

# ALTO ridership against the modal-shift evidence

*A synthesis of four research notes on rail–air substitution, rail–car substitution, the ALTO ridership envelope, and the operating subsidy frontier.*

## Headline finding

ALTO's published target of 24 million annual passengers by 2055 sits **2.6× above the CRI central case** and is incompatible with every other independent forecast for the corridor.

# Modal shift versus air follows a logistic S-curve

Note 1 — rail captures the majority of the rail+air market below ~4 hours station-to-station

## What the evidence shows

- < 2 h — **rail dominates** (near full capture of rail+air market)
- 2–4 h — **competitive zone** (60–80% rail share, infrastructure decisive)
- > 5 h — **rail share collapses** (only price-sensitive or rail-loyal travellers)

### Empirical anchors

- Paris–Lyon TGV: rail share 40% → 72%
- Madrid–Barcelona AVE: ~75% rail share at 2 h 30 min
- Madrid–Seville: rail share 16% → 52%
- Beijing–Shanghai: 1,318 km in 4 h 18 min, rail-dominant




Figure 1 — rail share of the rail+air market, logistic curve with inflection at 3.5 h.

Note 1 · Modal shift between high-speed rail and air on the ALTO corridor

# Modal shift versus car: harder in North America

Note 2 — the NA-calibrated S-curve is anchored on VIA Rail's ~13% rail share against road, with a 19-point shift in inflection

## Why NA shifts the curve

**Toll-free highways** — 401/A20 corridor end-to-end

**Low fuel taxes** — ~1/3 of European levels

**No congestion charging** anywhere in Canada

**Family-car economics** — per-person car cost divides among occupants; rail charges per ticket

### Predicted rail share of rail+car market

ALTO Toronto–Ottawa ( $\tau \approx 0.44$ ): ~51% NA / 67% EU

ALTO Toronto–Montréal ( $\tau \approx 0.56$ ): ~41% NA / 58% EU

HPR both pairs ( $\tau \approx 0.65$ – $0.67$ ): ~33% NA / 50% EU




Figure 1b — NA-calibrated rail-vs-car S-curve. Inflection shifts left from  $\tau = 0.65$  (Europe) to  $\tau = 0.46$  (NA).


Note 2 · Modal shift between rail and car on the ALTO corridor

# Price shifts the whole modal-shift curve

Fare-to-comparator price ratio ( $r$ ) determines where the corridor sits within each S-curve family


## Air-to-Rail

Rail share of the rail+air market vs station-to-station time, at six rail-to-air price ratios.



## Road-to-Rail

Rail share of the rail+car market vs  $\tau$ , at six rail-to-car per-person price ratios.



### Price elasticity differs

Road-rail substitution is more price-sensitive than air-rail ( $\gamma = 1.5$  vs  $1.0$ ); families amplify this effect.

### Group travel hurts rail

Per-person car cost divides among occupants; rail charges per ticket. A family of 4 faces  $r \times$  higher than solo.

### Regime mapping

Regime A  $r \approx 0.55$  / Regime B  $r \approx 1.0$  / Regime C  $r \approx 1.4$  — each selects a different curve in the family.

# The ridership envelope at 2055 is 3.7 to 17.2 million

Note 3 — three demographic trajectories under Regime B (moderate subsidy, fares at parity with air)

**9.2M**  
 CRI central case at 2055 (Regime B)

## Framework

Ridership = population × per-capita trips × modal share × ramp-up.

## Demographic inputs (post-2024)


14.9M corridor population (2025)

1.68 intercity trips per resident

StatCan LG / M1 / HG growth: 0.5% / 1.0% / 1.6% per year

Reflects 2024 federal NPR cap

## Regime B — moderate subsidy, parity with air




Regime B — central 2055 reading: 9.2M; 2080 reading: 12.5M (central), 8.9–18.3M envelope.

Note 3 · Ridership envelope for the ALTO corridor, 2035–2080

# The 24M target is the outlier

Every independent forecast — academic, federal, and policy — clusters around the CRI central case.

**CRI central case is reduced by the 2024–25 immigration inflection:** the federal cap on non-permanent residents broke the corridor’s demographic trajectory, lowering the central forecast relative to pre-2024 expectations.



**Pre-cap demographics:** all independent forecasts — including the 2025 McGill and C.D. Howe studies — use pre-2024 population assumptions; only the CRI analysis incorporates the federal NPR cap.

**Post-pandemic business travel:** hybrid work and AI-mediated meetings structurally reduce corridor business travel below pre-2020 baseline (Note 3) — a head-wind absent from older forecasts.

# The 24-million target fails three independent feasibility tests

1

## Modal-shift framework

Reaching 24M requires modal share above the 40 per cent ceiling implied by the NA-calibrated S-curves in Notes 1 and 2. Even ALTO's heaviest-subsidy regime, with deeply discounted fares, plateaus near 11–12M annual riders at the modal-shift ceiling.

2

## Demographic baseline

The 2024 federal Immigration Levels Plan capped non-permanent residents, producing a structural break in corridor population growth. Pre-2024 forecasts assumed continued surge; post-2024 trajectories are materially lower. 15–25 per cent of the gap to ALTO is demographic alone.

3

## Subsidy frontier

Pushing past Regime A toward 24M requires operating subsidy above \$5B per year with full federal cost approaching \$7B per year under the proponent's own \$75B capex base case — outside any defensible operating-regime choice on the corridor.