In the News — 2024–Feb 2026
News Jan–Apr 2026 → or
News 2026 (Post-Consultation) →
The Ontario Federation of Agriculture and l’Union des producteurs agricoles issued a joint resolution calling for an immediate suspension of the Alto project. OFA President Spoelstra: Ontario farmland contributes $51 billion annually to the provincial economy.
MP Scott Reid told the House of Commons the project would “destroy lives, ruin property rights and ruin communities.” MPP Steve Clark cited harms to farms, sensitive habitat, and heritage areas.
Detailed coverage of the Peterborough open house — 815 attendees.
CPAWS research: Canada’s protected natural areas generate $10.9 billion in GDP, support 150,000 jobs — value not in Alto’s route cost-benefit analysis.
Mirabel farming families who had land expropriated in 1969 and repurchased it now face another expropriation for Alto.
Belleville City Council approved a motion opposing the southern corridor. The route could affect 2,500–2,700 homeowners and up to eight Quinte Conservation land holdings.
National Post columnist Chris Selley examines the McGill University public transit lab survey: only 778 daily boardings in Quebec City projected and an average willingness to pay just $20 more than current VIA Rail fares. At Eglinton Crosstown cost rates of $684 million per kilometre, Toronto–Quebec City HSR would cost roughly $600 billion. May require a subscription.
Rideau Lakes Township unanimously rejected the Alto HSR proposal, citing agricultural lands and the UNESCO-designated Frontenac Arch Biosphere and Rideau Canal.
Kingston City Council voted 9–2 to support the southern route only if it includes a city station, formally opposing it otherwise.
South Frontenac votes unanimously against the southern corridor. Mayor Vandewal calls the potential impact ‘generational devastation.’
Alto’s consultation platform confirms its “current hypothesis” involves a tunnel under the Rivière des Prairies and Mount Royal to reach downtown Montréal — a bore exceeding 10 kilometres. McGill Urban Planning professor Ahmed El-Geneidy warns it would cost over $1 billion per kilometre, representing 12–18% of Alto’s $60–90 billion budget.
Jerome Gessaroli (Macdonald-Laurier Institute) argues Alto faces a costly fiscal reckoning — capital costs of $250M–$375M per minute of travel time saved, well above EU averages.
Matti Siemiatycski — U of T Infrastructure Institute director and Alto academic advisor — argues the project has no public business case, final route, budget, or ridership forecast.
The Davies Howe analysis mirrored on Mondaq. Confirms Bill C-15 reduces opportunities for landowners to challenge or delay expropriation.
Legal analysis of Bill C-15’s three major changes: elimination of public hearing rights, expanded survey access, and the new expropriation framework.
Coverage of Bill C-15’s grant of sweeping new powers to Alto — including the right to enter and survey private property without consent or advance notice.
Official press release confirming Ottawa–Montreal as the first segment, the January–March 2026 public consultation, and a 2029–2030 construction start target.
Overview of the December announcement: Cadence consortium, the accelerated timeline from Major Projects Office designation, and why Ottawa–Montreal was prioritised first.
Transport Action Canada urging residents to “come forward with as much information as possible regarding community assets” — one of the clearest engagement calls from an established transit advocacy group.
Recap of the December announcement with historical context — from the 2021 proposal through Cadence selection and the Ottawa–Montreal first-segment decision.
The Globe on Bill C-15’s sweeping new expropriation powers — including survey rights on private land without consent.
HSR advocacy overview of Bill C-15’s rail provisions — a useful counterpoint to the critical legal analyses.
Access-to-information documents reveal the Cadence bid was so low that government evaluators triple-checked whether it could be delivered. Cadence won primarily on its “very competitive commercial package” — worth up to 30 of 120 evaluation points. U of T’s Matti Siemiatycki warns low bids typically see costs rise, and without the bid contents being public, tracking will be impossible. Essential context for the $60–90B project cost range. May require a subscription.
Kathryn Exon Smith and Egon Terplan draw lessons from Amtrak’s Acela, Florida’s Brightline, and California HSR for Alto’s planners. Three key decisions: (1) Station location — city-centre stations maximize ridership and development but add tunnelling costs; (2) Incremental vs. greenfield build — electrifying the Montréal–Ottawa segment first would deliver early wins and let politicians experience fast rail; (3) Stable long-term funding beyond construction, including potential value capture around stations. Note: Brightline ridership is triple projections; California’s greenfield-first approach produced a “train to nowhere” perception problem. Authors recommend Alto avoid both mistakes.
Federal budget documentation: $597M allocated to Alto for 2025–26 and the overall $3.9B six-year commitment.
The EOWC writes to Alto CEO Martin Imbleau opposing any route bypassing 800,000+ residents. SDG Warden Martin Lang: the rail will cut up farms and townships, just as the 401 did.
Opinion analysis from an aviation infrastructure advocacy perspective. Questions the switch from High-Frequency Rail to HSR without reopening the bidding process, and cites VIA Rail’s own 2015 report to Parliament concluding that HSR is not financially viable and would require public underwriting of 75% of total project costs. Argues that by 2050, when HSR is projected to be complete, aviation will have achieved net zero emissions, eliminating the line’s environmental advantage. Also raises conflict-of-interest questions about Air Canada’s participation in the Cadence consortium.
Transport Action Canada’s detailed analysis of the February 2025 Cadence announcement. Raises serious concerns: Alto published — then withdrew — a timeline showing construction unlikely before the early 2030s and passengers not until the 2040s. Notes Cadence was chosen primarily on commercial price, not technical merit. Flags that Canada still lacks national HSR standards, without which contracts cannot be properly specified. Consortium: CDPQ Infra, AtkinsRéalis, Keolis, SYSTRA, SNCF Voyageurs, Air Canada.
Toronto City Council briefed on the then-HFR project, when the price tag was still estimated at $6–12 billion. U of T’s Matti Siemiatycki — now an Alto academic advisor — warned directly: “This could be a really important move or — depending on how it’s designed — it could do very little and be a costly boondoggle.” Experts also warned the project could “siphon money away” from local transit budgets.
David Reevely’s early investigation when the project was still “high-frequency rail” with a $6–12 billion price tag. U of T’s Siemiatycski warned “costs tend to be underestimated and benefits overestimated.” Essential reading for tracking how the project’s scope and cost have escalated to $60–90B today. May require a subscription.