Tag: capital cost

Where you put a railway

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Plain Language Brief

Where you put a railway decides almost everything else

Build beside a highway that already exists, or cut a new line through open country. That single choice sets the carbon, the habitat damage, the disruption during construction and the opposition — and it sets the cost too.

Chapter 5 of the HPR Research Report · September 2026

−15 Mt

Carbon removed over fifty years by the brownfield route, on our model

+15 Mt

Carbon added over the same period by the greenfield route

29 v 65

Community friction scores, brownfield against greenfield

The environmental case for a railway is usually made with one number: the carbon saved by taking people out of cars and planes. That number matters, and we deal with it first. But the bigger environmental fact about a railway is decided before a single train runs — by where the line is put.

A route that follows an existing transport corridor inherits ground that has already been cleared, drained, fenced and cut through. A route driven across open country creates a new line of disturbance where there was none. The same choice governs the human side: whether a project takes its land from beside a highway people already live next to, or from farms and communities that never expected a railway.

This page covers the four consequences that follow from that one decision. On each of them the two routes differ not by a margin but in kind.

1. Carbon: the two routes have opposite signs

Over fifty years the brownfield route is a net removal of carbon. The greenfield route, measured the same way, is a net emitter. Not smaller — opposite.

Three things drive that. Construction carbon is the one-off emission of building the line. Building at grade beside an existing highway needs no tunnelling through the Canadian Shield, no deep cuts, and no treatment of the unstable marine clay south of Ottawa. Our estimate is 4.9 Mt for the brownfield line against 14.9 Mt for the greenfield one — roughly three times more.

Running the trains turns out to be almost a rounding error either way. On Ontario’s grid, electric traction at 200 km/h emits about 6 grams of carbon per passenger-kilometre.

Freight is what decides it. A passenger line built beside the existing freight railway frees capacity on that railway. Every long-haul truck that moves off Highway 401 onto rail saves about a quarter of a tonne of carbon on a typical haul. At 3,000 trucks a day — about eight freight trains — that is roughly 13.5 Mt over fifty years. The greenfield route has no freight function, so it cannot claim any of it.

Fifty-year carbon balance — our estimate, central case
What counts	Brownfield (electric)	Greenfield
Building it	+4.9 Mt	+14.9 Mt
Running the trains	+1.3 Mt	+5.4 Mt
Roads closed by fencing	—	+1.7 Mt
Trucks moved to rail	−13.5 Mt	none
Passengers out of cars	−7.9 Mt	−7 Mt
Net over 50 years	−15.2 Mt	+15 Mt

Both columns are Initiative estimates, not published figures. A dash means the project structurally has no such term. The two routes differ in length — roughly 485 km against roughly 1,000 km — which is itself part of the comparison, because the longer line is the heavier one to build.

Why the freight credit matters so much

The carbon saved by taking a passenger out of a car shrinks every year as more cars become electric. By the 2050s it is close to nothing. The carbon saved by taking a truck off the road and putting the load on a train does not shrink the same way, because trucks stay diesel far longer — and it grows as the electricity grid gets cleaner.

So the brownfield route’s carbon case rests on something that strengthens with time. The greenfield route’s rests on something that weakens.

That shows up most clearly in how long each takes to pay back its construction carbon. The brownfield line breaks even in 12 to 18 years and stays in credit after that, and the timing barely changes with passenger numbers because freight carries it. The greenfield line depends entirely on passengers: about 22 years at the ridership its reference class suggests, 39 years at a more central figure, and at low ridership it does not break even within fifty years at all.

2. Habitat: a new barrier in the wrong place

A railway is a barrier to animals. Where you put the barrier decides whether it cuts through habitat that is still whole, or adds one more strand to ground that is already crossed by a highway and a freight line.

The greenfield alignment runs through or beside three of eastern Ontario’s most sensitive landscapes.

The Frontenac Arch

A billion-year-old granite ridge linking the Canadian Shield to the Adirondacks, a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve since 2002, and the narrowest point on the wildlife corridor running from Algonquin to the Adirondacks. It holds Blanding’s turtle, the grey ratsnake, the eastern whip-poor-will and somewhere between half and two thirds of Canada’s cerulean warblers, along with fisher, black bear, moose and eastern wolf.

Because it is already the tightest pinch-point in a continental corridor, a new barrier laid across it does disproportionate harm. It does not just disturb habitat; it narrows the last gap animals still move through.

The Napanee Limestone Plain

Alvar — flat limestone pavement with almost no soil, flooded in spring and parched in summer. It exists in only two places on Earth, the Great Lakes basin and the Baltic, and about 85 per cent of North America’s alvar is in Ontario. It supports part of Ontario’s remaining eastern loggerhead shrike population, a bird now down to a handful of nesting pairs province-wide.

A brownfield route is not ecologically free. Its right-of-way still crosses natural land. The point is comparative: it adds a strand where a barrier already exists, rather than opening a fresh one through the ground that the biosphere designation exists to protect.

We say that plainly because it matters. The corridor audit in Chapter 4 finds the brownfield spine still crosses about 41 per cent natural cover. It is not a route through nothing. It is a route through ground that a four-lane highway and a Class I freight main already run down.

3. Construction: where the trucks go

A 479-kilometre construction site has to be fed. The brownfield spine needs roughly 9.8 million tonnes of fill, ballast, track and concrete — about 20,400 tonnes for every kilometre built. Delivered entirely by road, that is around 390,000 loaded truck trips, running on the same Highway 401 the railway is being built beside, during the decade that highway is itself being widened.

Britain has already run this experiment. HS2 moved more than 10 million tonnes of material by rail, and the reason it did is the instructive part: it was not a carbon measure. Local councils refused the lorry routes the project had planned. Moving material by train was how the works stayed consented.

The honest size of the carbon saving

Moving 60 to 80 per cent of the material by rail instead of road would avoid somewhere between 0.05 and 0.08 Mt of carbon. That is one to two per cent of the line’s construction emissions. It is a real saving and a small one, and the carbon case on this page does not rest on it.

What it changes is something else: whether people along the route can live with the construction. That is the variable that decides whether a corridor gets built at all.

And this is not a strategy a project can simply decide to adopt. It is a property of where the line is. A route beside an existing freight railway has yards at Belleville, Kingston, Brockville, Cornwall and Coteau available as railheads, and on the Ottawa legs runs on publicly owned track. A greenfield route through the Frontenac Arch has no railway to deliver to. Materials arrive by road on haul roads built for the purpose, and excavated rock leaves the same way, through the same rural communities.

4. Communities: friction is priced into the cost

We score this two ways. The Latent Friction Index measures the structural friction a route will generate, before any opposition has appeared. The Community Friction Index measures opposition that has actually materialised. On the forward measure the brownfield spine scores about 29 and the greenfield corridor about 65. On the realised measure the greenfield project has already reached 54, and is rising.

This is not only a political point. In our reference-class cost model, community friction is a statistically significant predictor of cost escalation — it carries most of the explanatory power in what a kilometre actually costs to build, across the international sample. The friction a new corridor generates gets priced into the bill.

A low-friction route is not just quieter. It is cheaper, and those are the same fact seen from two sides.

The difference comes down to where the land is taken from. Both routes need new land; a railway cannot be laid inside a live highway. But land taken beside an existing highway and freight line is already fragmented, already severed, and already next to infrastructure. Land taken across open country is none of those things, and the people it is taken from had no prior relationship with the project.

One thing that cuts the other way

The margin beside Highway 401 that makes the brownfield route cheap is being consumed — by interchange development, logistics parks moving east, subdivisions at growth centres and utility lock-in. Chapter 4 puts the cost of waiting until the corridor fills in at around $20 billion, which would roughly halve the route’s benefit-cost ratio and erase the advantage that is the reason to prefer it.

The brownfield option is the low-friction one, but only while the window is open.

5. What the corridor could give back

Everything above treats the corridor as something done to the land it crosses. There is a reciprocal question worth asking.

Against the intuition that Ontario’s sun improves as you go south and west, the province’s strongest solar yields are in the east. Kingston records about 1,194 kilowatt-hours per installed kilowatt per year and Ottawa about 1,140, against roughly 1,096 for Toronto and 1,084 for London. The railway is proposed through the sunniest ground in southern Ontario — and developers noticed first. Four ten-megawatt solar farms stand within a few kilometres of the 401 around Ingleside alone — Rutley, Cornwall, David Brown and South Stormont, built between 2012 and 2015 — and at Edwardsburgh Cardinal a partnership including the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn First Nation is building the largest battery storage system in Canada.

This matters for a reason that has nothing to do with electricity. A right-of-way takes a strip of land and pays for it once. A generation lease pays on the land that remains, every year, for decades. The awkward leftover parcels created by a railway are poor ground for crops and perfectly good ground for solar panels. The Rutley farm gives a sense of the scale: ten megawatts across about ninety acres.

Being clear about the numbers

The contracts that built the existing solar farms paid up to 44.3 cents a kilowatt-hour and are closed to new entrants. At today’s rates a ten-megawatt facility earns closer to a million dollars a year than the five to seven million those contracts paid. The existing arrays are a poor guide to what a new one is worth.

A million a year through a lease and a tax roll is still a different thing from a single expropriation cheque.

The limits deserve stating as plainly as the opportunity. Solar output peaks in summer and stops at night, while a railway’s demand is flat and year-round — so this is a commercial and community proposition, not a way to power trains. Provincial policy restricts ground-mount solar on prime farmland. Connection capacity governs what can actually be built. None of that is a reason to leave it unexamined; it is a reason to examine it while the route is still being decided, rather than after the land has been taken and the relationships have set.

How to read the numbers on this page

Figures attributed to a named source — Alto, HS2, the C.D. Howe Institute, Metrolinx, Environment and Climate Change Canada, the Treasury Board, Natural Resources Canada, UNESCO, or a named developer — are quoted from the full chapter’s source lists and can be checked there.

Everything else is output from our own models: both columns of the carbon table, the freight credit, the breakeven years, the friction scores, the land-cover audit, the materials tonnage and the delay-escalation estimate. These are estimates built on stated assumptions, not measurements. The assumptions are set out in the full report so that any of them can be replaced and the arithmetic re-run.

Where Alto has not published a figure, we say so rather than inferring one, and we make no claim about why any figure has not been published.

Read the full chapter

Chapter 5 — Environmental and Community Impact (PDF)

Nineteen pages. The full lifecycle carbon account with its discount-rate sensitivity, the traction comparison including bi-mode trainsets, the species and habitat assessments, the materials-by-rail analysis against HS2 outturn, the friction indices, the corridor solar assessment, and the complete source lists for each section.

Sources and notes

1Discount rates: Metrolinx Business Case Manual Volume 2 (3.5 per cent); Environment and Climate Change Canada, social cost of greenhouse gas emissions (2 per cent near-term Ramsey rate); Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Canadian Cost-Benefit Analysis Guide: Regulatory Proposals (8 per cent); US Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4, revised November 2023, in which the 7 per cent capital rate was withdrawn.

2C.D. Howe Institute, All Aboard: The Benefits of Faster, More Frequent Passenger Trains between Ontario and Québec (D. Jones and T. Fariha), February 2025 — 3.5 per cent social discount rate over a 60-year appraisal, and the only published benefit analysis of this corridor.

3Habitat: UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme, Frontenac Arch Biosphere Reserve; Birds Canada, cerulean warbler profile; COSEWIC and Environment and Climate Change Canada recovery strategies; Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas Canada, Napanee Limestone Plain (ON152); Wildlife Preservation Canada, eastern loggerhead shrike. Initiative assessments of the Frontenac Arch (A. Hyett) and the Napanee Limestone Plain (S. Moore and K. Hennige), March 2026.

4Materials by rail: HS2 Ltd, Materials by Rail, HS2 Learning Legacy, and HS2 media releases 2020–2023; Crossrail Excavated Materials Story; Railway Association of Canada on rail fuel efficiency.

5Solar: Natural Resources Canada photovoltaic potential data; Canada Energy Regulator market snapshot; Firelight Infrastructure Partners, Saturn Power and Clearlight Energy project data; The Energy Mix on the Skyview 2 storage project at Edwardsburgh Cardinal.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative Independent, non-partisan citizen research on the proposed Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor. This page is a plain-language summary of Chapter 5 of the HPR Research Report. The full chapter sets out the models, the tables and the complete source lists. Nothing on this page is a statement about the motives or conduct of any person or organisation. It is a comparison of two route choices and of what follows from each.

September 5, 2026

Counting the crossings

Counting the Crossings

ALTO says it will not wall off communities, and points to France and Spain. Those countries did something else as well, and the letter leaves it out.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Analytical Brief · Published August 2026

⚠ What ALTO Told Kingston Readers

On 14 August 2026, a letter in the Kingston Whig-Standard from ALTO’s Chief Project Management Officer and Cadence’s Project Director told corridor residents the railway “will not create a wall between communities”, nor a barrier to wildlife or water. As proof it can be done, the letter offered two numbers: France has built more than 4,000 structures across roughly 2,700 km of high-speed line, and Spain more than 900 across roughly 750 km.

The letter does not mention Kingston, the route, where stations would go, what any of it costs, or expropriation. It does say preserving access has been a key principle from the beginning. ALTO’s own Preserving Access and Movement page carries a last-modified date of 7 May 2026 — after the consultation closed on 24 April.

The Short Version

Take ALTO’s own figures and divide them through. France works out to about one structure every 675 metres. Spain, about one every 833 metres. Those are the rates being offered as reassurance.

The trouble is that a count of structures built tells you nothing about how many crossings were closed. A railway can put in 900 bridges and still cut off 3,000 field entrances, farm lanes and township roads. The letter gives the top half of the fraction and leaves out the bottom.

Kingstonians already have ALTO’s own answer to this. In February 2026, ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering told Kingston City Council that crossings would be consolidated to bring costs down, and that the company would try to limit how many overpasses get built. That was six months before the letter, to the same city, on the same subject.

There is a larger omission. France did not solve farm severance with bridges. It has a legal procedure that lets the state reorganise the surrounding farmland so that a farm cut in two can be put back into a workable shape, paid for by the project. On one French high-speed line, 3,700 hectares of land were bought up in advance so that farmers could be compensated in land rather than only in cash. Ontario has nothing of the kind.

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Counting the Crossings — Full Brief (PDF)

The arithmetic behind ALTO’s France and Spain comparison, and the land instrument the letter leaves out

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The Arithmetic

What ALTO’s own numbers work out to

Neither figure in the letter is disputed here. They are simply divided through. A structure count only becomes meaningful once you know how far apart the structures are, and how far apart the things they are meant to replace used to be.

~675 m

average gap between structures on the French network, using ALTO’s figures

4,000 structures over 2,700 km

~833 m

average gap on the Spanish line ALTO cites

900 structures over 750 km

1.25–2 km

typical spacing of public roads across eastern Ontario’s concession grid

before counting farm lanes and driveways

There is a third number the letter does not offer, and it cuts the other way. HS2 in Britain is the most recent comparable project of this kind: a brand-new high-speed line built through peri-urban and rural England. Its first phase runs about 225 km and will carry more than 500 bridging structures, including over 50 major viaducts — roughly one structure every 450 m. That is about half again the French rate, through country a good deal more built up than eastern Ontario. The most recent comparable project provided more, not fewer, than the average ALTO offers as reassurance.

The spread between the three is itself worth noticing. A fifty per cent difference between two European networks tells you that these totals are governed by terrain, by how much of a route sits in tunnel or on viaduct, and by what each project counts as a structure. About nine tenths of HS2’s first phase runs in tunnel, in cutting or on structures, so a large share of those 500 exist to carry the railway over the landscape rather than to carry a community across the railway. A structure count is a construction statistic, not a standard of community access.

Eastern Ontario was surveyed on a grid. Roads run at regular intervals, and between them sit farm lanes, private driveways and municipal drains. Whether a European average is enough for that grid is exactly the question people along the corridor are asking. Quoting the French figure does not answer it. It assumes the answer.

There is a comparison closer to home that nobody has yet made. Highway 416 is a modern, fully grade-separated corridor built through the same survey grid, the same farmland and several of the same municipalities. How many crossings Ontario provided on that road is not something this brief has established, but it is the obvious yardstick, and it ought to be established before a French average is relied on.

The Missing Number

How many roads are we talking about?

The denominator is not actually a mystery. Canada’s own transport department has published it.

In a briefing note prepared for a Parliamentary committee in March 2023, Transport Canada set out what a full high-speed line between Québec City and Toronto would require: a fully enclosed and fenced corridor, a straighter alignment, double tracking throughout, and complete grade separation on a route that currently carries more than 1,000 public and private crossings.

That figure described the northern route, through comparatively empty country — Canadian Shield, wetlands, big rural lots. The southern corridor now being prioritised runs through some of the most intensively farmed land in eastern Ontario, where the concession grid is tightest. On the southern option, 1,000 is more likely a floor than a ceiling.

The Initiative’s own road severance analysis puts the proportion of crossings permanently closed rather than bridged on rural high-speed corridors at somewhere between 30 and 60 per cent. Applied to a floor of 1,000, that is 300 to 600 roads dead-ended — our estimate, not a figure ALTO or Transport Canada has published.

1,000+

public and private crossings on the alignment

Transport Canada, March 2023

300–600

roads likely closed, on the Initiative’s estimate

30 to 60 per cent of crossings

$3.2–8.4B

Initiative’s estimated cost of the crossings that would be built

never shown as a separate line

That last figure matters for a different reason. Grade separation is one of the most expensive parts of any high-speed corridor, and a sum of that size has never appeared as its own line in ALTO’s published capital estimate. Neither has any methodology explaining how many crossings will be built, or to what standard, or how it will be decided which roads are simply stopped up.

The reassurance in the August letter is offered in the absence of the one document that could support it. Further detail is set out in the Initiative’s technical analysis of road severances.

On the Record

What ALTO told Kingston in February

Six months before this letter appeared in Kingston’s paper, ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering and Interface sat before Kingston City Council and was asked about exactly this. The transcript is the fullest account ALTO has given in public of how it approaches road crossings, and it does not read the way the letter does.

The reassurance

Asked by a councillor whether there would be a standard distance between crossings, he described a working assumption that every road would get some form of duct or overpass, since the roads belong to municipalities or road authorities and cannot be cut unilaterally.

The qualification, in the same answer

He went on to say that in reality some crossings would be looked at for consolidation, to lower costs and improve construction, subject to discussion with the road authority.

The objective

Pressed by the Deputy Mayor, he set it out plainly: grade separations would vary by area, would be settled during route selection, and ALTO would “try and limit the number of overpasses that we’ll need to get created”.

And the fencing

He confirmed that modern high-speed rail must be completely segregated and fully fenced anywhere level access is possible, whether the line runs at 200 or 300 km/h.

Read together: a starting assumption that is subject to cost-driven consolidation, an explicit goal of building as few overpasses as possible, and continuous fencing between whatever crossings survive.

The councillor’s actual question — is there a standard distance between crossings — was not answered, and no standard has been published since. February’s statements and August’s letter were addressed to the same city.

Three Problems

Why the structure count does not settle it

You are being shown half a fraction

The number that answers the severance question is a ratio: structures built, divided by accesses cut off. The letter supplies only the first. Every complaint recorded by French and Spanish farmers over the last forty years is perfectly compatible with the figures quoted.

Not every structure reconnects anything

“Engineering structures” and “viaducts” include everything the railway needs to build itself: bridges over rivers, crossings of existing motorways and railways, tunnels through hills. A viaduct over a river gorge restores nobody’s access to their back field. How many of the 4,000 exist to reconnect a severed local road or laneway is not stated, and is certainly a much smaller number.

A different landscape

The French network largely runs through consolidated farming country. Eastern Ontario is a survey grid of concession roads, side roads, long farm lots and dead ends. The same rate of crossings produces a very different result depending on how much there was to cross in the first place.

The Missing Piece

What France also built

The most important thing missing from the letter is not a number. It is a law.

Two of the countries with the longest high-speed rail experience did not leave farm access to be worked out project by project. They legislated it. France did so through its rural code; Germany passed a federal land consolidation statute in 1953 that covers exactly this situation. In both, farmers sit on the body that decides, that body can compulsorily redraw the farms and the farm tracks together, the proponent pays, and there is a right of appeal to the courts.

France has a statutory procedure called aménagement foncier agricole et forestier — land reorganisation, formerly known as remembrement. Its stated purpose includes repairing the damage that major linear projects, high-speed railways among them, do to rural land. Where a line slices a farm in half, the surrounding parcels can be legally reorganised so that holdings are handed back in a shape a farmer can actually work. Local commissions run it under departmental authority, and the project pays for it.

Land is also bought up ahead of time. A national rural land agency, SAFER, holds first refusal on farmland coming up for sale, so that displaced farmers can be given land instead of only a cheque. Spain has its own version of the same idea.

This matters for who gets a say. In Canada there is no seat and no statutory role. On 4 June 2026 the five organisations representing effectively the whole farm sector in Ontario and Quebec concluded that ALTO’s proposed collaboration agreement was not in their members’ interests to sign. In France they would not have had to negotiate for a place at the table. They would already have had one, in law.

This is not a minor administrative detail. On the Le Mans to Rennes high-speed line, roughly 3,700 hectares were placed in reserve, with agricultural land bought up as it came to market within three kilometres of the future route. In Ille-et-Vilaine alone, 48.5 km of new railway took about 480 hectares of crops and pasture — and against that, 720 hectares of land reserve were assembled and parcels across some 1,200 hectares either side of the track were reorganised, affecting more than 4,400 landowners, financed by the project and delivered through intercommunal commissions.

In France and Germany	In Ontario
A legal procedure to reorganise farmland around a new line, whose express purpose includes repairing damage done by major linear infrastructure.	No equivalent. There is no statutory land reorganisation for farms severed by infrastructure.
Farmers hold seats on the deciding body, and decisions can be appealed to the courts.	No seat and no statutory role. Five farm organisations declined ALTO’s collaboration agreement in June 2026 rather than accept its terms.
A rural land agency with first refusal on farmland coming to market, used to assemble land reserves years ahead of construction.	No equivalent agency and no statutory land reserve mechanism.
Local commissions empowered to redraw parcel boundaries, operating under departmental authority.	No equivalent body. No one can redraw the neighbours’ boundaries to make a severed farm whole again.
Compensation in land is possible: a farmer who loses acreage can be given workable acreage back.	Compensation in money only, for what is physically taken. Expropriation and negotiated purchase are the available tools.

So the comparison in the letter is accurate and, at the same time, does not carry over. The French result rests partly on a legal instrument Canada does not have. A letter that cites France’s bridge count while saying nothing about France’s land reorganisation is describing half of how the problem was solved.

Cadence’s Project Director is quoted in French farming trade coverage of that same Le Mans to Rennes project, explaining that the land reserve had to account for the right-of-way, the land reorganisation and the environmental compensation together.

That gap is a problem in Canadian law rather than a failing of the project sponsor. It is still a gap, and it has to be closed before European results can reasonably be promised here. Closing it is not something ALTO can do on its own.

Not Just How Many

A structure is not automatically an answer

Even where a crossing is built, two questions decide whether it is any use, and ALTO has published nothing on either.

Size

A livestock crossing and a machinery crossing are not the same structure. A standard cattle underpass runs about 2.1 metres high. A modern combine or grain cart needs 4 metres or more. A structure built to the wrong dimension is a closure as far as the equipment is concerned. No minimum dimensions have been published, and no spacing standard.

Upkeep

Nobody has decided who maintains these crossings over the decades that follow. ALTO describes its approach as still being developed. France took roughly a decade of litigation and legislation to settle the same question. Municipalities along the corridor have a direct interest in the answer.

What closure pushes onto the road

When a farm crossing is extinguished, the equipment does not disappear. It goes onto the public road. By the Ontario Federation of Agriculture’s own figure, slow-moving farm vehicles are 3.8 to 4.8 times more likely to be involved in a fatal collision per kilometre travelled. Severance is therefore also a road-safety question, and one that has not been assessed.

The Initiative has examined the two halves of this problem separately: road severances and wildlife crossings.

The Wall

One claim that cannot be tested as written

A railway running at over 300 km/h is fully grade-separated and fenced along its entire length. That is what grade separation means. The structure is a continuous barrier by engineering necessity. The real question is where the openings are and how many there are, not whether the barrier exists.

What ALTO could reasonably promise is that severance will be mitigated at designed crossings, to a stated standard, at a stated spacing. A flat undertaking that no wall will be created is not something anyone can test — and it is a sentence that will be read back to ALTO by every landowner and every township that later finds an access closed.

The same applies to wildlife. Continuous fencing is a barrier to animals except where crossings are designed in, and how well those crossings get used varies a great deal by species — a question examined at length in the Initiative’s work on wildlife crossings.

An early study along a Spanish high-speed line, monitoring fifteen underpasses and two overpasses over two years, recorded no deer or wild boar crossings at all. That was 1996, and crossing design has moved on a great deal since; it should not be read as the last word. But the more recent evidence does not settle the question the other way either. A systematic review of crossing structures across roads and railways found that animals did cross them in almost every study examined — and yet a decline in wildlife movement after construction was prevented in fewer than 40 per cent of cases, with many structures poorly built or poorly monitored.

On Spain’s network the best-documented harm is to birds. Camera monitoring from on board trains estimated 60.5 bird collisions per kilometre per year on a stretch carrying 53 trains a day, and 26.1 on a stretch carrying 25. Later work found the surrounding bird community changing species by species, and uncapped catenary poles acting as pitfall traps for birds that nest in cavities. Anti-birdstrike screens are routinely fitted to viaducts, and how well they work is still being studied.

None of this says the corridor cannot be crossed by wildlife. It says that whether it can depends on design decisions and monitoring commitments not yet made, and that a flat undertaking given before them is not one a reader can test. Of the three promises, the one about natural water flows is the most straightforward to deliver.

What Can Be Asked Now

Six questions ALTO can answer today

The letter makes commitments specific enough to be checked. None of the following requires a finalised route.

The ratio

Against Transport Canada’s figure of more than 1,000 crossings, how many are assumed to get a structure, and how many will be closed?

Composition

Of the French and Spanish structures cited, how many exist to reconnect a severed local access, as opposed to carrying the line over a river, motorway or railway?

Ontario benchmark

What crossing rate is assumed for the Ontario segments, and how was it arrived at? A comparison with Highway 416 through similar country would be useful to communities along the route.

Criteria

What method decides whether a road is bridged or dead-ended, and what detour distance is treated as acceptable in the countryside?

Cost

What provision for grade separation sits inside the capital estimate, and why has it never been shown as a separate line?

Dimensions

What minimum height and width will agricultural crossings meet, and what spacing standard applies? Will structures be sized for machinery or only for livestock?

Maintenance

Who owns and maintains each crossing structure over its life, and who carries that cost — ALTO, Cadence, or the municipality?

Detours

Where an access will not be reinstated, how much further will people have to drive to reach the nearest crossing, and what work supports that figure?

Emergency access

Which paramedic services and municipal fire departments have been consulted about response routes, on what dates, and what did they find?

Severed farms

Is any land reorganisation or land reserve contemplated for farms cut in two, and under what legal authority would it operate?

The letter is right that decades of international experience exist and should be drawn on. The difficulty is that it draws on one half of that experience and leaves out the other. France built more than four thousand structures. France also rebuilt the farms. The second of those depended on machinery Ontario does not have, and no number of overpasses substitutes for it. Meanwhile the company’s own engineering executive has told this city’s council that the aim is to build as few overpasses as it can.

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Counting the Crossings (PDF)

Full analysis for municipal councils, farm organisations, MPs and residents along the corridor — with the per-kilometre working, the French statutory provisions and the complete source list

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How to read the numbers on this page

The French and Spanish structure counts are as given in the 14 August letter and used here as stated. The Transport Canada crossing count, the HS2 figures, the Kingston council statements, the French statutory provisions, the HS2 petition figures, the emergency-response research and the wildlife findings are all quoted from the sources listed below and can be checked there.

Everything else is our own calculation or estimate, and is marked as such where it appears: the per-kilometre and spacing rates, the 30 to 60 per cent closure proportion and the 300 to 600 closures that follow from it, the $3.2 to $8.4 billion grade-separation range, and the detour arithmetic. Where ALTO or Transport Canada has not published a figure, we say so rather than inferring one, and we make no claim about what anyone knew or intended.

Sources

Primary documents and statements

Maria Luisa Dominguez and Loïc Dorbec, “Building on decades of high-speed rail experience,” letter to the editor, Kingston Whig-Standard, 14 August 2026. Structure and length figures for France and Spain are as stated in that letter and are used here as given; the per-kilometre rates are the Initiative’s arithmetic.

Chambres d’agriculture France, on aménagement foncier agricole et forestier and its role in repairing disruption caused to rural land by the route of major linear works, high-speed railways included. chambres-agriculture.fr

Département d’Ille-et-Vilaine, on the LGV Bretagne–Pays de la Loire land reorganisation and land reserve programme: 48.5 km of new line, 480 ha absorbed, 720 ha of reserve constituted, 1,200 ha of parcels reorganised, more than 4,400 landowners affected, financed by the project owner. cg35.fr

WikiAgri, on the land reserves assembled through SAFER for the Le Mans–Rennes high-speed line: approximately 3,700 ha placed in reserve, with agricultural land pre-empted within three kilometres of the future alignment. Contains the quoted remarks of Cadence’s Project Director on the composition of that reserve. wikiagri.fr

Transport Canada, TRAN Committee Appearance Binder, Item 15: High Frequency Rail, 7 March 2023 — source of the figure of more than 1,000 public and private crossings on the alignment.

City of Kingston, Council meeting of 17 February 2026, closed-captioning transcript — remarks of ALTO’s Vice-President of Systems Engineering and Interface on crossing consolidation, overpass numbers and corridor fencing.

HS2 Phase 1 structure count: more than 500 bridging structures including over 50 major viaducts, per HS2 Ltd’s head of civils structures, reported in New Civil Engineer, 15 June 2022, and repeated on the Institution of Civil Engineers project page. Route length taken as approximately 225 km; some sources give 208 route km, which would raise the per-kilometre rate rather than lower it.

Wildlife. Rodríguez, Crema and Delibes (1996), on underpass and overpass use along Spanish high-speed line. Rytwinski and others, systematic review and meta-analysis of crossing-structure effectiveness, for the finding on movement decline. Barrientos and Borda-de-Água, “Railways as Barriers for Wildlife: Current Knowledge,” in Railway Ecology (Springer, 2017). García de la Morena and others (2017) for the on-board camera collision estimates; Malo and others (2017) on bird response and catenary-pole mortality; and work on high-speed rail and bird-community change published in PLOS One (2024).

Erin Durant, “Alto: Which farm roads stay open and who pays?” 16 August 2026 — source for the German Flurbereinigungsgesetz parallel, the seats-and-appeal structure of the French and German commissions, crossing dimensions for livestock versus machinery, the unresolved maintenance question, the OFA slow-moving-vehicle collision figure, and the last-modified metadata on ALTO’s agricultural pages.

10.

Joint statement of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, l’Union des producteurs agricoles, National Farmers Union (Ontario), Christian Farmers Federation of Ontario and Union des cultivateurs franco-ontariens, 16 June 2026, following their 4 June meeting on ALTO’s proposed collaboration agreement.

11.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, Road severances (technical analysis, March 2026 — source of the closure proportions and grade separation cost range) and Wildlife crossings.

12.

Ontario road spacing reflects the concession survey pattern across the corridor study area. Highway 416 is proposed here as a benchmark for comparison; no crossing-provision figure for that corridor has been established for this brief.

September 5, 2026

50000 jobs

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Plain Language Brief

Where do 50,000 jobs come from?

Alto says building the railway will support about 50,000 jobs. We checked that figure against two railways that publish both what they spend and who they employ.

September 2026

50,000

Jobs Alto says the project will support during construction. Its report defines the figure once, in an appendix.

~18,000

People actually working on the railway, on our estimate, at Alto’s own budget and schedule.

The number is not wrong. It is a standard output of a standard economic model, and when we rebuilt it from scratch we got almost exactly the same answer. But roughly two thirds of it is not people building a railway, and Alto’s report says so in only one place.

What Alto says

Alto’s report Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, published in August 2026, says the Québec City–Toronto line will support approximately 50,000 jobs while it is being built, and more than 5,000 once it is running. The figure has been repeated in federal announcements and in news coverage since. Almost everywhere it appears, it appears on its own: 50,000 jobs during construction.

An earlier version of the number was slightly different. The federal announcement of 19 February 2025 gave over 51,000 jobs and a GDP gain of up to $35 billion a year. Transport Canada was still publishing that pairing in its 12 December 2025 release. Canada’s Moment, eight months later, gives 50,000 jobs and $24.5 billion. The report does not explain the difference between the two GDP figures, which is about 43 per cent.

What the report actually says

Further into the report, in section 4.3.3 and in two identical tables — Table 7 in the body and Table A4 in the appendix — the figure is described much more fully. There it is:

50,000 full-time equivalent jobs. A full-time equivalent is work converted to a standard full-time measure. It is not a count of people.
Spread across a ten-year construction period.
Three kinds of work counted together. Direct work on the project; supply chain work at the firms that supply it; and induced work, meaning jobs supported when those workers spend their wages in shops, restaurants and everywhere else.
Produced by the 2019 Statistics Canada input-output model. This is a standard tool that estimates how spending in one part of the economy ripples through the rest of it.
Labelled an upper estimate.

The appendix is careful about what this does and does not mean. It says the results describe economic activity supported by spending rather than a net gain to the country. It leaves them out of the project’s benefit-cost ratio. And it notes that the method does not allow for labour shortages or other limits on how much the economy can absorb.

That is a fair and reasonably candid description. The difficulty is where it sits. Those two pages of an eighty-four page report carry it, and nothing else does. The summary at the front, the table comparing high-speed rail with the alternative, Alto’s website, the government announcements and the news coverage all carry the number without any of it.

The number reaching the public is not the number the appendix defines. It is the same figure with its definition left behind.

How we checked it

Two railways publish both halves of the equation — how much they spend in a year, and how many people that spending puts to work.

HS2 in Britain publishes audited capital spending and a programme workforce figure every year.
The Réseau express métropolitain in Montréal, built by CDPQ Infra, published a jobs claim and periodic counts of workers on site. It is also the closest match anywhere to the way Alto has been set up.

Both land in the same place: roughly 2,200 to 3,300 people working for every billion dollars spent in a year.

Alto’s own published figures are $60 to $90 billion of capital over ten to fourteen years. That works out to $4.3 to $9.0 billion a year, which is around half the rate HS2 is spending at present. Applying the observed rate from those two projects to Alto’s own budget and schedule gives 13,000 to 21,000 people working on the programme in the central cases, and a ceiling near 30,000 if the project spends at the top of its range on the fastest possible build.

We then rebuilt the whole 50,000 the way the appendix says it is built — adding supply chain and induced work on top of the people on site, using standard multiplier ratios.

Rebuilding the 50,000 — ten-year build at the top of Alto’s capital range
Layer	What it means	People
Owner and engineering	Alto’s own staff and the designers	700 – 2,000
Site and contractor	People building the railway	16,000 – 17,300
Supply chain	Staff at firms supplying the project	14,400
Induced	Jobs supported when those wages are spent	18,200
Total	Alto publishes 50,000	50,600

Initiative estimate, built from HS2 and REM published spending and workforce figures and standard supply-chain and induced multiplier ratios, applied to Alto’s own published capital range and schedule.

What the check found

50,600, against Alto’s published 50,000. The two agree to within one per cent, using the same three categories Alto names in its own appendix, by a route that borrows nothing from Alto’s model. On that basis the figure stands up as an output of the model that produced it.

What the agreement also does is fix what is inside the number. On Alto’s own budget, roughly 18,000 of the 50,000 are people working on the railway. The rest — nearly two thirds — are jobs at supplier firms and jobs supported when wages are spent again. Fewer than four in ten are on the railway itself.

A second and completely separate check gives the same answer. Direct labour usually accounts for 30 to 40 per cent of spending on heavy civil construction. Applied to $75 billion over ten to twelve years, at a fully loaded cost of $100,000 to $140,000 per worker-year, that supports somewhere between 13,400 and 30,000 people, centred near 19,000. Two methods that share no inputs bracket the same range.

The other way of reading it

Turn the question round and the arithmetic bites. If 50,000 really meant 50,000 people working on the railway, the project would need to spend $15.2 to $22.7 billion every year — a programme of $152 to $273 billion, against the $60 to $90 billion Alto has published. That is close to the $142 billion the Initiative’s own cost model predicts for this corridor. On the arithmetic set out here, Alto’s employment claim implies a more expensive railway than the one Alto has costed.

The question the report leaves open

“50,000 full-time equivalent jobs during a ten-year construction period” can be read two ways. It can mean 50,000 full-time equivalents working in each year of the decade. Or it can mean 50,000 years of work in total, spread across the decade. The two readings are ten times apart, and the report does not say which is meant.

Only the first works arithmetically. The second would put the project at 0.67 job-years for every $1 million spent, against 2.6 at HS2 and 2.6 to 3.3 at the REM — roughly a quarter of the labour intensity of any comparable railway now being built. So this analysis treats the figure as an annual average, which is the reading that makes it defensible. A reader has no way to know without being told.

Two more things in the tables

Upper, not central

Both tables head their value column “upper estimate”. One appendix earlier, the $24.5 billion GDP figure is labelled a central estimate, drawn from a stated range of sensitivity tests. So a range exists behind the 50,000 as well. What has been published is its top. The Initiative has recorded the same pattern twice before in this report: ranges that appear in the commissioned studies but not in the public summaries.

The comparison figures have no source

Table 2 sets high-speed rail against the alternative, “high-frequency rail”, and credits that alternative with 44,000 construction jobs at a capital cost of $45 to $75 billion. Neither figure carries a footnote, a source or a method anywhere in the document. The implied job intensity is internally consistent with the high-speed figures, so the numbers do not look wrong. The point is that a reader has no way to check them.

This has been released before

Employment modelling for this corridor has been published once already, and what happened to it is worth knowing. The Joint Project Office — VIA Rail and the Canada Infrastructure Bank — produced a business case for High Frequency Rail, the slower predecessor to this project, in December 2021. It gives construction employment as 71,000 to 96,000 annual equivalent jobs. That is a third unit of measure again, different from Alto’s 50,000 and from the 51,000 in the 2025 announcement, but stated plainly enough that a reader knows what is being counted.

The Canada Infrastructure Bank released that document in full in November 2025. The same document, released under a separate access request, cuts the identical sentence: “an estimated ___ annual equivalent jobs could be created,” with the sentence left grammatical around the missing number and no exemption provision marked against it. We hold both versions.

So the same employment figure, for the same corridor, has been treated as releasable by one federal body and withheld by another. That is worth putting on the record now, before anyone argues that the modelling behind the 50,000 is too commercially sensitive to publish.

What we are asking Alto to publish

Alto holds all of this already. None of it would cost anything the organisation does not have.

Whether the 50,000 is an annual average, or a cumulative count of full-time-equivalent years.
How it splits across the three categories Table A4 names: direct, supply chain and induced.
The range the upper estimate was drawn from, and the central value within it.
The year-by-year profile across the ten-year construction period.
The assumption made about imports and Canadian content in the input-output run.
The capital and operating spending profile that was fed into the model.
The source of the 44,000 jobs and the $45 to $75 billion attributed to high-frequency rail in Table 2.

And, more simply than any of that: carry the appendix definition alongside the number, wherever the number appears.

How to read the numbers on this page

Every figure attributed to Alto, HS2, CDPQ Infra, the California High-Speed Rail Authority or a Government of Canada release is quoted from the published source listed below, and can be checked there.

Every other figure on this page is a calculation by the Initiative from those published inputs, and is described as an estimate where it appears. The reconstruction is an estimate rather than a measurement: it applies labour intensity observed on two comparator projects, together with standard supply-chain and induced multiplier ratios, to Alto’s own published capital range and schedule.

Where Alto has not published something, this page says so rather than inferring it, and makes no claim about why any particular figure was or was not published.

Read the full paper

50,000 Jobs? — the research paper (PDF)

Ten pages. Sets out the method in full, the year-by-year spending and workforce figures for HS2 and the Réseau express métropolitain, the layer-by-layer reconstruction, the job-years-per-dollar comparison against California and the US Federal Highway Administration, and the complete source list.

Sources and notes

1Alto, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026. Section 4.3.3 and Tables 7 and A4 (50,000 full-time equivalent jobs across direct, supply chain and induced effects, ten-year construction period, upper estimate; $86 billion value added; $23 billion tax revenue). Appendix A.2 methodology box (2019 Statistics Canada input-output model; static; excluded from the benefit-cost ratio; no account taken of labour shortages or capacity limits). Table A2 ($24.5 billion GDP, central estimate). Table 2 (44,000 construction jobs and $45 to $75 billion capital for high-frequency rail, unsourced). Section 4.3.3 sidebar (Canadian materials commitment).

2Prime Minister of Canada, news release, 19 February 2025 (over 51,000 jobs during construction; GDP gain of up to $35 billion annually).

3Transport Canada, news release, 12 December 2025, naming Ottawa–Montréal as the first segment (51,000 jobs during construction; up to $35 billion in GDP).

4HS2 Ltd, Annual Report and Accounts 2022–23 to 2025–26 (capital expenditure and workforce), and six-monthly reports to Parliament, December 2024, July 2025 and May 2026 (jobs supported, supply chain businesses, spend to date, cost range and schedule).

5CDPQ Infra, REM fact sheet and project pages; REM news releases of April 2018, November 2020 and June 2021 (34,000 jobs; over 30,000 direct and indirect jobs; more than 2,000 and then more than 3,000 workers on site).

6California High-Speed Rail Authority, economic impact analyses for FY2023–24 and FY2024–25, and the March 2024 release on construction jobs and daily dispatch.

7US Federal Highway Administration, Employment Impacts of Highway Infrastructure Investment (13,000 job-years per US$1 billion; 64/36 split between direct-and-indirect and induced).

8Exchange rates: Bank of Canada daily rates, 1 September 2026. 1 GBP = C$1.8795; 1 USD = C$1.3896. Per-kilometre cost comparison uses the Initiative’s own ECI/CFI cost model.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative Independent, non-partisan citizen research on the proposed Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor. This page is a plain-language summary of the research paper 50,000 Jobs?, September 2026. The full paper sets out the method, the tables and the complete source list. Nothing on this page is a statement about the motives or conduct of any person or organisation. It is an analysis of published figures and of what those published figures do and do not say.

September 5, 2026

Where the line goes

Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · The HPR Research Report

Where the line goes, and what it costs

Pick the route first and the speed follows. Pick the speed first and the route picks itself — expensively.

Chapter 4 · The HPR Research Report

Every rail project has one decision that cannot be undone. Not the trains, not the timetable, not whether the line runs on diesel or electricity — all of those can be changed later. The route is the one that is fixed for a century. This chapter is about that decision: where an HPR line would run, why, and what it would cost.

It also explains the single choice that separates the two proposals. ALTO decided on 300 km/h and then had to find ground straight enough to carry it. HPR starts from what the corridor already offers and lets the speed come out of that. The result is a railway that costs roughly a third as much per kilometre — and arrives about twenty-five minutes later.

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Chapter 4: Route Alignment and Capital Cost (PDF)

The full chapter, with the cost model, maps and sourcing

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4.1 · The Window

Is the corridor still available?

Speed decides how straight a railway has to be, and the relationship is steep. A curve for 200 km/h needs a radius of about 1,900 metres. At 240 km/h it is about 2,700. At 300 km/h it is about 4,250 — nearer 7,000 for a comfortable ride. Anywhere in the 177–240 km/h band, those curves are gentle enough to follow a route that has already been cut through the landscape, easing the bends here and there. At 300 km/h the curves run for kilometres, and no amount of easing fits them alongside Highway 401 or the existing rail corridor. The line has to strike out across open country. That is physics, not preference.

This is why the project’s own history matters. What became ALTO went into the procurement as VIA High Frequency Rail — a plan the government itself described as running at up to 200 km/h on dedicated track along mostly existing rights-of-way. The 300 km/h target that emerged is what closed the existing corridor off.

The window is closing, but not mainly because of the highway

The Highway 401 widening is the visible threat, but it is only the leading edge. What really closes the corridor is ordinary growth: commercial development at the interchanges, then logistics parks moving east from the GTA, then housing, then the utility corridors — hydro, gas, fibre, water — that lock in behind them.

None of it reverses. A logistics park is not removed; a subdivision is not un-built; a utility corridor is not moved cheaply. Each step is fast and cheap to build and slow and expensive to undo. By late in the century the corridor that is open today is set solid, and a surface railway through it is no longer possible — only an elevated or tunnelled one, at a cost approaching ALTO’s.

We put a number on what that closure would cost: roughly $42.6 billion, in a range of about $28 to $55 billion. It has three parts — farmland on the margin re-valued as developed land when it finally has to be bought ($2.6B); the jump from an at-grade build on open ground to elevated and tunnelled construction through built-up areas ($19.3B); and the value of the benefits lost during the decades of delay ($20.7B). The headline is that the cost of missing the window is about the same order as the cost of building the railway — and it is incurred by waiting, not by building.

4.2 · The Route

Take the speed the ground gives you

Inside the Toronto–Ottawa–Montréal triangle the route has two parts. A spine of roughly 479 kilometres from Pickering Junction to Dorval, built and upgraded as a dedicated passenger route. And the Ottawa legs, about 200 kilometres of upgrades on track the public passenger operator already owns.

In each stretch the line follows whichever existing corridor runs straighter — Highway 401 or the existing rail corridor — sitting beside it rather than on it, separated from road traffic throughout. The two run roughly parallel for most of the way, so the ground the railway follows is already a transport corridor rather than open farmland. No major tunnels, and only a limited number of viaducts.

The reversal at the heart of the chapter

ALTO fixes the speed and lets it dictate the route — which is exactly how the corridor came to be closed off. HPR does it the other way round: it takes the highest speed each stretch of corridor already offers, up to a 240 km/h ceiling, and never buys speed the ground does not give away free.

Where the ground is generous, the trains go fast

The dead-straight run along the St. Lawrence from Brockville to Cornwall, the riverside stretch to Coteau, the inland 401 across the Napanee plain — all support 240 km/h with routine curve easing alone.

Where it isn’t, they go slower

Through the Frontenac Arch, where the line follows the least-bad path the 1850s builders found through the Shield, and on the tight approaches through Durham and into Montréal, trains simply run slower. Buying speed there would mean buying tunnels, viaducts and a new right-of-way.

One consequence matters for the costing: the whole spine is priced at the 200 km/h standard — conventional structures, curves near 1,900 metres. The stretches that can run faster are a bonus in service, not an extra cost to build. The cost model never pays for speed the corridor gives away.

4.3–4.6 · The Cost

What it would cost, and what we commit against

The spine is priced two ways, and the difference between them is the discipline this whole report is built on.

Figure	What it means
$19.0 billion as specified — about $40M per km	What the 479 km diesel spine costs if everything goes to plan, grade separations included.
$26.1 billion de-biased — about $54M per km	What comparable projects have actually cost when things didn’t go to plan. This is the figure to commit against — not because this project is expected to overrun, but because comparable ones reliably have.
+$3.1 billion electrification	A separately priced option that can be deferred, rather than a fixed requirement. The line opens on diesel and electrifies when demand warrants.

Adjusting for the record is not pessimism. The as-specified figure is what the corridor costs if everything goes right; the adjusted figure is what similar projects have actually cost when it didn’t. Committing against the second is the discipline ALTO never applied to itself.

Why deferring electrification matters more than it sounds

Eastern Ontario’s electricity system is already under active capacity assessment — the system operator is testing whether the existing grid can meet ordinary demand growth over the next two decades before any railway load is added. A 300 km/h electric line is a heavy new customer on exactly that system, and its electric design makes that load mandatory and up front.

A diesel-first railway opens on the traction it carries with it. Electrification — lighter in any case at 200 km/h — follows once the grid has headroom and the ridership justifies it. The railway’s opening is not tied to the grid’s expansion timetable.

Cold climate cuts the same way. Leda clay, karst and freeze–thaw are real hazards, and the international record shows what they can do: China’s Harbin–Dalian line cost about 25% more than its original budget, had sections rebuilt before opening because of frost-heave deformation, and opened roughly a year late. But that is a 300 km/h record. At 200 km/h the tolerances are far more forgiving, and frost heave that would force a speed restriction on a high-speed line is a maintenance item on a slower one. The lower design speed buys a smaller penalty.

4.7 · The Comparison

Three and a half times the price per kilometre

The chapter’s figures resolve into a single comparison. Measured the same way, the HPPR spine costs about $40 million per kilometre. ALTO costs about $142 million per kilometre. Two railways, the same corridor, the same cities — one priced at roughly three and a half times the other for every kilometre of route.

The gap splits roughly one-third engineering, two-thirds friction. About 35% is engineering complexity: a 300 km/h line across open country with its tunnels, viaducts and fresh cut through difficult ground, against a 200 km/h build that needs no major spine tunnels. The other 65% is corridor friction: the consultation, land-tenure and political burden of a new corridor, against a route that asks far less of the land and the people it crosses. The gap is not the product of one assumption. It is about a third from how the line is engineered and two-thirds from where it is put.

Railway	Cost per kilometre
TGV Paris–Lyon	~$26M — flat, low-friction early French high-speed line
Tokaido Shinkansen	~$35M — dense, high-utilisation Japanese line
HPPR spine	~$40M — among the most efficiently delivered railways in the international record
ALTO	~$142M — above the international range

4.8 · Journey Time

What the speed difference actually buys

Speeds are only interesting for what they add up to. Toronto Union to Montréal’s Gare Centrale, on an express stopping once at Kingston, works out at a little over three and a half hours.

Service	Toronto–Montréal journey time
VIA Rail today	~5h00 — scheduled service on shared freight track
VIA HFR base case, 177 km/h	3h59–4h19 — the only journey time ever actually simulated for this corridor
HPPR express, Kingston stop	~3h32 — estimated from segment speeds and corridor geometry
ALTO, 300 km/h	3h07 — ALTO’s published figure, a spreadsheet estimate rather than a simulation

One caution and one conclusion. The caution is that our figure is an estimate of the same kind as ALTO’s — distance divided by speed, with allowances. Neither has been simulated, and we say so.

The conclusion is that the honest gap between the two railways is about twenty-five minutes, and about nineteen against a non-stop run. ALTO buys that quarter of an hour at roughly three and a half times the capital cost per kilometre.

Toronto–Ottawa works out at about 2h55 — the spine as far as Brockville, then the upgraded Ottawa leg — against roughly four and a quarter hours today. And the towns along the route gain proportionally more than the endpoints do, because they start from a slower and less frequent service: Cobourg in under an hour, Belleville in about 1h20, on a regional train calling at every station.

4.9 · The Long View

What the corridor becomes a century from now

A rail corridor is not a project. It is an asset that lasts a century, and the decision taken now is the corridor the region lives with long after today’s arguments about cost and timetable are forgotten. The right test of a route is not only what it costs to build this decade, but what kind of corridor it leaves to the people who inherit it.

That is why the questions in this chapter matter most. They are the irreversible ones. The trains, the traction and the timetable can all be changed later. The route cannot.

Chapters 5 through 8 take these figures forward — into the environmental and community comparison, the ridership modelling, the operating economics, and the full cost-benefit and financial analysis.

September 2, 2026

Procured and then

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Brief · September 2026

Procured, and Then?

ALTO commissioned the outside view. Whether it changed anything is the one question the record does not answer.

Independent, non-partisan research · citizenresearch.ca

In Plain Language

The standard fix for over-optimistic infrastructure forecasts is to check them against what comparable projects actually cost and carried, rather than trusting the project’s own bottom-up numbers. That check is called reference-class forecasting, and ALTO commissioned one. It hired the firm founded by the researcher who developed the method.

That is to ALTO’s credit. But commissioning a check and acting on it are different things, and only one document would show which happened: a comparison putting ALTO’s own published figures beside the ones the check produced. The Initiative asked for that record. The response was extended to 18 September 2026, with notice that a third party would be consulted — a step the Act provides for where an institution intends to release records that may contain a supplier’s commercial information.

Meanwhile, in June 2026, ALTO published two studies putting large dollar values on the project’s benefits. Neither sets those benefits against what the line would cost. This brief looks at all three documents and asks what they show about how the project’s numbers are being assembled — and what a single unredacted release would settle.

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Procured, and Then? (PDF)

The full brief, with sources

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Related

HPR Research Report, Chapter 1

The forecasting framework this brief applies, set out in full

Read Chapter 1

01 · The Instrument

ALTO commissioned the outside view

Chapter 1 of the HPR Research Report sets out the method this brief relies on, so it is only summarised here. Large infrastructure forecasts miss in a consistent direction: costs come in high, benefits come in low. The established corrective is to stop treating a project as unique and instead compare it against the recorded outcomes of projects like it. The technique has a name — reference-class forecasting — and a literature behind it.

In 2024 ALTO issued an advance contract award notice, PAS240625-002-00, for reference-class forecasting, should-cost and should-schedule modelling, and a series of Challenge Boards. An advance contract award notice is the instrument used when a department intends to award without competition, on the basis that only one supplier can do the work. The named supplier was Oxford Global Projects, the consultancy founded by Bent Flyvbjerg and Alexander Budzier.

This is worth stating plainly, because it cuts against the easy criticism. ALTO did not ignore the outside view. It went out and procured it, from the people who developed it.

02 · The Question

Buying the instrument is not the same as letting it bind

Reference-class forecasting corrects a forecast only if the number it produces is permitted to move the decision. A should-cost that is commissioned, delivered and then filed next to an unchanged inside-view estimate has not corrected anything. The method’s own literature is explicit that the failure mode is not the absence of the outside view but its subordination — the number produced, and then declined.

So the decisive record is not the existence of the forecast. It is the comparison: does ALTO’s published capital cost reflect its own reference-class should-cost, or diverge from it? One document would answer that — the inside view and the outside view set side by side.

A test, not an accusation

This yields something better than a claim about anyone’s conduct: a prediction that can be checked. If the commissioned reference-class figures are more conservative than the numbers ALTO has published, the outside view was procured but not applied. If they match, the Initiative’s cost critique weakens accordingly.

We do not know which. Nothing in this brief asserts that ALTO set the analysis aside. The point is that the question is answerable, that a single document answers it, and that the document exists.

03 · The Clock

The record will arrive after the decision has moved on

The Initiative requested the reference-class records under access to information — the workbook, the should-cost and should-schedule outputs, and above all any document setting the inside view beside the outside view. Request A-2026-0004 was met in June 2026 with a ninety-day extension carrying the response to 18 September 2026, together with a notice invoking third-party consultation under section 27.

Section 27 consultation is a routine step, and it is worth being precise about which way it points. The section applies where the head of an institution intends to disclose a record that may contain a third party’s commercial information: the notice tells that third party of the intention to release and gives it twenty days to make representations against disclosure, and invoking the section is what permits the response time to be extended. The notice on A-2026-0004 therefore records that Alto has turned its mind to releasing the reference-class records and has given Oxford Global Projects the opportunity to object. It is not a signal that the material will be withheld.

What remains is a question of timing rather than intent. The third party may object and the institution may then withhold some of the figures; equally it may not. What can be said is the sequence: the record capable of testing the decision will arrive after further commitment has been made. What it contains, the disclosure itself will settle.

Why timing decides this

An outside-view check disciplines a decision only while the decision is still open. Once enough money is committed, the arithmetic changes: the cost of stopping is subtracted from the cost of continuing, and a project can show better value for money the more has already been spent on it. Britain’s High Speed Two reached exactly that point — the National Audit Office found in June 2026 that the ratio for completing the programme had risen even as the programme grew more expensive, because the estimated cost of cancelling had more than quadrupled.

The cheapest moment to apply the test is before that crossover, not after it.

04 · The Benefit Case

Two studies, no cost side

In June 2026, two months after the consultation closed, ALTO released two commissioned studies. A computable general equilibrium assessment by Aviseo Consulting reports a national real GDP gain of about $24.4 billion a year. A corridor tourism study by CPCS with HDR adds up to $3.9 billion in GDP and 43,000 jobs.

Neither nets a cost. The macroeconomic study excludes construction and operating expenditure by design; the tourism study has no cost side to exclude. Both are benefit totals unaccompanied by the outlay required to obtain them. Both, to their credit, describe their outputs as illustrative and order-of-magnitude rather than forecasts, and make the largest figures conditional on tourism policy the railway itself does not deliver.

The scenario range has a floor and no ceiling on the downside

Each study is built as a fan of scenarios, from pessimistic to optimistic. In both, the entire fan sits above zero. The macro study reports welfare increasing in every scenario; the tourism study’s weakest case is still $177 million and two thousand jobs. The modelled question is how large the gain is, never whether there is a loss.

Adverse mechanisms are identified but do not reach the total

The tourism study acknowledges that faster trains shorten stays and convert overnight visits into day trips, and shows length of stay falling in several cities. The aggregate rises regardless.

The two studies disagree, and each resolves the disagreement upward

The macro study omits domestic tourism on the ground that it is largely substitution from other household spending, with little net effect on national output. The tourism study builds most of its $33.7-billion base, and most of its headline uplift, from precisely that in-corridor domestic travel — counted through gross multipliers that assume no such displacement. The two treatments diverge, and in each case the treatment adopted is the one that yields the larger figure for that study.

The studies import the literature’s upside but not its realisation record

Both studies draw their benefit magnitudes from the international high-speed rail literature — the same comparison set the Initiative uses. What they import is the size of the upside. What they do not import is that literature’s record on realisation: rail benefits arriving at about two-thirds of forecast, and passenger numbers overstated by roughly a hundred per cent.

Each of the four observations above is a description of what the documents contain. Taken together they describe a benefit case in which every point of divergence has resolved in the same direction — which is the pattern the forecasting literature says to look for, and the reason an independent outside-view comparison matters more, not less, once numbers of this size are in circulation. The same two studies are examined in detail in the Initiative’s briefs Two Point Two Trillion and At Face Value.

05 · The Ask

Publish the comparison

The Initiative’s recommendation is narrow and does not require anyone to accept a word of its own analysis.

01
Release the comparison in full. ALTO should publish its reference-class should-cost and should-schedule outputs alongside its published capital cost and benefit-cost figures, unredacted. The outside view was commissioned to be seen, not filed.

02
Publish the benefit studies against a cost. A $24.4-billion annual benefit figure is not interpretable without the outlay required to obtain it. The two June 2026 studies should be accompanied by an appraisal that nets one against the other.

03
Apply the test before further commitment. The window in which an outside-view check can still change a decision is open now. It narrows with every disbursement.

It requires one document to be made public. The framework behind the request is set out in full in Chapter 1 of the HPR Research Report; what ought to be built instead is the subject of the chapters that follow it.

How to read this brief

Every figure attributed to Alto, Aviseo, CPCS, the National Audit Office or a published paper is quoted from the source listed below and can be checked there. Nothing else here is a calculation of ours: the argument rests on what the documents contain and on the sequence of dates, not on a competing estimate.

Where a record has not been released, this brief says so rather than inferring its contents, and makes no claim about why any extension was taken or any figure was or was not published. The prediction in section 02 is stated in both directions and will be settled by the disclosure, not by us.

Sources

Documents relied on

1
Alto (VIA HFR – VIA TGF Inc.). Advance Contract Award Notice PAS240625-002-00 — project management and control expertise; pre-identified supplier Oxford Global Projects UK Limited. 2024.

2
Alto (VIA HFR – VIA TGF Inc.). Notice of extension, Access to Information request A-2026-0004. June 2026. On file with the Initiative.

3
Aviseo Consulting. An Overview of the Structural Economic Impacts of Alto: Computable General Equilibrium Modelling Approach to Assessing High-Speed Rail in the Toronto–Québec City Corridor. Prepared for Alto. June 2026.

4
CPCS, in association with HDR. Tourism in the Alto Corridor: Current Conditions and Potential Impacts. Prepared for Alto. June 2026.

5
National Audit Office. High Speed Two reset. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Session 2026-27, HC 52. London: National Audit Office, June 2026.

6
Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Quality Control and Due Diligence in Project Management: Getting Decisions Right by Taking the Outside View.” International Journal of Project Management 31, no. 5 (2013): 760–774.

7
Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Top-Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An Overview.” Project Management Journal 52, no. 6 (2021): 531–546.

Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · citizenresearch.ca · Brief · September 2026
Independent, non-partisan research on Canada’s proposed Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor.

September 2, 2026

Hours are not dollars

Hours Are Not Dollars

Almost none of ALTO’s $49.5 billion is money. It is time — and a saved hour cannot service a loan. Here is what that figure actually is, how it was built, and why it says nothing about who pays for the railway.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Economics Explainer · August 2026 · Companion to the audit It Left the Rules Behind

⚠ Where the Number Sits

In August 2026 ALTO published Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, reporting $49.5 billion in benefits against a construction cost of $60 to $90 billion. Those benefits are not money in a bank account. They are mostly hours — time that travellers would have spent on the road or at an airport — stretched over sixty years and converted into today’s dollars.1

The tool that does the converting is called a discount rate. ALTO uses 3.5 per cent a year. Change that one number and the headline changes by tens of billions, without a single train or passenger changing.

In One Paragraph

The $49.5 billion is a measure of worth, not of funds. The tool that produces it, a discount rate, answers the question is this worth doing? It does not answer the question who pays, and how? Those are separate ledgers, and ALTO’s report is detailed on the first and thin on the second. This explainer sets out what the rate does, shows the arithmetic openly, and then follows the money to the place the appraisal never goes: the difference between what it costs the government to borrow and what a private partner needs to earn.

One finding runs against the grain and is stated here first. Two of the adjustments ALTO leaves out would have made its benefit figure larger, not smaller. The problem is not that the number is tilted. The problem is that a reader is given one number, no range, and no way to know that any of these choices were made.

Start Here

What a discount rate is, in ordinary words

Ask yourself a simple question. Would you rather have $100 today, or $100 in forty years? Almost everyone takes it today. The money is useful now, the future is uncertain, and by 2066 we will probably all be somewhat better off anyway, so $100 will matter a little less to us then than it does now.

Economists turn that instinct into a percentage. A discount rate shrinks future amounts back to what they are worth to us today, by a fixed amount each year. At 3.5 per cent, a benefit arriving sixty years from now counts for about 13 cents on the dollar. At 8 per cent, the same benefit counts for about one cent.

That is the whole mechanism. It sounds technical and it is arithmetically simple. But it matters enormously for a railway, because of when the money and the benefits arrive.

13¢

what a dollar of benefit in year 60 is worth today at ALTO’s 3.5 per cent

23¢

the same dollar at 2.5 per cent, the rate ALTO’s own cited manual requires be tested

1¢

the same dollar at 8 per cent, the rate identified in 2007 Treasury Board guidance

The timing is what makes this decisive. Construction money is spent early — from 2029 through the early 2040s — so it is barely shrunk at all. The benefits arrive later and keep arriving for sixty years, so they are shrunk heavily. Anything that changes the rate therefore hits the benefit side hard and the cost side hardly at all. A project’s whole case can move from comfortable to marginal without anything physical changing.

The Arithmetic, Shown Openly

How much the answer moves

The table below is the Initiative’s own arithmetic, not a re-run of ALTO’s model. It takes a steady stream of benefits running for sixty years, beginning fifteen years from now, and asks what that stream is worth in today’s dollars at different rates. The last column simply scales ALTO’s published $49.5 billion by the same proportion, to show the size of the swing.

Discount rate used	Value of the stream	Relative to 3.5%	$49.5B scaled
2.5 per cent	21.34	1.43×	$71.0B
3.0 per cent	17.76	1.19×	$59.1B
3.5 per cent — ALTO’s rate	14.89	1.00×	$49.5B
UK declining schedule	15.61	1.05×	$51.9B
5 per cent	9.11	0.61×	$30.3B
7 per cent	5.09	0.34×	$16.9B
8 per cent	3.90	0.26×	$13.0B

Assumptions, stated so the arithmetic can be checked: a level benefit stream of one dollar per year, sixty years of operation beginning in year 16, discounted back to a year-zero base. ALTO’s real benefit stream ramps up rather than running level, so the exact figures would differ; the proportions are what matter here. The scaled column is illustrative and is not ALTO’s number at those rates.

Read the middle rows first. At 8 per cent, the same railway carrying the same passengers saving the same hours produces a benefit figure roughly a quarter the size. At 2.5 per cent it produces one roughly forty per cent larger. Nothing about the trains changed. Only the parameter changed.

This is why appraisal manuals require the calculation to be repeated at more than one rate and the results published as a range. It is not a bureaucratic formality. It is the only way a reader can tell whether a case is robust or whether it depends on a parameter choice.

Where 3.5 Per Cent Comes From

A number with a family tree

ALTO’s report attributes its rate to one source: the Business Case Manual Volume 2: Guidance, published by Metrolinx, the Government of Ontario’s transit agency for the Toronto and Hamilton region.2 That manual sets a social discount rate of 3.5 per cent, alongside an evaluation period of five to sixty years.

The 3.5 per cent figure is not original to Metrolinx. It is the rate used by HM Treasury in the United Kingdom, and the Treasury publishes exactly how it was assembled. Three judgements are added together:

0.5 per cent for simple impatience. People prefer good things sooner. Half a percentage point is the allowance for that.

1.0 per cent for the risk that the future does not arrive as expected. Wars, pandemics, collapses. A benefit promised in 2080 might never materialise, so it is discounted a little further.

2.0 per cent because people in the future will be richer. If incomes rise about 2 per cent a year, our grandchildren will be considerably better off than we are, and an extra dollar will matter less to them than it does to us. This is the largest of the three, and the most contestable.

Those three add to 3.5.3

Notice what the rate is not. It is not a market price, an interest rate, or anything anyone can look up. It is a set of judgements about how much weight to give people who are not yet born — and every one of the three is disputed by serious people. That is not a criticism of the figure. It is the reason a serious appraisal shows what happens when the figure moves.

The detail that cuts in ALTO’s favour

HM Treasury does not apply 3.5 per cent forever. The rate steps down to 3.0 per cent for years 31 to 75, and 2.5 per cent thereafter,3 and the Treasury’s supplementary guidance instructs practitioners in the same terms: the standard 3.5 per cent for years 1 to 30, and 3.0 per cent for years 31 to 75.4 The reason is uncertainty: the further out you look, the less confident anyone can be in the parameters, and the lower the rate should be.

ALTO discounts a sixty-year stream at a flat 3.5 per cent throughout. Applying the stepped-down schedule instead would have made ALTO’s benefit total about five per cent larger, as the fourth row of the table above shows. This is a conservatism in ALTO’s favour, and it should be credited as one. It is recorded here because a reader assessing where a federal appraisal input came from deserves the whole picture, including the parts that do not fit a critical narrative.

The Canadian Comparison

What the federal government uses, and the gap where a manual should be

Canada has approached the same question from the opposite end, and it is worth understanding the difference, because it produces a far higher number.

The British method asks a question about values: how much should we care about the future? The Canadian method asks a question about alternatives: what else could this money have done? If public money invested elsewhere in the economy would have earned, say, 8 per cent, then a project has to clear that bar to be worth funding — otherwise the country was better off doing the other thing. That is what economists mean by the opportunity cost of capital.

Neither question is wrong. They are simply different questions, and the second one produces a much tougher test than the first.

The Treasury Board’s 2007 guidance identified 8 per cent as the appropriate rate, with sensitivity tests at 3 and 10 per cent, on that opportunity-cost basis.5 The current federal Policy on Cost-Benefit Analysis still directs departments to use the opportunity cost of capital as the discount rate, permitting a social rate only in defined cases — including where impacts run fifty years or more — and requiring that even when a social rate is used, results using the opportunity cost of capital must also be reported.6

Two honest qualifications belong here, and neither is small. First, that federal policy governs regulations, not capital projects, so it does not bind ALTO. Second, the current edition of the Treasury Board guide is no longer published on canada.ca and is available only through an internal government wiki page,7 so the Initiative has not been able to verify the figure it now specifies.

And the federal manual for transport projects specifically? Transport Canada’s guide to benefit-cost analysis dates from 1994.8 Thirty-two years later, there is no current, public federal appraisal manual for a project of this kind. That absence is very likely why a national railway is being appraised using a provincial transit agency’s parameters — and it is a finding about the machinery of government rather than about ALTO.

Even the academic case for 3.5 per cent has conditions

The most cited Canadian argument for a 3.5 per cent rate comes from the economists Boardman, Moore and Vining, who reject the 8 per cent approach. So there is a respectable Canadian case for ALTO’s rate. But it is a conditional case, and the conditions are specific.

Condition one: the project runs under fifty years. Beyond that, they recommend a rate that steps down over time, for the same reason the UK Treasury does — nobody can see that far ahead with confidence.

Condition two: the project must not pull money away from private investment. The money for a public project comes from taxes or borrowing, and it would otherwise have been used by someone else. Some of it would have been spent, and some would have been invested — a business expansion, new equipment, a factory. Those two are not equivalent. A dollar diverted from someone’s spending costs the economy that one dollar. A dollar diverted from investment costs more, because that investment would have gone on producing returns for years afterwards.

And if the project does pull money from investment, there is a fix. Rather than argue about the rate all over again, you take the portion of the cost that displaced private investment and mark it up by 26 per cent before putting it in the calculation — because that is roughly what the lost investment was worth to the economy over time. Economists call the 1.26 multiplier a shadow price of capital. It is simply a way of using a generous discount rate honestly, instead of using it to pretend the money was free.5

ALTO’s appraisal period is sixty years, which fails the first condition outright. Whether a $60 to $90 billion draw on Canadian capital displaces private investment is a real question, not a technicality — and the mark-up would apply only to the share that does, not to the whole sum. Neither condition is mentioned in the report.

The pattern is the one the companion audit It Left the Rules Behind describes: a number travels, and the conditions attached to it stay behind.

The Precedent

The last time anyone published these numbers for this corridor

ALTO’s stated reason for publishing no benefit-cost ratio is that the cost estimate is not yet mature enough to support one. It is worth knowing that a predecessor project on the same corridor did publish one, at a comparable stage, and published the funding ledger alongside it.

In December 2021 the Joint Project Office — a body formed by VIA Rail and the Canada Infrastructure Bank — completed a Business Case Update for High Frequency Rail, the slower, cheaper predecessor to ALTO between Toronto and Québec City. It was released through access to information by the Canada Infrastructure Bank in November 2025.16

What the 2021 business case published	Figure
Capital cost, with electrification (2020 prices)	$27.71B
Projected revenue over 30 years (2019 prices)	$33.7B
Operations, maintenance and rehabilitation, 30 years	$32.5B
Net present value over 30 years	−$21.1B
Benefit-cost ratio	~0.13
Expanded benefit-cost ratio	~0.4
Public subsidy over 30 years, by delivery model	$37.1B to $42.2B

Source: Joint Project Office, High Frequency Rail Business Case Update V.002, 10 December 2021. Ratios at Table 14, page 43; capital, revenue, lifecycle and net present value figures in the executive summary, pages 7 and 8; subsidy comparison at Table 4, page 8.

A benefit-cost ratio of 0.13 means about thirteen cents of measured benefit for every dollar of cost. The wider figure of 0.4 is what the same table calls an expanded ratio, and the difference between the two is worth understanding, because it is the larger of the two numbers.

The expansion adds two items. One is agglomeration — the economic gain from businesses being better connected — worth $0.3 to $0.9 billion. The other, worth $5.6 to $7.6 billion, is a resource correction: the fares new passengers would pay, counted as a benefit because they arrive as revenue for the operator. That single item is larger than the journey time savings and all the external benefits put together. The business case itself notes that both are relatively new to Canadian economic appraisal, which is why it reports the ratio with and without them.

The same two sources, five years apart

The 2021 economic case states where its parameters came from: the social discount rate, the value of time and the value of external impacts were taken from a combination of Metrolinx and Ministère des Transports du Québec guidance. Those are the same two sources ALTO cites in 2026.

So the identical parameter lineage, applied to a $27.71 billion version of this corridor, produced a published ratio of 0.13. Five years later, on a project costing two to three times as much, the same two sources are cited and no ratio is published at all.

And it kept the two ledgers apart

The 2021 document also shows how the distinction this page has been drawing is meant to work in practice. Its net present value calculation used a discount rate of 2.5 per cent, sourced explicitly to the ten-year average of the 30-year Government of Canada benchmark bond — a financing rate, taken from what the government actually pays to borrow. Its economic case used the social parameters from Metrolinx and MTQ. Two questions, two rates, both disclosed, in a single document.

Three cautions, stated plainly. High Frequency Rail is not ALTO: different technology, different speed, a $27.71 billion cost rather than $60 to $90 billion, and a thirty-year evaluation rather than sixty. The JPO described its own results as preliminary. And none of these figures transfer to ALTO by arithmetic. What the document establishes is narrower and harder to set aside: a benefit-cost ratio can be produced for a project on this corridor at this stage of development, because one was.

One further point belongs on the record. The identical document was also released under a separate access request, and in that version the whole net present value section, the capital cost figure, the revenue figure and both ratios were blacked out — along with the subsection titles of the Economic Case within the table of contents, and the construction employment figure in the executive summary. No exemption provision is marked against any of it.17 Same document, same date, two releases, opposite outcomes.

Following the Money

Three different rates, and only one of them is in the report

Here is the heart of it. People use the phrase “the discount rate” for three quite different things, and conflating them is how an appraisal result gets mistaken for a financing plan.

1. The appraisal rate — 3.5 per cent

Used to decide whether a project is worth doing. No money moves because of it. It turns hours saved and collisions avoided into a single present-day figure so they can be compared with the cost. Nobody charges it, nobody pays it, and no bank uses it.

2. What it costs the government to borrow

Real money, actually paid. When the federal government borrows for thirty years it has been paying in the region of 3.7 to 3.9 per cent during 2026. Take off inflation, which the Bank of Canada aims to hold at 2 per cent, and the true cost of the money is roughly two per cent a year.9 If the state simply builds the railway and holds it, this is what the borrowing actually costs, and it is lower than the appraisal rate.

3. What a private partner needs to earn

Considerably more. If a pension fund or infrastructure investor builds the railway, it is putting its own money at risk — the risk that construction costs more than planned, or that too few people ride. It requires a return for carrying that risk, and that return is paid out every year for decades. This is the rate that decides what the public actually hands over, and it appears nowhere in ALTO’s economic report.

The gap between the second and the third is the entire public-private question. If the government borrows at 2 per cent and builds the railway itself, that is what the money costs. If a private partner builds it instead and needs 8 per cent, someone has to make up the difference — every year, for as long as the arrangement lasts. That someone is the public.

So a project can pass the 3.5 per cent test comfortably and still require very large annual public payments to get built. The appraisal will go on saying “worth doing.” It will never say who writes the cheque, for how long, or at what return.

Why the $49.5 billion cannot pay for anything

This is the point most easily missed, and it is not a technicality. Nearly all of ALTO’s benefit figure is not cash. It is hours of travel time, collisions that did not happen, tonnes of emissions avoided. These are real and they matter. But a saved hour cannot service a loan, meet a payroll, or renew a worn rail.

The money that actually funds a railway comes from two places only: fares, and government payments. ALTO’s report handles that second ledger in a few pages, supported chiefly by the operating margins of three foreign railways, and it publishes no fare, no revenue figure and no farebox recovery ratio. So the document is expansive about whether the project is worth doing and close to silent about how it would be paid for.

A Canadian Example, Fully Documented

How the Montréal REM is actually funded

The Réseau express métropolitain is a 67-kilometre automated light metro in Greater Montréal, built, owned and operated by CDPQ Infra, a subsidiary of the Québec pension fund manager. It is the clearest Canadian illustration of what the third rate looks like once it becomes money, and its terms are public.10

Who put up the capital

CDPQ Infra $2.95B; the Government of Québec $1.283B; the Government of Canada $1.283B; Hydro-Québec $295M; the regional transit authority $512M. The construction estimate rose from $6.3 billion in 2018 to $7.95 billion by 2023, an increase CDPQ Infra absorbed under its agreement.11

How the money returns

Not through fares. The regional transit authority pays CDPQ Infra 72 cents for every kilometre every passenger travels, indexed annually to the Consumer Price Index. That single rate covers construction, operation and long-term maintenance.12

If ridership beats forecast

The rate steps down. CDPQ Infra has described trips beyond 15 per cent above forecast being paid at roughly 57 cents, and trips beyond 40 per cent above forecast at the user fare itself.13

The two return targets

8 to 9 per cent for CDPQ Infra. 3.7 per cent for the governments. Both were set at the outset and publicly reaffirmed during construction.14

That pair of numbers is the whole point of this section, made concrete. The same railway, the same track, the same passengers — and two participants requiring returns that differ by more than double. The difference is not a rounding error in an appraisal. It is paid out, in cash, on every passenger-kilometre, for as long as the agreement runs.

Why this case and not another. The REM is not an analogy picked at random. CDPQ Infra leads Cadence, the consortium selected in February 2025 as ALTO’s private development partner. AtkinsRéalis — formerly SNC-Lavalin, a member of the group that built the REM and, with Alstom, of the group that supplies and operates its trains — is also a Cadence member. The other Cadence members are SYSTRA Canada, Keolis Canada, SNCF Voyageurs and Air Canada.18 The REM is the lead sponsor’s own model, which CDPQ Infra presents publicly as an innovative approach to delivering public infrastructure. That is what makes it the most informative available guide to how a private partner’s return might be priced here.

An important caution. ALTO is nonetheless not the REM, and this is not a prediction. Canada is to retain permanent ownership of the ALTO network, which was never the REM arrangement; the project is in a co-development phase running to 2029; and no payment mechanism has been disclosed. Cadence is a different group with different members and a different contract. The REM is offered as the one Canadian case where the arithmetic of a private partner’s return has been made public — which is exactly what has not yet happened for a project several times its size.

Notice what a payment mechanism does with risk. Because CDPQ Infra is paid per passenger-kilometre, a shortfall in riders is a shortfall in its own revenue — the investor carries the demand risk. Under a different structure, where the public pays for the railway simply being available, a shortfall in riders changes nothing the partner receives and everything the public pays.

Same railway, same disappointing ridership, opposite consequences. Which of those applies to ALTO has not been published.

Limits of This Explainer

What this does not claim

On the rate

3.5 per cent is not wrongIt is a mainstream, well-supported choice for long-lived public investment. This explainer does not argue that ALTO’s rate is too low.

Two omissions favour ALTOBoth the stepped-down schedule and the sensitivity test its cited manual requires would have produced a larger benefit figure. The omissions do not all run one way.

The arithmetic is illustrativeThe table uses a level benefit stream and a stated start year. It shows the shape of the sensitivity, not a recalculation of ALTO’s result.

The 2021 ratios are not ALTO’sHigh Frequency Rail was a different and cheaper project assessed over thirty years, and its authors called the results preliminary. Those figures are cited as evidence that a ratio can be produced at this stage, not as an estimate of ALTO’s.

On the comparisons

Nothing here binds ALTOMetrolinx guidance, UK Treasury practice and federal regulatory policy carry no legal force over this project. They are offered as points of comparison, one of which ALTO chose to cite itself.

The federal figure is unverifiedThe 8 per cent rate is documented from 2007 guidance through peer-reviewed sources. The current edition of that guide is not publicly posted, and the Initiative does not assert what it now specifies.

We do not say whyWhere the report does not state something — a fare, a payment mechanism, a sensitivity test, a range — this page says so rather than inferring it, and makes no claim about why any figure was or was not published, or about the intentions of anyone who prepared it.

This is a public report, not a business caseA submission to Cabinet in 2029 may contain material this document does not. What is examined here is what has been placed in public.

What Would Settle It

Two questions, answerable without releasing a model

1. Who absorbs it if the passengers do not come?

Not a forecasting question but a contract question. If a partner is paid per passenger, a shortfall reduces its return. If it is paid for availability, a shortfall costs the partner nothing and the public a great deal. Identical ridership, opposite outcomes — and ALTO has published neither the mechanism nor the cost of capital behind it.

2. What fare, and what revenue?

No fare level, average yield or farebox recovery ratio appears in eighty-three pages. Without one, the funding question cannot be examined by anyone outside the project.

Neither requires access to ALTO’s models, cooperation from its staff, or agreement about what the correct discount rate for a national railway ought to be. Both are answerable from work already done.

A third question — whether the calculation was ever run at any rate other than 3.5 per cent — belongs to the companion audit It Left the Rules Behind, which sets out the full list of tests the cited manual requires at this project’s scale and which of them appear in the report.

Sources

Primary documents

ALTO, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026, 83 pp. Discount rate, sixty-year appraisal period and price base in the Appendix A methodology box, sourced at footnote 65 to the Metrolinx manual; capital cost and AACE Class 5 estimate at pp. 5 and 65; direct-benefit tables headed “upper estimate”. Analysed in full in the Initiative’s companion brief Two Parameters, None of the Conditions, summarised at It Left the Rules Behind.

Metrolinx, Business Case Manual Volume 2: Guidance, August 2021, 222 pp. Economic parameters at Table 5.8: social discount rate 3.5 per cent, evaluation period five to sixty years, single blended value of time. Verified as the current edition, 21 August 2026. metrolinx.com

HM Treasury, Review of discounting in the Green Book: Terms of Reference, 16 December 2025. Sets out the derivation of the 3.5 per cent Social Time Preference Rate. The Treasury specifies four parameters — pure time preference, catastrophe risk, the elasticity of marginal utility and the growth rate — the last two of which multiply to the 2.0 per cent component described above as a single judgement. and the declining schedule of 3.0 per cent for years 31 to 75 and 2.5 per cent thereafter. gov.uk

HM Treasury, Green Book supplementary guidance: discounting, updated 5 February 2026. Instructs practitioners to use 3.5 per cent for years 1 to 30 and 3.0 per cent for years 31 to 75. gov.uk (PDF)

A. E. Boardman and M. A. Moore, “The Social Discount Rate for Canada Based on Future Growth in Consumption,” Canadian Public Policy, vol. 36 no. 3 (2010), pp. 325 onward. Records the Treasury Board Secretariat’s 2007 interim recommendation of an 8 per cent social discount rate with sensitivity rates of 3 and 10 per cent on a weighted social opportunity cost of capital basis; argues instead for 3.5 per cent, conditional on a horizon under fifty years and no crowding out of private investment, with a shadow price of capital of 1.26 applied to investment flows, and a declining schedule beyond fifty years. Canadian Public Policy

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Policy on Cost-Benefit Analysis, in force since 1 September 2018. Requires departments to use the opportunity cost of capital specified in the TBS guide, with a social discount rate permitted in defined cases including impacts of fifty years or more, and requires opportunity-cost results to be reported in any event. canada.ca

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Requirements for developing, managing and reviewing regulations,” canada.ca, page updated 26 November 2025, accessed 21 August 2026. States that the most current version of Canada’s Cost-Benefit Analysis Guide for Regulatory Proposals is available exclusively on the Cabinet Directive on Regulation GCwiki page. The 2022 edition remains catalogued in Government of Canada Publications as an archived document. canada.ca

Transport Canada, Economic Evaluation Branch, Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis in Transport Canada, Ottawa, 1994. Catalogued in the Transport Research International Documentation database. TRID

Bank of Canada, selected benchmark bond yields, accessed August 2026; Bank of Canada policy interest rate held at 2.25 per cent through mid-2026 against a 2 per cent inflation target. Long-bond yields move daily and should be checked against the source rather than quoted from this page. bankofcanada.ca

10.

Réseau express métropolitain, “Information about the agreement with the ARTM and its rate mechanisms.” Sets out the 72-cent per passenger-kilometre invoice to the regional transit authority, the reduction once ridership projections are exceeded, and the turnkey scope covering construction, operation and long-term maintenance. rem.info

11.

Capital structure as reported on award of the construction contracts: CDPQ Infra $2.95B, Government of Québec $1.283B, Government of Canada $1.283B, Hydro-Québec $295M, ARTM $512M, against a construction cost of $6.3B. The estimate was revised to $7.95B in September 2023, with CDPQ Infra absorbing the increase under its agreement with the Québec government. International Railway Journal

12.

Gouvernement du Québec, ARTM and CDPQ Infra, “Release of the management and implementation agreement and of the integration agreement for the Réseau express métropolitain,” 23 April 2018. Confirms the $0.72 per passenger-km base cost and annual indexation to Canada’s Consumer Price Index, and the cap limiting additional municipal costs to roughly $45 to $60 million a year in then-current dollars. quebec.ca

13.

CDPQ Infra, “7 myths about the REM de l’Est,” February 2022. Describes the ridership relief mechanism: the rate falls by about 20 per cent, to roughly $0.57, for trips above 15 per cent over forecast, and equals the user fare for trips above 40 per cent over forecast. Published in the context of a later project; the mechanism described is the REM’s. cdpqinfra.com

14.

Réseau express métropolitain, semi-annual project update, 3 June 2021. Reaffirms the 72-cent rate set in the 2018 agreement and states the performance targets: 8 to 9 per cent for CDPQ Infra and 3.7 per cent for the government partners. rem.info

15.

Discounting arithmetic in this explainer computed by the Initiative on the stated assumptions: a level annual benefit stream, sixty years of operation beginning in year 16, discounted to a year-zero base; the declining-schedule row applies 3.5 per cent to years 1 to 30, 3.0 per cent to years 31 to 75, per source 3.

16.

Joint Project Office (VIA Rail Canada and the Canada Infrastructure Bank), High Frequency Rail Project: Business Case Update, V.002, 10 December 2021, 150 pp., released by the Canada Infrastructure Bank under the Access to Information Act, November 2025. Capital cost breakdown and 30-year revenue at p. 7; benefit-cost ratio, net present value and the Table 4 subsidy comparison at p. 8; economic appraisal parameters sourced to Metrolinx and MTQ guidance at p. 40; incremental capex and opex at Table 9; other impacts at Table 12; impact results and both ratios at Table 14, p. 43; net present value assumptions, including the 2.5 per cent discount rate sourced to the ten-year average 30-year Government of Canada benchmark bond, at Figure 38, p. 85.

17.

The same document released as Annexe A to access request 22-2207 (148 pp., stamped Demande d’accès à l’information #22-2207 AI(D)). In that version, section 9.7 Net Present Value Analysis survives as a heading at p. 84 with pp. 84–86 otherwise blank; section 9.8 Financial Structuring at p. 87 is withheld in full; the capital cost and 30-year revenue sentences are truncated mid-clause at p. 21, leaving the grammar intact around the removed figures; and the subsection headings of section 7 Economic Case are withheld within the table of contents, together with the title of section 8 and all of its subsections, which appear as bare dot leaders against pp. 40–43 and 44–63. The construction employment sentence at p. 21 is severed in the same way: “an estimated ___ annual equivalent jobs could be created.” That figure — 71,000 to 96,000 annual equivalent — is disclosed in full in the Canada Infrastructure Bank release at note 16. No exemption provisions are marked against any of the severed passages. Both versions held by the Initiative.

18.

Cadence consortium membership and CDPQ Infra’s leadership role: Cadence, “About us,” and CDPQ Infra, “Alto high-speed rail,” both accessed August 2026; consortium announced as preferred private development partner 19 February 2025, co-development agreement signed March 2025. AtkinsRéalis (formerly SNC-Lavalin) was a member of NouvLR, which held the REM engineering, procurement and construction contract, and of the group now operating as Pulsar with Alstom under the rolling stock, systems, operations and maintenance contract. cadence.info

August 21, 2026

It left the rules behind

ALTO Used the Rulebook’s Numbers. It Left the Rules Behind.

ALTO’s new economic report takes two key figures from an Ontario appraisal manual and names that manual as its source. The manual attaches conditions to those figures. The report uses the figures and leaves the conditions out.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Economics Brief · Published August 2026 · Plain-language version of the research brief Two Parameters, None of the Conditions · Companion explainer: Hours Are Not Dollars

⚠ The Document Under Examination

In August 2026 ALTO published Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, an 83-page report setting out the economic case for the Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor. Its central figure is $49.5 billion in benefits to travellers and society, set against a construction cost of $60 to $90 billion.

To turn sixty years of future benefits into one number in today’s dollars, the report needs two things: a rate at which to shrink future benefits back to present value, and a price for an hour of a traveller’s time. For both, it names one source — a public appraisal manual published by Metrolinx, the Government of Ontario’s transit agency for the Toronto and Hamilton region.

Critical Finding

The Metrolinx manual does not simply publish those two numbers. It publishes them as part of a package. For any project over $500 million, the same manual requires that the numbers be re-tested at different values, that results be reported as a range rather than a single figure, that early-stage construction costs be topped up to correct for known optimism, and that the project’s benefit-to-cost ratio be published. ALTO’s project is roughly a hundred times larger than that threshold.

None of those requirements appears in ALTO’s report. There is no test of the discount rate, no range around the $49.5 billion, no optimism adjustment to the cost, and no benefit-cost ratio. The two numbers were carried across. The conditions attached to them were not.

This brief does not argue that ALTO used the wrong discount rate. The rate it used is a mainstream, defensible choice. The finding is narrower and, we think, harder to answer: the report presents a set of choices as though they were simply facts, and a reader has no way of knowing that anything was chosen at all.

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Why this matters

Imagine a builder quotes you a price for an extension. Asked where the figures come from, they name the standard industry pricing guide. That guide does set those rates. It also says that on a job this size the quote must show a high and a low figure rather than a single number, must add a fixed percentage on top because early quotes are almost always too low, and must set the total against the value of what you are getting.

The builder uses the guide’s rates and does none of the rest. The quote may well be sound. You have no way of telling — and nothing on the page tells you that anything was left out.

That is the situation this brief describes. ALTO’s economic report takes two figures from a public appraisal manual and names that manual as its source. The same manual attaches a set of mandatory checks to those figures for projects of this size. The figures were used. The checks are absent, and their absence is not disclosed.

It matters because of what rests on the result. The $49.5 billion benefit figure is the number now appearing in news coverage and public statements as the reason to build a railway costing $60 to $90 billion of public money, ahead of a federal decision in 2029. Presented as a single figure with no range, it reads as something measured. The report’s own tables call it an upper estimate.

What the report gives you

One benefit figure, $49.5 billion, built on a rate and an hourly value of time presented without explanation of where they came from or what else was possible. No range. No benefit-to-cost ratio.

What its own cited source requires

The same figures re-tested at different values, results published as a range with a confidence level, a 64 per cent top-up on early-stage construction costs, and the benefit-to-cost ratio reported.

What that leaves a reader with

No way to judge how firm the headline number is — and no indication in the document that this is a question worth asking.

One thing this brief does not do: argue that the numbers ALTO chose are wrong, or that high-speed rail is a bad idea. The rate it used is a mainstream choice, and the one test the manual requires would, if anything, make the benefits look larger. The ask is simply that the tests be run and published, as the cited manual says they must be.

The Two Numbers

What the report borrowed, and from where

3.5%

the discount rate ALTO uses, taken from the Metrolinx manual

Appendix A, footnote 65

$22.32

the value of one hour of a traveller’s time, the same figure for every trip

justified as following Metrolinx method

64%

the top-up the same manual requires on construction costs at this stage of design

not applied in the report

The discount rate. A benefit that arrives in 2085 is not worth as much to us today as the same benefit next year. Economists handle this by shrinking future amounts back to a present-day value at a fixed annual percentage — the discount rate. ALTO uses 3.5 per cent a year, applied over a sixty-year period. The rate matters enormously: over sixty years, small changes to it move the headline benefit figure by billions.

The value of time. Most of the $49.5 billion is not cash. It is hours — time that travellers would otherwise have spent on the road or waiting at an airport. To put a dollar figure on those hours, you have to decide what an hour is worth. ALTO uses $22.32, and applies the same figure to every trip: business or holiday, commuter or tourist. The report tells us its own ridership model did separate business from non-business travel, and that this distinction was set aside in favour of one blended figure.

Where both come from. The footnote attached to the discount rate cites one document and one only: the Business Case Manual Volume 2: Guidance, published by Metrolinx in August 2021. The single blended value of time is defended on the grounds that it follows Metrolinx method. So a manual written for regional transit projects in the Toronto and Hamilton area is the published authority for how a national intercity railway has been appraised.

Metrolinx guidance is not binding on a federal Crown corporation, and nothing here suggests otherwise. But a citation carries the terms of the thing cited. If you name a manual as your authority, it is fair to look at what else that manual says on the same page.

The Manual’s Own Terms

The numbers come as a set, not a menu

The 3.5 per cent rate appears in a table of standard parameters. The text introducing that table is direct about their status: any departure from them has to be explicitly agreed during the work, with a clear justification recorded. It is a list of defaults you may leave, provided you say so. Below is how each of those defaults is treated in ALTO’s report.

What the Metrolinx manual specifies	What ALTO’s report does
Discount rate: 3.5 per cent. The rate at which future benefits are shrunk to present value.	3.5 per cent. Adopted exactly as specified, and correctly footnoted to the manual.
Status:Carried across
Value of time: one blended figure. A single hourly value across all modes and all trip purposes, rather than separate values for business and leisure travel.	One blended figure, $22.32. Adopted, and expressly justified by reference to the manual — in preference to the business and non-business split that ALTO’s own ridership model had already produced.
Status:Carried across
Growth cap: stop escalating benefits 30 years out. The manual caps growth in the inputs thirty years after the base year, expressly to reflect the fact that nobody can see that far ahead. User benefits are named as covered by the cap.	Applied to two small lines, not the big one. Accident rates are capped after twenty years, and vehicle emission factors run to 2050. No cap is stated on travel-time benefits — which are 78 per cent of the total.
Status:Applied selectively
One price year throughout. All values discounted and escalated to a single common year, fixed at the start of the study, so that every figure in the document is in the same money.	Two price years in one report. The appraisal and the capital cost are in 2024 dollars; the economy-wide GDP result is in 2019 dollars.
Status:Not consistent
Test the value of time at 0.75 per cent real growth. The manual’s base case assumes the value of an hour does not rise in real terms — but pairs that assumption with a required test of what happens if it does.	Zero growth assumed; no test run. The assumption was carried across. The test that the manual attaches to the assumption was not.
Status:Left behind

One footnote on the money. Adjusting the manual’s 2021 value of time for inflation to 2024 gives roughly $21.40 — within a few per cent of ALTO’s $22.32. We are not claiming ALTO derived its figure that way, and ALTO does not say how it did. The point is simply that the figure sits where you would expect a Metrolinx-derived figure to sit, which makes the omission of the accompanying test harder to explain as an oversight.

The Missing Tests

What a project this size is supposed to publish

The Metrolinx manual scales its requirements to the size of the project. Anything above $500 million is treated as large scale, and a specific list of tests and disclosures becomes mandatory. ALTO’s cost estimate is $60 to $90 billion — roughly a hundred times that threshold. Here is that list, and where each item stands in ALTO’s report.

Re-run the numbers at a different discount rate

The manual requires the calculation be repeated at 2.5 per cent so the reader can see how sensitive the answer is to the rate. Not done, and not mentioned. Note the direction here: the required test is at a lower rate, which would make the benefits look larger. Nothing in the manual supports an argument that ALTO’s rate is too generous. What it supports is the narrower point that the manual’s author expects the rate to be tested and the test to be shown.

Re-run the numbers with a rising value of time

Required at 0.75 per cent real growth per year. Not done.

Run the costs and assumptions through a range analysis

The manual requires costs and modelling assumptions be run thousands of times with the inputs varied, and the result reported as a range with a stated confidence level. Not done.

Report the odds that the project is worth doing

The manual asks specifically for the probability that benefits exceed costs. Not reported — the report publishes no benefit-cost ratio at all.

Publish the standard indicators

Net present value, benefit-cost ratio, capital utilisation, return on investment, internal rate of return. None published.

Model low, medium and high growth scenarios

Required, with the ridership growth rate stated for each. A ridership range is shown; the underlying growth scenarios are not stated.

This is not a theoretical requirement

The manual works the method through on a real example: an extension of the Yonge subway line in Toronto, at an early stage of design. A single cost estimate of $5.65 billion becomes a range of $6.16 to $6.84 billion, with the confidence level attached. The reader is shown a central figure, a spread, and how sure anyone is about it.

That project is roughly one per cent the size of ALTO. On uncertainty, the manual ALTO cites tells its reader more about a subway extension than ALTO’s report tells its reader about a national railway.

The Missing Lower Number

The report concedes a range it never publishes

The two tables carrying the entire $49.5 billion case are both headed with the words upper estimate. Every figure in the narrative is prefixed the same way: up to 24 million riders, up to 9.3 billion hours saved, up to 400 fatalities avoided, up to 39.1 million tonnes of emissions.

An upper estimate is one end of a range. The other end does not appear anywhere in the document.

The claim built on top of those figures goes further still. The report states that the benefits hold across a wide range of scenarios, and repeats the point in its conclusion. But demonstrating that a result holds across a range of scenarios is exactly what the missing sensitivity analysis does, and exactly what the cited manual requires be reported at this scale. The scenarios may well have been run. Their results are not shown.

And the report clearly knows how to show them. Elsewhere in the same document, the ridership forecast comes with multiple scenarios and a published band around it. The economy-wide GDP figure rests on nearly a hundred separate model runs with the assumptions varied. Between a tested input and a tested output sits the largest single number in the report, presented as a single column of point estimates.

The Optimism Adjustment

A top-up the manual requires, and the report does not mention

Early cost estimates for big infrastructure projects are, as a matter of record, too low. Not occasionally — routinely. The Metrolinx manual is explicit about the evidence behind this: in an international sample of 258 rail projects, ninety per cent were undercosted, by an average of forty-five per cent.

The manual’s response is a mandatory top-up applied to the construction cost when it is compared with benefits, over and above whatever contingency is already in the estimate. The size of the top-up depends on how far the design has progressed. At the earliest stage — nought to ten per cent designed — it is 64 per cent.

ALTO’s cost estimate is described in its own report as an AACE Class 5 estimate, which is the earliest and least developed class there is. Applied as the manual directs, a cost of $60 to $90 billion would enter the comparison at roughly $98 to $148 billion, before any comparison with benefits is attempted. That range is our own arithmetic on ALTO’s published estimate at the manual’s stated uplift; ALTO publishes no uplifted figure.

The report applies no such adjustment and does not mention the concept. It is worth noting where this reasoning comes from: the manual grounds the adjustment in the research on transport megaproject cost overruns that this Initiative has drawn on since its first publication. That reasoning is already embedded in the appraisal manual ALTO chose to cite.

The Central Inversion

Too early to divide, but not too early to multiply

The report declines to publish a benefit-cost ratio — benefits divided by costs, the single number a reader would most want. Its stated reason is that the cost estimate is too immature to support one.

Under the framework ALTO cites, that reasoning runs backwards. The manual sets out what is required at each stage of a project’s life. At the earliest stage, the very stage ALTO is at, the requirement is a single line: conduct sensitivity testing to understand the key drivers and the level of uncertainty in each option.

Early-stage uncertainty is not an exemption from testing. It is the reason testing is required. The report treats it the other way round: immaturity on the cost side is given as grounds for publishing nothing, while single-point figures are published on the benefit side of the same ledger. The same uncertainty is treated as decisive for one number and immaterial for the other.

And a business case for this corridor has already done it. In December 2021 the Joint Project Office — VIA Rail and the Canada Infrastructure Bank — published a benefit-cost ratio for High Frequency Rail, the cheaper predecessor to ALTO, at a comparable stage of development: about 0.13, or roughly 0.4 on an expanded basis counting fare revenue and agglomeration as benefits. It published a net present value of minus $21.1 billion and a thirty-year public subsidy of $37.1 to $42.2 billion alongside it. Its economic parameters were drawn from Metrolinx and Ministère des Transports du Québec guidance — the same two sources ALTO cites. Immaturity did not prevent a ratio then. The companion explainer Hours Are Not Dollars sets out those figures in full, including why 0.13 rather than 0.4 is the anchor.

A related point arises elsewhere in the report. In explaining why one set of results is excluded from the welfare account, it refers to those results as therefore not being included in the benefit-cost ratio — speaking of it as a thing with a settled boundary about what enters it. One page says a meaningful ratio cannot yet be produced. Another treats the ratio as already drawn up. The two are difficult to read together, and the report does not reconcile them.

Limits of This Analysis

What this brief does not say

Stated here rather than left for others to find.

On the analysis

The rate is not wrong3.5 per cent is a defensible choice, used by the United Kingdom Treasury and by Metrolinx, and well supported for long-horizon public investment. This brief does not argue that ALTO’s rate is too low or too high.

Metrolinx does not bind ALTOA provincial agency’s manual has no legal force over a federal Crown corporation. The argument is about the coherence of a citation, not about jurisdiction.

One choice runs in ALTO’s favourThe 3.5 per cent rate is applied flat across sixty years. The UK Treasury, whose Social Time Preference Rate this figure matches, steps its rate down to 3.0 per cent after year 30. Applying that schedule would have made ALTO’s benefit total larger, not smaller.

One cited source was not reviewedGuidance from the Ministère des Transports du Québec is cited separately for the value of time. The Initiative has not reviewed it and takes no position on what it requires.

On the report and its source

The report does apply conservatism in placesAccident reductions are capped after twenty years, and car emission factors are assumed to improve to 2050, which the report notes limits the emissions benefit. These are the two smallest monetised lines. No equivalent constraint is disclosed for travel time, which is 78 per cent of the total.

The manual itself is datedMetrolinx said in 2021 that a revised version with updated values would follow in 2022. Five years on, it has not. That is a limitation of the source document, not a fault of ALTO’s — but a reader assessing where a federal appraisal input came from is entitled to know it.

Which figures are whoseEvery figure attributed to ALTO, Metrolinx, the Joint Project Office, HM Treasury or Statistics Canada is quoted from the sources listed below and can be checked there. Three figures are our own arithmetic and are marked as such where they appear: the $98 to $148 billion uplifted capital range, the $21.40 inflation-escalated value of time, and the five per cent effect of the declining Green Book schedule. Where the report does not state something, we say so rather than inferring it, and we make no claim about why any requirement was or was not carried across.

This is a public report, not a formal submissionA business case submitted to Cabinet in 2029 may well contain material this document does not. The claims examined here are the claims ALTO has chosen to put in public.

What Would Settle It

Two questions ALTO can answer without releasing a model

Both are answerable from work ALTO has already done. Neither requires disclosure of a model, cooperation from staff, or agreement about what the correct discount rate for a national railway ought to be.

1. Was the calculation ever run at a rate other than 3.5 per cent?

And if so, what were the results? A negative answer is itself informative — it would mean the required test was never performed. An affirmative answer is the sensitivity table the report does not contain.

2. Which parts of the cited guidance were applied, and which were departed from?

The Metrolinx document requires that any variation from its parameters be agreed and clearly justified. The report records no variations at all — while, on the evidence above, departing from several.

Where Things Stand · August 2026

Summary ledger

Measured against the requirements of the manual ALTO names as its authority:

Carried across

The 3.5 per cent discount rate, correctly cited to the manual.

Carried across

The single blended value of time, expressly justified by reference to the manual.

Partial

The thirty-year cap on benefit growth: applied to accident and emissions lines, not stated for travel time, which is 78 per cent of the benefits.

Partial

A single price year throughout: the appraisal is in 2024 dollars, the GDP result in 2019 dollars.

Left behind

Discount rate sensitivity test at 2.5 per cent.

Left behind

Value of time sensitivity test at 0.75 per cent real growth.

Left behind

Range analysis of costs and assumptions, reported with a confidence level.

Left behind

The probability that benefits exceed costs, and the benefit-cost ratio itself.

Left behind

The standard set of performance indicators: net present value, benefit-cost ratio, capital utilisation, return on investment, internal rate of return.

Left behind

The optimism-bias top-up on construction costs, 64 per cent at this level of design — not applied and not mentioned.

Left behind

The lower end of the range, on figures the report itself labels an upper estimate.

ALTO names an appraisal manual twice — once for its discount rate, once to justify a single blended value of time — and leaves behind the testing, the ranges, the optimism adjustment and the benefit-cost reporting that the same manual attaches to those figures at this project’s scale. What remains is a column of numbers labelled an upper estimate whose lower estimate is never shown, resting on parameters presented as facts rather than as selections, in a report that declines to divide that column by the cost while describing the benefits as holding across a wide range of scenarios.

Every document relied on here is public. Nothing in this analysis requires access to ALTO’s models, cooperation from its staff, or a view on what the correct discount rate for a national railway ought to be.

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If the terms in this brief are unfamiliar — what a discount rate actually does, why a benefit figure is not money, and who ends up paying — the companion explainer Hours Are Not Dollars covers the same ground in plain language, and sets out the 2021 business case figures in full.

Sources

Primary documents

ALTO, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026, 83 pp. Discount rate, appraisal period and price base in the Appendix A methodology box, sourced at footnote 65 to the Metrolinx Business Case Manual Volume 2; value of time and the single-parameter justification in the same appendix, with Ministère des Transports du Québec guidance at footnote 66. Direct-effects tables headed “upper estimate, $2024 CAD”; benefit-cost ratio discussion at p. 62 and reference to the benefit-cost ratio at p. 80; capital cost and AACE Class 5 at pp. 5 and 65; scenario-robustness claims at pp. 3 and 69.

Metrolinx, Business Case Manual Volume 2: Guidance, August 2021, 222 pp. Economic parameters at Table 5.8; sensitivity requirements at Tables 5.1 to 5.3; optimism bias at Tables 5.4 to 5.6; worked range example at Table 5.7; Economic Case lifecycle requirements and key performance indicators; business case principles at pp. 11 and 13; guidance revision cycle at p. 4. metrolinx.com

Metrolinx, “Business Cases — Resources,” accessed 21 August 2026. The Business Case Guidance link resolves to the Volume 2 file under an asset version token corresponding to 15 September 2022; no Volume 2 revision has been issued.

B. Flyvbjerg, Procedures for Dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning (UK Department for Transport, 2004), cited in the Metrolinx Guidance as the basis for the optimism-bias uplift.

Statistics Canada, Table 18-10-0004-01, consumer price index, used for the 2021 to 2024 escalation of the Metrolinx value of time. The comparison is arithmetic and is not an attribution of method.

August 21, 2026

The wrong answer to the right question

Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · The HPR Research Report

The Wrong Answer to the Right Question

The corridor genuinely needs better trains. What it got instead was a project that grew far beyond its original plan during procurement — and that can’t be fixed with tweaks, because its problems come from how it was chosen, not how it’s being built.

Chapter 2 · The HPR Research Report

This chapter doesn’t dispute that the Windsor–Toronto–Ottawa–Montréal corridor needs better intercity rail. It does. What it disputes is ALTO — on grounds that are about method and evidence, not politics. We trace how a modest upgrade of a largely existing, disused rail corridor turned into a 300 km/h greenfield megaproject during a competitive bidding process, lay out four structural problems with the project as designed, and explain why none of it can be patched from the inside.

Source Note

Much of this chapter draws on documents obtained through Access to Information requests — internal board and executive records, procurement files, and the independent fairness monitor’s final report — along with the Initiative’s own independent cost, ridership, and route-friction models. Specific releases are cited by their file numbers throughout. Some key documents, including the internal slide where the project’s scope was reframed, remain withheld.

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2.1 · The Real Problem

The corridor genuinely needs better trains

The Windsor–Toronto–Ottawa–Montréal corridor connects Canada’s two largest metro areas and the national capital, and generates roughly half the country’s GDP. Despite that, intercity rail service on it is among the worst in any comparable wealthy country. VIA Rail shares track with CN freight, and freight trains get priority — when both need the same stretch of track, the passenger train waits in a siding. The result is slow, unreliable, and infrequent service.

<64%

VIA Rail’s on-time performance in 2023 — worse than Air Canada’s 63%, which itself ranked last among North America’s ten largest airlines

4h+

Scheduled Toronto–Montréal journey time — more than double a competitive flight, including check-in

~50%

Share of Canada’s GDP generated in this corridor — the economic weight today’s rail service fails to serve

Schedules are padded with hours of slack to absorb the delays that freight priority makes routine. The result isn’t competitive with driving or flying, and VIA can’t simply add more trains without bumping freight that has the contractual and legal right of way. So the question this report asks isn’t whether the corridor needs investment. It’s what kind of investment actually delivers it — at what cost, on what timeline, with what risk.

2.2 · How This Happened

A modest upgrade grew into a much bigger, much pricier project — during the bidding process

ALTO’s cost and ambition problems didn’t come from ordinary planning drift. Records obtained through Access to Information show the project’s scope escalating in the middle of the bidding process itself — not through any public announcement or debate. Understanding how that happened explains why ALTO costs what it costs today.

One thing to be clear about up front: this is not a claim that the procurement was run improperly. BDO Canada, the independent fairness monitor appointed in 2022, concluded in its final report of May 2025 that the process it observed was carried out in a fair, open and transparent manner, and recorded no fairness concerns at any stage. The problem is not that rules were broken. It is that a process run properly within its own terms produced a project no one had put to Parliament.

What was on the table originally

The project ALTO replaced was VIA Rail’s High Frequency Rail (HFR) plan: a dedicated-track plan running at up to 177 km/h, largely reviving a long-disused rail right-of-way through Peterborough, Havelock, and Smiths Falls — a separate, more direct route away from the CN Kingston Subdivision VIA still shares with freight today — delivered incrementally, segment by segment. Its own 2021 business case projected about 13.5 million riders a year, at a capital cost roughly a quarter to a third of what ALTO now proposes. That’s the baseline the public was never shown as a discrete choice against what came next.

An open-ended bidding process

The request for proposals went out in October 2023 without a settled route — internal records show the route was still being debated at the executive and board level as late as March 2024, five months after bidding opened. It also asked every bidder for two designs: one topping out at 200 km/h, and a second, more ambitious one with high-speed sections. The process then included 36 structured private meetings between the government and each bidder over eight and a half months.

All three bidders proposed something bigger

A Privy Council Office briefing note of 20 February 2025, released under access to information, records that as the bidding progressed all three shortlisted consortia put forward designs more ambitious than the high-frequency plan — new routes on largely new land, above 250 km/h. The jump in scope did not come from any one bidder. The winning consortium, Cadence — CDPQ Infra, AtkinsRéalis, Keolis, SYSTRA Canada, SNCF Voyageurs, and Air Canada — brings substantial experience in dedicated, higher-speed rail: its members built Montréal’s REM and operate France’s TGV network. What has never been published is the comparison the bidding process was set up to produce. The same briefing note credits an unnamed third party with concluding those bigger proposals would deliver greater benefits, and that analysis has not appeared in any release to date.

Billions committed before the plan was finished

The government committed $3.9 billion in the 2024 Fall Economic Statement before the business case was finalized and before a route was chosen. The internal slide that appears to document the scope escalation — titled “Level of Ambition Supported by Business Case” — remains withheld from public release. Once the funding commitment was public, there was effectively no way back to the smaller project.

Selling the bigger, pricier version

With the scope already locked in, the government faced a communications problem: a project that started as “VIA HFR” was now something much closer to European-style high-speed rail. Internal records show “high frequency” tested poorly with Ontario audiences, while the name “Alto” tested well with 18–34-year-olds and worked bilingually. A national ad campaign promoting the project’s benefits ran while the business case and route documents were still being withheld from information requesters.

The pattern, stated plainly

A project that entered the bidding process as a $9–12 billion, 177 km/h upgrade of a largely disused rail corridor came out the other side as a $60–90 billion (on the government’s own published figures — our independent estimate is materially higher), 300 km/h greenfield railway. That change in scope was never put to Parliament or the public as a choice. It emerged from the mechanics of the procurement itself.

2.3 · Four Problems Built Into the Design

Route, math, price tag, ridership — each one falls short

Having won a mandate for a much bigger project than the one that went to bid, ALTO’s proponents faced four separate problems: a route through sensitive land, a business case that has to clear a federal investment bar, a cost estimate that has to hold up, and a ridership forecast that has to be believable. None of the four holds up well under independent scrutiny.

2.3.1 · The route runs through some of the most sensitive land in the corridor

ALTO’s proposed new corridor crosses the Frontenac Arch Biosphere Reserve — a UNESCO-designated ecological corridor — the Napanee Limestone Plain, habitat for several species at risk, and Leda clay deposits south of Ottawa with known engineering hazards at high speed. This wasn’t a routing choice made for technical reasons; it reflects a decision to build an entirely new, 300 km/h-optimized corridor rather than follow existing, already-disturbed infrastructure. In our Participant Experience Survey, only 2% of respondents received direct notification about ALTO, and 88% found the information they did get inadequate. Our Community Friction Index — which scores corridors on land conflict, municipal pushback, expropriation exposure, ecological sensitivity, and public mobilisation — puts ALTO’s corridor at 54 out of 100, in the high-friction range. That matters financially, not just politically: in our statistical model, community friction is a significant predictor of cost overruns.

2.3.2 · The math doesn’t clear the government’s own bar

The only published economic appraisal of this corridor is the December 2021 business case for the predecessor project. It puts the benefit-cost ratio at about 0.13 over a 30-year period — about thirteen cents of measured value for every dollar spent — rising to about 0.4 once two newer and less established benefit categories are added in. A separate calculation in the same document shows a net loss of $21.1 billion in present-value terms. These are the government’s own figures. A ratio of 1.0 is simply break-even, the point where benefits equal costs. Our independent analysis, which grounds every input in how comparable projects have actually performed rather than project-specific projections, finds the ratio is likely far worse still.

Scenario	What it shows
Published (Dec 2021 appraisal) 30-year evaluation period	Benefit-cost ratio ~0.13, or ~0.40 on the expanded basis
Initiative reference-class estimate Cost assumed: ~$143B	Benefit-cost ratio ~0.03–0.11
Break-even	Benefit-cost ratio of 1.0 — benefits equal costs

In plain terms

ALTO fails its own government’s investment test on the government’s own numbers. Checking those numbers against how similar projects have actually performed makes the gap worse, not better.

2.3.3 · The price tag is very likely too low

ALTO’s published cost range of $60–90 billion comes from an early-stage estimate — the type quantity surveyors flag as accurate only to within roughly ±50%, which makes it a planning figure, not a firm commitment. Our own cost model, built from 16 comparable rail megaprojects worldwide and calibrated to those projects’ actual outcomes, puts ALTO’s realistic central cost at around $143 billion, with a worst-case scenario approaching $200 billion or more once cold-climate engineering risk (frost-susceptible clay, karst terrain, freeze-thaw cycles at high-speed tolerances) is factored in.

2.3.4 · No independent study backs the ridership numbers

ALTO projects 24 million riders a year by 2055. No car-dependent North American corridor without existing high-speed rail has ever come close to that. Research on transportation megaprojects generally finds ridership forecasts overstate actual results by about 51% on average. Our own bottom-up model — built from corridor population, trip-making patterns, and VIA’s own ridership data, tested under three different fare and subsidy scenarios — puts 2055 ridership at 3.7 to 17.2 million, with 9.2 million as the central estimate. ALTO’s 24-million target sits 40% above even our upper bound.

Source	2055 ridership estimate
ALTO’s public target	24 million
ALTO’s internal Corporate Plan figure (by 2059)	17 million — about 30% below the public figure
McGill TRAM stated-preference study	~19.7 million (year 50)
Munk School (U of T) model	18–19 million (year 30)
Standard bias correction applied to ALTO’s own figure	8.4 million
Initiative bottom-up model, central case	9.2 million (range: 3.7–17.2 million)

The pattern here too

Every independent forecast built from a published methodology lands within or close to our range. ALTO’s own public target is the outlier — and it’s the one figure whose methodology has never been disclosed.

2.4 · Why Patching It Won’t Work

These aren’t execution problems — they’re the project’s founding choices

A different route doesn’t fix the business case. A revised ridership forecast doesn’t fix the cost problem. Tighter project management doesn’t undo the fact that funding was committed before the business case was finished, on a specification set by the bidding process rather than by public need. Four reasons why this can’t be corrected from within:

It’s been treated as one-of-a-kind, so nothing gets checked against it

ALTO’s documentation consistently describes the corridor as having no real comparator, which is exactly the reasoning pattern researchers have found opens the door to over-optimistic numbers. Every genuinely comparable project elsewhere in the world gets waved away as not relevant — leaving the project’s own estimate as the only “evidence” available.

The most optimistic version of the numbers is the one that won

In competitive funding processes, the most optimistic projection tends to win, because optimism produces a better-looking business case than realism does. A version built on our reference-class numbers — a benefit-cost ratio of 0.03–0.11 — could never have survived the funding decision. The optimistic version did, but only because the more realistic numbers weren’t available yet when the commitment was made.

The first segment is too weak to stand alone — which is exactly the point

The planned first segment, Ottawa–Montréal, is the corridor’s weakest market: roughly 98% of that travel is currently by road, and there’s barely any competing flight traffic for a speed premium to beat. It can’t pay for itself. Its economics only work if the network keeps extending toward Toronto — which locks in a public commitment to the rest of the corridor before its full price has ever been disclosed. Britain’s HS2 project shows how badly this can go if it doesn’t: two legs cancelled, leaving a line more than double its original budget serving less than half the original network. HS2 at least stranded into its strongest market. If ALTO’s later phases stall, it strands into its weakest.

The alternative is quietly being closed off while this proceeds

The report’s proposed alternative, HPR, would run alongside the existing Highway 401 corridor. Ontario’s ongoing 401 widening is already consuming the road margin that alternative would need, section by section. Every year ALTO’s planning phase continues is a year in which that door narrows further — a real cost that doesn’t show up in any of ALTO’s published figures.

What’s Next

What’s in the rest of this report

This chapter has traced one argument in four parts: the corridor’s need is real (2.1); a modest upgrade became a much bigger project during procurement (2.2); the resulting project has four structural problems (2.3); and none of it can be fixed by refinement (2.4). The chapters that follow set out the alternative.

Ch. 3

The HPR alternative. How a passenger line built along the existing Highway 401 and rail corridor can free up freight capacity at the same time, instead of building an entirely new line elsewhere and leaving the freight problem untouched.

Ch. 4

Route and cost. Where the line would go and what it would cost, using the same cost model applied consistently to both ALTO and HPR.

Ch. 5

Environment and communities. How the two options compare on carbon emissions and disruption to the communities along the route.

Ch. 6

How many people would ride it. Ridership estimates built on the real-world pattern, checked four different ways.

Ch. 7

Running costs. The ongoing yearly balance between what it costs to operate and maintain the railway, and what fares plus any subsidy bring in.

Ch. 8

Is it worth it. A full cost-benefit and financial analysis across a range of scenarios, including the value of the freed-up freight capacity.

Ch. 9

Getting it built. How to phase construction, manage the risk of cost overruns, and keep the project accountable to the numbers in this report.

August 10, 2026

Deconstructing the Megaproject Playbook

Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · The HPR Research Report

Deconstructing the Megaproject Playbook

Why big rail projects almost always cost more and carry fewer riders than promised — and how to check a project’s numbers against the real-world record, not just its own promises.

Chapter 1 · The HPR Research Report

This chapter explains the method behind every number in this report. It’s based on the work of Bent Flyvbjerg, an Oxford researcher who has spent decades studying how big infrastructure projects around the world actually turn out, compared to what they promised. His findings have been confirmed again and again, across many countries and many kinds of projects. We use his method for every forecast in this report — and we’re explaining it here first, before any of our own results, so you can see the rules before you see the numbers.

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Chapter 1: Deconstructing the Megaproject Playbook (PDF)

The full chapter, with footnotes and sourcing

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1.1 · The Track Record

The iron law of megaprojects

Here’s an uncomfortable fact: big public infrastructure projects almost always cost more, take longer, and carry fewer passengers than promised. This isn’t bad luck on any one project — it’s been true again and again, everywhere records have been kept, for decades. Researcher Bent Flyvbjerg calls this the iron law of megaprojects: over budget, over time, under benefits — over and over again, regardless of country, project type, or how sophisticated the planning was.

1.40×
What rail projects actually cost, on average, vs. what was first promised

0.66×
The benefits rail projects actually deliver, on average, vs. what was promised

52%
Average budget overrun for high-speed rail specifically

106%
How much rail projects overestimate rider numbers, on average

9/10
Rail projects that predicted more riders than they actually got

+45%
How much longer construction takes than planned, on average

Our own analysis of ALTO finds the same pattern. The published benefit-cost ratio — a standard measure of whether a project’s benefits are worth its costs — is already far short of break-even. The December 2021 business case for the predecessor project put it at about 0.13 over 30 years, or about 0.4 once some newer and less established benefit categories are counted. A ratio of 1.0 is the point where benefits merely equal costs. Correct the cost and ridership numbers using the real-world track record, and that ratio falls further still. This doesn’t mean going over budget is inevitable. It means any assessment that ignores this well-documented pattern is starting from an unrealistic place — not by accident, but by leaving out the most relevant evidence available. ALTO’s risk profile isn’t an unlucky exception. It’s exactly what you’d expect from a project of this size, this type, and this level of political backing.

1.2 · Two Reasons Forecasts Go Wrong

Honest mistakes and strategic misrepresentation

There are two different reasons a project forecast can turn out to be wrong — and it matters which one is at play, because they call for very different fixes.

Optimism bias — the honest mistake

Planners genuinely believe their numbers. They aren’t lying — they’re not even aware they’re being too optimistic. This is a well-documented pattern in psychology: people naturally focus on the details of their own project and forget to check how similar projects have actually gone in the past. It’s a fixable process problem — the fix is forcing real-world comparisons into every estimate.

Strategic misrepresentation — telling people what they want to hear

Costs get underestimated and benefits get overestimated on purpose, to get a project approved and funded. Writing about the research record as a whole, Flyvbjerg borrows a word from ethics and calls this what it is: lying. It’s an incentive problem — and it’s only fixed by changing what forecasters are rewarded and held accountable for.

In real projects, both are usually present together, and the mix shifts with the stakes. For small, low-attention projects, honest mistakes tend to be the bigger factor. For large projects with strong political backing — the kind a minister or a Crown corporation needs approved — strategic misrepresentation tends to dominate, with honest optimism layered on top rather than absent.

The pattern, stated plainly

Underestimate the cost, overestimate the benefit, and you get funded. This isn’t random. It points in exactly the direction that wins the competition for a limited pool of money.

1.3 · Structural Profile

Where ALTO sits on the scale

Flyvbjerg’s research lets us predict, in general terms, which kind of error is more likely for a given project — without needing to know what’s in anyone’s head. For small projects that don’t attract much political attention, honest mistakes are usually the bigger factor. For large projects with major political weight behind them, strategic misrepresentation usually is — with honest mistakes still layered on top.

Figure 1.1. How the mix of honest mistakes and strategic misrepresentation changes as a project gets bigger and more politically important. Honest mistakes (dashed line) matter more for small, low-pressure projects and fade — but never fully disappear — as projects grow. Strategic misrepresentation (solid line) is close to zero for small projects but rises sharply and takes over for large, high-pressure ones. Large, politically backed projects competing for scarce funding sit at the right-hand end of this scale.

ALTO checks every box that predicts heavy political pressure. It’s run by a federal Crown corporation with a multi-billion-dollar budget. It has had public backing from successive governments. And it’s competing against every other federal priority for a limited pot of money. By this framework’s own logic, projects in that position sit at the end of the scale where the research expects political pressure, rather than honest error, to account for most of the pattern across the class. The pressure to look good is strongest exactly where the numbers matter most for getting funded.

Flyvbjerg calls this the survival of the unfittest: it isn’t necessarily the best projects that get built — it’s the ones that look best on paper. The approval process quietly rewards optimistic numbers over honest ones: a proposal with realistic costs and realistic ridership loses the funding contest to one that doesn’t. Seen this way, the fact that ALTO has survived several rounds of budget approval isn’t proof its numbers are wrong — but it is a reason to look at them carefully rather than take them at face value.

To be clear

None of this requires anyone at ALTO to be lying. An honest mistake would produce errors that go in both directions about equally — some projects under budget, some over. What actually happens, again and again, is that the errors all point the same way: costs come in higher, benefits come in lower. That one-directional pattern is the tell. It is why this report checks ALTO’s published figures against the real-world record instead of accepting them on their own terms. Nothing here identifies the cause of any particular number, and this report makes no claim about the honesty of any person or organisation.

1.4 · The Uniqueness Trap

Why “it’s different this time” doesn’t hold up

One of the most common — and most costly — mistakes in big project planning is treating a project as one-of-a-kind, and therefore exempt from comparison with anything else. ALTO has been promoted as Canada’s first true high-speed railway, on uniquely Canadian geology, on an unprecedented corridor. That’s exactly the kind of claim researchers have found, again and again, opens the door to over-optimistic forecasting.

Figure 1.2. The uniqueness trap. Claiming a project is unique (left) leaves nothing to compare it to, so all you can do is trust the project’s own estimate. Looking at similar projects elsewhere (right) means checking that estimate against real-world evidence instead. This report takes the second approach throughout.

Here’s why the “unique” claim matters so much. If a project is truly one of a kind, there’s nothing to compare it to — which means the only evidence left is the very estimate you’re trying to check. Every comparable project, every real-world outcome from similar lines, gets waved away as not relevant. This report takes the opposite view: ALTO is one example of a well-studied category — high-speed and intercity rail megaprojects — and there’s plenty of real-world data on how that category actually performs. That data is the most relevant evidence available.

What the disagreement is really about

The disagreement between this report and ALTO’s own numbers isn’t really about any single figure. It’s about whether ALTO should be judged purely on its own terms, as a one-off case — or against how similar projects have actually turned out.

1.5 · Risk of Bad Surprises

Why standard contingency budgets fall short

Standard project planning assumes cost risk is spread fairly evenly around a central estimate — like a bell curve — so a reasonable contingency budget can be calculated with simple statistics. The real-world data don’t support that assumption. Big infrastructure projects almost never come in significantly under budget, but they regularly come in massively over — by two or three times the original estimate in the worst cases. Statisticians call this a fat-tailed distribution: the chance of a very bad outcome is much higher than a normal bell curve would suggest.

Figure 1.3. The real pattern of cost overruns on rail megaprojects (solid line) has a much bigger chance of large overruns than a normal bell curve (dashed line) would predict. A typical 10–15% contingency budget looks safe against a bell curve — but against the real-world pattern, it may only cover half of projects, or fewer. The shaded area shows the range of bad outcomes a standard contingency budget doesn’t account for.

This matters directly for how much money a project should set aside for the unexpected. A standard 10–15% buffer looks adequate if you assume a bell curve — but against the real-world pattern, it may only protect against half of possible outcomes, or fewer. That’s why this report carries three cost figures all the way through its financial model — the number as originally specified, a corrected central estimate based on similar projects, and a worst-case scenario — instead of relying on one confident number that history suggests is likely to be wrong.

1.6 · The Fix

Checking the numbers against the real-world record

The standard fix for both problems above is simple in principle: find a group of similar past projects; look at how their costs, benefits, and ridership actually turned out compared to what was promised; then use that real-world pattern to sanity-check the new project’s own estimate, rather than taking that estimate at face value. This flips the usual burden of proof — the real-world pattern becomes the starting assumption, and anyone predicting something better has to explain why.

Figure 1.4. Where the comparison projects are. They span Europe, East Asia, North Africa, and North America — different countries, different governments, different planning systems. That range matters: it shows the patterns we rely on aren’t specific to any one country’s way of doing things. ALTO’s corridor is shown for reference.

What it costs

We compared 16 real high-speed rail projects worldwideWe looked at what actually drove the final cost per kilometre on 16 comparable projects, and found two things matter most: how difficult the engineering is, and how much local resistance and land-use friction a project runs into.

Local resistance is the stronger driver in our modelOf the two, local and political resistance is the stronger predictor of final cost per kilometre — carrying roughly twice the weight of engineering difficulty in the fitted model.

What this means for ALTOBased on ALTO’s engineering difficulty and level of local resistance, this points to a realistic cost of around $142 million per kilometre, with a likely range of $76–264 million per kilometre.

How many people would ride it

We compared 12 real high-speed rail systems worldwideWe looked at how car-dependent a region is against how many people actually use rail there.

No car-dependent region has high ridershipNot one of the 12 systems combines heavy car dependence with high rail ridership. ALTO’s corridor scores as heavily car-dependent.

ALTO’s target vs. the realistic estimateALTO’s own target of 24 million riders a year by 2055 is far above what any comparable region has achieved. Three independent forecasts for this corridor instead cluster around 10 million riders a year.

The standard this report holds itself to

A forecast that looks better than the real-world pattern isn’t more accurate — it’s less accurate. This report’s numbers are, on purpose, less flattering than what a typical project pitch would produce for the same corridor. That’s the point: this report is built to hold up under tough scrutiny, which means accepting an honest, sometimes unwelcome, comparison to how these projects actually turn out.

1.7 · Why Now

Canada’s changed circumstances

The case against ALTO isn’t only about method — it’s also about timing. ALTO was approved during a period of relative calm with the US, a stable trade agreement, extra federal money after the pandemic, low interest rates, and confident population-growth predictions that made ambitious ridership numbers easier to defend. Nearly all of those conditions have since changed. Today, Canada faces US tariff pressure, pressure to diversify trade away from the US, a tighter federal budget, and a public more focused on economic resilience than on amenity projects. A passenger project of this scale — on the Initiative’s reference-class estimates, $100–200 billion — has to clear a much higher bar today than it did when it was first approved.

Figure 1.5. Canada’s income per person compared to the US, 2000–2025. Canada came close to matching US income per person during the 2011–2012 resource boom, then fell steadily as oil prices dropped. By 2025, Canada’s income per person is roughly 61% of the US level — a gap of about $35,000. ALTO was approved near the peak of Canada’s post-pandemic economic rebound, in conditions that have since tightened considerably. Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators 2000–2024; IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2025.

The question this raises

ALTO is a project built for good economic times. The question for Canada in 2026 isn’t whether high-speed rail would be nice to have. It’s whether this corridor is worth the cost — and whether this design is the right answer to the problem.

The high-speed rail systems that have actually succeeded — in Japan, France, Spain, Taiwan, South Korea — share things the Toronto–Ottawa–Montréal corridor doesn’t have: low car use, dense cities at both ends, strong local transit, and a rail culture that already existed before high-speed rail arrived. What’s left, globally, are second-tier projects on car-dependent corridors where the ridership case relies on optimistic in-house projections rather than real-world evidence. California’s high-speed rail project is the best-known example: years behind schedule, billions over budget, and in political trouble, for exactly these reasons. On the real-world evidence, the Toronto–Ottawa–Montréal corridor shares that second-tier profile.

What’s Next

What’s in the rest of this report

This chapter sets out the method. The chapters that follow apply it — to ALTO, and to the alternative this report proposes, HPR (High-Performance Rail).

Ch. 2
Why the current plan doesn’t add up. Checks the case for doing something about intercity travel on this corridor — which we don’t dispute — against whether ALTO’s specific design actually makes financial sense.

Ch. 3
The HPR alternative. How a passenger line built along the existing Highway 401 and rail corridor can free up freight capacity at the same time, instead of building an entirely new line elsewhere and leaving the freight problem untouched.

Ch. 4
Route and cost. Where the line would go and what it would cost, using the same cost model applied consistently to both ALTO and HPR.

Ch. 5
Environment and communities. How the two options compare on carbon emissions and disruption to the communities along the route.

Ch. 6
How many people would ride it. Ridership estimates built on the real-world pattern from this chapter, checked four different ways.

Ch. 7
Running costs. The ongoing yearly balance between what it costs to operate and maintain the railway, and what fares plus any subsidy bring in.

Ch. 8
Is it worth it. A full cost-benefit and financial analysis across a range of scenarios, including the value of the freed-up freight capacity.

Ch. 9
Getting it built. How to phase construction, manage the risk of cost overruns, and keep the project accountable to the numbers in this report.

Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · beyondalto.ca · citizenresearch.ca · The HPR Research Report · Chapter 1
Independent, non-partisan research on Canada’s proposed Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor. This chapter explains the method used throughout the HPR Research Report.

August 4, 2026
Introduction: What is HPR

Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · The HPR Research Report

What is HPR?

An alternative built around the journey people actually take — not the top speed on the brochure.

Introduction · The HPR Research Report

High Performance Rail (HPR) is a plan to modernise passenger and freight rail along a corridor that already has track. Instead of one brand-new high-speed line built from scratch, HPR treats the whole corridor as a single system and asks what the smartest fix is for each part. That means new track where new track earns its place, upgrades to existing lines where they deliver more per dollar, and added freight capacity so passenger and freight trains can each run to their own schedule. The goal is a trip that beats driving door to door, reaches city centres and the towns in between, and gets built in affordable stages.

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What is HPR? — Introduction (PDF)

The HPR framework in full: the three-part structure, the 10 Guiding Principles, and the case for a made-in-Canada alternative to greenfield high-speed rail

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The Framework

Three parts, one corridor strategy

HPR is not one thing but a whole-system approach with two working halves. It combines a passenger spine and a freight dimension into one corridor strategy, assessed together and built step by step, so each mode can grow on its own terms instead of being forced onto the other’s infrastructure.

Three names for three things, used consistently across this report. The corridor is the Toronto–Québec City route Alto proposes. The triangle is the Toronto–Ottawa–Montréal network HPR proposes in its place. The spine is the 479-kilometre Pickering Junction to Dorval element of that triangle, on the Toronto–Montréal axis, which is where the new-build cost concentrates. Where a chapter names one of the three, it means that one.

HPR — High Performance Rail · the framework

The whole-system approach. HPR combines the passenger spine and the freight side into one corridor strategy, assessed together and delivered in stages.

HPPR — High Performance Passenger Rail · the spine

The physical passenger railway. New-build and grade-separated where the corridor requires it, engineered to run reliably across a 177–240 km/h band, with 240 km/h (150 mph) the alignment’s design maximum, serving downtowns and the communities along the route.

HPFR — High Performance Freight Rail · the freight dimension

The capacity that separates freight from passenger obligations. Freed from passenger schedules, freight can run to a more flexible timetable and operate longer trains. Those are the levers that lower a railway’s operating ratio, so each mode can grow without crowding out the other on shared track.

The 10 Guiding Principles of HPR

What HPR is built on

01
Look at the whole system. Treat the rail network as one system rather than a set of separate projects, and respect the different business models freight and passenger operations run on. Avoid a single project that monopolises the funding and starves the many smaller improvements that would together deliver more.

02
Build for communities. Make sure the towns along the route benefit from the railway, not just the big cities at each end. A railway that brings those places in rather than bypassing them meets less local opposition, carries less political risk and, in the end, costs less.

03
Separate freight from passengers. Build the capacity to give each its own space, so neither has to run to the other’s schedule.

04
Go fast enough, not the fastest possible. Target speeds of 177–240 km/h. That is fast enough to compete with driving or flying door to door, without the cost of fully new, arrow-straight high-speed lines. A 240 km/h maximum is also the more practical option in extreme Canadian heat and cold (±30 °C).

05
Make the ride safe, comfortable and useful. Grade separation and modern rolling stock make rail among the safest ways to travel, and generous space lets passengers work, rest or talk on the way. Time on the train is usable time, which driving can never offer.

06
Be frequent and on time. Compete on turn-up-and-go frequency and dependable punctuality, with on-time performance above 90% sustained through Canadian winters. Reliability, not peak speed, is what earns a traveller’s trust.

07
Reach downtowns and smaller towns. Put stations in city centres and serve the communities along the route, not only the two endpoints.

08
Mix new construction with upgrades. Use whichever delivers more value for the money: new track, or improvements to what is already there.

09
Share the tracks. Let regional, commuter and intercity trains use the same tracks, with freed freight capacity as a deliberate co-benefit.

10
Build it in stages. Invest where the benefits can be demonstrated, phasing improvements so each stage earns its place, instead of concentrating all the cost and risk in one megaproject.

How HPR Differs

A North American solution

The defining difference is what the railway is optimised for. A design that chases 300-plus km/h commits, almost by necessity, to a new greenfield alignment: long straight sections, wide curves, and bypasses that route around the very communities and city centres a passenger service exists to reach. The speed gained on open track is paid back in access time, capital and carbon.

HPR takes the opposite approach. By accepting typical speeds of 177–240 km/h, it can follow the existing corridor, upgrade what already works, and go straight into downtowns, all while freeing up capacity for freight. The result is competitive door to door at a fraction of the capital exposure, in stages that can be re-scoped as the evidence matures.

It is also a difference of origin. A greenfield high-speed line is essentially an imported design. The French passenger-rail model was built for a temperate, densely settled country on a network that carries no freight. North American railroading is the opposite: freight-dominated, shared-track, and tested by hard winters and long distances.

HPR is engineered for those conditions — made in Canada, for Canadian ones. It builds domestic expertise that transfers to later Canadian projects rather than importing it. HPR is best understood not as a slower high-speed railway but as a different answer for a different continent. The question it sets out to answer is this: how do you move the most people and freight, to the most useful places, at prices that compete with driving, for the most defensible investment at the lowest risk?

Travel Time, Not Speed

The clock, not the speedometer

A journey is not a single dash between two stations. It is a chain: getting to the station, waiting for the departure, the run itself, and then getting to the final destination at the far end. Top speed touches only one link in that chain. Once the time at both ends is counted, the run itself is a fraction of the door-to-door total, and shaving it returns less and less. The gap between 240 and 300 km/h saves minutes on the segment that is already the smallest part of the trip.

Worse, the alignments that allow the highest speeds tend to push stations out of city centres. That adds time at both ends, which can outweigh whatever the faster run saved — so a train that is quicker on paper can be slower in practice. Frequency compounds the point: a train leaving soon beats a faster one you have to wait an hour to board.

The measure that matters

Over a corridor drive of some 540 kilometres, the car is the real competitor. Measured the way travellers actually experience the journey, what counts is the reliable door-to-door clock — not the number on the fastest stretch of track.

The Price Lever

Pricing for a car-centric market

In a car-centric country, the railway’s real competitor is not the airplane or the existing train. It is the private car. Against a car someone already owns, a trip is judged on the fairly small extra cost of just driving it. That makes price the most direct lever on whether people switch.

A line built at megaproject cost has to recover that capital somewhere. Fares set to service debt push budget-conscious travellers straight back into their cars, hollowing out the very ridership the business case assumed. HPR’s lower capital cost is therefore not only a fiscal virtue but a demand strategy: a railway that costs less to build can price to fill trains rather than to service debt.

Frequency, downtown access and reliable door-to-door times create the conditions for people to switch. Price is what converts them into boardings — and where most trips default to the car, the fare is often the difference between a full train and an empty one.

What HPR Is Not

Neither political, nor all at once

HPR is not a political project. Its route, its staging and its scope follow the evidence — engineering, economics and demographics — not political convenience or partisan preference. Where a claim cannot be grounded in that evidence, it is not made.

Nor is it everything at once. Stage 1, the scope of the current report, is deliberately limited. It does not detour via Peterborough, it reaches Ottawa over upgraded existing lines rather than costly new-build, and it leaves Québec City to a later stage. Each further stage is added only when the evidence and the need justify it.

The Pitch

A case built to be checked

HPR does not ask to be believed. It asks to be checked. Every figure in its case is meant to be traced to a source, tested against what comparable projects actually cost and carried, and stated with its uncertainty rather than at its best case. Where a promotional business case leads with a single confident number, HPR leads with a range and the reference class behind it. The honest way to forecast a railway is from the record of railways already built, rather than from a proponent’s own projections for the one not yet built.

The result is a stronger case, not a softer one. Compared with a conventional greenfield high-speed line, HPR offers four things:

Passengers
A service that beats driving on door-to-door time, for a fraction of the cost of a from-scratch high-speed line.

Freight
Upgrades that help freight operators instead of competing with passenger trains for track space.

Delivery
Benefits that arrive in proven stages, each one demonstrated before the next is committed.

Whole life
A cost and environmental picture that improves, rather than worsens, once the entire lifespan of the asset is counted.

None of that needs an optimistic ridership forecast or heroic cost control to stand up. That is the pitch: not the fastest railway that can be drawn on paper, but the one that will actually get built, get used, and pay its way.

Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · beyondalto.ca · citizenresearch.ca · The HPR Research Report · Introduction
Independent, non-partisan research on Canada’s proposed Toronto–Québec City corridor. This introduction describes the HPR framework. Later chapters cover corridor geometry, capital cost, ridership, operating economics, environmental impact and benefit–cost analysis.

July 17, 2026

Tag: capital cost

Where you put a railway decides almost everything else

1. Carbon: the two routes have opposite signs

2. Habitat: a new barrier in the wrong place

The Frontenac Arch

The Napanee Limestone Plain

3. Construction: where the trucks go

4. Communities: friction is priced into the cost

One thing that cuts the other way

5. What the corridor could give back

How to read the numbers on this page

Sources and notes

Counting the Crossings

What ALTO’s own numbers work out to

How many roads are we talking about?

What ALTO told Kingston in February

The reassurance

The qualification, in the same answer

The objective

And the fencing

Why the structure count does not settle it

You are being shown half a fraction

Not every structure reconnects anything

A different landscape

What France also built

A structure is not automatically an answer

Size

Upkeep

What closure pushes onto the road

One claim that cannot be tested as written

Six questions ALTO can answer today

Primary documents and statements

Where do 50,000 jobs come from?

What Alto says

What the report actually says

How we checked it

What the check found

The question the report leaves open

Two more things in the tables

Upper, not central

The comparison figures have no source

This has been released before

What we are asking Alto to publish

How to read the numbers on this page

Sources and notes

Where the line goes, and what it costs

Is the corridor still available?

Take the speed the ground gives you

The reversal at the heart of the chapter

Where the ground is generous, the trains go fast

Where it isn’t, they go slower

What it would cost, and what we commit against

Three and a half times the price per kilometre

What the speed difference actually buys

What the corridor becomes a century from now

Procured, and Then?

ALTO commissioned the outside view

Buying the instrument is not the same as letting it bind

The record will arrive after the decision has moved on

Two studies, no cost side

The scenario range has a floor and no ceiling on the downside

Adverse mechanisms are identified but do not reach the total

The two studies disagree, and each resolves the disagreement upward

The studies import the literature’s upside but not its realisation record

Publish the comparison

Documents relied on

Hours Are Not Dollars

What a discount rate is, in ordinary words

How much the answer moves

A number with a family tree

What the federal government uses, and the gap where a manual should be

The last time anyone published these numbers for this corridor

Three different rates, and only one of them is in the report

1. The appraisal rate — 3.5 per cent

2. What it costs the government to borrow

3. What a private partner needs to earn

How the Montréal REM is actually funded

What this does not claim

On the rate

On the comparisons