Tag: Transport Canada

  • Counting the crossings

    Counting the Crossings

    ALTO says it will not wall off communities, and points to France and Spain. Those countries did something else as well, and the letter leaves it out.

    ⚠ What ALTO Told Kingston Readers

    On 14 August 2026, a letter in the Kingston Whig-Standard from ALTO’s Chief Project Management Officer and Cadence’s Project Director told corridor residents the railway “will not create a wall between communities”, nor a barrier to wildlife or water. As proof it can be done, the letter offered two numbers: France has built more than 4,000 structures across roughly 2,700 km of high-speed line, and Spain more than 900 across roughly 750 km.

    The letter does not mention Kingston, the route, where stations would go, what any of it costs, or expropriation. It does say preserving access has been a key principle from the beginning. ALTO’s own Preserving Access and Movement page carries a last-modified date of 7 May 2026 — after the consultation closed on 24 April.

    The Short Version

    Take ALTO’s own figures and divide them through. France works out to about one structure every 675 metres. Spain, about one every 833 metres. Those are the rates being offered as reassurance.

    The trouble is that a count of structures built tells you nothing about how many crossings were closed. A railway can put in 900 bridges and still cut off 3,000 field entrances, farm lanes and township roads. The letter gives the top half of the fraction and leaves out the bottom.

    Kingstonians already have ALTO’s own answer to this. In February 2026, ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering told Kingston City Council that crossings would be consolidated to bring costs down, and that the company would try to limit how many overpasses get built. That was six months before the letter, to the same city, on the same subject.

    There is a larger omission. France did not solve farm severance with bridges. It has a legal procedure that lets the state reorganise the surrounding farmland so that a farm cut in two can be put back into a workable shape, paid for by the project. On one French high-speed line, 3,700 hectares of land were bought up in advance so that farmers could be compensated in land rather than only in cash. Ontario has nothing of the kind.

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    Counting the Crossings — Full Brief (PDF)
    The arithmetic behind ALTO’s France and Spain comparison, and the land instrument the letter leaves out

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    The Arithmetic

    What ALTO’s own numbers work out to

    Neither figure in the letter is disputed here. They are simply divided through. A structure count only becomes meaningful once you know how far apart the structures are, and how far apart the things they are meant to replace used to be.

    ~675 m
    average gap between structures on the French network, using ALTO’s figures
    4,000 structures over 2,700 km
    ~833 m
    average gap on the Spanish line ALTO cites
    900 structures over 750 km
    1.25–2 km
    typical spacing of public roads across eastern Ontario’s concession grid
    before counting farm lanes and driveways

    There is a third number the letter does not offer, and it cuts the other way. HS2 in Britain is the most recent comparable project of this kind: a brand-new high-speed line built through peri-urban and rural England. Its first phase runs about 225 km and will carry more than 500 bridging structures, including over 50 major viaducts — roughly one structure every 450 m. That is about half again the French rate, through country a good deal more built up than eastern Ontario. The most recent comparable project provided more, not fewer, than the average ALTO offers as reassurance.

    The spread between the three is itself worth noticing. A fifty per cent difference between two European networks tells you that these totals are governed by terrain, by how much of a route sits in tunnel or on viaduct, and by what each project counts as a structure. About nine tenths of HS2’s first phase runs in tunnel, in cutting or on structures, so a large share of those 500 exist to carry the railway over the landscape rather than to carry a community across the railway. A structure count is a construction statistic, not a standard of community access.

    Eastern Ontario was surveyed on a grid. Roads run at regular intervals, and between them sit farm lanes, private driveways and municipal drains. Whether a European average is enough for that grid is exactly the question people along the corridor are asking. Quoting the French figure does not answer it. It assumes the answer.

    There is a comparison closer to home that nobody has yet made. Highway 416 is a modern, fully grade-separated corridor built through the same survey grid, the same farmland and several of the same municipalities. How many crossings Ontario provided on that road is not something this brief has established, but it is the obvious yardstick, and it ought to be established before a French average is relied on.

    The Missing Number

    How many roads are we talking about?

    The denominator is not actually a mystery. Canada’s own transport department has published it.

    In a briefing note prepared for a Parliamentary committee in March 2023, Transport Canada set out what a full high-speed line between Québec City and Toronto would require: a fully enclosed and fenced corridor, a straighter alignment, double tracking throughout, and complete grade separation on a route that currently carries more than 1,000 public and private crossings.

    That figure described the northern route, through comparatively empty country — Canadian Shield, wetlands, big rural lots. The southern corridor now being prioritised runs through some of the most intensively farmed land in eastern Ontario, where the concession grid is tightest. On the southern option, 1,000 is more likely a floor than a ceiling.

    The Initiative’s own road severance analysis puts the proportion of crossings permanently closed rather than bridged on rural high-speed corridors at somewhere between 30 and 60 per cent. Applied to a floor of 1,000, that is 300 to 600 roads dead-ended — our estimate, not a figure ALTO or Transport Canada has published.

    1,000+
    public and private crossings on the alignment
    Transport Canada, March 2023
    300–600
    roads likely closed, on the Initiative’s estimate
    30 to 60 per cent of crossings
    $3.2–8.4B
    Initiative’s estimated cost of the crossings that would be built
    never shown as a separate line

    That last figure matters for a different reason. Grade separation is one of the most expensive parts of any high-speed corridor, and a sum of that size has never appeared as its own line in ALTO’s published capital estimate. Neither has any methodology explaining how many crossings will be built, or to what standard, or how it will be decided which roads are simply stopped up.

    The reassurance in the August letter is offered in the absence of the one document that could support it. Further detail is set out in the Initiative’s technical analysis of road severances.

    On the Record

    What ALTO told Kingston in February

    Six months before this letter appeared in Kingston’s paper, ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering and Interface sat before Kingston City Council and was asked about exactly this. The transcript is the fullest account ALTO has given in public of how it approaches road crossings, and it does not read the way the letter does.

    The reassurance

    Asked by a councillor whether there would be a standard distance between crossings, he described a working assumption that every road would get some form of duct or overpass, since the roads belong to municipalities or road authorities and cannot be cut unilaterally.

    The qualification, in the same answer

    He went on to say that in reality some crossings would be looked at for consolidation, to lower costs and improve construction, subject to discussion with the road authority.

    The objective

    Pressed by the Deputy Mayor, he set it out plainly: grade separations would vary by area, would be settled during route selection, and ALTO would “try and limit the number of overpasses that we’ll need to get created”.

    And the fencing

    He confirmed that modern high-speed rail must be completely segregated and fully fenced anywhere level access is possible, whether the line runs at 200 or 300 km/h.

    Read together: a starting assumption that is subject to cost-driven consolidation, an explicit goal of building as few overpasses as possible, and continuous fencing between whatever crossings survive.

    The councillor’s actual question — is there a standard distance between crossings — was not answered, and no standard has been published since. February’s statements and August’s letter were addressed to the same city.

    Three Problems

    Why the structure count does not settle it

    You are being shown half a fraction

    The number that answers the severance question is a ratio: structures built, divided by accesses cut off. The letter supplies only the first. Every complaint recorded by French and Spanish farmers over the last forty years is perfectly compatible with the figures quoted.

    Not every structure reconnects anything

    “Engineering structures” and “viaducts” include everything the railway needs to build itself: bridges over rivers, crossings of existing motorways and railways, tunnels through hills. A viaduct over a river gorge restores nobody’s access to their back field. How many of the 4,000 exist to reconnect a severed local road or laneway is not stated, and is certainly a much smaller number.

    A different landscape

    The French network largely runs through consolidated farming country. Eastern Ontario is a survey grid of concession roads, side roads, long farm lots and dead ends. The same rate of crossings produces a very different result depending on how much there was to cross in the first place.

    The Missing Piece

    What France also built

    The most important thing missing from the letter is not a number. It is a law.

    Two of the countries with the longest high-speed rail experience did not leave farm access to be worked out project by project. They legislated it. France did so through its rural code; Germany passed a federal land consolidation statute in 1953 that covers exactly this situation. In both, farmers sit on the body that decides, that body can compulsorily redraw the farms and the farm tracks together, the proponent pays, and there is a right of appeal to the courts.

    France has a statutory procedure called aménagement foncier agricole et forestier — land reorganisation, formerly known as remembrement. Its stated purpose includes repairing the damage that major linear projects, high-speed railways among them, do to rural land. Where a line slices a farm in half, the surrounding parcels can be legally reorganised so that holdings are handed back in a shape a farmer can actually work. Local commissions run it under departmental authority, and the project pays for it.

    Land is also bought up ahead of time. A national rural land agency, SAFER, holds first refusal on farmland coming up for sale, so that displaced farmers can be given land instead of only a cheque. Spain has its own version of the same idea.

    This matters for who gets a say. In Canada there is no seat and no statutory role. On 4 June 2026 the five organisations representing effectively the whole farm sector in Ontario and Quebec concluded that ALTO’s proposed collaboration agreement was not in their members’ interests to sign. In France they would not have had to negotiate for a place at the table. They would already have had one, in law.

    This is not a minor administrative detail. On the Le Mans to Rennes high-speed line, roughly 3,700 hectares were placed in reserve, with agricultural land bought up as it came to market within three kilometres of the future route. In Ille-et-Vilaine alone, 48.5 km of new railway took about 480 hectares of crops and pasture — and against that, 720 hectares of land reserve were assembled and parcels across some 1,200 hectares either side of the track were reorganised, affecting more than 4,400 landowners, financed by the project and delivered through intercommunal commissions.

    In France and Germany In Ontario
    A legal procedure to reorganise farmland around a new line, whose express purpose includes repairing damage done by major linear infrastructure. No equivalent. There is no statutory land reorganisation for farms severed by infrastructure.
    Farmers hold seats on the deciding body, and decisions can be appealed to the courts. No seat and no statutory role. Five farm organisations declined ALTO’s collaboration agreement in June 2026 rather than accept its terms.
    A rural land agency with first refusal on farmland coming to market, used to assemble land reserves years ahead of construction. No equivalent agency and no statutory land reserve mechanism.
    Local commissions empowered to redraw parcel boundaries, operating under departmental authority. No equivalent body. No one can redraw the neighbours’ boundaries to make a severed farm whole again.
    Compensation in land is possible: a farmer who loses acreage can be given workable acreage back. Compensation in money only, for what is physically taken. Expropriation and negotiated purchase are the available tools.

    So the comparison in the letter is accurate and, at the same time, does not carry over. The French result rests partly on a legal instrument Canada does not have. A letter that cites France’s bridge count while saying nothing about France’s land reorganisation is describing half of how the problem was solved.

    Cadence’s Project Director is quoted in French farming trade coverage of that same Le Mans to Rennes project, explaining that the land reserve had to account for the right-of-way, the land reorganisation and the environmental compensation together.

    That gap is a problem in Canadian law rather than a failing of the project sponsor. It is still a gap, and it has to be closed before European results can reasonably be promised here. Closing it is not something ALTO can do on its own.

    Not Just How Many

    A structure is not automatically an answer

    Even where a crossing is built, two questions decide whether it is any use, and ALTO has published nothing on either.

    Size

    A livestock crossing and a machinery crossing are not the same structure. A standard cattle underpass runs about 2.1 metres high. A modern combine or grain cart needs 4 metres or more. A structure built to the wrong dimension is a closure as far as the equipment is concerned. No minimum dimensions have been published, and no spacing standard.

    Upkeep

    Nobody has decided who maintains these crossings over the decades that follow. ALTO describes its approach as still being developed. France took roughly a decade of litigation and legislation to settle the same question. Municipalities along the corridor have a direct interest in the answer.

    What closure pushes onto the road

    When a farm crossing is extinguished, the equipment does not disappear. It goes onto the public road. By the Ontario Federation of Agriculture’s own figure, slow-moving farm vehicles are 3.8 to 4.8 times more likely to be involved in a fatal collision per kilometre travelled. Severance is therefore also a road-safety question, and one that has not been assessed.

    The Initiative has examined the two halves of this problem separately: road severances and wildlife crossings.

    The Wall

    One claim that cannot be tested as written

    A railway running at over 300 km/h is fully grade-separated and fenced along its entire length. That is what grade separation means. The structure is a continuous barrier by engineering necessity. The real question is where the openings are and how many there are, not whether the barrier exists.

    What ALTO could reasonably promise is that severance will be mitigated at designed crossings, to a stated standard, at a stated spacing. A flat undertaking that no wall will be created is not something anyone can test — and it is a sentence that will be read back to ALTO by every landowner and every township that later finds an access closed.

    The same applies to wildlife. Continuous fencing is a barrier to animals except where crossings are designed in, and how well those crossings get used varies a great deal by species — a question examined at length in the Initiative’s work on wildlife crossings.

    An early study along a Spanish high-speed line, monitoring fifteen underpasses and two overpasses over two years, recorded no deer or wild boar crossings at all. That was 1996, and crossing design has moved on a great deal since; it should not be read as the last word. But the more recent evidence does not settle the question the other way either. A systematic review of crossing structures across roads and railways found that animals did cross them in almost every study examined — and yet a decline in wildlife movement after construction was prevented in fewer than 40 per cent of cases, with many structures poorly built or poorly monitored.

    On Spain’s network the best-documented harm is to birds. Camera monitoring from on board trains estimated 60.5 bird collisions per kilometre per year on a stretch carrying 53 trains a day, and 26.1 on a stretch carrying 25. Later work found the surrounding bird community changing species by species, and uncapped catenary poles acting as pitfall traps for birds that nest in cavities. Anti-birdstrike screens are routinely fitted to viaducts, and how well they work is still being studied.

    None of this says the corridor cannot be crossed by wildlife. It says that whether it can depends on design decisions and monitoring commitments not yet made, and that a flat undertaking given before them is not one a reader can test. Of the three promises, the one about natural water flows is the most straightforward to deliver.

    What Can Be Asked Now

    Six questions ALTO can answer today

    The letter makes commitments specific enough to be checked. None of the following requires a finalised route.

    The ratio
    Against Transport Canada’s figure of more than 1,000 crossings, how many are assumed to get a structure, and how many will be closed?
    Composition
    Of the French and Spanish structures cited, how many exist to reconnect a severed local access, as opposed to carrying the line over a river, motorway or railway?
    Ontario benchmark
    What crossing rate is assumed for the Ontario segments, and how was it arrived at? A comparison with Highway 416 through similar country would be useful to communities along the route.
    Criteria
    What method decides whether a road is bridged or dead-ended, and what detour distance is treated as acceptable in the countryside?
    Cost
    What provision for grade separation sits inside the capital estimate, and why has it never been shown as a separate line?
    Dimensions
    What minimum height and width will agricultural crossings meet, and what spacing standard applies? Will structures be sized for machinery or only for livestock?
    Maintenance
    Who owns and maintains each crossing structure over its life, and who carries that cost — ALTO, Cadence, or the municipality?
    Detours
    Where an access will not be reinstated, how much further will people have to drive to reach the nearest crossing, and what work supports that figure?
    Emergency access
    Which paramedic services and municipal fire departments have been consulted about response routes, on what dates, and what did they find?
    Severed farms
    Is any land reorganisation or land reserve contemplated for farms cut in two, and under what legal authority would it operate?

    The letter is right that decades of international experience exist and should be drawn on. The difficulty is that it draws on one half of that experience and leaves out the other. France built more than four thousand structures. France also rebuilt the farms. The second of those depended on machinery Ontario does not have, and no number of overpasses substitutes for it. Meanwhile the company’s own engineering executive has told this city’s council that the aim is to build as few overpasses as it can.

    Download Full Brief
    Counting the Crossings (PDF)
    Full analysis for municipal councils, farm organisations, MPs and residents along the corridor — with the per-kilometre working, the French statutory provisions and the complete source list

    Download PDF

    How to read the numbers on this page

    The French and Spanish structure counts are as given in the 14 August letter and used here as stated. The Transport Canada crossing count, the HS2 figures, the Kingston council statements, the French statutory provisions, the HS2 petition figures, the emergency-response research and the wildlife findings are all quoted from the sources listed below and can be checked there.

    Everything else is our own calculation or estimate, and is marked as such where it appears: the per-kilometre and spacing rates, the 30 to 60 per cent closure proportion and the 300 to 600 closures that follow from it, the $3.2 to $8.4 billion grade-separation range, and the detour arithmetic. Where ALTO or Transport Canada has not published a figure, we say so rather than inferring one, and we make no claim about what anyone knew or intended.

    Sources

    Primary documents and statements

    1.

    Maria Luisa Dominguez and Loïc Dorbec, “Building on decades of high-speed rail experience,” letter to the editor, Kingston Whig-Standard, 14 August 2026. Structure and length figures for France and Spain are as stated in that letter and are used here as given; the per-kilometre rates are the Initiative’s arithmetic.
    2.

    Chambres d’agriculture France, on aménagement foncier agricole et forestier and its role in repairing disruption caused to rural land by the route of major linear works, high-speed railways included. chambres-agriculture.fr
    3.

    Département d’Ille-et-Vilaine, on the LGV Bretagne–Pays de la Loire land reorganisation and land reserve programme: 48.5 km of new line, 480 ha absorbed, 720 ha of reserve constituted, 1,200 ha of parcels reorganised, more than 4,400 landowners affected, financed by the project owner. cg35.fr
    4.

    WikiAgri, on the land reserves assembled through SAFER for the Le Mans–Rennes high-speed line: approximately 3,700 ha placed in reserve, with agricultural land pre-empted within three kilometres of the future alignment. Contains the quoted remarks of Cadence’s Project Director on the composition of that reserve. wikiagri.fr
    5.

    Transport Canada, TRAN Committee Appearance Binder, Item 15: High Frequency Rail, 7 March 2023 — source of the figure of more than 1,000 public and private crossings on the alignment.
    6.

    City of Kingston, Council meeting of 17 February 2026, closed-captioning transcript — remarks of ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering and Interface on crossing consolidation, overpass numbers and corridor fencing.
    7.

    HS2 Phase 1 structure count: more than 500 bridging structures including over 50 major viaducts, per HS2 Ltd’s head of civils structures, reported in New Civil Engineer, 15 June 2022, and repeated on the Institution of Civil Engineers project page. Route length taken as approximately 225 km; some sources give 208 route km, which would raise the per-kilometre rate rather than lower it.
    8.

    Wildlife. Rodríguez, Crema and Delibes (1996), on underpass and overpass use along Spanish high-speed line. Rytwinski and others, systematic review and meta-analysis of crossing-structure effectiveness, for the finding on movement decline. Barrientos and Borda-de-Água, “Railways as Barriers for Wildlife: Current Knowledge,” in Railway Ecology (Springer, 2017). García de la Morena and others (2017) for the on-board camera collision estimates; Malo and others (2017) on bird response and catenary-pole mortality; and work on high-speed rail and bird-community change published in PLOS One (2024).
    9.

    Erin Durant, “Alto: Which farm roads stay open and who pays?” 16 August 2026 — source for the German Flurbereinigungsgesetz parallel, the seats-and-appeal structure of the French and German commissions, crossing dimensions for livestock versus machinery, the unresolved maintenance question, the OFA slow-moving-vehicle collision figure, and the last-modified metadata on ALTO’s agricultural pages.
    10.

    Joint statement of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, l’Union des producteurs agricoles, National Farmers Union (Ontario), Christian Farmers Federation of Ontario and Union des cultivateurs franco-ontariens, 16 June 2026, following their 4 June meeting on ALTO’s proposed collaboration agreement.
    11.

    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, Road severances (technical analysis, March 2026 — source of the closure proportions and grade separation cost range) and Wildlife crossings.
    12.

    Ontario road spacing reflects the concession survey pattern across the corridor study area. Highway 416 is proposed here as a benchmark for comparison; no crossing-provision figure for that corridor has been established for this brief.
  • A deal that lost its other half

    The Billy Bishop Reversal
    A Deal That Lost Its Other Half

    Reporting says Ontario agreed to go along with ALTO in exchange for the Billy Bishop airport expansion. Ottawa has now pulled back from the airport — so if that account is right, what is holding up the province’s side?

    The short version

    A newspaper report describes an informal trade behind the scenes: the province would support the ALTO high-speed rail line, and in return Ottawa would let Billy Bishop airport expand. Ottawa has now pulled back from the airport. If the report is right, the reason Ontario was cooperating with ALTO has just disappeared — and that matters for every community along the route.

    What the reporting says

    In late July 2026, the Toronto Star reported that Ottawa’s decision to drop the Billy Bishop airport expansion was tied to a behind-the-scenes understanding: the province would go along with ALTO, and in exchange the airport expansion would proceed. One source put it plainly — “It’s Billy Bishop for Alto, that was always the understanding.”1 The paper reported the Premier and Prime Minister had even shaken hands on it. It also noted that the high-speed line — a 300 km/h train cutting through farmland in rural Ontario — has always been a hard sell to the province’s own members whose ridings it crosses.

    A private handshake can’t be independently confirmed, and the account rests on unnamed sources. But it was reported in detail, and it fits how difficult the corridor has been for the province to defend.

    What changed

    Ottawa has now pulled back from the airport expansion. In his July 24 statement, the Minister of Transport said the government’s focus is now only on the already-approved safety work, that Toronto voices would shape any future plans, and that it would not pursue anything that harms treasured public spaces, raises noise, damages the environment, or blocks housing — the effects opponents of the expansion had raised.2 The government cited more than 87,000 public responses;2 the Toronto Star reported that about 87 per cent were opposed.1 Some call the decision a cancellation, others a pause1 — but either way, the province is left holding, at best, a promise that has been put on hold. Whatever it was reportedly getting in return for supporting ALTO is, for now, gone.

    Why this matters for the corridor

    ALTO’s Ontario stretch can’t be built by the federal government on its own. It needs the province and local municipalities to cooperate on the hard, unglamorous parts: assembling land, approving where the line crosses roads, relocating utilities, and separating the tracks from local traffic. If that cooperation was really a trade — support given in exchange for the airport — then taking the airport away removes the reason for the support. That uncertainty lands squarely on the towns, farms, and landowners in the train’s path, who still don’t know whether or how the project moves ahead.

    One standard, for everyone

    Ottawa reconsidered the airport by listening: it counted the public responses, weighed the opposition, and set conditions rather than pressing ahead. Yet the same July 24 statement reaffirmed ALTO as part of the government’s integrated plan for the Greater Toronto Area, alongside the Pearson expansion.2 One waterfront project was reshaped by public feedback; the far larger rail project was restated in the same document without reference to any. Communities along the ALTO route raised their objections too, through the project’s own consultation, which closed on 24 April 2026. No comparable count of responses received, or of concerns raised, has been published for that consultation. If 87,000 responses were enough to change course on one waterfront project, the people who live along a much larger one are entitled to know how their objections are being weighed.

    Questions worth asking

    • Does Ontario still support ALTO now that the thing it was reportedly promised is off the table?
    • If the province’s support was tied to the airport, what is it tied to now?
    • Will the communities along the corridor get the same fair hearing that stopped the airport expansion?

    None of this is about one political party. Unease with ALTO crosses party lines. The Star reports the line has been a hard sell to the province’s own members whose ridings it crosses. This is a straightforward question of accountability: if the reported understanding was what it appeared to be, one public decision has knocked a leg out from under another, and the people in the corridor’s path deserve to know where that leaves them.

    How to read this page

    The trade described here is reported by the Toronto Star on unnamed sources. Neither government has confirmed it, and this page does not treat it as established. Everything that follows from it is written conditionally, because that is all the evidence supports.

    Everything else is quoted from the two named sources below and can be checked there: the Minister’s 24 July statement and its conditions, the figure of more than 87,000 responses, the reported 87 per cent opposition, and the reaffirmation of ALTO in the same statement. Where something has not been published, this page says so rather than inferring it, and makes no claim about anyone’s motives.

    Sources

    1. 1Robert Benzie, Ryan Tumilty and Mark Ramzy, “‘Disappointed’ Doug Ford spoke privately with Mark Carney after decision blocking Billy Bishop expansion,” Toronto Star, July 27, 2026.
    2. 2Hon. Steven MacKinnon, Minister of Transport, Statement on Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport, July 24, 2026.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative Independent, non-partisan research on the proposed Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor citizenresearch.ca
  • Tourism Study

    Benefits for Stations, Costs for the Corridor

    ALTO has published its own tourism study. It studies only the seven station cities — and counts none of the costs.

    ⚠ New Release: ALTO Commissions a Tourism Study

    In June 2026 ALTO released “Tourism in the Alto Corridor: Current Conditions and Potential Impacts,” prepared for ALTO by the consultancy CPCS in association with HDR. It is the first time the project has placed a tourism analysis on the public record. The report’s headline is that ALTO “could contribute an additional $1 billion to GDP annually, and support 11,500 more jobs under a medium coordination scenario.”

    The report carries the standard commissioned-work disclaimer — the opinions “are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Alto” — and is dated June 2026, after the April 24 consultation deadline had already closed. It is a gross-benefit study of the seven station cities. It does not measure a single cost.

    Critical Finding

    ALTO’s own consultant has now confirmed, in writing, the distinction this initiative has argued from the start: tourism benefits accrue to stations, not to the tracks between them. The report studies only the six Census Metropolitan Areas that contain the seven proposed stations — Toronto, Peterborough, Ottawa-Gatineau, Montreal, Trois-Rivières, and Québec City. The rural landscapes the corridor would traverse without stopping — Frontenac, Leeds & Grenville, the entire RTO 9 region — are outside the study’s frame entirely.

    The report is a benefits-only document. It contains no construction-phase impacts, no tourism losses, and no accounting for visitors who shift away from non-station regions toward station hubs — even though the report itself concedes that smaller places that fail to differentiate “will limit gains — or even risk losing activity to larger centres.” The study answers one question: how much tourism might the seven stops gain? It never asks the second: what does the corridor cost the regions it passes through?

    The much-quoted “$1 billion / 11,500 jobs” is the medium scenario, not the central case. The low scenario is +$177 million and roughly 2,000 jobs. Even the medium figure is contingent on dedicated tourism policy, last-mile connections, and destination readiness across the corridor — none of which ALTO controls or funds. The report concedes the foundational caveat in its own words: “HSR alone is rarely sufficient to generate sustained tourism development.”

    Download
    Benefits for Stations, Costs for the Corridor — Full Brief (PDF)
    A point-by-point reading of ALTO’s tourism study against the cost side it omits, with the evidence from this initiative’s earlier tourism research
    Download PDF
    What the Study Is

    A commissioned, benefits-only study of the seven stops

    “Tourism in the Alto Corridor” combines three things: a baseline profile of tourism in the six station CMAs; a review of international case studies on high-speed rail and tourism; and three illustrative scenarios that vary the level of tourism-policy coordination from low to high. Its baseline finding is that tourism in those CMAs already generates over $31 billion in visitor spending, contributes about $33.7 billion to GDP, and supports more than 377,000 jobs, with Toronto and Montreal accounting for the largest shares.

    The forward-looking finding — the one ALTO’s communications will lead with — is that additional tourism spending under the project could add to GDP and jobs. But the three scenarios produce very different numbers, and the report is explicit that they are “illustrative and should not be interpreted as forecasts.”

    +$177M
    added GDP / ~2,000 jobs — low coordination scenario
    CPCS for ALTO, p.23
    +$1.0B
    added GDP / 11,500 jobs — medium coordination scenario (the headline)
    CPCS for ALTO, p.23
    +$3.9B
    added GDP / 43,000 jobs — high coordination scenario
    CPCS for ALTO, p.23

    The single most important sentence in the document appears on page 7: the destinations “most likely to be affected by a high-speed rail service are the urban areas where stations are located.” That premise defines the study’s entire scope. Everything that follows is built on the six station CMAs. The communities between them — the ones with no station — are not modelled, not measured, and not mentioned in the results.

    What ALTO’s Consultant Concedes

    The report admits the bypass risk in its own words

    This initiative has argued throughout the consultation that high-speed rail creates a station/no-station divide: stations create tourism, tracks do not. ALTO’s commissioned study does not contradict that argument. In several places, it states it.

    What the report saysWhat it means for the corridor regions
    “The travel and tourism destinations most likely to be affected by a high-speed rail service are the urban areas where stations are located.” (p.7) The study is then built only on the six station CMAs.The regions the southern corridor would cross without a station — Frontenac, Leeds & Grenville, Lennox & Addington, the RTO 9 region — are outside the analytical frame. The study cannot show a benefit for them because it never looks at them.
    Smaller municipalities that fail to differentiate and coordinate “will limit gains — or even risk losing activity to larger centres.” (p.18)This is the bypass / agglomeration effect, conceded. The report frames it as a risk that supportive policy might manage. For a region with tracks and no station, it is the predictable default, not a managed exception.
    “HSR alone is rarely sufficient to generate sustained tourism development; realized impacts depend on coordinated local strategies.” (p.18)Even the modelled gains require destination marketing, event programming, accommodation, and last-mile connections that ALTO neither funds nor controls. Absent that coordination, the report’s own logic points to the low scenario or below.
    International tourist numbers see “limited to no change” (p.22 note); nearly all modelled gains are in-corridor domestic visitors making shorter trips.The projected uplift is largely Ontario and Quebec residents travelling more within their own provinces — a reshuffling of where Canadians already spend, not clearly net-new national tourism. The report never tests whether this is displacement.

    Read together, these are not stray caveats. They are the analytical spine of the report. ALTO’s consultant has confirmed the station/no-station distinction, conceded that non-station places can lose activity, and acknowledged that the benefits depend on conditions outside ALTO’s gift.

    Update · July 2026

    A second commissioned study, and what it says about the first

    This brief was published in June 2026, days after ALTO released the CPCS tourism study. On July 13, 2026 ALTO published a second commissioned economic study — An Overview of the Structural Economic Impacts of Alto, prepared by Aviseo Consulting — alongside a blog post summarising it. That study answers a question this brief left open, and it answers it against ALTO’s own tourism claim.

    The displacement question, answered by ALTO’s other consultant

    This brief noted that the modelled tourism gains are largely in-corridor domestic visitors, that international numbers show limited to no change, and that the CPCS report never tests whether this is displacement rather than net-new national tourism.

    The Aviseo study does test it, and reaches the opposite conclusion. It counts international tourism only, on the stated ground that increased domestic tourism would at least partly reflect substitution from existing household expenditure, with limited net effect at the macroeconomic level. In its own words, the driver of national GDP is the net inflow of foreign spending.

    The category that produces the CPCS headline is therefore the category ALTO’s other consultant sets aside as largely a reshuffling of money Canadians would have spent anyway.

    Aviseo — $0.8 billionCPCS — $1.0 billion
    International visitors only. Domestic tourism excluded as substitution with limited national effect. Estimated using a general equilibrium model, which nets out activity displaced from elsewhere in the economy.Medium scenario driven predominantly by in-corridor domestic travel. Estimated using Statistics Canada input-output multipliers including induced effects, which aggregate gross activity without netting displacement.
    Result:Two figures that cannot be combined

    A third figure circulates alongside them. ALTO’s FAQ page advertises $800 million a year in tourism revenue. That corresponds to Aviseo’s contribution-to-GDP figure, which is a value-added measure rather than revenue, and matches no revenue figure in either report.

    In the base case, two station cities receive nothing

    This brief established that the rural corridor regions are outside the study’s frame. The per-city results, at Tables 13 and 15 of the CPCS report, show that the scope problem does not stop at the regions left out. It reaches two of the station cities that were included.

    CityAdditional annual tourism spending
    Toronto$37M under low coordination; up to $1,500M under high
    Québec City$50M under low coordination; up to $500M under high
    Montréal (incl. Laval)$44M under low coordination; up to $900M under high
    Ottawa-Gatineau$21M under low coordination; up to $560M under high
    Trois-Rivières$0 under low coordination; up to $25M under high
    Peterborough$0 under low coordination; up to $35M under high
    Low coordination:Nothing for the two smallest station cities

    The GDP table records the same outcome: under low coordination Peterborough remains unchanged at $475 million and Trois-Rivières unchanged at $318 million. Even under full corridor-wide policy coordination, Peterborough reaches up to $35 million against Toronto’s $1.5 billion — a ratio of roughly 43 to 1.

    The blog post with which ALTO announced this study is titled “How High-Speed Rail Will Boost Tourism from Big Cities to Small Towns.”

    The summary reverses the report’s own caution

    This brief quoted the report’s statement that its scenarios are illustrative and should not be interpreted as forecasts. ALTO’s June 8 blog post describes the same scenarios as forecasts, says the report contains tangible projections, and states that ALTO engaged CPCS to provide real-world, objective results. It reports the medium scenario figures and does not mention the low scenario at all.

    An unreported finding: faster trains can reduce hotel revenue

    Under low coordination, business tourism spending falls in Montréal, Ottawa-Gatineau and Québec City, as high-speed rail converts overnight business trips into same-day return trips. The report cites the Paris–Lyon case, where average stays fell from 2.3 nights to 1.7 once same-day return became practical. This appears in no public summary of the study.

    The Initiative examines the second study, the treatment of both in ALTO’s public materials, and the arithmetic of the 1.1 per cent GDP claim in a companion economics brief. Two Point Two Trillion

    The Cost Side

    Everything the study does not count

    A tourism impact assessment that names a benefit but no cost is a half-ledger. The report’s title promises “potential impacts”; what it delivers is potential gains at the seven stops. The costs documented in this initiative’s earlier research — and in submissions from affected regions — appear nowhere in it.

    Cost the corridor imposesHow ALTO’s tourism study treats it
    Construction-phase disruption. Eight to ten years of blasting, dust, night lighting, truck traffic, road closures, and trail severance through tourism-dependent rural areas — documented in this initiative’s RTO 9 submission and the snowmobile-trail brief.Absent. The scenarios model an operating railway “if Alto were in service today.” The decade of construction that precedes any operating benefit is not in the analysis at all.
    Treatment:Not counted
    Trail and active-tourism loss. The Cataraqui Trail (a 104 km segment of the Trans-Canada Trail) and the organized snowmobile network of OFSC Districts 1, 2 and 6 — an estimated $220–270 million in direct expenditure and $450–540 million in total annual activity — run through the corridor.Absent. The study’s tourism universe is the six metropolitan CMAs. Rural rail-trail and winter-tourism economies are not in its scope, so their potential loss does not register against the modelled urban gains.
    Treatment:Not counted
    The at-risk regional economy. RTO 9 recorded $1.8 billion in tourism spending in the first nine months of 2024; the Rideau Heritage Route sustains roughly $695 million in GDP and 8,744 jobs. Both sit in the southern corridor’s path.Absent. Neither figure appears. The regions that generate them are not among the six CMAs studied, so the report’s GDP and jobs gains are not netted against any of this exposure.
    Treatment:Not counted
    VIA Rail displacement — regional and national. MP Scott Reid has confirmed in writing that either corridor option is likely to reduce VIA ridership and trigger service cuts through Kingston, Brockville, and other southeastern Ontario towns — the low-carbon access mode visitors use to reach these destinations without a car. The risk is also national: then–NDP transport critic Taylor Bachrach (Skeena–Bulkley Valley) warned that VIA earns more than 80% of its revenue and carries more than 90% of its passengers on the Quebec City–Windsor corridor, and that handing that corridor to a private operator would leave VIA with “a fraction of the revenue” it uses to cross-subsidize long-distance rural routes across the Prairies, the West, and the Maritimes.Absent. The report does not consider the loss of existing rail access to non-station communities, even as it counts new rail access as a benefit to station communities. Nor does it weigh the wider risk to the national VIA network that the corridor’s revenue currently helps sustain.
    Treatment:Not counted
    Visitors drawn away from non-station regions. The bypass effect the report concedes on page 18 — activity migrating to larger centres with stations.Conceded but not quantified. The report names the risk and then models only the upside at the stations that would gain. The corresponding loss elsewhere is acknowledged in prose and excluded from the numbers.
    Treatment:Acknowledged, not measured
    How Robust Are the Numbers?

    Assumption-driven scenarios, not forecasts

    Even taken on its own terms, the report’s headline number is softer than it will sound in a press release. Five features of the method are worth keeping in view.

    The headline is the middle scenario, not a central estimate

    The “$1 billion / 11,500 jobs” figure is the medium coordination scenario. It requires dedicated tourism policy in every city, improved last-mile connections, and rising convention and event activity. The report’s own framing makes clear these are conditions to be met, not outcomes of the railway itself.

    The gains are scenario assumptions, not a Canadian model

    The arrival, length-of-stay, and spending percentages in Appendix B are judgmental selections from the international literature, applied to Canadian baseline data. They are not derived from a Canadian demand model or validated against Canadian outturns. The outputs are functions of the chosen inputs.

    No reference-class or outturn discipline

    The tourism uplift is bracketed by three policy scenarios chosen to span a positive range. There is no reference-class comparison to what comparable HSR projects actually delivered — the same optimism-friendly structure this initiative has critiqued in ALTO’s ridership and cost work.

    Shorter stays can reduce spending even as arrivals rise

    The report concedes that average length of stay falls in some cities even in the medium scenario, as shorter-staying in-corridor visitors displace longer-staying international ones, and that accommodation spending can drop even when arrival counts go up.

    The report’s own “structural differences” section undercuts transfer

    Page 19 lists the reasons the European evidence may not transfer to Canada: dispersed attractions, lower base tourism, car-dominant travel (85–98% of corridor visitors drive today; train is about 6% to Toronto and ~2% elsewhere), and an immature rail network. It concludes “early impacts may take longer to be realized.”

    Where Things Stand · June 2026

    Summary ledger

    Measuring ALTO’s tourism study against what an honest tourism assessment of the corridor would have to show:

    Confirmed
    Benefits accrue to stations, not tracks. ALTO’s consultant builds the entire study on the six station CMAs and states that station cities are the destinations most likely to be affected (p.7).
    Confirmed
    Non-station places can lose activity. The report concedes the bypass / agglomeration risk in its own words (p.18).
    Confirmed
    HSR alone is not sufficient. Benefits depend on policy coordination, last-mile connections, and destination readiness that ALTO does not fund (p.18).
    Confirmed
    The scope problem reaches inside the study. Under low coordination, Peterborough and Trois-Rivières — two of the six CMAs the report does cover — receive $0 additional tourism spending and $0 additional GDP (Tables 13 and 15).
    Soft
    The headline figure is the medium scenario, not a central estimate; the low scenario is roughly one-sixth of it. The numbers are scenario assumptions, explicitly “not forecasts.”
    Soft
    Gains are largely in-corridor domestic, with international numbers showing little change — raising an unanswered displacement question.
    Omitted
    Construction-phase disruption (8–10 years): not in the analysis.
    Omitted
    Trail and winter-tourism loss (Cataraqui Trail; OFSC Districts 1/2/6, $450–540M total activity): not in scope.
    Omitted
    At-risk regional economy (RTO 9 $1.8B; Rideau Heritage Route $695M GDP / 8,744 jobs): not netted against modelled gains.
    Omitted
    VIA Rail displacement: loss of existing rail access to non-station communities not considered — nor the national risk to VIA, which earns 80%+ of its revenue on this corridor.
    Omitted
    Bypass losses: conceded in prose (p.18) but excluded from the numbers.
    Contradicted
    ALTO’s two consultants disagree on the headline category. The Aviseo study (July 2026) counts international tourism only, treating domestic tourism as substitution with limited net national effect — the category that drives the CPCS figure. The two estimates use methods that cannot be combined.
    Reversed
    “Should not be interpreted as forecasts.” ALTO’s own June 8 blog post describes the same scenarios as forecasts and tangible projections giving real-world, objective results, and reports the medium scenario alone.

    ALTO has now produced its own tourism study, and it confirms three things this initiative has argued throughout. Tourism benefits accrue to stations, not to tracks. The rural corridor regions are not in the study. And the report contains no cost side at all. ALTO’s consultant has, in effect, validated the station/no-station distinction while declining to measure the half of the ledger that falls on Eastern Ontario. A benefits-only study of the seven stops is not a tourism impact assessment of the corridor.

    Download Full Brief
    Benefits for Stations, Costs for the Corridor (PDF)
    Complete reading of ALTO’s tourism study for decision-makers, RTO 9, MTCG, MPs, and constituents tracking the tourism file
    Download PDF
    Sources

    Primary documents

    1.
    CPCS, in association with HDR, for ALTO. Tourism in the Alto Corridor: Current Conditions and Potential Impacts. June 2026. (Scenario results, pp.21–24; policy-coordination conclusions, p.18; study scope, p.7; structural differences, p.19; baseline, p.5.)
    2.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative. The Tourism Economy at Risk. citizenresearch.ca/tourism-economy
    3.
    ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative. Snowmobile Trails and High-Speed Rail. citizenresearch.ca/snowmobile-trails
    4.
    Submission to RTO 9 — ALTO High-Speed Rail Southern Corridor: Tourism & Economic Impacts for Southeastern Ontario. February 2026. (RTO 9 regional tourism spending, Jan–Sep 2024.)
    5.
    OFSC 2022–2023 Economic Impact Study (Harry Cummings & Associates, using the Ontario Ministry of Tourism TREIM model); district-level apportionment for Districts 1, 2 and 6.
    6.
    MP Scott Reid, correspondence to constituents (2026), re: VIA Rail displacement risk from HSR corridor selection.
    7.
    CBC News, “NDP warns privatizing high-speed rail from Toronto to Quebec could kill passenger trains in rest of Canada,” February 19, 2025 — carries MP Taylor Bachrach’s warning and VIA’s corridor revenue and passenger shares. cbc.ca
    8.
    ALTO, “Embark on a culinary adventure from Toronto to Quebec City” — Facebook advertisement, February 2026 (alto-hsr.ca).
  • Estimated not simulated

    Estimated, Not Simulated

    The journey times behind ALTO were drawn from a spreadsheet of international averages — not from a model of the actual corridor. What that distinction means, and who set the target.

    Critical Finding

    A government record released under the Access to Information Act shows that, of the journey times prepared for the project, only the slowest case was produced by an actual simulation of the railway. That case was a 110 mph (177 km/h) train — a roughly four-hour Toronto–Montréal trip. Every faster time, including those near the speeds ALTO now markets, came from a spreadsheet that applied average speeds borrowed from intercity railways in other countries.

    The technical memorandum describes those faster figures, in its own words, as “for information and comparison purposes.” And the email chain attached to it records the most senior Transport Canada official on the file directing that the times not assume Toronto speeds above 160 mph (257 km/h), because a higher figure was “not the intent of the Government.” The journey time, in other words, was managed as a policy and cost target — not derived as an engineering result.

    The Record

    What the document is

    The release (A-2025-00333) was obtained under the Access to Information Act and provided to the Initiative. It consists of an email chain dated August 30 to September 4, 2023 among Transport Canada and Via HFR / Via TGF officials and their technical advisers, together with the attached memorandum “VIA HFR-TGF Journey Times.” It dates from the procurement period, when the project was still a high-frequency rail (HFR) programme under Transport Canada’s lead, before the February 2025 announcement re-scoped it as high-speed rail at 300 km/h.

    The memorandum is the engineering note that sits beneath the project’s headline travel times. It is explicit about how those times were calculated — and it used two very different methods for two different parts of the answer.

    The Distinction That Matters

    Two ways to get a journey time

    A train’s journey time is the single number a project like this is sold on — “Toronto to Montréal in X hours.” There are two fundamentally different ways to produce that number, and they are not equally reliable.

    A simulation builds a digital twin of the real railway and “drives” a train along it. The software knows the actual track: every curve that forces the train to slow, every hill, every station stop, where the signals are, how fast the specific train accelerates and brakes, and whether other trains — including freight — are in the way. It runs the trip second by second on that line and reports how long it genuinely takes. The memorandum names the tool used for this: RailSys, drawing on the JPO’s 2021 Rail Operational Summary Report. It is the railway equivalent of a flight simulator, or of a mapping app with live traffic.

    A spreadsheet estimate does something far cruder: it takes the distance, assumes an average speed borrowed from how fast trains run in other countries, and divides one by the other. It never looks at this corridor’s actual geometry, terrain, urban approaches, or shared freight track. The memorandum is candid that its faster figures are of this kind — an “estimated calculation based on the maximum permissible speed,” provided “for information and comparison purposes.”

    Simulation — the RailSys toolSpreadsheet estimate
    Drives the actual route. Models every curve, gradient, station stop, signal and conflicting train on the real Toronto–Québec line, second by second. Distance ÷ an assumed average speed. Takes the route length and an average operating speed benchmarked to comparable intercity rail abroad, and divides.
    Knows the corridor. A curve too tight for high speed shows up as a slower section; a freight train ahead shows up as lost minutes. Constraints surface before construction, not after. Blind to the corridor. Cannot see this line’s curves, hills, city approaches or freight sharing. The memorandum labels its outputs indicative only.
    What ALTO simulated. Only the 110 mph (177 km/h) base case — roughly a four-hour Toronto–Montréal trip. What ALTO estimated. Every faster time, including the 160 and 186 mph figures (257 and 300 km/h) closest to the marketed speeds.

    The difference is the difference between “we modelled it and it works” and “we estimated it from comparables.” The first is a tested result for this railway. The second is an educated guess that a later, detailed study would have to confirm.

    What Was Actually Run

    The only simulated number is the slow one

    ~4 hrs
    the only Toronto–Montréal time actually simulated (110 mph / 177 km/h base case)
    RailSys, per the memorandum
    Spreadsheet
    the source of every faster journey time on the page
    benchmarked to foreign averages
    160 mph
    (257 km/h) — the speed ceiling set as “the intent of the Government”
    TC official, Aug–Sept 2023

    The memorandum’s own tables make the gap plain. The single time it produced by simulation — the 110 mph (177 km/h) base case — is roughly 3:59 to 4:19 for Toronto–Montréal. The faster times on the same page, for a 186 mph (300 km/h) or 160 mph (257 km/h) train, run from about 2:40 to 3:10. But those faster figures are the spreadsheet ones. The four-hour trip is the only number anyone actually drove through the model. The under-three-hour trips that make high-speed rail attractive were never simulated for this corridor.

    This matters because the public ALTO project is now built on 300 km/h (186 mph) running. Even the “calculated” 186 mph (300 km/h) times in this 2023 record trace back to the spreadsheet, not the simulator — and the simulator was only ever pointed at the slow case.

    A second problem: not the door-to-door time

    There is a second issue with these numbers, separate from how they were produced. Every figure here — simulated or estimated — is a train-in-motion time, measured platform to platform. It is not the door-to-door time that decides whether a traveller picks rail over flying, and door-to-door time depends on something ALTO has not settled: where the stations are. With downtown stations at both ends the corridor is competitive; with the suburban or peri-urban stations most consistent with the project’s cost structure, the advantage over air narrows or disappears. A separate academic submission to the consultation went further, noting that ALTO’s published times do not appear to even include the time for a stop in Ottawa — so the in-motion figures may be understated before the door-to-door question is reached. We treat that in full in The Station Location Problem and The Last Mile; the point here is narrower — the headline time is an estimate, and even taken at face value it is not the number that matters.

    Who Set the Target

    The journey time as a government decision

    The instruction to hold the journey times down did not come from a technician. The email chain records that when a Toronto figure was put forward assuming sustained speeds above 160 mph (257 km/h), a Transport Canada official objected that it “assumes a full journey time from Toronto at speed greater than 160, which is not the intent of the Government,” and explained that the intent was to have bidders identify the segments with the lowest marginal cost for higher speed. The exchange closes on September 4, 2023 with the project director’s note: “No change to journey time agreed by Vincent.”

    That official is Vincent Robitaille. According to Transport Canada’s own published biography, Robitaille has served as Assistant Deputy Minister – High Frequency Rail since December 2021 — the month the project’s governance passed to a Transport Canada–led integrated team — and he leads that team. His background before the role was in commercial policy and financing, not rail engineering: from 2018 to 2021 he was Director General of Transport Canada’s Centre of Excellence on Strategic Investments, working on the commercial elements and alternative financing of major transportation investments, and before that he led the public-private-partnership procurement of the new Champlain Bridge Corridor in Montréal. His credentials are financial and project-management designations (CFA, PMP, Certified Director, and an MBA). Transport Canada

    Why the background is relevant, not incidental

    This is an observation of record, not of motive. The person defining the journey-time ceiling as the Government’s intent — and steering bidders toward “the lowest marginal cost” rather than the fastest trip — is the project’s most senior Transport Canada official, whose professional expertise is procurement and project financing. It is consistent with a journey time being treated as a commercial and cost target to be managed, rather than an engineering output to be measured. The released record shows the target being set; it does not require any inference about why.

    Two Years Later

    The same official, now selling the fast times

    In a public podcast interview in December 2025, Robitaille — by then leading the project for Transport Canada — described the corridor to a general audience in precisely the terms the 2023 record could not support with simulation: Montréal reachable in well under current rail times, a city you could reach for a day trip and return the same evening, trains “every half an hour,” the corridor as “commuting distance.” Those are the fast, frequent-service figures — the ones drawn from the spreadsheet.

    The internal record from 2023 shows the same official holding the specification below those speeds — directing that journey times not assume sustained running above 160 mph (257 km/h), because faster was “not the intent of the Government” — and relying on benchmarked estimates for anything quicker. The public pitch and the internal caution are two years apart and point in opposite directions. The travel times now used to sell the project are of the kind the same official described internally, in 2023, as indicative.

    The Bottom Line

    A promise, or an estimate?

    When a government tells the public “this train will get you there in X hours,” people reasonably assume engineers modelled the actual route and confirmed it. This record shows that, for the fast times, they did not. They did the back-of-an-envelope version — distance against speeds observed in other countries — and said so internally. A spreadsheet estimate is a hope; a simulation is the closest thing to a tested promise. The faster ALTO travels in its marketing, the further it gets from the only journey time anyone actually ran.

    One caveat, stated plainly so the point is not overdrawn. The memorandum does say these estimates were always meant to be refined through later design and operational modelling by the eventual private partner. So the fair claim is not that the numbers were invented. It is that the detailed validation was deferred, and that as of this 2023 record the project’s faster journey times — including those near what is marketed today — had no corridor-specific engineering behind them, only benchmarked estimates. No simulation of high-speed running on the Toronto–Québec line appears anywhere in the released record.

    Sources

    Primary documents

    1.
    Transport Canada / Via HFR (Via TGF), “VIA HFR-TGF Journey Times” (HFR JT note 20230831) and accompanying email chain, August 30 – September 4, 2023. Released under the Access to Information Act as file A-2025-00333.
    2.
    Joint Project Office, Phase 2C Rail Operational Summary Report (2021) — the RailSys simulation source referenced in the memorandum for the 110 mph (177 km/h) base case.
    3.
    Transport Canada, Briefing Documents 2025, biography: “Vincent Robitaille — Assistant Deputy Minister – High Frequency Rail.” tc.canada.ca
    4.
    “From Bridges to Trains: Career lessons with Vincent Robitaille,” The Supply Chain Ambassador podcast, premiered December 3, 2025. Public interview; transcript auto-generated. youtube.com