Tag: farmland

  • Counting the crossings

    Counting the Crossings

    ALTO says it will not wall off communities, and points to France and Spain. Those countries did something else as well, and the letter leaves it out.

    ⚠ What ALTO Told Kingston Readers

    On 14 August 2026, a letter in the Kingston Whig-Standard from ALTO’s Chief Project Management Officer and Cadence’s Project Director told corridor residents the railway “will not create a wall between communities”, nor a barrier to wildlife or water. As proof it can be done, the letter offered two numbers: France has built more than 4,000 structures across roughly 2,700 km of high-speed line, and Spain more than 900 across roughly 750 km.

    The letter does not mention Kingston, the route, where stations would go, what any of it costs, or expropriation. It does say preserving access has been a key principle from the beginning. ALTO’s own Preserving Access and Movement page carries a last-modified date of 7 May 2026 — after the consultation closed on 24 April.

    The Short Version

    Take ALTO’s own figures and divide them through. France works out to about one structure every 675 metres. Spain, about one every 833 metres. Those are the rates being offered as reassurance.

    The trouble is that a count of structures built tells you nothing about how many crossings were closed. A railway can put in 900 bridges and still cut off 3,000 field entrances, farm lanes and township roads. The letter gives the top half of the fraction and leaves out the bottom.

    Kingstonians already have ALTO’s own answer to this. In February 2026, ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering told Kingston City Council that crossings would be consolidated to bring costs down, and that the company would try to limit how many overpasses get built. That was six months before the letter, to the same city, on the same subject.

    There is a larger omission. France did not solve farm severance with bridges. It has a legal procedure that lets the state reorganise the surrounding farmland so that a farm cut in two can be put back into a workable shape, paid for by the project. On one French high-speed line, 3,700 hectares of land were bought up in advance so that farmers could be compensated in land rather than only in cash. Ontario has nothing of the kind.

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    Counting the Crossings — Full Brief (PDF)
    The arithmetic behind ALTO’s France and Spain comparison, and the land instrument the letter leaves out

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    The Arithmetic

    What ALTO’s own numbers work out to

    Neither figure in the letter is disputed here. They are simply divided through. A structure count only becomes meaningful once you know how far apart the structures are, and how far apart the things they are meant to replace used to be.

    ~675 m
    average gap between structures on the French network, using ALTO’s figures
    4,000 structures over 2,700 km
    ~833 m
    average gap on the Spanish line ALTO cites
    900 structures over 750 km
    1.25–2 km
    typical spacing of public roads across eastern Ontario’s concession grid
    before counting farm lanes and driveways

    There is a third number the letter does not offer, and it cuts the other way. HS2 in Britain is the most recent comparable project of this kind: a brand-new high-speed line built through peri-urban and rural England. Its first phase runs about 225 km and will carry more than 500 bridging structures, including over 50 major viaducts — roughly one structure every 450 m. That is about half again the French rate, through country a good deal more built up than eastern Ontario. The most recent comparable project provided more, not fewer, than the average ALTO offers as reassurance.

    The spread between the three is itself worth noticing. A fifty per cent difference between two European networks tells you that these totals are governed by terrain, by how much of a route sits in tunnel or on viaduct, and by what each project counts as a structure. About nine tenths of HS2’s first phase runs in tunnel, in cutting or on structures, so a large share of those 500 exist to carry the railway over the landscape rather than to carry a community across the railway. A structure count is a construction statistic, not a standard of community access.

    Eastern Ontario was surveyed on a grid. Roads run at regular intervals, and between them sit farm lanes, private driveways and municipal drains. Whether a European average is enough for that grid is exactly the question people along the corridor are asking. Quoting the French figure does not answer it. It assumes the answer.

    There is a comparison closer to home that nobody has yet made. Highway 416 is a modern, fully grade-separated corridor built through the same survey grid, the same farmland and several of the same municipalities. How many crossings Ontario provided on that road is not something this brief has established, but it is the obvious yardstick, and it ought to be established before a French average is relied on.

    The Missing Number

    How many roads are we talking about?

    The denominator is not actually a mystery. Canada’s own transport department has published it.

    In a briefing note prepared for a Parliamentary committee in March 2023, Transport Canada set out what a full high-speed line between Québec City and Toronto would require: a fully enclosed and fenced corridor, a straighter alignment, double tracking throughout, and complete grade separation on a route that currently carries more than 1,000 public and private crossings.

    That figure described the northern route, through comparatively empty country — Canadian Shield, wetlands, big rural lots. The southern corridor now being prioritised runs through some of the most intensively farmed land in eastern Ontario, where the concession grid is tightest. On the southern option, 1,000 is more likely a floor than a ceiling.

    The Initiative’s own road severance analysis puts the proportion of crossings permanently closed rather than bridged on rural high-speed corridors at somewhere between 30 and 60 per cent. Applied to a floor of 1,000, that is 300 to 600 roads dead-ended — our estimate, not a figure ALTO or Transport Canada has published.

    1,000+
    public and private crossings on the alignment
    Transport Canada, March 2023
    300–600
    roads likely closed, on the Initiative’s estimate
    30 to 60 per cent of crossings
    $3.2–8.4B
    Initiative’s estimated cost of the crossings that would be built
    never shown as a separate line

    That last figure matters for a different reason. Grade separation is one of the most expensive parts of any high-speed corridor, and a sum of that size has never appeared as its own line in ALTO’s published capital estimate. Neither has any methodology explaining how many crossings will be built, or to what standard, or how it will be decided which roads are simply stopped up.

    The reassurance in the August letter is offered in the absence of the one document that could support it. Further detail is set out in the Initiative’s technical analysis of road severances.

    On the Record

    What ALTO told Kingston in February

    Six months before this letter appeared in Kingston’s paper, ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering and Interface sat before Kingston City Council and was asked about exactly this. The transcript is the fullest account ALTO has given in public of how it approaches road crossings, and it does not read the way the letter does.

    The reassurance

    Asked by a councillor whether there would be a standard distance between crossings, he described a working assumption that every road would get some form of duct or overpass, since the roads belong to municipalities or road authorities and cannot be cut unilaterally.

    The qualification, in the same answer

    He went on to say that in reality some crossings would be looked at for consolidation, to lower costs and improve construction, subject to discussion with the road authority.

    The objective

    Pressed by the Deputy Mayor, he set it out plainly: grade separations would vary by area, would be settled during route selection, and ALTO would “try and limit the number of overpasses that we’ll need to get created”.

    And the fencing

    He confirmed that modern high-speed rail must be completely segregated and fully fenced anywhere level access is possible, whether the line runs at 200 or 300 km/h.

    Read together: a starting assumption that is subject to cost-driven consolidation, an explicit goal of building as few overpasses as possible, and continuous fencing between whatever crossings survive.

    The councillor’s actual question — is there a standard distance between crossings — was not answered, and no standard has been published since. February’s statements and August’s letter were addressed to the same city.

    Three Problems

    Why the structure count does not settle it

    You are being shown half a fraction

    The number that answers the severance question is a ratio: structures built, divided by accesses cut off. The letter supplies only the first. Every complaint recorded by French and Spanish farmers over the last forty years is perfectly compatible with the figures quoted.

    Not every structure reconnects anything

    “Engineering structures” and “viaducts” include everything the railway needs to build itself: bridges over rivers, crossings of existing motorways and railways, tunnels through hills. A viaduct over a river gorge restores nobody’s access to their back field. How many of the 4,000 exist to reconnect a severed local road or laneway is not stated, and is certainly a much smaller number.

    A different landscape

    The French network largely runs through consolidated farming country. Eastern Ontario is a survey grid of concession roads, side roads, long farm lots and dead ends. The same rate of crossings produces a very different result depending on how much there was to cross in the first place.

    The Missing Piece

    What France also built

    The most important thing missing from the letter is not a number. It is a law.

    Two of the countries with the longest high-speed rail experience did not leave farm access to be worked out project by project. They legislated it. France did so through its rural code; Germany passed a federal land consolidation statute in 1953 that covers exactly this situation. In both, farmers sit on the body that decides, that body can compulsorily redraw the farms and the farm tracks together, the proponent pays, and there is a right of appeal to the courts.

    France has a statutory procedure called aménagement foncier agricole et forestier — land reorganisation, formerly known as remembrement. Its stated purpose includes repairing the damage that major linear projects, high-speed railways among them, do to rural land. Where a line slices a farm in half, the surrounding parcels can be legally reorganised so that holdings are handed back in a shape a farmer can actually work. Local commissions run it under departmental authority, and the project pays for it.

    Land is also bought up ahead of time. A national rural land agency, SAFER, holds first refusal on farmland coming up for sale, so that displaced farmers can be given land instead of only a cheque. Spain has its own version of the same idea.

    This matters for who gets a say. In Canada there is no seat and no statutory role. On 4 June 2026 the five organisations representing effectively the whole farm sector in Ontario and Quebec concluded that ALTO’s proposed collaboration agreement was not in their members’ interests to sign. In France they would not have had to negotiate for a place at the table. They would already have had one, in law.

    This is not a minor administrative detail. On the Le Mans to Rennes high-speed line, roughly 3,700 hectares were placed in reserve, with agricultural land bought up as it came to market within three kilometres of the future route. In Ille-et-Vilaine alone, 48.5 km of new railway took about 480 hectares of crops and pasture — and against that, 720 hectares of land reserve were assembled and parcels across some 1,200 hectares either side of the track were reorganised, affecting more than 4,400 landowners, financed by the project and delivered through intercommunal commissions.

    In France and Germany In Ontario
    A legal procedure to reorganise farmland around a new line, whose express purpose includes repairing damage done by major linear infrastructure. No equivalent. There is no statutory land reorganisation for farms severed by infrastructure.
    Farmers hold seats on the deciding body, and decisions can be appealed to the courts. No seat and no statutory role. Five farm organisations declined ALTO’s collaboration agreement in June 2026 rather than accept its terms.
    A rural land agency with first refusal on farmland coming to market, used to assemble land reserves years ahead of construction. No equivalent agency and no statutory land reserve mechanism.
    Local commissions empowered to redraw parcel boundaries, operating under departmental authority. No equivalent body. No one can redraw the neighbours’ boundaries to make a severed farm whole again.
    Compensation in land is possible: a farmer who loses acreage can be given workable acreage back. Compensation in money only, for what is physically taken. Expropriation and negotiated purchase are the available tools.

    So the comparison in the letter is accurate and, at the same time, does not carry over. The French result rests partly on a legal instrument Canada does not have. A letter that cites France’s bridge count while saying nothing about France’s land reorganisation is describing half of how the problem was solved.

    Cadence’s Project Director is quoted in French farming trade coverage of that same Le Mans to Rennes project, explaining that the land reserve had to account for the right-of-way, the land reorganisation and the environmental compensation together.

    That gap is a problem in Canadian law rather than a failing of the project sponsor. It is still a gap, and it has to be closed before European results can reasonably be promised here. Closing it is not something ALTO can do on its own.

    Not Just How Many

    A structure is not automatically an answer

    Even where a crossing is built, two questions decide whether it is any use, and ALTO has published nothing on either.

    Size

    A livestock crossing and a machinery crossing are not the same structure. A standard cattle underpass runs about 2.1 metres high. A modern combine or grain cart needs 4 metres or more. A structure built to the wrong dimension is a closure as far as the equipment is concerned. No minimum dimensions have been published, and no spacing standard.

    Upkeep

    Nobody has decided who maintains these crossings over the decades that follow. ALTO describes its approach as still being developed. France took roughly a decade of litigation and legislation to settle the same question. Municipalities along the corridor have a direct interest in the answer.

    What closure pushes onto the road

    When a farm crossing is extinguished, the equipment does not disappear. It goes onto the public road. By the Ontario Federation of Agriculture’s own figure, slow-moving farm vehicles are 3.8 to 4.8 times more likely to be involved in a fatal collision per kilometre travelled. Severance is therefore also a road-safety question, and one that has not been assessed.

    The Initiative has examined the two halves of this problem separately: road severances and wildlife crossings.

    The Wall

    One claim that cannot be tested as written

    A railway running at over 300 km/h is fully grade-separated and fenced along its entire length. That is what grade separation means. The structure is a continuous barrier by engineering necessity. The real question is where the openings are and how many there are, not whether the barrier exists.

    What ALTO could reasonably promise is that severance will be mitigated at designed crossings, to a stated standard, at a stated spacing. A flat undertaking that no wall will be created is not something anyone can test — and it is a sentence that will be read back to ALTO by every landowner and every township that later finds an access closed.

    The same applies to wildlife. Continuous fencing is a barrier to animals except where crossings are designed in, and how well those crossings get used varies a great deal by species — a question examined at length in the Initiative’s work on wildlife crossings.

    An early study along a Spanish high-speed line, monitoring fifteen underpasses and two overpasses over two years, recorded no deer or wild boar crossings at all. That was 1996, and crossing design has moved on a great deal since; it should not be read as the last word. But the more recent evidence does not settle the question the other way either. A systematic review of crossing structures across roads and railways found that animals did cross them in almost every study examined — and yet a decline in wildlife movement after construction was prevented in fewer than 40 per cent of cases, with many structures poorly built or poorly monitored.

    On Spain’s network the best-documented harm is to birds. Camera monitoring from on board trains estimated 60.5 bird collisions per kilometre per year on a stretch carrying 53 trains a day, and 26.1 on a stretch carrying 25. Later work found the surrounding bird community changing species by species, and uncapped catenary poles acting as pitfall traps for birds that nest in cavities. Anti-birdstrike screens are routinely fitted to viaducts, and how well they work is still being studied.

    None of this says the corridor cannot be crossed by wildlife. It says that whether it can depends on design decisions and monitoring commitments not yet made, and that a flat undertaking given before them is not one a reader can test. Of the three promises, the one about natural water flows is the most straightforward to deliver.

    What Can Be Asked Now

    Six questions ALTO can answer today

    The letter makes commitments specific enough to be checked. None of the following requires a finalised route.

    The ratio
    Against Transport Canada’s figure of more than 1,000 crossings, how many are assumed to get a structure, and how many will be closed?
    Composition
    Of the French and Spanish structures cited, how many exist to reconnect a severed local access, as opposed to carrying the line over a river, motorway or railway?
    Ontario benchmark
    What crossing rate is assumed for the Ontario segments, and how was it arrived at? A comparison with Highway 416 through similar country would be useful to communities along the route.
    Criteria
    What method decides whether a road is bridged or dead-ended, and what detour distance is treated as acceptable in the countryside?
    Cost
    What provision for grade separation sits inside the capital estimate, and why has it never been shown as a separate line?
    Dimensions
    What minimum height and width will agricultural crossings meet, and what spacing standard applies? Will structures be sized for machinery or only for livestock?
    Maintenance
    Who owns and maintains each crossing structure over its life, and who carries that cost — ALTO, Cadence, or the municipality?
    Detours
    Where an access will not be reinstated, how much further will people have to drive to reach the nearest crossing, and what work supports that figure?
    Emergency access
    Which paramedic services and municipal fire departments have been consulted about response routes, on what dates, and what did they find?
    Severed farms
    Is any land reorganisation or land reserve contemplated for farms cut in two, and under what legal authority would it operate?

    The letter is right that decades of international experience exist and should be drawn on. The difficulty is that it draws on one half of that experience and leaves out the other. France built more than four thousand structures. France also rebuilt the farms. The second of those depended on machinery Ontario does not have, and no number of overpasses substitutes for it. Meanwhile the company’s own engineering executive has told this city’s council that the aim is to build as few overpasses as it can.

    Download Full Brief
    Counting the Crossings (PDF)
    Full analysis for municipal councils, farm organisations, MPs and residents along the corridor — with the per-kilometre working, the French statutory provisions and the complete source list

    Download PDF

    How to read the numbers on this page

    The French and Spanish structure counts are as given in the 14 August letter and used here as stated. The Transport Canada crossing count, the HS2 figures, the Kingston council statements, the French statutory provisions, the HS2 petition figures, the emergency-response research and the wildlife findings are all quoted from the sources listed below and can be checked there.

    Everything else is our own calculation or estimate, and is marked as such where it appears: the per-kilometre and spacing rates, the 30 to 60 per cent closure proportion and the 300 to 600 closures that follow from it, the $3.2 to $8.4 billion grade-separation range, and the detour arithmetic. Where ALTO or Transport Canada has not published a figure, we say so rather than inferring one, and we make no claim about what anyone knew or intended.

    Sources

    Primary documents and statements

    1.

    Maria Luisa Dominguez and Loïc Dorbec, “Building on decades of high-speed rail experience,” letter to the editor, Kingston Whig-Standard, 14 August 2026. Structure and length figures for France and Spain are as stated in that letter and are used here as given; the per-kilometre rates are the Initiative’s arithmetic.
    2.

    Chambres d’agriculture France, on aménagement foncier agricole et forestier and its role in repairing disruption caused to rural land by the route of major linear works, high-speed railways included. chambres-agriculture.fr
    3.

    Département d’Ille-et-Vilaine, on the LGV Bretagne–Pays de la Loire land reorganisation and land reserve programme: 48.5 km of new line, 480 ha absorbed, 720 ha of reserve constituted, 1,200 ha of parcels reorganised, more than 4,400 landowners affected, financed by the project owner. cg35.fr
    4.

    WikiAgri, on the land reserves assembled through SAFER for the Le Mans–Rennes high-speed line: approximately 3,700 ha placed in reserve, with agricultural land pre-empted within three kilometres of the future alignment. Contains the quoted remarks of Cadence’s Project Director on the composition of that reserve. wikiagri.fr
    5.

    Transport Canada, TRAN Committee Appearance Binder, Item 15: High Frequency Rail, 7 March 2023 — source of the figure of more than 1,000 public and private crossings on the alignment.
    6.

    City of Kingston, Council meeting of 17 February 2026, closed-captioning transcript — remarks of ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering and Interface on crossing consolidation, overpass numbers and corridor fencing.
    7.

    HS2 Phase 1 structure count: more than 500 bridging structures including over 50 major viaducts, per HS2 Ltd’s head of civils structures, reported in New Civil Engineer, 15 June 2022, and repeated on the Institution of Civil Engineers project page. Route length taken as approximately 225 km; some sources give 208 route km, which would raise the per-kilometre rate rather than lower it.
    8.

    Wildlife. Rodríguez, Crema and Delibes (1996), on underpass and overpass use along Spanish high-speed line. Rytwinski and others, systematic review and meta-analysis of crossing-structure effectiveness, for the finding on movement decline. Barrientos and Borda-de-Água, “Railways as Barriers for Wildlife: Current Knowledge,” in Railway Ecology (Springer, 2017). García de la Morena and others (2017) for the on-board camera collision estimates; Malo and others (2017) on bird response and catenary-pole mortality; and work on high-speed rail and bird-community change published in PLOS One (2024).
    9.

    Erin Durant, “Alto: Which farm roads stay open and who pays?” 16 August 2026 — source for the German Flurbereinigungsgesetz parallel, the seats-and-appeal structure of the French and German commissions, crossing dimensions for livestock versus machinery, the unresolved maintenance question, the OFA slow-moving-vehicle collision figure, and the last-modified metadata on ALTO’s agricultural pages.
    10.

    Joint statement of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, l’Union des producteurs agricoles, National Farmers Union (Ontario), Christian Farmers Federation of Ontario and Union des cultivateurs franco-ontariens, 16 June 2026, following their 4 June meeting on ALTO’s proposed collaboration agreement.
    11.

    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, Road severances (technical analysis, March 2026 — source of the closure proportions and grade separation cost range) and Wildlife crossings.
    12.

    Ontario road spacing reflects the concession survey pattern across the corridor study area. Highway 416 is proposed here as a benchmark for comparison; no crossing-provision figure for that corridor has been established for this brief.
  • Ottawa-montreal

    ALTO is starting where rail already works

    The Ottawa–Montréal segment is ALTO’s first construction phase — and the corridor’s weakest case for high-speed rail.

    ⚠ ALTO Has Chosen Its Easiest Case

    ALTO has confirmed that the Ottawa–Montréal segment will be the first phase of construction, with work to begin in 2029–30. ALTO CEO Martin Imbleau publicly describes the segment as “shorter and technically simpler”; Transport Minister Steven MacKinnon called it “relatively short, flat and straight”; ALTO’s own consultation materials describe it as a “learning segment” — a test case to refine before scaling to the rest of the corridor. CBC News   ALTO consultation

    The case ALTO is starting with is the strongest case for HSR that the project can publicly make. If the case fails on this segment, it fails on the corridor.

    Critical Finding

    The Ottawa–Montréal segment is ALTO’s strongest case for high-speed rail. It is also the corridor’s weakest case for it. VIA Rail owns the bulk of this 185-km line — the 110-km Alexandria Subdivision from Ottawa east to Coteau Junction, Québec — and on this VIA-owned segment, on-time performance runs at approximately 90%, well above any other corridor route. The freight-conflict problem that ALTO exists to solve is confined to the ~65-km CN-owned approach into Montréal from Coteau Junction.

    ALTO’s CEO has publicly refused to estimate the segment cost. The project will require crossing approximately 1,700 properties, including roughly 500 farms, in a 60-metre right-of-way through Eastern Ontario and western Québec farmland, with construction taking 8–10 years — to save approximately 25–30 minutes of travel time. The alternative — upgrading the existing line to High Performance Rail — would deliver nearly the same time savings at a fraction of the cost, decades sooner, without greenfield expropriation. The federal government has never produced a public comparison.

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    ALTO Is Starting Where Rail Already Works — Ottawa–Montréal Case Study (PDF)
    Single-page summary for distribution to MPs, municipal councils, and constituents along the Ottawa–Montréal corridor
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    The Choice

    ALTO picked Ottawa–Montréal because it’s the easiest. They said so.

    In December 2025, the federal government announced that the Ottawa–Montréal segment would be the first construction phase of the ALTO project. The rationale offered, publicly and consistently, has been that this segment is the most straightforward to deliver. ALTO CEO Martin Imbleau has described it as “shorter and technically simpler” than the rest of the corridor. Transport Minister Steven MacKinnon called it “relatively short, flat and straight.” ALTO’s own consultation materials describe Ottawa–Montréal as a “learning segment” that will be used to refine delivery methods before scaling to the Toronto and Québec City segments. CBC News   Railway-News

    This framing is not incidental. The Toronto and Québec segments are technically harder, politically harder, and considerably more expensive. The Toronto segment must enter a constrained urban transportation system; the Mount Royal tunnel approach to Montréal on the Québec end carries McGill engineering estimates exceeding $1 billion per kilometre. ALTO is leading with Ottawa–Montréal because it is the demonstration most likely to succeed, and because demonstrating success here is the political precondition for proceeding with the rest. The whole project’s institutional credibility now rests on a segment ALTO itself has framed as its strongest case for HSR.

    The test-case logic, stated by ALTO itself

    Imbleau told the US High Speed Rail Conference that the Ottawa–Montréal segment is “a learning segment to refine delivery methods before scaling to the full network.” By starting here, the project “can validate assumptions and manage scope responsibly before expanding east and west.” The strongest case ALTO can make for high-speed rail is the case on this segment. If validation fails here, the rest of the corridor cannot inherit a successful demonstration.

    What Already Works

    The Ottawa–Montréal train is the corridor’s most reliable service

    2h 4min
    current VIA Ottawa–Montréal travel time over 185 km
    VIA Rail published schedule
    ~90%
    on-time performance on the VIA-owned segment
    VIA spokesperson, via CBC News
    34+
    scheduled departures per week between the two cities
    VIA Rail published schedule

    VIA Rail Ottawa–Montréal currently runs 34 or more scheduled departures per week over 185 km, with an average travel time of 2 hours 4 minutes. The route’s defining characteristic is not its speed; it is its reliability. Unlike most of the Québec City–Windsor corridor, where VIA passenger trains share track with CN-owned freight operations, VIA Rail owns the bulk of this line — specifically the 110-km Alexandria Subdivision running from Ottawa east to Coteau Junction in Québec. CPTDB Wiki   VIA Rail

    VIA Rail confirmed to CBC News that on-time performance on this VIA-owned segment runs at approximately 90% — significantly better than any other corridor route. By comparison, VIA’s national on-time performance has hovered between 65% and 75% over recent years, with the gap explained almost entirely by passenger trains being held in sidings while CN freight passes through. Where VIA controls the dispatch, the trains run on schedule. CBC News

    The reliability problem is a freight-conflict problem

    ALTO repeatedly cites VIA’s poor on-time performance as the justification for HSR investment. That problem is real on most of the corridor: across VIA’s national network, 97% of the track it operates on is owned by other companies, mostly CN. But the poor reliability is concentrated on the freight-shared segments. On the segment ALTO is starting with, the problem is already substantially solved — not by ALTO, but by VIA’s existing ownership of the line.

    Solving What Problem?

    The freight conflict ALTO exists to solve barely exists here

    ALTO’s entire rationale — what justifies the $60–90 billion estimated price tag for a dedicated passenger-only high-speed line — is that VIA passenger trains share CN-owned freight track across most of the Québec City–Windsor corridor and get pushed aside whenever freight passes. Building a new dedicated passenger-only line is presented as the solution. ALTO consultation

    On Ottawa–Montréal, the problem is already mostly solved. The 110-km Alexandria Subdivision from Ottawa to Coteau Junction is owned and dispatched by VIA Rail. Passenger trains on this segment have priority because VIA controls the line. The 90% on-time performance reflects exactly that. The freight conflict that does exist on this route is confined to a relatively short stretch — the approximately 65-km CN-owned approach into Montréal from Coteau Junction, where VIA trains pick up CN’s Kingston Subdivision into Central Station. CPTDB Wiki

    The proportionality problem this creates for ALTO’s case is significant. If the freight-conflict problem on Ottawa–Montréal is confined to roughly 65 km of CN-owned approach to Montréal, the corresponding intervention is a 65-km fix, not a 185-km greenfield replacement. The targeted alternatives — track-sharing reform, capacity upgrades, dedicated passenger right-of-way on the CN section, or a publicly negotiated priority agreement with CN — have not been publicly evaluated against the cost and disruption of the ALTO HSR plan on this segment.

    Starting where the problem isn’t

    ALTO is starting construction by replacing the segment of the corridor where reliability is already strongest, and where the freight-conflict problem ALTO claims to solve is structurally smallest. That is not a demonstration of HSR’s necessity. It is a demonstration of where institutional and engineering risk is lowest — precisely the segment where the case for HSR specifically is weakest on the merits.

    The Cost

    ALTO refuses to put a number on this segment

    ~1,700
    properties to be acquired on the Ottawa–Montréal segment
    Imbleau, May 2026
    ~500
    farms within the planned 60-metre right-of-way
    Imbleau, May 2026
    25–30
    minutes of travel time saved over current VIA service
    ALTO projection vs. VIA schedule

    Asked directly at the December 2025 announcement to estimate the cost of building HSR on the Ottawa–Montréal segment, ALTO CEO Martin Imbleau refused. “It would be difficult to have an estimate,” he told reporters. He added that it would be “kind of absurd to have an independent budget” for a portion of the corridor. Eight months later, no segment-specific cost figure has been published. The project’s overall $60–90 billion estimate is, in Imbleau’s own May 2026 characterisation, a working assumption rather than a cost estimate; reliable estimates are expected only in 2027 or 2028, after engineering follows alignment selection. CBC News

    What ALTO has confirmed about the segment is what it would take to build it. The line will cross approximately 1,700 properties, including roughly 500 farms (about 40% of the total acquisitions), in a 60-metre fenced right-of-way through Eastern Ontario and western Québec farmland. Construction will take 8–10 years, with no passenger service on the segment until the late 2030s. The travel-time saving, as currently projected: approximately 25–30 minutes, taking the Ottawa–Montréal journey from 2h 4min to roughly 1h 35min. CBC News

    The price ALTO has named, even without a cost figure

    Twenty-five minutes saved on a route that already arrives on time approximately 90% of the time. For an undisclosed cost. Crossing 500 farms, in the segment ALTO itself has chosen as its strongest case for high-speed rail. The federal commitment is not to a price; it is to a process — corridor narrowing in autumn 2026, formal letters to property owners before that corridor is publicly disclosed, acquisition beginning in late 2026 or early 2027, ahead of any segment-specific cost estimate the public can scrutinise.

    The Alternative

    High Performance Rail on the existing line

    There is an alternative that addresses the corridor’s actual problem — reliability where freight conflict exists — without replacing what already works. High Performance Rail (HPR) on the existing Ottawa–Montréal line means upgrading the VIA-owned track to dedicated passenger speeds of approximately 200 km/h, with targeted intervention on the CN-owned Montréal approach to address the reliability bottleneck where it actually lives. Operational time on the upgraded line would be approximately 1 hour 40 minutes — within minutes of ALTO’s projected 1h 35min on a brand-new HSR alignment, and roughly 25 minutes faster than today.

     ALTO HSR (planned)HPR on existing line
    Travel time Ottawa–Montréal~1h 35min projected~1h 40min projected
    Travel time saved vs. current VIA (2h 4min)~25–30 minutes~20–25 minutes
    Operational byLate 2030s (construction 2029–30, then 8–10 years)3–5 years from project start
    Capital costUndisclosed; project total $60–90BA fraction of ALTO’s segment cost
    Properties affected~1,700, including ~500 farmsMinimal — existing right-of-way
    Right-of-wayNew 60-metre fenced corridorExisting VIA-owned alignment
    Downtown stationsMount Royal tunnel required for Central; Ottawa station status “not ideal”Ottawa rail station and Montréal Gare Centrale preserved
    Rolling stockNew procurementVIA’s already-purchased Siemens Venture fleet
    National network impactCross-subsidy from corridor revenue diverted to private operatorVIA’s national network preserved

    The federal government has never produced a public comparison of HSR against HPR on this segment. The procurement process has moved from concept directly to dedicated-corridor HSR design without an intermediate evaluation of whether the existing line, upgraded, would deliver most of the benefit at a small fraction of the cost. This is not a question of opposing modernisation. It is a question of what modernisation is being procured, against what alternatives, and at whose recommendation.

    The integrated-network case

    HPR on Ottawa–Montréal would be one piece of an integrated rail network upgrade: dedicated passenger track on the existing Toronto–Montréal CN Kingston Subdivision, upgrades to existing alignments where they already work, targeted new construction where genuinely needed. The result is faster trains on every existing corridor route, not a single greenfield HSR line bypassing the network that exists. The federal government has commissioned twenty-eight studies into the 300 km/h vision. None into this.

    Take Action

    Three questions for the Minister of Transport

    Construction on the Ottawa–Montréal segment is currently scheduled to begin in 2029–30, with corridor narrowing in autumn 2026 and acquisitions beginning shortly after. The window to compel the government to produce, and publish, an independent comparison of HSR against the HPR alternative on this segment is narrow. Three questions, the kind that must be answered or visibly declined, are sufficient to make the case for that comparison politically unavoidable.

    1. Publish a cost estimate for the Ottawa–Montréal segment specifically, before construction begins in 2029–30. ALTO’s continued refusal to do so on a publicly funded project of this scale is not justifiable.
    2. Publish a public comparative analysis of HSR versus HPR on the existing Ottawa–Montréal line — time, cost, disruption, and timeline side by side, with the methodology disclosed.
    3. Refer ALTO to the Parliamentary Budget Officer for independent review of the fiscal, ridership, and station-location assumptions underpinning the project before construction commitments are made.

    Also write to your Member of Parliament — Ottawa-area, Eastern Ontario, and western Québec MPs in particular have constituencies that will bear the operational consequences of the choices made now. The decision to refer the project to the PBO for independent review can be initiated through any MP.

    Download One-Pager
    ALTO Is Starting Where Rail Already Works — Ottawa–Montréal Case Study (PDF)
    Single-page printable version for distribution
    Download PDF
    Sources

    Primary documents and statements

    1.
    Benjamin Shingler, “Ottawa-Montreal chosen as 1st segment of promised high-speed rail line,” CBC News, December 12, 2025 — carries Imbleau’s refusal to estimate the Ottawa–Montréal segment cost. cbc.ca
    2.
    CBC News live story, December 12, 2025 — carries the “kind of absurd to have an independent budget” Imbleau quote on segment-specific costing. cbc.ca
    3.
    Mathieu Berger, “Montreal–Ottawa high-speed rail line could cross 1,700 properties, Alto predicts,” CBC News / Radio-Canada, May 5, 2026 — the 1,700 properties / 500 farms figure for the Ottawa–Montréal first segment. cbc.ca
    4.
    “Via Rail’s performance has gone from bad to worse,” CBC News, November 7, 2024 — carries VIA spokesperson’s confirmation that on-time performance is approximately 90% on the small section of track VIA owns between Ottawa and Montréal. cbc.ca
    5.
    CPTDB Wiki, VIA Rail Montreal–Quebec line — documents the Alexandria Subdivision (Coteau Junction, QC to Ottawa, ON) as VIA-owned. cptdb.ca
    6.
    Via Rail, Wikipedia — on-time performance, track ownership, and corridor service data. The 97% figure for VIA operating on track owned by other companies is from VIA’s most recent reporting. en.wikipedia.org
    7.
    VIA Rail, Montréal–Ottawa route information — 185 km distance, 2h 4min average travel time, 34+ scheduled weekly departures. viarail.ca
    8.
    Alto Project, “Shaping the Canada of tomorrow with high-speed rail” consultation site — Ottawa–Montréal as “shorter and technically simpler route,” first construction phase, 8–10 year build per phase. altotrain.ca
    9.
    “Alto Provides Update on Canada’s High-Speed Rail Programme,” Railway-News, May 2026 — the “learning segment” framing and Imbleau’s USHSR Conference remarks. railway-news.com
    10.
    “A Generational Move: Alto CEO Martin Imbleau,” ReNew Canada, May/June 2026 — Imbleau’s Empire Club address and the timeline for construction. renewcanada.net
  • Urban concerns

    Three hours, downtown to downtown?

    It sounds wonderful — a fast train at French or Japanese speeds, the airport hassle gone. The plan being sold isn’t that plan.

    ⚠ What ALTO Is Selling, And What Has Actually Been Promised

    ALTO is marketed as a three-hour, downtown-to-downtown high-speed train between Toronto and Montréal, equivalent to French TGV or Japanese Shinkansen service. The federal government has approved a $3.9 billion design phase, with construction projected at $60–90 billion over twelve to fourteen years and operating speeds of up to 300 km/h. Wikipedia   ALTO consultation

    What is not in the marketing: the “three hours” is train-in-motion time only; none of the three terminus cities has a contractually committed downtown station; ALTO has not published a single projected fare; and the corridor is being graded for the entire 1,000 km through Class 1 and 2 agricultural land that took millennia to form.

    Critical Finding

    ALTO has obvious urban appeal: civilised, fast, no airport, no security line. The case against it is not ideological and is not rural nostalgia. It is structural. With realistic station locations, door-to-door times grow by 60–90 minutes — Toronto–Montréal becomes essentially identical to flying, and Toronto–Québec City becomes slower. ALTO’s own internal Benefit-Cost Ratio is approximately 0.4, well below the viability threshold of 1.0. The CEO has publicly committed that the service will operate without government subsidy, which is mathematically incompatible with fares comparable to subsidised European or Japanese services.

    The alternative is High Performance Rail on existing alignments — dedicated passenger track at 200 km/h alongside the 401 highway or on the CN Kingston Subdivision. Under $10 billion. Operational in five to seven years. Real downtown stations preserved. Serves all eleven existing corridor communities rather than bypassing them. The federal government has never produced a public evaluation of this option.

    Download One-Pager
    Three Hours, Downtown to Downtown? — Urban Reader’s Brief (PDF)
    Single-page summary for distribution to MPs, municipal councils, and constituents in Toronto, Ottawa, Montréal, and Québec City
    Download PDF
    The Time

    The “three hours” is the train, not your trip

    0 of 3
    terminus cities with a contractually committed downtown station
    Toronto, Montréal, Québec City
    10+ km
    Mount Royal tunnel required for direct Montréal Gare Centrale access
    McGill engineering analysis
    60–90 min
    added door-to-door time once realistic station locations and the Montréal reversal are accounted for
    CRI analysis

    ALTO’s published travel times — the “three hours” from Toronto to Montréal, the “under two hours” from Toronto to Ottawa — are train-in-motion only. They exclude getting to the station, through it, and from the terminus to your actual destination. The marketed times assume true downtown stations at every end. None has been contractually committed.

    In April 2026, ALTO CEO Martin Imbleau publicly conceded that Toronto’s first station will be a suburb — the downtown station, if it is built at all, would come in a later phase. Even the eventual “downtown” candidate, East Harbour, sits approximately 3 km east of Union Station. Montréal’s downtown station depends on a 10+ km tunnel under Mount Royal at over a billion dollars per kilometre (McGill engineering estimate); the P3 partner has every incentive to shorten or omit the tunnel. Québec City favours suburban Sainte-Foy. Globe and Mail

    Toronto–Montréal at realistic times

    With a suburban Toronto first stop, the unavoidable Montréal reversal at Gare Centrale (the existing terminus configuration), and surface transit at both ends, door-to-door times grow by 60 to 90 minutes. Toronto–Montréal becomes essentially identical to flying, point to point. Toronto–Québec City becomes 45 minutes slower than flying. The civilised, no-airport advantage is the marketing’s strongest emotional claim — and the part that least survives realistic stations.

    The Geography

    We’re not France or Japan. The geography isn’t comparable.

    1,000+ km
    ALTO corridor length, three meaningful destinations
    Toronto, Montréal, Québec City
    465 km
    TGV Paris–Lyon, the canonical HSR success
    SNCF Voyageurs
    515 km
    Tokaido Shinkansen, four metro areas of 5M+ each
    JR Central

    The TGV connects Paris and Lyon — two of Europe’s largest cities — in 465 km. The Tokaido Shinkansen connects four metropolitan areas of five million people or more in 515 km. These are short, dense corridors with multiple major hubs. They are the cases where high-speed rail demonstrably outperforms air and conventional rail in both ridership and economics.

    The ALTO corridor is 1,000 kilometres or more between only three destinations with meaningful ridership demand. The intermediate stops — Peterborough, Laval, Trois-Rivières — are too small to sustain frequent HSR service in their own right. Ontario’s own 2016 high-speed rail business case, prepared for the more densely populated Toronto–Windsor corridor, found explicitly that “speeds of up to 300 km/h do not deliver a significant increase in benefits” over 250 km/h. The geography of southern Ontario and Quebec does not deliver the conditions that make HSR work elsewhere.

    The federal government’s own number

    ALTO’s internal Benefit-Cost Ratio is approximately 0.4. The viability threshold for federal infrastructure investment is 1.0. A BCR below 1.0 means the project’s costs exceed its measurable benefits, even on the project’s own assumptions. The federal government has not publicly disputed the figure. It has proceeded with the project regardless.

    The Price

    ALTO won’t tell you what a ticket will cost. Here’s why.

    $0
    government operating subsidy committed by ALTO
    Imbleau, public statements
    $200–400
    typical Acela fare in Canadian dollars on the New York–Washington corridor
    Amtrak published fares
    $275+
    typical Eurostar London–Paris fare in Canadian dollars
    Eurostar published fares

    Four years into procurement, ALTO has not published a single projected fare. Its public FAQ says fares “cannot be set” until the route is finalised. At the same time, the CEO has publicly committed that the service will operate without any government subsidy. These two positions are mathematically incompatible with low fares. A $60–90 billion design-build-finance-operate-maintain project — private profit, debt service, and operating costs all recovered from the farebox — must price like one. ALTO FAQ

    International benchmarks are the closest available proxies. In Canadian dollars: Amtrak’s Acela on the Northeast Corridor typically prices between $200 and $400 one-way; Eurostar between London and Paris starts around $275 and rises sharply at peak times. Both services are operated on networks that receive substantial state support. ALTO is committing to the opposite: full-cost recovery from passengers. CRI analysis indicates ALTO fares are likely to run higher than these benchmarks rather than lower — most international HSR is state-subsidised; ALTO has committed not to be.

    The civilised, affordable train is not what is being built

    ALTO’s own published FAQ concedes the answer most plainly: “VIA Rail may remain the more economical option for travellers with time but tighter budgets.” The civilised, affordable, no-airport train urban Canadians imagine is a French- or Japanese-style public service operating under social-rate fare regulation. ALTO, as procured, is the opposite financial structure: a privately operated profit centre with no fare ceiling, expected to recover its full $60–90 billion capital cost from passengers.

    The Land

    The farmland we lose doesn’t come back. Your grocery bill does.

    ~5%
    share of Canada’s total land base classified as Class 1 or 2 agricultural soil
    Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
    60 m
    width of the fenced, level-crossing-free ALTO right-of-way
    ALTO published specifications
    1,000+ km
    of new greenfield corridor through the St. Lawrence Lowlands
    Network total length

    The proposed greenfield corridor crosses some of Canada’s most productive agricultural land — Class 1 and 2 soils in Eastern Ontario and the St. Lawrence Lowlands that took millennia to form. Canada has only about 5% of its land base in this top agricultural category. Once expropriated and graded for a 300 km/h alignment — fenced, unscalable three-metre security walls, no level crossings, severed fields, viaducts — it is no longer farmland. The loss is permanent and irreversible.

    ALTO’s chief executive has publicly estimated that the Ottawa–Montréal first segment alone will cross approximately 1,700 properties, including roughly 500 farms. The Toronto and Québec segments have not yet been quantified in equivalent terms, but the agricultural footprint of the full 1,000 km network is necessarily substantially larger. CBC News

    This is not a sentimental rural concern

    The food on grocery shelves and farmers’ market stalls along this corridor comes from this land. Less farmland nearby means higher prices and a longer, more fragile import chain — at the exact moment trade with the United States has become unreliable. The four major Canadian farm associations — OFA, UPA, CFA, and BFO — have unanimously called for a halt to the project to allow for independent agricultural impact assessment before route selection. The federal government has declined to do so.

    The Alternative

    High Performance Rail on existing corridors

    There is a credible alternative that delivers the substantive benefits ALTO is meant to provide — faster trains, more frequent service, real downtown access, intercity rail competitive with driving and flying — without the cost, the timeline, or the irreversible disruption. High Performance Rail: new dedicated passenger track at 200 km/h, alongside the 401 highway or on the existing CN Kingston Subdivision, integrated with VIA Rail’s existing fleet and stations. The federal government has commissioned twenty-eight studies into ALTO’s 300 km/h vision. None into this.

     ALTO HSR (Planned)HPR Alternative
    Top speed300 km/h dedicated200 km/h dedicated
    Toronto–Montréal, train only~3h projected~3.5h projected
    Toronto–Montréal, door-to-door~4h (suburban Toronto stop)~4h (existing downtown stations)
    Capital cost$60–90 billion (working assumption)Under $10 billion (CRI estimate)
    Years to operation12–14 years (full network)5–7 years
    InfrastructureNew 1,000 km greenfield corridorExisting 401 and CN Kingston Sub alignments
    Downtown stationsNone contractually committedPreserved at all existing VIA terminals
    Corridor communities served7-station network; bypasses major existing VIA stops including Belleville, Kingston, Brockville, CornwallAll eleven existing corridor communities preserved
    Rolling stockNew procurementVIA’s already-purchased Siemens Venture fleet
    VIA national networkCorridor cross-subsidy diverted to private operatorNational network revenue preserved

    Premier Doug Ford has stated his preference for the 401 alignment over the ALTO greenfield route. The Eastern Ontario Wardens’ Caucus, representing 103 municipalities along the corridor, has supported it. The Coalition for Better Rail and the four major Canadian farm associations have all called for an independent comparative evaluation before construction commitments are made. The federal government has not produced one.

    The integrated-network case

    HPR is not a single project; it is a network upgrade. Existing VIA-owned segments (the Alexandria Subdivision between Ottawa and Coteau Junction; the Brockville and Smiths Falls subdivisions on the Toronto–Ottawa route) already deliver corridor-best reliability. Targeted new construction along the 401 and on the CN Kingston Subdivision addresses the remaining bottlenecks. The result is faster, more reliable service on every existing corridor route — not a single greenfield HSR line bypassing the network that exists.

    Take Action

    Three questions for the Minister of Transport

    Construction is scheduled to begin in 2029–30. The window in which the federal government can be compelled to produce, and publish, a credible comparative evaluation of HSR against HPR is the period before that date. Three questions, the kind that must be answered or visibly declined, are sufficient to make the case for that evaluation politically unavoidable.

    1. Release the comparative analysis between 200, 250, and 300 km/h options that preceded the rebrand from VIA HFR to ALTO. The decision to commit to 300 km/h dedicated HSR was not transparently justified against alternatives.
    2. Publish a public evaluation of dedicated passenger track along the 401 and the CN Kingston Subdivision before construction commitments are made — time, cost, disruption, and timeline side by side, with methodology disclosed.
    3. Refer ALTO to the Parliamentary Budget Officer for independent review of fiscal, ridership, and station-location assumptions before construction commitments are made.

    Also write to your Member of Parliament. The decision to refer the project to the Parliamentary Budget Officer for independent review can be initiated through any MP. Urban-riding MPs, in particular, have an interest in establishing whether the procurement that has been authorised will deliver the service their constituents have been told to expect.

    Download One-Pager
    Three Hours, Downtown to Downtown? — Urban Reader’s Brief (PDF)
    Single-page printable version for distribution
    Download PDF
    Sources

    Primary documents and statements

    1.
    Alto Project, “Shaping the Canada of tomorrow with high-speed rail” consultation site — project scope, timeline, $60–90 billion cost range, 300 km/h speed, “reduce travel times by half” framing, FAQ on fares. altotrain.ca
    2.
    Alto (high-speed rail), Wikipedia — project history, $3.9 billion design phase, Cadence consortium, 12–14 year timeline, intermediate station list. en.wikipedia.org
    3.
    Bill Curry, “Ottawa train station isn’t ideal location for high-speed rail terminal, Transport Minister says,” The Globe and Mail, May 1, 2026 — carries the Imbleau / MacKinnon concession on station locations. theglobeandmail.com
    4.
    Benjamin Shingler, “Ottawa-Montreal chosen as 1st segment of promised high-speed rail line,” CBC News, December 12, 2025 — project costing context, MacKinnon and Imbleau statements. cbc.ca
    5.
    Mathieu Berger, “Montreal–Ottawa high-speed rail line could cross 1,700 properties, Alto predicts,” CBC News / Radio-Canada, May 5, 2026 — the 1,700 properties / 500 farms figure for the Ottawa–Montréal first segment. cbc.ca
    6.
    Ontario Ministry of Transportation, High Speed Rail Business Case Toronto–Windsor (2016) — on the 250 vs 300 km/h marginal benefit analysis. Referenced in subsequent federal procurement documentation.
    7.
    VIA Rail Canada — published schedules, fleet composition (Siemens Venture procurement), and corridor track ownership disclosed in annual reporting. viarail.ca
    8.
    Ontario Federation of Agriculture and l’Union des producteurs agricoles, joint press release, February 27, 2026; Canadian Federation of Agriculture AGM resolution, February 25, 2026; Beef Farmers of Ontario statement, March 3, 2026 — the four-association call for project halt and independent agricultural impact assessment. ofa.on.ca
    9.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative — supporting research notes on door-to-door travel time analysis, the High Performance Rail alternative framework, and the Benefit-Cost Ratio assessment are available at citizenresearch.ca. citizenresearch.ca