Tag: Vision Transport

  • The options nobody priced

    The Option Nobody Priced

    ALTO’s same-day reply to the UPA’s existing-corridor study, measured against ALTO’s own published record.

    ⚠ Same-Day Response: ALTO Replies Within Hours

    On November 12, 2026, the Union des producteurs agricoles released a study by Vision Transport estimating that the existing Québec City–Toronto rail corridor could be modernised for about $11 billion, or $24–30 billion with additional crossing work and electrification. Vision Transport

    At 2:26 p.m. the same day, ALTO issued a formal French-language release rejecting the approach. The release contained no new cost figure, no benefit-cost ratio, and no costing of an upgrade to the existing corridor. For a comparison of high-frequency and high-speed rail, it gave a contact email address. Newswire

    Later that afternoon, ALTO’s CEO Martin Imbleau told The Canadian Press the proposal was “unfeasible” and that if it were feasible it would have been done decades ago. On the Québec radio programme La commission, he said ALTO cannot build a crossing for every farm, put the Montréal–Ottawa segment at just under 2,000 properties, including 500 or 600 agricultural owners, and offered to resume talks with the UPA without a confidentiality agreement. Canadian Press / L’actualité

    Critical Finding

    ALTO’s central claim, that high-speed rail would generate about five times the economic benefit of high-frequency rail, compares high-speed rail with a new $45–75 billion, 200 km/h railway that no one has proposed. The option the study actually puts forward, modernising the corridor that already exists, has not been costed or appraised by ALTO in any published document.

    On ALTO’s own published table, “five times” holds on one row only. On the row a standard transport appraisal is built on, direct benefits to travellers, high-speed rail delivers 1.47 times the slower option’s benefits. ALTO’s freight objection describes how the corridor is run today, not a physical limit, and ALTO’s own freight consultant describes the alternative: significant investment in the existing corridor.

    The reply asserts the conclusion of a comparison ALTO has not published. The farm associations’ request was for that comparison.

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    The Option Nobody Priced — Full Brief (PDF)
    ALTO’s November 12 reply and the CEO’s interviews, claim by claim, against Canada’s Moment, ALTO’s freight study and the Vision Transport report
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    What Was Released

    A study of the corridor that already exists

    The Vision Transport study, prepared by Vincent Duguay with an expert opinion from Pierre DuSablon, a track engineering consultant who formerly ran CN operations between Montréal and Québec City, does not propose a new railway. It asks how fast a passenger train could run on the tracks that already exist if they were modernised, and what that would cost. Its answer rests on five actions: a second track on the 37% of the corridor that is single-track today; in-cab train control allowing 177 km/h; a standing power for the Canadian Transportation Agency to set train priority in favour of passengers; full gates at level crossings in the faster sections; and tilting trains on curves. Vision Transport

    ~$11B
    five actions on the existing corridor, 20% contingency included
    2025 dollars; $24–30B with all options
    6h51
    Québec City–Toronto with all 22 stations served, down from 8h50 today
    6h00 as an express
    924
    existing level crossings kept open, 569 of them private or farm crossings
    none required to close

    On the upgraded corridor, Montréal–Toronto would take 4h14 with all stops or 3h42 as an express, against 5h18 today and ALTO’s announced 3h. Montréal–Québec City would take 2h26, or 2h08 express, against 3h22 today. Every time includes a 10% scheduling cushion. The study attributes almost half of the 120 minutes saved end to end to fixing how passenger trains share the line with freight, rather than to higher speed.

    ALTO’s Release

    What the reply says, and what it brings

    ALTO’s release, Alto réaffirme l’importance du train à grande vitesse pour le Canada et ses engagements envers le milieu agricole, makes four points: freight priority rules out more passenger trains on CN, CPKC and CFQG track; high-speed rail would cut travel times about 50% and generate about five times the economic benefit of high-frequency rail ($24.5 billion a year in added GDP against $4.9 billion); about twenty countries, including France and Morocco, have invested in fast passenger rail; and ALTO restates its five commitments to farmers.

    The release links ALTO’s economic-benefits analysis, its June 2026 consultation report, its rural commitments page and its property-acquisition page. It does not link a comparison of high-frequency and high-speed rail. For that comparison, it provides an email address.

    In the release, ALTO’s president and CEO Martin Imbleau says the UPA has chosen to stop talking to ALTO. The public record shows that five farm organisations met on June 4, 2026 to consider ALTO’s invitation to sign a collaboration agreement and declined to sign it, and that the UPA, OFA and CFA have since asked Ottawa to release the analyses behind the choice of high-speed rail and to commission an independent comparison. OFA   Radio-Canada

    Claim by Claim

    ALTO’s reply against its own published record

    Each claim in the release, and in the CEO’s interviews with The Canadian Press and on radio the same afternoon, is set below against what ALTO and its commissioned consultants have already published. Radio remarks are from an app-assisted English translation posted by Stone Mills Against Alto; all interview remarks are translations from French.

    What ALTO’s Release SaysWhat the Published Record Shows
    1. High-speed rail generates about five times the economic benefit of high-frequency rail: $24.5 billion a year in added GDP against $4.9 billion.The comparison appears in ALTO’s Canada’s Moment, Table 2. The “high-frequency rail” it prices is a new 200 km/h railway costing $45–75 billion, a figure that carries no footnote or source. That is not the $11–30 billion existing-corridor option the study proposes. On the same table, direct benefits to travellers are $49.5 billion against $33.6 billion: 1.47 times, not five.
    Status:Holds on one row, against a different option
    2. Passenger trains cannot be added to CN, CPKC and CFQG track because freight has priority, and slowing freight would harm exporters including farmers; a new network is needed.Freight priority on the corridor is a default, not a law: no G7 country gives freight priority over passengers in statute. ALTO’s own freight study states ALTO “is not assumed to result in the discontinuation of local passenger rail services”, so ALTO’s plan keeps passenger trains on the freight line. The same study says accommodating freight growth without degrading passenger service “would imply significant investments in the absence of Alto.” The release gives no figure for the harm to exporters.
    Status:Describes today’s rules, not a physical limit
    3. High-speed rail would cut travel times by about 50%.On ALTO’s announced times, Québec City–Toronto falls from 8h50 to about 4h30, a 49% cut. Those times are spreadsheet estimates: the government’s own journey-time record shows only the 177 km/h case was simulated. ALTO has not said whether they include a scheduling margin, and they run between seven stations on a new alignment, none on the existing VIA line between Montréal and Québec City or through Kingston.
    Status:Holds on estimates, without qualification
    4. About twenty countries have invested in fast passenger rail, including France and Morocco.Morocco’s Al Boraq runs 186 km on a new high-speed line, then 137 km on the upgraded existing line into Casablanca at 160 km/h. It is an example of new construction combined with the existing corridor. The release does not say so.
    Status:Cited example is a hybrid
    5. ALTO restates its five commitments to farmers: limiting impacts, negotiated agreements, fair compensation, maintaining farm access through safe crossings, and supporting succession.Above 201 km/h a railway can have no level crossings at all, and Canadian rules already prohibit any new crossing on a line above 177 km/h. Every farm crossing on a 300 km/h alignment becomes a structure or a closure. On radio the same day, ALTO’s CEO said ALTO cannot build a crossing for every farm and that detours are “possible, even probable,” with compensation for decades of lost production; how that would be calculated has not been published. The existing-corridor option keeps all 924 crossings open. The release does not address the difference.
    Status:Difference between options not addressed
    6. “The UPA has chosen to stop talking to us.” The CEO told The Canadian Press he had never heard the confidentiality criticism before that morning, and that it was “absolutely not the reason” discussions broke down.Five farm organisations declined ALTO’s collaboration agreement on June 4, 2026, stating that signing would not be in their members’ best interests and citing the need for greater transparency and open communication with their memberships. The UPA, OFA and CFA have since asked for the analyses behind the choice of high-speed rail and for an independent comparison. The CEO’s offer to continue working with the UPA without a confidentiality agreement, and his statement that he needs the UPA’s members to help design crossings and detours, are new, and a constructive step if taken up.
    Status:Request for analysis not answered
    7. “A TGF doesn’t exist” and the concept is “unfeasible.” On radio, the CEO described high-frequency rail as a conventional train that goes a little faster. To The Canadian Press, he said that if it were feasible it would have been done 40, 30, 20 or 10 years ago, and that Ottawa’s original high-frequency project used new tracks independent of freight.ALTO began as VIA HFR–VIA TGF, the Crown subsidiary created to develop high-frequency rail. ALTO’s release the same day assigns high-frequency rail an annual GDP effect of $4.9 billion, and its Canada’s Moment report prices it at $45–75 billion. The CEO’s own account confirms that the high-frequency project ALTO compares against was a new line, not the existing-corridor option. No published ALTO analysis shows that option to be infeasible; ALTO’s own freight consultant refers to “expansions to the CN corridor that may no longer be needed due to Alto being built”, an investment it treats as one ALTO would avoid, not one that cannot be made.
    Status:Inconsistent with ALTO’s own release and freight study
    8. A second track would mean closing the CN and CP lines for several years and buying “thousands and thousands of properties”, because the existing right-of-way is too narrow in most places. Electrifying lines used by double-stacked trains would be prohibitively expensive.None of the three statements is accompanied by a figure: no closure period, no property count, no electrification cost. The study’s core $11 billion package is diesel; electrification is an optional add-on. For comparison, ALTO’s CEO put the Montréal–Ottawa first segment of the new line at just under 2,000 properties.
    Status:Asserted without figures
    The Comparison

    Which “high-frequency rail”?

    The Alto Files has traced both the $24.5 billion and the $4.9 billion to a September 2024 slide deck shown to deputy ministers and released under Access to Information, where the slower option was priced at $58.9 billion on a new route. Its article sets out how the two figures are built; this brief does not repeat that work. The Alto Files

    The comparator is a different railway

    A 200 km/h option costing $45–75 billion is a new dedicated line. In September 2026 ALTO told Radio-Canada that high-speed rail costs only about 20–30% more than its high-frequency alternative, which is consistent with that range. The existing-corridor package costs $11–30 billion, uses a 177 km/h ceiling, and keeps all 22 intermediate stations. No published ALTO document costs or appraises an option of that kind.

    “Five times” is true on one row only

    ALTO’s Table 2 gives annual GDP effects of 0.2% and 1.1%, which is the “five times”. The same table gives direct benefits to travellers of $33.6 billion and $49.5 billion, or 1.47 times. The Alto Files notes the C.D. Howe Institute reached a similar 1.4 to 1.6 times in 2025.

    Per dollar, ALTO’s two options are close

    Dividing direct benefits by the midpoint of each capital range gives about 0.66 for high-speed rail and 0.56 for the slower option. On the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s $75–113 billion range, the high-speed figure falls to about 0.44–0.66. That range covers construction of the baseline route only, excludes a Kingston routing, and assumes European-level cost efficiency; the PBO puts the chance of costs reaching $243 billion or more at about 1 in 40. These are Initiative calculations from ALTO’s and the PBO’s published numbers. ALTO has said it will not publish a benefit-cost ratio at this stage.

    The $24.5 billion has its own limits

    It is 1.1% of Canada’s 2019 GDP from a static model; the commissioned study’s own range runs from $14.8 to $41.0 billion; about 86% of it rests on one productivity assumption; and the model leaves out construction and operating costs. These are set out in the Initiative’s earlier brief Two Point Two Trillion.

    The Freight Objection

    A rule, not a property of the track

    ALTO is right that freight goes first on the corridor today. That describes how the line is run. ALTO’s own commissioned freight study, High-Speed Rail and Freight Capacity (CPCS with HDR, June 2026), supplies the figures that bear on whether it must stay that way.

    8–13
    CN freight trains a day on Toronto–Montréal, a mix close to 50-50 with passenger trains
    CPCS, p. 8
    3–5
    CN freight trains a day on Montréal–Québec City
    CPCS, p. 8
    8am–8pm
    when freight volumes are lowest and passenger volumes highest
    CPCS, Table 1, p. 10

    Priority is a default

    The Initiative’s brief Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism found that no G7 country gives freight statutory priority over passenger trains, and that the United States legislates the opposite. Canada has none of the usual passenger protections, so freight goes first by default. The study’s third action is aimed at that gap.

    The timetable shows where the time goes

    On single track, VIA’s schedule carries about half the padding where VIA owns the track (29%) as where CN owns it (60%). Montréal–Ottawa, mostly on VIA’s own track, already runs with 8%. Montréal–Québec City, with the fewest freight trains on CPCS’s count, is where the study finds its largest gain from fixing how the two share the line.

    ALTO’s consultant describes the alternative

    CPCS finds “little ability to expand passenger services on lines shared with freight without adding substantial new capacity” (p. 11), and that accommodating freight growth without degrading passenger service “would imply significant investments in the absence of Alto” (p. 6). That investment in the existing corridor is the option the study proposes. The comparison that would settle the question is its cost against the cost of a new line. ALTO has not published it.

    What a response with numbers would contain

    What the reply does not include

    A same-day reply cannot be expected to carry a full appraisal. It can be measured against what ALTO already holds and has not published, and against what the farm associations have asked for.

    Already in ALTO’s hands

    The inputs behind the $4.9 billion Travel times, ridership and productivity assumptions for the slower option. The economic summary ALTO has published models high-speed rail only.
    A source for the $45–75 billion The “high-frequency rail” cost in Canada’s Moment carries no footnote.
    The September 2024 business case Released under Access to Information (A-2026-00195) with most of its pages withheld.
    A figure for the freight harm the release describes The release asserts harm to exporters without a number; ALTO’s freight study does not estimate one.

    Requires an independent process

    An appraisal of the existing-corridor option On the same basis as high-speed rail: cost, ridership, benefits, land, and the added capacity both ALTO’s freight consultant and Vision Transport say is needed. (UPA / OFA / CFA)
    Timing ALTO says a more detailed business case is coming in 2027. Landowners are being asked to make decisions before then. The comparison would need to precede corridor narrowing to inform it.
    Where things stand · November 2026

    Summary ledger

    ALTO’s November 12 reply and the CEO’s interviews, claim by claim, against ALTO’s own published record:

    Not supported
    “Five times the economic benefit”: holds on the GDP row only, and against a $45–75 billion new railway rather than the existing-corridor option. Traveller benefits on the same table: 1.47 times.
    Not published
    A costing of the existing-corridor option: none in any published ALTO document; the release offers an email address.
    Incomplete
    Freight priority: accurate as a description of current operation; ALTO’s own plan keeps passenger trains on the freight line, and its consultant describes the investment alternative.
    Incomplete
    50% faster: holds on ALTO’s estimated times, which are unsimulated, station to station, and serve seven stations rather than twenty-two.
    Incomplete
    Morocco: cited as a high-speed example; operates as a hybrid of new line and upgraded existing line.
    Not addressed
    Five commitments to farmers: the release does not address the difference between a fully grade-separated new line and an option that keeps all 924 existing crossings.
    Inconsistent
    “A TGF doesn’t exist” (CEO, radio): ALTO’s own release the same day puts a $4.9 billion figure on high-frequency rail, and ALTO began as VIA HFR–VIA TGF.
    No figures
    Line closures and “thousands and thousands of properties” (CEO, Canadian Press): no closure period, property count or cost given; the new line’s first segment alone involves just under 2,000 properties.
    Acknowledged
    Farm detours (CEO, radio): no crossing for every farm; detours possible, even probable; compensation method for decades of lost production not published.
    New
    Offer to talk without a confidentiality agreement (CEO, radio): a constructive step if taken up.
    Not answered
    The farm associations’ request for the analyses behind the choice of high-speed rail and an independent comparison.

    Until ALTO publishes otherwise, its comparison is between high-speed rail and a $45–75 billion new railway. The option on the table on November 12 is an $11–30 billion modernisation of a railway that already exists. That is the option nobody has priced.

    Status of the figures

    Published figures on this page are quoted from the named sources and can be checked there. All other figures are Initiative calculations from those inputs, and the inputs are named where each calculation appears. Reconstructions are estimates, not measurements. Where ALTO has not published something, we say so rather than infer its contents, and we make no claim about why any figure was or was not published.

    Download Full Brief
    The Option Nobody Priced (PDF, 10 pages)
    ALTO’s November 12 reply set against Canada’s Moment, ALTO’s freight study and the Vision Transport report
    Download PDF
    Sources

    Primary documents and statements

    1.
    ALTO, “Alto réaffirme l’importance du train à grande vitesse pour le Canada et ses engagements envers le milieu agricole,” Canada Newswire, November 12, 2026. newswire.ca
    2.
    Vision Transport (V. Duguay, with P. DuSablon), Corridor Québec-Toronto : ce que la voie existante permet, November 2026, with presentation and data visualiser. tgf.corda.consulting
    3.
    ALTO, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026, Table 2 and p. 62.
    4.
    CPCS with HDR for ALTO, High-Speed Rail and Freight Capacity: Potential Freight Benefits of Alto, June 2026, pp. 5, 6, 8, 10, 11.
    5.
    The Alto Files, “Five Times What?: Alto’s UPA response,” November 12, 2026, citing ATI release A-2026-00195 and C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 676. thealtofiles.substack.com
    6.
    Ontario Federation of Agriculture, “Farm groups meet to discuss the Alto high-speed rail project,” June 17, 2026. ofa.on.ca
    7.
    P. Saint-Arnaud, “Le PDG d’Alto affirme que le projet de TGF présenté par l’UPA ne tient pas la route,” The Canadian Press, in L’actualité, November 12, 2026. lactualite.com
    8.
    Stone Mills Against Alto, Facebook post, November 12, 2026, with an app-assisted English translation of Martin Imbleau’s interview on La commission (French). CBC News, “Montreal–Ottawa high-speed rail line could cross 1,700 properties, Alto predicts,” May 5, 2026. CBC News
    9.
    Radio-Canada, “TGV d’Alto : « On fait face à des vendeurs de chars », lance l’UPA,” September 2026. ici.radio-canada.ca
    10.
    International Railway Journal, “ONCF completes study into first phase of new Morocco high-speed line.” railjournal.com
    11.
    Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Canada’s Eastern Corridor High-Speed Rail: A Cost Analysis using Global Data, RP-2627-009-C, October 1, 2026.
    12.
    Initiative briefs: Two Point Two Trillion (July 2026); Estimated, Not Simulated (June 2026); Canada’s Rail Exceptionalism (2026); Counting the Crossings (August 2026).