The $3.9 Billion Before the First Shovel
Canada has already committed $3.9 billion to ALTO — not to build anything, but to plan it. Is that money being spent well?
The public debate about ALTO has focused on the $60–90 billion it might eventually cost to build. But that decision has not been made. What has been decided — through a Treasury Board filing — is that Canada will spend $3.9 billion between now and 2030 just on planning.
This money is already flowing. It funds the private consortium doing the design work, the land acquisition team, the communications operation, and executive salaries for a Crown corporation of 145 staff at Co-development launch (2024–25), growing to 209 in 2025–26. No track will be laid. No stations built. The $3.9B produces plans, studies, permits, and agreements — and ends with a cost estimate the government’s own documents acknowledge could still be wrong by 50%.
The question this analysis asks: is $3.9 billion of public money being spent with adequate transparency, appropriate priorities, and the rigour Canadians should expect? The Amended Corporate Plan — the only document that breaks this spending down — raises serious concerns.
$5.2 billion before construction begins
The $3.9B announced in February 2025 is not the first money spent on this project. Canada has invested in the rail corridor for years, and the cumulative pre-construction total now exceeds $5 billion — all operating expenditure, all before a Final Investment Decision has been made.
| Budget | Purpose | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| Budget 2021 | Planning, de-risking, VIA Rail infrastructure | $495.6M |
| Budget 2022 | Procurement Phase — selecting a private partner | $396.8M |
| Budget 2024 | Bridge funding to Co-development | $371.8M |
| Feb 19, 2025 | Co-development Phase — the $3.9B now in question | $3.9B |
| Total pre-construction commitment | ~$5.2B | |
Sources: Transport Canada Parliamentary Binder, Item 08; VIA HFR Corporate Plan Summary; PM news release February 19, 2025.
Three categories — one that is largely undisclosed
The Amended Corporate Plan is the only public document to break the $3.9B into categories. The split reveals something important about priorities.
The critical transparency gap
The largest category — $2.95 billion — combines what Cadence (the private consortium) is paid with what Alto itself spends running the project. The split between these two has not been disclosed. The Pre-Development Agreement governing this arrangement has not been released. This is the single most important undisclosed document in the project record.
18 communications staff for every 1 environmental scientist
The Amended Corporate Plan contains a complete workforce breakdown that has never been made publicly available. The numbers tell a striking story about where this project’s real priorities lie.
| Team | 2024–25 | 2025–26 | 2026–27 | 2027–28 | 2028–29 | 2029–30 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Communications, Public Affairs & Indigenous Relations | 36 | 48 | 56 | 65 | 65 | 65 |
| Land Negotiations | 11 | 19 | 23 | 25 | 27 | 42 |
| Project Management Office | 22 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| Project Controls | 14 | 20 | 26 | 26 | 36 | 36 |
| Enabling Functions (Executive, Finance, IT, Legal, HR) | 51 | 73 | 78 | 81 | 77 | 77 |
| Commercial Project Development | 9 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Environmental and Regulatory | 2 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Total | 145 | 209 | 232 | 246 | 254 | 269 |
Source: Annex B — HR Strategy, VIA HFR Amended Corporate Plan Summary 2024–25 to 2028–29, p.28
The Land Negotiations team confirms the pattern: 11 land negotiators against 2 environmental scientists at launch — a 5.5:1 ratio. By 2029–30, Land Negotiations grows to 42 while Environmental and Regulatory reaches only 10, a ratio of 4.2:1. This project is staffed to acquire land at more than four times the rate it is staffed to assess what acquiring that land means for the environment.
Land will be taken before the cost is known
The Amended Corporate Plan’s own glossary defines what the cost estimates at each planning stage are actually worth. The numbers are striking.
| Stage | Estimate Class | Accuracy | Meaning for a $60B project |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stage 2 — current | Class 4 | −30% to +50% | Could come in anywhere from $42B to $90B |
| Stage 3 | Class 3 | −20% to +30% | $48B to $78B |
| Stage 4 (outside plan period) | Class 2 | −15% to +20% | $51B to $72B |
Class 4 is the standard used for initial feasibility screening — not for selecting a corridor affecting thousands of landowners.
The expropriation timeline
Alto CEO Martin Imbleau told CBC Ottawa Morning (March 25, 2026): “That process will probably start in 2027” — referring to land acquisition across thousands of properties. Construction mobilizes in 2029; real construction in 2030.
2027 is Stage 2 completion — the earliest point at which even a Class 4 estimate exists. Minister MacKinnon told the Senate National Finance Committee (March 11, 2026) that cost precision requires “the final alignment, geology, public rights-of-way, and station locations” to be determined — none of which are settled today.
Thousands of landowners will have their properties permanently acquired under a cost estimate the government’s own documents acknowledge could be wrong by 50%. The expropriation decision precedes the cost certainty that would ordinarily justify it.
Five things the public still doesn’t know
The Amended Corporate Plan is the most informative public budget document in the ALTO record — and it still leaves five critical questions unanswered.
How much is Cadence actually being paid?
The $2.95 billion “Drive Design” category combines Alto’s own costs with all payments to the Cadence consortium in a single line. The Pre-Development Agreement governing this split has not been released. There is no public basis for evaluating whether Cadence’s share is reasonable.
What is the contingency budget?
The Corporate Plan states a “rationale on contingency amounts has been developed.” That rationale has not been made public. Given a Stage 2 estimate that could be wrong by +50%, a contingency of unknown size is a material financial risk.
How will the corridor actually be chosen?
The public consultation closed April 24 — before the corridor is determined. No criteria, weighting, or methodology for corridor selection has been published. Communities engaged without knowing how their input will be used.
Where will the stations go?
Station location determines ridership, and ridership determines the entire economic case. The criteria for station selection remain undisclosed, even as the consultation invited comment on potential corridor impacts.
What did the three competing bids actually say — and why haven’t they been released?
The RFQ (February 2023, p.18) states explicitly that proposal development fees would be “up to $20 million per Proponent, including the successful Proponent” — conditional on each consortium granting Canada intellectual property rights over all deliverables. With three shortlisted consortia, the total public investment in these proposals was up to $60 million.
Per Section 1.3 of the RFQ (“RFP Submittals”), each consortium was required to produce: independent corridor alignments; a Class 5 Cost Estimate based on the international Cost Estimate Classification System; ridership forecasts and revenue models; operating cost models; a financial structure and financial model; construction schedules; and risk and opportunity registers. These are precisely the documents that would provide independent context for the $60–90B range and for the Class 4 accuracy problem described above.
Three independent world-class teams each spent up to $20 million developing this analysis. The Government of Canada owns all of it. None of it has been released. Confirmed as Crown-owned intellectual property under ATI A-2025-00026. The government’s rationale for non-disclosure has not been published.
ALTO versus every other project on Carney’s nation-building list
Prime Minister Carney’s Major Projects Office (MPO) portfolio covers $116 billion in infrastructure across two tranches (September and November 2025). ALTO sits alongside LNG terminals, nuclear power, copper mines, and Arctic corridors. The financial comparison is instructive.
No other project in Carney’s MPO portfolio requires $3.9 billion in purely operating expenditure before a construction contract is awarded. No other MPO project carries a published benefit-cost ratio below 1.0. No other MPO project is consulting communities while its cost estimate carries a Class 4 accuracy range.
What else $3.9 billion could do — right now
Canada’s federal-provincial collective deficit rose 88% in a single year (Globe and Mail Editorial Board, April 2026). In that context, $3.9 billion of pre-construction operating expenditure — producing no infrastructure — warrants comparison with current federal priorities.
~6 years of VIA Rail
VIA Rail’s federal appropriation runs ~$650M/year, covering the national network Halifax to Vancouver. The $3.9B Co-development Phase equals roughly six full years of the existing national passenger rail service ALTO is meant to complement.
Urban transit: 1.6 billion trips today vs. ALTO’s projected 24 million in the 2050s
Canada’s urban transit systems logged 1.6 billion passenger trips in 2024. ALTO projects 10.3 to 24 million inter-city trips per year by the 2050s — a number that, even at the optimistic end, is 67 times smaller than what urban transit already delivers annually. Matti Siemiatycki, director of the Infrastructure Institute at the University of Toronto and a member of Alto’s own academic advisory panel, argued in the Globe and Mail (January 2, 2026) that a major investment in Canada’s underfunded urban transit systems would deliver far greater economic, social, and environmental benefit. The comparison is transport-to-transport: ALTO serves a corridor already covered by air and road, while urban transit moves the daily majority of commuters in every major Canadian city.
2.6× all of Phase 1 pharmacare
The federal government committed $1.5B to launch pharmacare for diabetes and contraception. $3.9B is 2.6 times that entire investment, or 17 years at the current bilateral agreement rate of $232M/year.
91% of Canada’s Indigenous housing commitment
Budget 2021 committed $4.3B over seven years for Indigenous housing. The $3.9B Co-development Phase equals 91% of that entire commitment — for a project that produces no housing and no track.
~13,000 affordable housing units
Federal contributions to affordable housing average ~$300,000 per unit. At that rate, $3.9B would fund approximately 13,000 affordable homes.
24% of the Site C dam
B.C.’s Site C hydroelectric project, delivering clean power to 450,000+ homes annually, cost ~$16B. The Co-development Phase equals 24% of that dam’s cost — for a project that will not deliver a single kilowatt or passenger-kilometre before the 2030s.
Documents underlying this analysis
All findings on this page are drawn from government-filed documents and on-record statements. Download the full research note and primary source documents at citizenresearch.ca/submissions.