    Why new trains won’t fix this

    This week’s investment is real and worthwhile. But it buys a better machine; it does nothing about the track — which is where Canada’s problem actually lives.

    What the $1.95 billion buysWhat it leaves untouched
    45 new hybrid locomotives, most assembled in Montréal, plus a new maintenance facility and about 1,200 jobs. Who owns the track. The routes these trains will run on still belong to CN and CPKC.
    A cleaner, more modern fleet to replace aging equipment on long-distance and remote routes. Who goes first. A new locomotive still pulls into the siding to let the freight train pass.
    The promise of better reliability from newer, more capable trains. The real cause of delay. On freight-owned track, punctuality is capped by freight priority — no train upgrade can override it.

    We already know how this ends, because Canada has run the experiment. The last new fleet — the Siemens Venture trains bought for the busy Québec City–Windsor corridor — is today slowed by speed restrictions CN imposes on its own track, a dispute now before the Federal Court. New trains, same track, same problem.

    There’s an irony worth noting: the new locomotives are Swiss-built. Switzerland is exactly the country whose trains run on time — because it built its whole timetable around passengers. Canada is importing the Swiss hardware without the Swiss idea. It is buying the train, not the timetable.

    The real obstacle

    This is a political choice, not a technical one

    None of this is destiny. Every tool Canada is missing already exists and is used routinely by its neighbours — and adopting any one of them would cost a tiny fraction of a single locomotive order. What is missing isn’t money or engineering. It’s political will.

    The fix has been put to Parliament again and again — and set aside every time. Since 2013, at least half a dozen bills have tried to give passengers priority or put VIA Rail on a proper legal footing:

    Defeated 2015
    Bill C-640 (and its earlier version C-614), the VIA Rail Canada Act — Philip Toone. Would have given passenger service preference over freight. Voted down.
    Died 2019
    Bill C-370, VIA Rail Canada Act — Irene Mathyssen. Never debated to a vote; died when Parliament ended.
    Never voted
    Bills C-251 and C-236, VIA Rail Canada Act — Elizabeth May, reintroduced across two Parliaments.
    Never advanced
    Bill C-371, the Rail Passenger Priority Act — Taylor Bachrach, 2023. Would have required freight to give way to passengers, with fines up to $250,000 per violation.

    The pattern is telling. Every one of these bills came from an opposition member; not one was ever taken up as government legislation; and the only one to reach a vote was voted down. The freight railways and their shippers have lobbied against each attempt — one shippers’ group dismissed passenger priority as “the tail wagging the dog” — even as VIA Rail’s own CEO has publicly asked Ottawa for exactly the U.S.-style priority these bills propose. The tools are drafted and the precedent is understood. What’s missing is a government willing to enact them.

    What would actually fix it

    Three tools — any one would help

    Canada doesn’t need to invent anything. It can pick from the same toolkit every comparable country already uses. Each of these is cheaper than a single locomotive order.

    A law that puts passengers first

    Like the United States since 1973 — a statutory right for passenger trains to go ahead of freight, with penalties for ignoring it.

    A neutral track owner

    Like the UK and the EU — so the company running the trains isn’t also the company deciding who waits.

    An independent referee

    A regulator that hands out timetable slots by published rules and can enforce on-time performance.

    The high-speed corridor project (ALTO) is, in part, a workaround for all of this — building brand-new, dedicated passenger track precisely because passengers can’t get priority on freight-owned lines. But dedicated track for one corridor doesn’t fix the national problem. The exceptionalism this brief documents is a policy choice, not a constraint — and closing it is a matter of political will, not engineering.

    Read the full brief

    The complete comparison, with sources

    The full brief works through the G7 country by country, the other high-income comparisons, the corridor evidence, and the decade of failed legislation — with every claim sourced.

    Download Full Brief
    Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism (PDF)
    Comparative analysis for policymakers, MPs, journalists, and anyone following the passenger-rail file
    Download PDF
    Sources

    Key sources

    1.
    Transport Canada, news release, “Passenger Rail Locomotive Assembly Returns to Canada Through a $1.95 Billion Government of Canada Investment,” July 29, 2026. canada.ca
    2.
    CBC News, “Feds announce almost $2B for 45 hybrid battery-diesel Via Rail passenger locomotives,” July 29, 2026. CBC News
    3.
    CBC News, “Work’s chugging along to try to prioritize people over freight on Canada’s rail lines,” December 23, 2023 — source for VIA owning under 3% of its track, CN owning about 83%, and 57% on-time performance in 2022. CBC News
    4.
    The Canadian Press, November 26, 2024 — on VIA’s application to the Canadian Transportation Agency and CN’s freight prioritization as the leading cause of VIA delay, with the Montréal–Toronto scheduled time lengthening to 5 h 33 m.
    5.
    Railway Age, November 2022 — noting that, unlike Amtrak, VIA Rail holds no government-mandated priority over freight.
    6.
    United States: 49 U.S.C. §24308(c), the statutory passenger preference originating in the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973.
    7.
    European Union: Directive 2012/34/EU establishing a single European railway area (neutral infrastructure managers and independent regulators).
    8.
    Passenger-priority bills in Parliament — Bill C-640 / C-614 (Philip Toone), defeated 2015; Bill C-370 (Irene Mathyssen), 2017; Bills C-251 / C-236 (Elizabeth May); Bill C-371, the Rail Passenger Priority Act (Taylor Bachrach), 2023. parl.ca   openparliament.ca
    9.
    Transport Action Canada, “Taylor Bachrach Proposes Rail Passenger Priority Act,” and coverage in Trains (February 2, 2024), including VIA CEO Mario Péloquin’s call for Amtrak-style priority and freight-sector opposition. transportaction.ca