This brief documents, in chronological order, the public record of how Canada’s High Frequency Rail (HFR) procurement became the ALTO High-Speed Rail project. It draws exclusively on documents in the public record: government procurement instruments, parliamentary committee testimony, Access to Information releases, corporate plans filed with Treasury Board, and ministerial briefing notes.
The brief does not argue against high-speed rail in principle. It documents a specific accountability question: a structured, legally binding procurement was conducted, three private consortia were shortlisted, up to $60 million in public funds was committed for proposal development, Parliament was briefed on the project’s parameters — and then, between the summer of 2024 and February 2025, the project’s fundamental specification changed. The decision-making record for that change has never been publicly disclosed.
The four accountability questions at the end of this brief follow directly from the documentary record. They are not rhetorical. They have not been answered.
The Documentary Timeline
2017–2021
Phase 1: Review of VIA Rail’s HFR proposal
VIA Rail develops a High Frequency Rail proposal using predominantly dedicated tracks at speeds up to 160 km/h — not high speed. A Joint Project Office is established with the Canada Infrastructure Bank in 2019 with a $71M budget to “de-risk” the project. Transport Action Canada testified to Parliament that VIA Rail’s original proposal was decision-ready by summer 2018 and could have been in service by 2025. [Source: TRAN 18th Report]
Oct 2020
Ministerial Briefing filed: NPV −$21.1 billion, no HSR cold-climate precedent
A briefing prepared for Ministers McKenna and Garneau finds the predecessor project has a Net Present Value of −$21.1 billion, a benefit-cost ratio of approximately 0.4, and a 30-year subsidy requirement of $37–42 billion. It also states explicitly: “QMOT was unable to identify an HSR system that operates at 300 km/h in −30°C conditions.” Both findings remain on file at announcement. Neither is disclosed publicly. [Source: CIB ATI A-2024-004]
Feb 2023
PSPC issues binding RFQ — Project Outcomes establish HFR baseline
Public Services and Procurement Canada issues RFQ No. T8128-210188/C. Binding Project Outcomes include: 17 million annual passengers by 2059; elimination of operating subsidies; adherence to an affordability range throughout the project lifecycle. The document uses “mostly dedicated tracks” — not a fully fenced, fully grade-separated HSR corridor. Proposal development fees of up to $20 million per proponent are committed (up to $60 million total). Canada acquires intellectual property rights in all proposal deliverables. [Source: RFQ T8128-210188/C]
Apr 2023
RFQ closes — three consortia shortlisted
Three consortia are selected: Cadence (CDPQ Infra, Atkins-Réalis/SNC-Lavalin, Systra Canada, Keolis Canada); Intercity Rail Developers (Intercity Development Partners, Meridiam, Kilmer Transportation, First Rail Holdings, Jacobs, Hatch, CIMA+, RATP Dev Canada, First Group, Renfe Operadora); QConnexiON Rail Partners (Fengate, John Laing, Bechtel, WSP Canada, Deutsche Bahn). [Sources: RFQ; TC Briefing Note Mar 2024; TRAN 18th Report]
May 2023
RFP Summary circulated to Indigenous communities — IAA and Section 35 duties confirmed
VIA HFR circulates an RFP summary to Indigenous communities for consultation. The document explicitly states the project is subject to Impact Assessment Act requirements and identifies Transport Canada, the Canadian Transportation Agency, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada as federal authorities whose regulatory approvals would be required. Section 35 duty to consult and UNDRIP principles are invoked as governing frameworks. [Source: VIA HFR RFP Summary, May 2023]
Oct 2023
RFP launched — high-speed option framed as assessment tool, not the project
The RFP is issued October 13, 2023. Each consortium is required to develop two solutions: one meeting HFR outcomes at conventional speeds, and one more ambitious option including “high speed alignments or segments” — explicitly for the purpose of allowing government to “assess the potential benefits and costs of integrating segments of high speed rail.” The high-speed option is an assessment tool, not the project itself. [Sources: TC Briefing Note Mar 2024; TRAN 18th Report]
Nov 2023
VIA Rail CEO testifies to Parliament: no HSR precedent for 70°C temperature range
Mario Péloquin, President and CEO of VIA Rail Canada, testifies before the TRAN committee that he is “not aware of any examples of high-speed trains that operate in regions where the temperature can vary by up to 70°C from winter to summer, including drastic changes within a season, or even a single day.” This testimony is given fifteen months before the ALTO announcement and is never publicly reconciled with the subsequent 300 km/h specification. [Source: TRAN 18th Report, Nov 2023 testimony]
Feb 2024
Parliament passes Recommendation 4: budget and incremental cost analysis required within six months
The TRAN committee passes Recommendation 4, formally requiring the Minister of Transport to provide “within six months a budget and a timetable for completing this project, including an analysis of the incremental cost between HFR and HSR.” Recommendation 6 requires full unredacted release of the Joint Project Office report. Neither is fulfilled. [Source: TRAN 18th Report, September 2024]
Mar 2024
Transport Canada ministerial briefing: co-development expected late 2024 – early 2025
A Transport Canada briefing note prepared for the TRAN committee states the Co-Development Phase with the winning HFR bidder was “expected in late 2024 to early 2025.” The document’s scripted response on high-speed rail frames HSR as an assessment option within HFR — not as the project itself. The scripted response on cost states: “At this time, it is too early to establish a specific cost.” [Source: TC Briefing Note, binder item 37, March 2024]
Jun 2024
RFP proposals submitted by three consortia — Canada holds IP rights
All three consortia submit their RFP proposals. Under the Submission Agreement, Canada holds intellectual property rights in all deliverables. These proposals contain detailed engineering, financial, and operational analyses developed at a combined cost of up to $60 million. They have never been publicly disclosed. [Source: RFQ T8128-210188/C; TRAN 18th Report]
Late Summer 2024
Preferred proponent selection was scheduled — what happened is unknown and undisclosed
According to both the RFQ procurement schedule and the March 2024 TC briefing note, the preferred proponent was to be selected in late summer/fall 2024 and co-development was to begin in late 2024. Whether a selection was made, what the proposals showed, and what triggered the subsequent redesign are undisclosed. This is the central gap in the procurement record. [Sources: RFQ; TC Briefing Note Mar 2024]
Sep 2024
TRAN 18th Report tabled — Recommendations 4 and 6 both unfulfilled
The committee’s 18th Report is tabled. Neither the budget/incremental cost analysis (Rec. 4) nor the full JPO report (Rec. 6) has been provided. The government is required to respond within 120 days under Standing Order 109. [Source: TRAN 18th Report]
Feb 2025
ALTO announced — 300 km/h, $60–90B, construction 2029, no budget, no disclosed rationale
Prime Minister Trudeau announces ALTO: 300 km/h, fully dedicated fenced track, $60–90 billion, construction 2029. No budget methodology is disclosed. No incremental HFR/HSR cost analysis is published. No explanation is given for why the HFR procurement — whose preferred proponent was to be selected six months earlier — was superseded. The three HFR consortia’s proposals, worth up to $60M and containing government-owned IP, are not released.
May 2025
ALTO Corporate Plan: no validated budget until Stage 4 — beyond the five-year plan period
ALTO’s Amended Corporate Plan 2024-25 to 2028-29 confirms Class 2 cost estimates (−15% to +20% accuracy) will not be available until Stage 4 of co-development — which falls outside the five-year plan period. The plan also acknowledges ALTO “faced some challenges in recruiting very specific technical skills (e.g., rail sector).” [Source: ALTO Amended Corporate Plan, May 2025]
Jan 2026
ALTO CEO: “Our budget is not known”
Martin Imbleau states at the Empire Club of Canada, the day before public consultation opens: “Our budget is not known.” He also states: “What Canada does too often — we make political promises. We throw numbers, dates, without doing the proper work.” No correction to the $60–90B figure has been issued. [Source: Empire Club of Canada transcript, January 22, 2026]
Jan–Apr 2026
Public consultation opens and closes — no budget, no environmental baseline, consultation concurrent with route selection
ALTO’s three-month public consultation runs January 23 to April 24, 2026. Communities are asked to comment on corridor routes for a project with no validated budget, no completed environmental field studies, no geotechnical characterisation of either corridor, and a procurement record that has never been publicly accounted for. ALTO’s CEO has confirmed on the record that consultation and corridor refinement are concurrent — not sequential — with the route selection decision.
The cost of the gap
The RFQ committed up to $20 million per proponent in proposal development fees — totalling up to $60 million for three consortia. Canada also acquired intellectual property rights in all deliverables. These proposals contain detailed engineering, financial, and operational analyses for a High Frequency Rail project across the Toronto–Québec City corridor. They are government property. They have not been released. The communities now being consulted on ALTO have no access to the only independent financial analyses ever conducted for infrastructure of this scale and on this corridor.
What $60 Million in Proposals Actually Required
To understand why the undisclosed proposals matter, it helps to know what each consortium was actually required to produce. The list below is drawn directly from the binding procurement documents. Every item was required twice — once for the conventional HFR scenario and once for a high-speed variant — and was refined over nine months of intensive meetings with government officials.
Think of it this way: the government hired three of the world’s largest infrastructure consortia to independently answer the question “How would you build and run a railway across this corridor, and what would it cost?” Each team spent the better part of a year answering it. The answers belong to Canadians. They have not been released.
1
A Complete Business Plan for the Entire Project
Covering all phases from procurement through 30–50 years of operations. Each team had to demonstrate, with a documented plan, how their solution would meet the government’s stated outcomes for the corridor.
2
A Preliminary Route Alignment Across 1,000+ km
Each consortium had to propose where the track would actually go — across rivers, through Canadian Shield terrain, around cities, past karst limestone, through Leda clay zones. This required GIS analysis, geotechnical desk studies, and preliminary engineering capable of withstanding expert scrutiny.
3
Independent Ridership and Revenue Forecasts
Each consortium had to develop its own projections for how many people would use the service, what fares they would pay, and what revenue the system would generate. These are the only independent financial analyses of this corridor ever produced by qualified parties. They have never been disclosed — even though the government owns them.
4
Full Capital and Operating Cost Estimates
Complete cost estimates for building over 1,000 km of new railway and operating it for decades. The government’s current position is that “our budget is not known.” Three independent teams spent months producing exactly this analysis. Their numbers have not been released.
5
A Complete Financing Plan and Financial Model
How the private sector would actually fund a project of this scale — debt structure, equity, risk sharing between government and private partner, financial stress-testing. Three world-class financial teams — including pension funds and major infrastructure investors — built these models independently. They remain undisclosed.
6
A Land Acquisition Strategy Across Two Provinces
How the right-of-way for 1,000+ km of new track would be acquired — identifying affected properties, estimating expropriation costs, describing the legal and consultation process. This work directly informs what expropriation would look like for thousands of landowners in the corridor.
7
Plans for Transitioning VIA Rail Operations
VIA Rail currently runs passenger trains on this corridor. Each consortium had to describe how they would take over those services, protect existing employees and union agreements, and integrate the old service with the new one — while keeping trains running throughout the transition.
8
Indigenous Participation Plans for 40+ Communities
Detailed plans for engaging with more than 40 potentially-impacted Indigenous communities throughout the project lifecycle — including during environmental assessment, construction, and operations — with specific funding proposals and benefit-sharing arrangements.
9
A 30–50-Year Operations and Maintenance Programme
How the railway would be run day-to-day and maintained over decades — covering everything from customer service standards to capital renewal cycles for track, rolling stock, and systems. Each consortium built this out in full.
Why this matters to communities
The government says ALTO has no validated budget, no completed environmental assessments, and no confirmed route. Yet three world-class teams — working under binding legal agreements, for nine months, at a combined cost of up to $60 million — produced exactly this analysis for a predecessor project on the same corridor. The Canadian government owns every page of those proposals. They have not been released to Parliament, to the Parliamentary Budget Officer, or to the communities being asked to weigh in on ALTO before April 24, 2026.
Four Accountability Questions
The following questions arise directly from the documentary record. They have not been answered by the government, ALTO, or in parliamentary proceedings.
Q1
What happened between June 2024 and February 2025? Was a preferred HFR proponent selected, and if so, what did their proposal show? If a selection was made, why was the project specification then changed? If no selection was made, why not, and at whose direction?
Q2
What are the contents of the three HFR RFP proposals? Canada holds intellectual property rights in all deliverables. These proposals contain independent financial modelling, engineering analyses, and ridership projections produced at a combined cost of up to $60 million. Why have they not been released? Under what authority are they being withheld from communities participating in the ALTO consultation?
Q3
Why were Parliamentary Recommendations 4 and 6 not fulfilled? The TRAN committee required the Minister to provide a budget and incremental HFR/HSR cost analysis within six months, and to release the full JPO report. Neither has been provided. What is the government’s response under Standing Order 109?
Q4
What is the legal basis for proceeding to route corridor selection before the Impact Assessment Act process the RFQ identified as mandatory? The binding HFR RFQ stated the project is subject to IAA requirements and that regulatory approvals from Transport Canada, the Canadian Transportation Agency, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada are required before construction. Bill C-15 proposes to make these protections subject to ministerial exemption. What assurance exists that the statutory framework in place when the procurement was launched will govern the project through to construction?
What Access to Information Can Unlock
The ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative has filed formal ATIP requests to Infrastructure Canada. Parallel requests to Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) — confirmed as Procurement Authority in the RFQ — are warranted. The records in scope include:
- Draft and final RFP proposals submitted by all three consortia (government IP under the Submission Agreement)
- Evaluation scoring matrices and assessors’ notes from the RFP proposal evaluation process
- Internal correspondence and decision memoranda relating to any change in project scope, technology specification, or speed standard between June 2024 and February 2025
- Records of communication between PSPC, Transport Canada, VIA HFR, and the Privy Council Office regarding the transition from HFR to ALTO
- The JPO final report in unredacted form, as formally recommended by the TRAN committee
- The Canada Infrastructure Bank’s financial modelling for the ALTO specification (if any exists distinct from the 2021 HFR business case released under ATI)
Primary Sources
All documents listed below are available for direct download at citizenresearch.ca/source-files/.
CIB ATI A-2024-004 — Canada Infrastructure Bank Access to Information release, November 2025. Ministerial Briefing on HFR, October 2020. Contains NPV, BCR, and cold-climate findings.
RFQ T8128-210188/C — Request for Qualifications for the High Frequency Rail Project. Issued by PSPC, February 17, 2023. Submission deadline April 24, 2023.
VIA HFR RFP Summary — Summary of the Request for Proposals of the High Frequency Rail, circulated to Indigenous communities. VIA HFR, May 2023.
TRAN 18th Report — Issues and Opportunities: High Frequency Rail in the Toronto to Quebec City Corridor. Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, September 2024, 44th Parliament, 1st Session.
TC Briefing Note Mar 2024 — Transport Canada Ministerial Briefing Note, Item 37: High Frequency Rail. TRAN Briefing on Infrastructure in Canada, March 21, 2024. tc.canada.ca/en/binder/37-high-frequency-rail
ALTO Corporate Plan — ALTO Amended Corporate Plan 2024-25 to 2028-29. Filed with Treasury Board, May 2025.
Empire Club Transcript — Remarks of Martin Imbleau, CEO of ALTO, Empire Club of Canada, January 22, 2026.
This brief is produced by the ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative for the public record and the ALTO public consultation process (deadline April 24, 2026). All claims are sourced to publicly available documents. altohsrcitizenresearch.ca · Independent and non-partisan.