Tag: transparency

50000 jobs

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Plain Language Brief

Where do 50,000 jobs come from?

Alto says building the railway will support about 50,000 jobs. We checked that figure against two railways that publish both what they spend and who they employ.

September 2026

50,000

Jobs Alto says the project will support during construction. Its report defines the figure once, in an appendix.

~18,000

People actually working on the railway, on our estimate, at Alto’s own budget and schedule.

The number is not wrong. It is a standard output of a standard economic model, and when we rebuilt it from scratch we got almost exactly the same answer. But roughly two thirds of it is not people building a railway, and Alto’s report says so in only one place.

What Alto says

Alto’s report Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, published in August 2026, says the Québec City–Toronto line will support approximately 50,000 jobs while it is being built, and more than 5,000 once it is running. The figure has been repeated in federal announcements and in news coverage since. Almost everywhere it appears, it appears on its own: 50,000 jobs during construction.

An earlier version of the number was slightly different. The federal announcement of 19 February 2025 gave over 51,000 jobs and a GDP gain of up to $35 billion a year. Transport Canada was still publishing that pairing in its 12 December 2025 release. Canada’s Moment, eight months later, gives 50,000 jobs and $24.5 billion. The report does not explain the difference between the two GDP figures, which is about 43 per cent.

What the report actually says

Further into the report, in section 4.3.3 and in two identical tables — Table 7 in the body and Table A4 in the appendix — the figure is described much more fully. There it is:

50,000 full-time equivalent jobs. A full-time equivalent is work converted to a standard full-time measure. It is not a count of people.
Spread across a ten-year construction period.
Three kinds of work counted together. Direct work on the project; supply chain work at the firms that supply it; and induced work, meaning jobs supported when those workers spend their wages in shops, restaurants and everywhere else.
Produced by the 2019 Statistics Canada input-output model. This is a standard tool that estimates how spending in one part of the economy ripples through the rest of it.
Labelled an upper estimate.

The appendix is careful about what this does and does not mean. It says the results describe economic activity supported by spending rather than a net gain to the country. It leaves them out of the project’s benefit-cost ratio. And it notes that the method does not allow for labour shortages or other limits on how much the economy can absorb.

That is a fair and reasonably candid description. The difficulty is where it sits. Those two pages of an eighty-four page report carry it, and nothing else does. The summary at the front, the table comparing high-speed rail with the alternative, Alto’s website, the government announcements and the news coverage all carry the number without any of it.

The number reaching the public is not the number the appendix defines. It is the same figure with its definition left behind.

How we checked it

Two railways publish both halves of the equation — how much they spend in a year, and how many people that spending puts to work.

HS2 in Britain publishes audited capital spending and a programme workforce figure every year.
The Réseau express métropolitain in Montréal, built by CDPQ Infra, published a jobs claim and periodic counts of workers on site. It is also the closest match anywhere to the way Alto has been set up.

Both land in the same place: roughly 2,200 to 3,300 people working for every billion dollars spent in a year.

Alto’s own published figures are $60 to $90 billion of capital over ten to fourteen years. That works out to $4.3 to $9.0 billion a year, which is around half the rate HS2 is spending at present. Applying the observed rate from those two projects to Alto’s own budget and schedule gives 13,000 to 21,000 people working on the programme in the central cases, and a ceiling near 30,000 if the project spends at the top of its range on the fastest possible build.

We then rebuilt the whole 50,000 the way the appendix says it is built — adding supply chain and induced work on top of the people on site, using standard multiplier ratios.

Rebuilding the 50,000 — ten-year build at the top of Alto’s capital range
Layer	What it means	People
Owner and engineering	Alto’s own staff and the designers	700 – 2,000
Site and contractor	People building the railway	16,000 – 17,300
Supply chain	Staff at firms supplying the project	14,400
Induced	Jobs supported when those wages are spent	18,200
Total	Alto publishes 50,000	50,600

Initiative estimate, built from HS2 and REM published spending and workforce figures and standard supply-chain and induced multiplier ratios, applied to Alto’s own published capital range and schedule.

What the check found

50,600, against Alto’s published 50,000. The two agree to within one per cent, using the same three categories Alto names in its own appendix, by a route that borrows nothing from Alto’s model. On that basis the figure stands up as an output of the model that produced it.

What the agreement also does is fix what is inside the number. On Alto’s own budget, roughly 18,000 of the 50,000 are people working on the railway. The rest — nearly two thirds — are jobs at supplier firms and jobs supported when wages are spent again. Fewer than four in ten are on the railway itself.

A second and completely separate check gives the same answer. Direct labour usually accounts for 30 to 40 per cent of spending on heavy civil construction. Applied to $75 billion over ten to twelve years, at a fully loaded cost of $100,000 to $140,000 per worker-year, that supports somewhere between 13,400 and 30,000 people, centred near 19,000. Two methods that share no inputs bracket the same range.

The other way of reading it

Turn the question round and the arithmetic bites. If 50,000 really meant 50,000 people working on the railway, the project would need to spend $15.2 to $22.7 billion every year — a programme of $152 to $273 billion, against the $60 to $90 billion Alto has published. That is close to the $142 billion the Initiative’s own cost model predicts for this corridor. On the arithmetic set out here, Alto’s employment claim implies a more expensive railway than the one Alto has costed.

The question the report leaves open

“50,000 full-time equivalent jobs during a ten-year construction period” can be read two ways. It can mean 50,000 full-time equivalents working in each year of the decade. Or it can mean 50,000 years of work in total, spread across the decade. The two readings are ten times apart, and the report does not say which is meant.

Only the first works arithmetically. The second would put the project at 0.67 job-years for every $1 million spent, against 2.6 at HS2 and 2.6 to 3.3 at the REM — roughly a quarter of the labour intensity of any comparable railway now being built. So this analysis treats the figure as an annual average, which is the reading that makes it defensible. A reader has no way to know without being told.

Two more things in the tables

Upper, not central

Both tables head their value column “upper estimate”. One appendix earlier, the $24.5 billion GDP figure is labelled a central estimate, drawn from a stated range of sensitivity tests. So a range exists behind the 50,000 as well. What has been published is its top. The Initiative has recorded the same pattern twice before in this report: ranges that appear in the commissioned studies but not in the public summaries.

The comparison figures have no source

Table 2 sets high-speed rail against the alternative, “high-frequency rail”, and credits that alternative with 44,000 construction jobs at a capital cost of $45 to $75 billion. Neither figure carries a footnote, a source or a method anywhere in the document. The implied job intensity is internally consistent with the high-speed figures, so the numbers do not look wrong. The point is that a reader has no way to check them.

This has been released before

Employment modelling for this corridor has been published once already, and what happened to it is worth knowing. The Joint Project Office — VIA Rail and the Canada Infrastructure Bank — produced a business case for High Frequency Rail, the slower predecessor to this project, in December 2021. It gives construction employment as 71,000 to 96,000 annual equivalent jobs. That is a third unit of measure again, different from Alto’s 50,000 and from the 51,000 in the 2025 announcement, but stated plainly enough that a reader knows what is being counted.

The Canada Infrastructure Bank released that document in full in November 2025. The same document, released under a separate access request, cuts the identical sentence: “an estimated ___ annual equivalent jobs could be created,” with the sentence left grammatical around the missing number and no exemption provision marked against it. We hold both versions.

So the same employment figure, for the same corridor, has been treated as releasable by one federal body and withheld by another. That is worth putting on the record now, before anyone argues that the modelling behind the 50,000 is too commercially sensitive to publish.

What we are asking Alto to publish

Alto holds all of this already. None of it would cost anything the organisation does not have.

Whether the 50,000 is an annual average, or a cumulative count of full-time-equivalent years.
How it splits across the three categories Table A4 names: direct, supply chain and induced.
The range the upper estimate was drawn from, and the central value within it.
The year-by-year profile across the ten-year construction period.
The assumption made about imports and Canadian content in the input-output run.
The capital and operating spending profile that was fed into the model.
The source of the 44,000 jobs and the $45 to $75 billion attributed to high-frequency rail in Table 2.

And, more simply than any of that: carry the appendix definition alongside the number, wherever the number appears.

How to read the numbers on this page

Every figure attributed to Alto, HS2, CDPQ Infra, the California High-Speed Rail Authority or a Government of Canada release is quoted from the published source listed below, and can be checked there.

Every other figure on this page is a calculation by the Initiative from those published inputs, and is described as an estimate where it appears. The reconstruction is an estimate rather than a measurement: it applies labour intensity observed on two comparator projects, together with standard supply-chain and induced multiplier ratios, to Alto’s own published capital range and schedule.

Where Alto has not published something, this page says so rather than inferring it, and makes no claim about why any particular figure was or was not published.

Read the full paper

50,000 Jobs? — the research paper (PDF)

Ten pages. Sets out the method in full, the year-by-year spending and workforce figures for HS2 and the Réseau express métropolitain, the layer-by-layer reconstruction, the job-years-per-dollar comparison against California and the US Federal Highway Administration, and the complete source list.

Sources and notes

1Alto, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026. Section 4.3.3 and Tables 7 and A4 (50,000 full-time equivalent jobs across direct, supply chain and induced effects, ten-year construction period, upper estimate; $86 billion value added; $23 billion tax revenue). Appendix A.2 methodology box (2019 Statistics Canada input-output model; static; excluded from the benefit-cost ratio; no account taken of labour shortages or capacity limits). Table A2 ($24.5 billion GDP, central estimate). Table 2 (44,000 construction jobs and $45 to $75 billion capital for high-frequency rail, unsourced). Section 4.3.3 sidebar (Canadian materials commitment).

2Prime Minister of Canada, news release, 19 February 2025 (over 51,000 jobs during construction; GDP gain of up to $35 billion annually).

3Transport Canada, news release, 12 December 2025, naming Ottawa–Montréal as the first segment (51,000 jobs during construction; up to $35 billion in GDP).

4HS2 Ltd, Annual Report and Accounts 2022–23 to 2025–26 (capital expenditure and workforce), and six-monthly reports to Parliament, December 2024, July 2025 and May 2026 (jobs supported, supply chain businesses, spend to date, cost range and schedule).

5CDPQ Infra, REM fact sheet and project pages; REM news releases of April 2018, November 2020 and June 2021 (34,000 jobs; over 30,000 direct and indirect jobs; more than 2,000 and then more than 3,000 workers on site).

6California High-Speed Rail Authority, economic impact analyses for FY2023–24 and FY2024–25, and the March 2024 release on construction jobs and daily dispatch.

7US Federal Highway Administration, Employment Impacts of Highway Infrastructure Investment (13,000 job-years per US$1 billion; 64/36 split between direct-and-indirect and induced).

8Exchange rates: Bank of Canada daily rates, 1 September 2026. 1 GBP = C$1.8795; 1 USD = C$1.3896. Per-kilometre cost comparison uses the Initiative’s own ECI/CFI cost model.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative Independent, non-partisan citizen research on the proposed Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor. This page is a plain-language summary of the research paper 50,000 Jobs?, September 2026. The full paper sets out the method, the tables and the complete source list. Nothing on this page is a statement about the motives or conduct of any person or organisation. It is an analysis of published figures and of what those published figures do and do not say.

September 5, 2026

Procured and then

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Brief · September 2026

Procured, and Then?

ALTO commissioned the outside view. Whether it changed anything is the one question the record does not answer.

Independent, non-partisan research · citizenresearch.ca

In Plain Language

The standard fix for over-optimistic infrastructure forecasts is to check them against what comparable projects actually cost and carried, rather than trusting the project’s own bottom-up numbers. That check is called reference-class forecasting, and ALTO commissioned one. It hired the firm founded by the researcher who developed the method.

That is to ALTO’s credit. But commissioning a check and acting on it are different things, and only one document would show which happened: a comparison putting ALTO’s own published figures beside the ones the check produced. The Initiative asked for that record. The response was extended to 18 September 2026, with notice that a third party would be consulted — a step the Act provides for where an institution intends to release records that may contain a supplier’s commercial information.

Meanwhile, in June 2026, ALTO published two studies putting large dollar values on the project’s benefits. Neither sets those benefits against what the line would cost. This brief looks at all three documents and asks what they show about how the project’s numbers are being assembled — and what a single unredacted release would settle.

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Procured, and Then? (PDF)

The full brief, with sources

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Related

HPR Research Report, Chapter 1

The forecasting framework this brief applies, set out in full

Read Chapter 1

01 · The Instrument

ALTO commissioned the outside view

Chapter 1 of the HPR Research Report sets out the method this brief relies on, so it is only summarised here. Large infrastructure forecasts miss in a consistent direction: costs come in high, benefits come in low. The established corrective is to stop treating a project as unique and instead compare it against the recorded outcomes of projects like it. The technique has a name — reference-class forecasting — and a literature behind it.

In 2024 ALTO issued an advance contract award notice, PAS240625-002-00, for reference-class forecasting, should-cost and should-schedule modelling, and a series of Challenge Boards. An advance contract award notice is the instrument used when a department intends to award without competition, on the basis that only one supplier can do the work. The named supplier was Oxford Global Projects, the consultancy founded by Bent Flyvbjerg and Alexander Budzier.

This is worth stating plainly, because it cuts against the easy criticism. ALTO did not ignore the outside view. It went out and procured it, from the people who developed it.

02 · The Question

Buying the instrument is not the same as letting it bind

Reference-class forecasting corrects a forecast only if the number it produces is permitted to move the decision. A should-cost that is commissioned, delivered and then filed next to an unchanged inside-view estimate has not corrected anything. The method’s own literature is explicit that the failure mode is not the absence of the outside view but its subordination — the number produced, and then declined.

So the decisive record is not the existence of the forecast. It is the comparison: does ALTO’s published capital cost reflect its own reference-class should-cost, or diverge from it? One document would answer that — the inside view and the outside view set side by side.

A test, not an accusation

This yields something better than a claim about anyone’s conduct: a prediction that can be checked. If the commissioned reference-class figures are more conservative than the numbers ALTO has published, the outside view was procured but not applied. If they match, the Initiative’s cost critique weakens accordingly.

We do not know which. Nothing in this brief asserts that ALTO set the analysis aside. The point is that the question is answerable, that a single document answers it, and that the document exists.

03 · The Clock

The record will arrive after the decision has moved on

The Initiative requested the reference-class records under access to information — the workbook, the should-cost and should-schedule outputs, and above all any document setting the inside view beside the outside view. Request A-2026-0004 was met in June 2026 with a ninety-day extension carrying the response to 18 September 2026, together with a notice invoking third-party consultation under section 27.

Section 27 consultation is a routine step, and it is worth being precise about which way it points. The section applies where the head of an institution intends to disclose a record that may contain a third party’s commercial information: the notice tells that third party of the intention to release and gives it twenty days to make representations against disclosure, and invoking the section is what permits the response time to be extended. The notice on A-2026-0004 therefore records that Alto has turned its mind to releasing the reference-class records and has given Oxford Global Projects the opportunity to object. It is not a signal that the material will be withheld.

What remains is a question of timing rather than intent. The third party may object and the institution may then withhold some of the figures; equally it may not. What can be said is the sequence: the record capable of testing the decision will arrive after further commitment has been made. What it contains, the disclosure itself will settle.

Why timing decides this

An outside-view check disciplines a decision only while the decision is still open. Once enough money is committed, the arithmetic changes: the cost of stopping is subtracted from the cost of continuing, and a project can show better value for money the more has already been spent on it. Britain’s High Speed Two reached exactly that point — the National Audit Office found in June 2026 that the ratio for completing the programme had risen even as the programme grew more expensive, because the estimated cost of cancelling had more than quadrupled.

The cheapest moment to apply the test is before that crossover, not after it.

04 · The Benefit Case

Two studies, no cost side

In June 2026, two months after the consultation closed, ALTO released two commissioned studies. A computable general equilibrium assessment by Aviseo Consulting reports a national real GDP gain of about $24.4 billion a year. A corridor tourism study by CPCS with HDR adds up to $3.9 billion in GDP and 43,000 jobs.

Neither nets a cost. The macroeconomic study excludes construction and operating expenditure by design; the tourism study has no cost side to exclude. Both are benefit totals unaccompanied by the outlay required to obtain them. Both, to their credit, describe their outputs as illustrative and order-of-magnitude rather than forecasts, and make the largest figures conditional on tourism policy the railway itself does not deliver.

The scenario range has a floor and no ceiling on the downside

Each study is built as a fan of scenarios, from pessimistic to optimistic. In both, the entire fan sits above zero. The macro study reports welfare increasing in every scenario; the tourism study’s weakest case is still $177 million and two thousand jobs. The modelled question is how large the gain is, never whether there is a loss.

Adverse mechanisms are identified but do not reach the total

The tourism study acknowledges that faster trains shorten stays and convert overnight visits into day trips, and shows length of stay falling in several cities. The aggregate rises regardless.

The two studies disagree, and each resolves the disagreement upward

The macro study omits domestic tourism on the ground that it is largely substitution from other household spending, with little net effect on national output. The tourism study builds most of its $33.7-billion base, and most of its headline uplift, from precisely that in-corridor domestic travel — counted through gross multipliers that assume no such displacement. The two treatments diverge, and in each case the treatment adopted is the one that yields the larger figure for that study.

The studies import the literature’s upside but not its realisation record

Both studies draw their benefit magnitudes from the international high-speed rail literature — the same comparison set the Initiative uses. What they import is the size of the upside. What they do not import is that literature’s record on realisation: rail benefits arriving at about two-thirds of forecast, and passenger numbers overstated by roughly a hundred per cent.

Each of the four observations above is a description of what the documents contain. Taken together they describe a benefit case in which every point of divergence has resolved in the same direction — which is the pattern the forecasting literature says to look for, and the reason an independent outside-view comparison matters more, not less, once numbers of this size are in circulation. The same two studies are examined in detail in the Initiative’s briefs Two Point Two Trillion and At Face Value.

05 · The Ask

Publish the comparison

The Initiative’s recommendation is narrow and does not require anyone to accept a word of its own analysis.

01
Release the comparison in full. ALTO should publish its reference-class should-cost and should-schedule outputs alongside its published capital cost and benefit-cost figures, unredacted. The outside view was commissioned to be seen, not filed.

02
Publish the benefit studies against a cost. A $24.4-billion annual benefit figure is not interpretable without the outlay required to obtain it. The two June 2026 studies should be accompanied by an appraisal that nets one against the other.

03
Apply the test before further commitment. The window in which an outside-view check can still change a decision is open now. It narrows with every disbursement.

It requires one document to be made public. The framework behind the request is set out in full in Chapter 1 of the HPR Research Report; what ought to be built instead is the subject of the chapters that follow it.

How to read this brief

Every figure attributed to Alto, Aviseo, CPCS, the National Audit Office or a published paper is quoted from the source listed below and can be checked there. Nothing else here is a calculation of ours: the argument rests on what the documents contain and on the sequence of dates, not on a competing estimate.

Where a record has not been released, this brief says so rather than inferring its contents, and makes no claim about why any extension was taken or any figure was or was not published. The prediction in section 02 is stated in both directions and will be settled by the disclosure, not by us.

Sources

Documents relied on

1
Alto (VIA HFR – VIA TGF Inc.). Advance Contract Award Notice PAS240625-002-00 — project management and control expertise; pre-identified supplier Oxford Global Projects UK Limited. 2024.

2
Alto (VIA HFR – VIA TGF Inc.). Notice of extension, Access to Information request A-2026-0004. June 2026. On file with the Initiative.

3
Aviseo Consulting. An Overview of the Structural Economic Impacts of Alto: Computable General Equilibrium Modelling Approach to Assessing High-Speed Rail in the Toronto–Québec City Corridor. Prepared for Alto. June 2026.

4
CPCS, in association with HDR. Tourism in the Alto Corridor: Current Conditions and Potential Impacts. Prepared for Alto. June 2026.

5
National Audit Office. High Speed Two reset. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Session 2026-27, HC 52. London: National Audit Office, June 2026.

6
Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Quality Control and Due Diligence in Project Management: Getting Decisions Right by Taking the Outside View.” International Journal of Project Management 31, no. 5 (2013): 760–774.

7
Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Top-Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An Overview.” Project Management Journal 52, no. 6 (2021): 531–546.

Coalition for Better Rail · ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · citizenresearch.ca · Brief · September 2026
Independent, non-partisan research on Canada’s proposed Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor.

September 2, 2026

Hours are not dollars

Hours Are Not Dollars

Almost none of ALTO’s $49.5 billion is money. It is time — and a saved hour cannot service a loan. Here is what that figure actually is, how it was built, and why it says nothing about who pays for the railway.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Economics Explainer · August 2026 · Companion to the audit It Left the Rules Behind

⚠ Where the Number Sits

In August 2026 ALTO published Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, reporting $49.5 billion in benefits against a construction cost of $60 to $90 billion. Those benefits are not money in a bank account. They are mostly hours — time that travellers would have spent on the road or at an airport — stretched over sixty years and converted into today’s dollars.1

The tool that does the converting is called a discount rate. ALTO uses 3.5 per cent a year. Change that one number and the headline changes by tens of billions, without a single train or passenger changing.

In One Paragraph

The $49.5 billion is a measure of worth, not of funds. The tool that produces it, a discount rate, answers the question is this worth doing? It does not answer the question who pays, and how? Those are separate ledgers, and ALTO’s report is detailed on the first and thin on the second. This explainer sets out what the rate does, shows the arithmetic openly, and then follows the money to the place the appraisal never goes: the difference between what it costs the government to borrow and what a private partner needs to earn.

One finding runs against the grain and is stated here first. Two of the adjustments ALTO leaves out would have made its benefit figure larger, not smaller. The problem is not that the number is tilted. The problem is that a reader is given one number, no range, and no way to know that any of these choices were made.

Start Here

What a discount rate is, in ordinary words

Ask yourself a simple question. Would you rather have $100 today, or $100 in forty years? Almost everyone takes it today. The money is useful now, the future is uncertain, and by 2066 we will probably all be somewhat better off anyway, so $100 will matter a little less to us then than it does now.

Economists turn that instinct into a percentage. A discount rate shrinks future amounts back to what they are worth to us today, by a fixed amount each year. At 3.5 per cent, a benefit arriving sixty years from now counts for about 13 cents on the dollar. At 8 per cent, the same benefit counts for about one cent.

That is the whole mechanism. It sounds technical and it is arithmetically simple. But it matters enormously for a railway, because of when the money and the benefits arrive.

13¢

what a dollar of benefit in year 60 is worth today at ALTO’s 3.5 per cent

23¢

the same dollar at 2.5 per cent, the rate ALTO’s own cited manual requires be tested

1¢

the same dollar at 8 per cent, the rate identified in 2007 Treasury Board guidance

The timing is what makes this decisive. Construction money is spent early — from 2029 through the early 2040s — so it is barely shrunk at all. The benefits arrive later and keep arriving for sixty years, so they are shrunk heavily. Anything that changes the rate therefore hits the benefit side hard and the cost side hardly at all. A project’s whole case can move from comfortable to marginal without anything physical changing.

The Arithmetic, Shown Openly

How much the answer moves

The table below is the Initiative’s own arithmetic, not a re-run of ALTO’s model. It takes a steady stream of benefits running for sixty years, beginning fifteen years from now, and asks what that stream is worth in today’s dollars at different rates. The last column simply scales ALTO’s published $49.5 billion by the same proportion, to show the size of the swing.

Discount rate used	Value of the stream	Relative to 3.5%	$49.5B scaled
2.5 per cent	21.34	1.43×	$71.0B
3.0 per cent	17.76	1.19×	$59.1B
3.5 per cent — ALTO’s rate	14.89	1.00×	$49.5B
UK declining schedule	15.61	1.05×	$51.9B
5 per cent	9.11	0.61×	$30.3B
7 per cent	5.09	0.34×	$16.9B
8 per cent	3.90	0.26×	$13.0B

Assumptions, stated so the arithmetic can be checked: a level benefit stream of one dollar per year, sixty years of operation beginning in year 16, discounted back to a year-zero base. ALTO’s real benefit stream ramps up rather than running level, so the exact figures would differ; the proportions are what matter here. The scaled column is illustrative and is not ALTO’s number at those rates.

Read the middle rows first. At 8 per cent, the same railway carrying the same passengers saving the same hours produces a benefit figure roughly a quarter the size. At 2.5 per cent it produces one roughly forty per cent larger. Nothing about the trains changed. Only the parameter changed.

This is why appraisal manuals require the calculation to be repeated at more than one rate and the results published as a range. It is not a bureaucratic formality. It is the only way a reader can tell whether a case is robust or whether it depends on a parameter choice.

Where 3.5 Per Cent Comes From

A number with a family tree

ALTO’s report attributes its rate to one source: the Business Case Manual Volume 2: Guidance, published by Metrolinx, the Government of Ontario’s transit agency for the Toronto and Hamilton region.2 That manual sets a social discount rate of 3.5 per cent, alongside an evaluation period of five to sixty years.

The 3.5 per cent figure is not original to Metrolinx. It is the rate used by HM Treasury in the United Kingdom, and the Treasury publishes exactly how it was assembled. Three judgements are added together:

0.5 per cent for simple impatience. People prefer good things sooner. Half a percentage point is the allowance for that.

1.0 per cent for the risk that the future does not arrive as expected. Wars, pandemics, collapses. A benefit promised in 2080 might never materialise, so it is discounted a little further.

2.0 per cent because people in the future will be richer. If incomes rise about 2 per cent a year, our grandchildren will be considerably better off than we are, and an extra dollar will matter less to them than it does to us. This is the largest of the three, and the most contestable.

Those three add to 3.5.3

Notice what the rate is not. It is not a market price, an interest rate, or anything anyone can look up. It is a set of judgements about how much weight to give people who are not yet born — and every one of the three is disputed by serious people. That is not a criticism of the figure. It is the reason a serious appraisal shows what happens when the figure moves.

The detail that cuts in ALTO’s favour

HM Treasury does not apply 3.5 per cent forever. The rate steps down to 3.0 per cent for years 31 to 75, and 2.5 per cent thereafter,3 and the Treasury’s supplementary guidance instructs practitioners in the same terms: the standard 3.5 per cent for years 1 to 30, and 3.0 per cent for years 31 to 75.4 The reason is uncertainty: the further out you look, the less confident anyone can be in the parameters, and the lower the rate should be.

ALTO discounts a sixty-year stream at a flat 3.5 per cent throughout. Applying the stepped-down schedule instead would have made ALTO’s benefit total about five per cent larger, as the fourth row of the table above shows. This is a conservatism in ALTO’s favour, and it should be credited as one. It is recorded here because a reader assessing where a federal appraisal input came from deserves the whole picture, including the parts that do not fit a critical narrative.

The Canadian Comparison

What the federal government uses, and the gap where a manual should be

Canada has approached the same question from the opposite end, and it is worth understanding the difference, because it produces a far higher number.

The British method asks a question about values: how much should we care about the future? The Canadian method asks a question about alternatives: what else could this money have done? If public money invested elsewhere in the economy would have earned, say, 8 per cent, then a project has to clear that bar to be worth funding — otherwise the country was better off doing the other thing. That is what economists mean by the opportunity cost of capital.

Neither question is wrong. They are simply different questions, and the second one produces a much tougher test than the first.

The Treasury Board’s 2007 guidance identified 8 per cent as the appropriate rate, with sensitivity tests at 3 and 10 per cent, on that opportunity-cost basis.5 The current federal Policy on Cost-Benefit Analysis still directs departments to use the opportunity cost of capital as the discount rate, permitting a social rate only in defined cases — including where impacts run fifty years or more — and requiring that even when a social rate is used, results using the opportunity cost of capital must also be reported.6

Two honest qualifications belong here, and neither is small. First, that federal policy governs regulations, not capital projects, so it does not bind ALTO. Second, the current edition of the Treasury Board guide is no longer published on canada.ca and is available only through an internal government wiki page,7 so the Initiative has not been able to verify the figure it now specifies.

And the federal manual for transport projects specifically? Transport Canada’s guide to benefit-cost analysis dates from 1994.8 Thirty-two years later, there is no current, public federal appraisal manual for a project of this kind. That absence is very likely why a national railway is being appraised using a provincial transit agency’s parameters — and it is a finding about the machinery of government rather than about ALTO.

Even the academic case for 3.5 per cent has conditions

The most cited Canadian argument for a 3.5 per cent rate comes from the economists Boardman, Moore and Vining, who reject the 8 per cent approach. So there is a respectable Canadian case for ALTO’s rate. But it is a conditional case, and the conditions are specific.

Condition one: the project runs under fifty years. Beyond that, they recommend a rate that steps down over time, for the same reason the UK Treasury does — nobody can see that far ahead with confidence.

Condition two: the project must not pull money away from private investment. The money for a public project comes from taxes or borrowing, and it would otherwise have been used by someone else. Some of it would have been spent, and some would have been invested — a business expansion, new equipment, a factory. Those two are not equivalent. A dollar diverted from someone’s spending costs the economy that one dollar. A dollar diverted from investment costs more, because that investment would have gone on producing returns for years afterwards.

And if the project does pull money from investment, there is a fix. Rather than argue about the rate all over again, you take the portion of the cost that displaced private investment and mark it up by 26 per cent before putting it in the calculation — because that is roughly what the lost investment was worth to the economy over time. Economists call the 1.26 multiplier a shadow price of capital. It is simply a way of using a generous discount rate honestly, instead of using it to pretend the money was free.5

ALTO’s appraisal period is sixty years, which fails the first condition outright. Whether a $60 to $90 billion draw on Canadian capital displaces private investment is a real question, not a technicality — and the mark-up would apply only to the share that does, not to the whole sum. Neither condition is mentioned in the report.

The pattern is the one the companion audit It Left the Rules Behind describes: a number travels, and the conditions attached to it stay behind.

The Precedent

The last time anyone published these numbers for this corridor

ALTO’s stated reason for publishing no benefit-cost ratio is that the cost estimate is not yet mature enough to support one. It is worth knowing that a predecessor project on the same corridor did publish one, at a comparable stage, and published the funding ledger alongside it.

In December 2021 the Joint Project Office — a body formed by VIA Rail and the Canada Infrastructure Bank — completed a Business Case Update for High Frequency Rail, the slower, cheaper predecessor to ALTO between Toronto and Québec City. It was released through access to information by the Canada Infrastructure Bank in November 2025.16

What the 2021 business case published	Figure
Capital cost, with electrification (2020 prices)	$27.71B
Projected revenue over 30 years (2019 prices)	$33.7B
Operations, maintenance and rehabilitation, 30 years	$32.5B
Net present value over 30 years	−$21.1B
Benefit-cost ratio	~0.13
Expanded benefit-cost ratio	~0.4
Public subsidy over 30 years, by delivery model	$37.1B to $42.2B

Source: Joint Project Office, High Frequency Rail Business Case Update V.002, 10 December 2021. Ratios at Table 14, page 43; capital, revenue, lifecycle and net present value figures in the executive summary, pages 7 and 8; subsidy comparison at Table 4, page 8.

A benefit-cost ratio of 0.13 means about thirteen cents of measured benefit for every dollar of cost. The wider figure of 0.4 is what the same table calls an expanded ratio, and the difference between the two is worth understanding, because it is the larger of the two numbers.

The expansion adds two items. One is agglomeration — the economic gain from businesses being better connected — worth $0.3 to $0.9 billion. The other, worth $5.6 to $7.6 billion, is a resource correction: the fares new passengers would pay, counted as a benefit because they arrive as revenue for the operator. That single item is larger than the journey time savings and all the external benefits put together. The business case itself notes that both are relatively new to Canadian economic appraisal, which is why it reports the ratio with and without them.

The same two sources, five years apart

The 2021 economic case states where its parameters came from: the social discount rate, the value of time and the value of external impacts were taken from a combination of Metrolinx and Ministère des Transports du Québec guidance. Those are the same two sources ALTO cites in 2026.

So the identical parameter lineage, applied to a $27.71 billion version of this corridor, produced a published ratio of 0.13. Five years later, on a project costing two to three times as much, the same two sources are cited and no ratio is published at all.

And it kept the two ledgers apart

The 2021 document also shows how the distinction this page has been drawing is meant to work in practice. Its net present value calculation used a discount rate of 2.5 per cent, sourced explicitly to the ten-year average of the 30-year Government of Canada benchmark bond — a financing rate, taken from what the government actually pays to borrow. Its economic case used the social parameters from Metrolinx and MTQ. Two questions, two rates, both disclosed, in a single document.

Three cautions, stated plainly. High Frequency Rail is not ALTO: different technology, different speed, a $27.71 billion cost rather than $60 to $90 billion, and a thirty-year evaluation rather than sixty. The JPO described its own results as preliminary. And none of these figures transfer to ALTO by arithmetic. What the document establishes is narrower and harder to set aside: a benefit-cost ratio can be produced for a project on this corridor at this stage of development, because one was.

One further point belongs on the record. The identical document was also released under a separate access request, and in that version the whole net present value section, the capital cost figure, the revenue figure and both ratios were blacked out — along with the subsection titles of the Economic Case within the table of contents, and the construction employment figure in the executive summary. No exemption provision is marked against any of it.17 Same document, same date, two releases, opposite outcomes.

Following the Money

Three different rates, and only one of them is in the report

Here is the heart of it. People use the phrase “the discount rate” for three quite different things, and conflating them is how an appraisal result gets mistaken for a financing plan.

1. The appraisal rate — 3.5 per cent

Used to decide whether a project is worth doing. No money moves because of it. It turns hours saved and collisions avoided into a single present-day figure so they can be compared with the cost. Nobody charges it, nobody pays it, and no bank uses it.

2. What it costs the government to borrow

Real money, actually paid. When the federal government borrows for thirty years it has been paying in the region of 3.7 to 3.9 per cent during 2026. Take off inflation, which the Bank of Canada aims to hold at 2 per cent, and the true cost of the money is roughly two per cent a year.9 If the state simply builds the railway and holds it, this is what the borrowing actually costs, and it is lower than the appraisal rate.

3. What a private partner needs to earn

Considerably more. If a pension fund or infrastructure investor builds the railway, it is putting its own money at risk — the risk that construction costs more than planned, or that too few people ride. It requires a return for carrying that risk, and that return is paid out every year for decades. This is the rate that decides what the public actually hands over, and it appears nowhere in ALTO’s economic report.

The gap between the second and the third is the entire public-private question. If the government borrows at 2 per cent and builds the railway itself, that is what the money costs. If a private partner builds it instead and needs 8 per cent, someone has to make up the difference — every year, for as long as the arrangement lasts. That someone is the public.

So a project can pass the 3.5 per cent test comfortably and still require very large annual public payments to get built. The appraisal will go on saying “worth doing.” It will never say who writes the cheque, for how long, or at what return.

Why the $49.5 billion cannot pay for anything

This is the point most easily missed, and it is not a technicality. Nearly all of ALTO’s benefit figure is not cash. It is hours of travel time, collisions that did not happen, tonnes of emissions avoided. These are real and they matter. But a saved hour cannot service a loan, meet a payroll, or renew a worn rail.

The money that actually funds a railway comes from two places only: fares, and government payments. ALTO’s report handles that second ledger in a few pages, supported chiefly by the operating margins of three foreign railways, and it publishes no fare, no revenue figure and no farebox recovery ratio. So the document is expansive about whether the project is worth doing and close to silent about how it would be paid for.

A Canadian Example, Fully Documented

How the Montréal REM is actually funded

The Réseau express métropolitain is a 67-kilometre automated light metro in Greater Montréal, built, owned and operated by CDPQ Infra, a subsidiary of the Québec pension fund manager. It is the clearest Canadian illustration of what the third rate looks like once it becomes money, and its terms are public.10

Who put up the capital

CDPQ Infra $2.95B; the Government of Québec $1.283B; the Government of Canada $1.283B; Hydro-Québec $295M; the regional transit authority $512M. The construction estimate rose from $6.3 billion in 2018 to $7.95 billion by 2023, an increase CDPQ Infra absorbed under its agreement.11

How the money returns

Not through fares. The regional transit authority pays CDPQ Infra 72 cents for every kilometre every passenger travels, indexed annually to the Consumer Price Index. That single rate covers construction, operation and long-term maintenance.12

If ridership beats forecast

The rate steps down. CDPQ Infra has described trips beyond 15 per cent above forecast being paid at roughly 57 cents, and trips beyond 40 per cent above forecast at the user fare itself.13

The two return targets

8 to 9 per cent for CDPQ Infra. 3.7 per cent for the governments. Both were set at the outset and publicly reaffirmed during construction.14

That pair of numbers is the whole point of this section, made concrete. The same railway, the same track, the same passengers — and two participants requiring returns that differ by more than double. The difference is not a rounding error in an appraisal. It is paid out, in cash, on every passenger-kilometre, for as long as the agreement runs.

Why this case and not another. The REM is not an analogy picked at random. CDPQ Infra leads Cadence, the consortium selected in February 2025 as ALTO’s private development partner. AtkinsRéalis — formerly SNC-Lavalin, a member of the group that built the REM and, with Alstom, of the group that supplies and operates its trains — is also a Cadence member. The other Cadence members are SYSTRA Canada, Keolis Canada, SNCF Voyageurs and Air Canada.18 The REM is the lead sponsor’s own model, which CDPQ Infra presents publicly as an innovative approach to delivering public infrastructure. That is what makes it the most informative available guide to how a private partner’s return might be priced here.

An important caution. ALTO is nonetheless not the REM, and this is not a prediction. Canada is to retain permanent ownership of the ALTO network, which was never the REM arrangement; the project is in a co-development phase running to 2029; and no payment mechanism has been disclosed. Cadence is a different group with different members and a different contract. The REM is offered as the one Canadian case where the arithmetic of a private partner’s return has been made public — which is exactly what has not yet happened for a project several times its size.

Notice what a payment mechanism does with risk. Because CDPQ Infra is paid per passenger-kilometre, a shortfall in riders is a shortfall in its own revenue — the investor carries the demand risk. Under a different structure, where the public pays for the railway simply being available, a shortfall in riders changes nothing the partner receives and everything the public pays.

Same railway, same disappointing ridership, opposite consequences. Which of those applies to ALTO has not been published.

Limits of This Explainer

What this does not claim

On the rate

3.5 per cent is not wrongIt is a mainstream, well-supported choice for long-lived public investment. This explainer does not argue that ALTO’s rate is too low.

Two omissions favour ALTOBoth the stepped-down schedule and the sensitivity test its cited manual requires would have produced a larger benefit figure. The omissions do not all run one way.

The arithmetic is illustrativeThe table uses a level benefit stream and a stated start year. It shows the shape of the sensitivity, not a recalculation of ALTO’s result.

The 2021 ratios are not ALTO’sHigh Frequency Rail was a different and cheaper project assessed over thirty years, and its authors called the results preliminary. Those figures are cited as evidence that a ratio can be produced at this stage, not as an estimate of ALTO’s.

On the comparisons

Nothing here binds ALTOMetrolinx guidance, UK Treasury practice and federal regulatory policy carry no legal force over this project. They are offered as points of comparison, one of which ALTO chose to cite itself.

The federal figure is unverifiedThe 8 per cent rate is documented from 2007 guidance through peer-reviewed sources. The current edition of that guide is not publicly posted, and the Initiative does not assert what it now specifies.

We do not say whyWhere the report does not state something — a fare, a payment mechanism, a sensitivity test, a range — this page says so rather than inferring it, and makes no claim about why any figure was or was not published, or about the intentions of anyone who prepared it.

This is a public report, not a business caseA submission to Cabinet in 2029 may contain material this document does not. What is examined here is what has been placed in public.

What Would Settle It

Two questions, answerable without releasing a model

1. Who absorbs it if the passengers do not come?

Not a forecasting question but a contract question. If a partner is paid per passenger, a shortfall reduces its return. If it is paid for availability, a shortfall costs the partner nothing and the public a great deal. Identical ridership, opposite outcomes — and ALTO has published neither the mechanism nor the cost of capital behind it.

2. What fare, and what revenue?

No fare level, average yield or farebox recovery ratio appears in eighty-three pages. Without one, the funding question cannot be examined by anyone outside the project.

Neither requires access to ALTO’s models, cooperation from its staff, or agreement about what the correct discount rate for a national railway ought to be. Both are answerable from work already done.

A third question — whether the calculation was ever run at any rate other than 3.5 per cent — belongs to the companion audit It Left the Rules Behind, which sets out the full list of tests the cited manual requires at this project’s scale and which of them appear in the report.

Sources

Primary documents

ALTO, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026, 83 pp. Discount rate, sixty-year appraisal period and price base in the Appendix A methodology box, sourced at footnote 65 to the Metrolinx manual; capital cost and AACE Class 5 estimate at pp. 5 and 65; direct-benefit tables headed “upper estimate”. Analysed in full in the Initiative’s companion brief Two Parameters, None of the Conditions, summarised at It Left the Rules Behind.

Metrolinx, Business Case Manual Volume 2: Guidance, August 2021, 222 pp. Economic parameters at Table 5.8: social discount rate 3.5 per cent, evaluation period five to sixty years, single blended value of time. Verified as the current edition, 21 August 2026. metrolinx.com

HM Treasury, Review of discounting in the Green Book: Terms of Reference, 16 December 2025. Sets out the derivation of the 3.5 per cent Social Time Preference Rate. The Treasury specifies four parameters — pure time preference, catastrophe risk, the elasticity of marginal utility and the growth rate — the last two of which multiply to the 2.0 per cent component described above as a single judgement. and the declining schedule of 3.0 per cent for years 31 to 75 and 2.5 per cent thereafter. gov.uk

HM Treasury, Green Book supplementary guidance: discounting, updated 5 February 2026. Instructs practitioners to use 3.5 per cent for years 1 to 30 and 3.0 per cent for years 31 to 75. gov.uk (PDF)

A. E. Boardman and M. A. Moore, “The Social Discount Rate for Canada Based on Future Growth in Consumption,” Canadian Public Policy, vol. 36 no. 3 (2010), pp. 325 onward. Records the Treasury Board Secretariat’s 2007 interim recommendation of an 8 per cent social discount rate with sensitivity rates of 3 and 10 per cent on a weighted social opportunity cost of capital basis; argues instead for 3.5 per cent, conditional on a horizon under fifty years and no crowding out of private investment, with a shadow price of capital of 1.26 applied to investment flows, and a declining schedule beyond fifty years. Canadian Public Policy

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Policy on Cost-Benefit Analysis, in force since 1 September 2018. Requires departments to use the opportunity cost of capital specified in the TBS guide, with a social discount rate permitted in defined cases including impacts of fifty years or more, and requires opportunity-cost results to be reported in any event. canada.ca

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Requirements for developing, managing and reviewing regulations,” canada.ca, page updated 26 November 2025, accessed 21 August 2026. States that the most current version of Canada’s Cost-Benefit Analysis Guide for Regulatory Proposals is available exclusively on the Cabinet Directive on Regulation GCwiki page. The 2022 edition remains catalogued in Government of Canada Publications as an archived document. canada.ca

Transport Canada, Economic Evaluation Branch, Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis in Transport Canada, Ottawa, 1994. Catalogued in the Transport Research International Documentation database. TRID

Bank of Canada, selected benchmark bond yields, accessed August 2026; Bank of Canada policy interest rate held at 2.25 per cent through mid-2026 against a 2 per cent inflation target. Long-bond yields move daily and should be checked against the source rather than quoted from this page. bankofcanada.ca

10.

Réseau express métropolitain, “Information about the agreement with the ARTM and its rate mechanisms.” Sets out the 72-cent per passenger-kilometre invoice to the regional transit authority, the reduction once ridership projections are exceeded, and the turnkey scope covering construction, operation and long-term maintenance. rem.info

11.

Capital structure as reported on award of the construction contracts: CDPQ Infra $2.95B, Government of Québec $1.283B, Government of Canada $1.283B, Hydro-Québec $295M, ARTM $512M, against a construction cost of $6.3B. The estimate was revised to $7.95B in September 2023, with CDPQ Infra absorbing the increase under its agreement with the Québec government. International Railway Journal

12.

Gouvernement du Québec, ARTM and CDPQ Infra, “Release of the management and implementation agreement and of the integration agreement for the Réseau express métropolitain,” 23 April 2018. Confirms the $0.72 per passenger-km base cost and annual indexation to Canada’s Consumer Price Index, and the cap limiting additional municipal costs to roughly $45 to $60 million a year in then-current dollars. quebec.ca

13.

CDPQ Infra, “7 myths about the REM de l’Est,” February 2022. Describes the ridership relief mechanism: the rate falls by about 20 per cent, to roughly $0.57, for trips above 15 per cent over forecast, and equals the user fare for trips above 40 per cent over forecast. Published in the context of a later project; the mechanism described is the REM’s. cdpqinfra.com

14.

Réseau express métropolitain, semi-annual project update, 3 June 2021. Reaffirms the 72-cent rate set in the 2018 agreement and states the performance targets: 8 to 9 per cent for CDPQ Infra and 3.7 per cent for the government partners. rem.info

15.

Discounting arithmetic in this explainer computed by the Initiative on the stated assumptions: a level annual benefit stream, sixty years of operation beginning in year 16, discounted to a year-zero base; the declining-schedule row applies 3.5 per cent to years 1 to 30, 3.0 per cent to years 31 to 75, per source 3.

16.

Joint Project Office (VIA Rail Canada and the Canada Infrastructure Bank), High Frequency Rail Project: Business Case Update, V.002, 10 December 2021, 150 pp., released by the Canada Infrastructure Bank under the Access to Information Act, November 2025. Capital cost breakdown and 30-year revenue at p. 7; benefit-cost ratio, net present value and the Table 4 subsidy comparison at p. 8; economic appraisal parameters sourced to Metrolinx and MTQ guidance at p. 40; incremental capex and opex at Table 9; other impacts at Table 12; impact results and both ratios at Table 14, p. 43; net present value assumptions, including the 2.5 per cent discount rate sourced to the ten-year average 30-year Government of Canada benchmark bond, at Figure 38, p. 85.

17.

The same document released as Annexe A to access request 22-2207 (148 pp., stamped Demande d’accès à l’information #22-2207 AI(D)). In that version, section 9.7 Net Present Value Analysis survives as a heading at p. 84 with pp. 84–86 otherwise blank; section 9.8 Financial Structuring at p. 87 is withheld in full; the capital cost and 30-year revenue sentences are truncated mid-clause at p. 21, leaving the grammar intact around the removed figures; and the subsection headings of section 7 Economic Case are withheld within the table of contents, together with the title of section 8 and all of its subsections, which appear as bare dot leaders against pp. 40–43 and 44–63. The construction employment sentence at p. 21 is severed in the same way: “an estimated ___ annual equivalent jobs could be created.” That figure — 71,000 to 96,000 annual equivalent — is disclosed in full in the Canada Infrastructure Bank release at note 16. No exemption provisions are marked against any of the severed passages. Both versions held by the Initiative.

18.

Cadence consortium membership and CDPQ Infra’s leadership role: Cadence, “About us,” and CDPQ Infra, “Alto high-speed rail,” both accessed August 2026; consortium announced as preferred private development partner 19 February 2025, co-development agreement signed March 2025. AtkinsRéalis (formerly SNC-Lavalin) was a member of NouvLR, which held the REM engineering, procurement and construction contract, and of the group now operating as Pulsar with Alstom under the rolling stock, systems, operations and maintenance contract. cadence.info

August 21, 2026

It left the rules behind

ALTO Used the Rulebook’s Numbers. It Left the Rules Behind.

ALTO’s new economic report takes two key figures from an Ontario appraisal manual and names that manual as its source. The manual attaches conditions to those figures. The report uses the figures and leaves the conditions out.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Economics Brief · Published August 2026 · Plain-language version of the research brief Two Parameters, None of the Conditions · Companion explainer: Hours Are Not Dollars

⚠ The Document Under Examination

In August 2026 ALTO published Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, an 83-page report setting out the economic case for the Toronto–Québec City high-speed rail corridor. Its central figure is $49.5 billion in benefits to travellers and society, set against a construction cost of $60 to $90 billion.

To turn sixty years of future benefits into one number in today’s dollars, the report needs two things: a rate at which to shrink future benefits back to present value, and a price for an hour of a traveller’s time. For both, it names one source — a public appraisal manual published by Metrolinx, the Government of Ontario’s transit agency for the Toronto and Hamilton region.

Critical Finding

The Metrolinx manual does not simply publish those two numbers. It publishes them as part of a package. For any project over $500 million, the same manual requires that the numbers be re-tested at different values, that results be reported as a range rather than a single figure, that early-stage construction costs be topped up to correct for known optimism, and that the project’s benefit-to-cost ratio be published. ALTO’s project is roughly a hundred times larger than that threshold.

None of those requirements appears in ALTO’s report. There is no test of the discount rate, no range around the $49.5 billion, no optimism adjustment to the cost, and no benefit-cost ratio. The two numbers were carried across. The conditions attached to them were not.

This brief does not argue that ALTO used the wrong discount rate. The rate it used is a mainstream, defensible choice. The finding is narrower and, we think, harder to answer: the report presents a set of choices as though they were simply facts, and a reader has no way of knowing that anything was chosen at all.

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Two Parameters, None of the Conditions — Full Brief (PDF)

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Why this matters

Imagine a builder quotes you a price for an extension. Asked where the figures come from, they name the standard industry pricing guide. That guide does set those rates. It also says that on a job this size the quote must show a high and a low figure rather than a single number, must add a fixed percentage on top because early quotes are almost always too low, and must set the total against the value of what you are getting.

The builder uses the guide’s rates and does none of the rest. The quote may well be sound. You have no way of telling — and nothing on the page tells you that anything was left out.

That is the situation this brief describes. ALTO’s economic report takes two figures from a public appraisal manual and names that manual as its source. The same manual attaches a set of mandatory checks to those figures for projects of this size. The figures were used. The checks are absent, and their absence is not disclosed.

It matters because of what rests on the result. The $49.5 billion benefit figure is the number now appearing in news coverage and public statements as the reason to build a railway costing $60 to $90 billion of public money, ahead of a federal decision in 2029. Presented as a single figure with no range, it reads as something measured. The report’s own tables call it an upper estimate.

What the report gives you

One benefit figure, $49.5 billion, built on a rate and an hourly value of time presented without explanation of where they came from or what else was possible. No range. No benefit-to-cost ratio.

What its own cited source requires

The same figures re-tested at different values, results published as a range with a confidence level, a 64 per cent top-up on early-stage construction costs, and the benefit-to-cost ratio reported.

What that leaves a reader with

No way to judge how firm the headline number is — and no indication in the document that this is a question worth asking.

One thing this brief does not do: argue that the numbers ALTO chose are wrong, or that high-speed rail is a bad idea. The rate it used is a mainstream choice, and the one test the manual requires would, if anything, make the benefits look larger. The ask is simply that the tests be run and published, as the cited manual says they must be.

The Two Numbers

What the report borrowed, and from where

3.5%

the discount rate ALTO uses, taken from the Metrolinx manual

Appendix A, footnote 65

$22.32

the value of one hour of a traveller’s time, the same figure for every trip

justified as following Metrolinx method

64%

the top-up the same manual requires on construction costs at this stage of design

not applied in the report

The discount rate. A benefit that arrives in 2085 is not worth as much to us today as the same benefit next year. Economists handle this by shrinking future amounts back to a present-day value at a fixed annual percentage — the discount rate. ALTO uses 3.5 per cent a year, applied over a sixty-year period. The rate matters enormously: over sixty years, small changes to it move the headline benefit figure by billions.

The value of time. Most of the $49.5 billion is not cash. It is hours — time that travellers would otherwise have spent on the road or waiting at an airport. To put a dollar figure on those hours, you have to decide what an hour is worth. ALTO uses $22.32, and applies the same figure to every trip: business or holiday, commuter or tourist. The report tells us its own ridership model did separate business from non-business travel, and that this distinction was set aside in favour of one blended figure.

Where both come from. The footnote attached to the discount rate cites one document and one only: the Business Case Manual Volume 2: Guidance, published by Metrolinx in August 2021. The single blended value of time is defended on the grounds that it follows Metrolinx method. So a manual written for regional transit projects in the Toronto and Hamilton area is the published authority for how a national intercity railway has been appraised.

Metrolinx guidance is not binding on a federal Crown corporation, and nothing here suggests otherwise. But a citation carries the terms of the thing cited. If you name a manual as your authority, it is fair to look at what else that manual says on the same page.

The Manual’s Own Terms

The numbers come as a set, not a menu

The 3.5 per cent rate appears in a table of standard parameters. The text introducing that table is direct about their status: any departure from them has to be explicitly agreed during the work, with a clear justification recorded. It is a list of defaults you may leave, provided you say so. Below is how each of those defaults is treated in ALTO’s report.

What the Metrolinx manual specifies	What ALTO’s report does
Discount rate: 3.5 per cent. The rate at which future benefits are shrunk to present value.	3.5 per cent. Adopted exactly as specified, and correctly footnoted to the manual.
Status:Carried across
Value of time: one blended figure. A single hourly value across all modes and all trip purposes, rather than separate values for business and leisure travel.	One blended figure, $22.32. Adopted, and expressly justified by reference to the manual — in preference to the business and non-business split that ALTO’s own ridership model had already produced.
Status:Carried across
Growth cap: stop escalating benefits 30 years out. The manual caps growth in the inputs thirty years after the base year, expressly to reflect the fact that nobody can see that far ahead. User benefits are named as covered by the cap.	Applied to two small lines, not the big one. Accident rates are capped after twenty years, and vehicle emission factors run to 2050. No cap is stated on travel-time benefits — which are 78 per cent of the total.
Status:Applied selectively
One price year throughout. All values discounted and escalated to a single common year, fixed at the start of the study, so that every figure in the document is in the same money.	Two price years in one report. The appraisal and the capital cost are in 2024 dollars; the economy-wide GDP result is in 2019 dollars.
Status:Not consistent
Test the value of time at 0.75 per cent real growth. The manual’s base case assumes the value of an hour does not rise in real terms — but pairs that assumption with a required test of what happens if it does.	Zero growth assumed; no test run. The assumption was carried across. The test that the manual attaches to the assumption was not.
Status:Left behind

One footnote on the money. Adjusting the manual’s 2021 value of time for inflation to 2024 gives roughly $21.40 — within a few per cent of ALTO’s $22.32. We are not claiming ALTO derived its figure that way, and ALTO does not say how it did. The point is simply that the figure sits where you would expect a Metrolinx-derived figure to sit, which makes the omission of the accompanying test harder to explain as an oversight.

The Missing Tests

What a project this size is supposed to publish

The Metrolinx manual scales its requirements to the size of the project. Anything above $500 million is treated as large scale, and a specific list of tests and disclosures becomes mandatory. ALTO’s cost estimate is $60 to $90 billion — roughly a hundred times that threshold. Here is that list, and where each item stands in ALTO’s report.

Re-run the numbers at a different discount rate

The manual requires the calculation be repeated at 2.5 per cent so the reader can see how sensitive the answer is to the rate. Not done, and not mentioned. Note the direction here: the required test is at a lower rate, which would make the benefits look larger. Nothing in the manual supports an argument that ALTO’s rate is too generous. What it supports is the narrower point that the manual’s author expects the rate to be tested and the test to be shown.

Re-run the numbers with a rising value of time

Required at 0.75 per cent real growth per year. Not done.

Run the costs and assumptions through a range analysis

The manual requires costs and modelling assumptions be run thousands of times with the inputs varied, and the result reported as a range with a stated confidence level. Not done.

Report the odds that the project is worth doing

The manual asks specifically for the probability that benefits exceed costs. Not reported — the report publishes no benefit-cost ratio at all.

Publish the standard indicators

Net present value, benefit-cost ratio, capital utilisation, return on investment, internal rate of return. None published.

Model low, medium and high growth scenarios

Required, with the ridership growth rate stated for each. A ridership range is shown; the underlying growth scenarios are not stated.

This is not a theoretical requirement

The manual works the method through on a real example: an extension of the Yonge subway line in Toronto, at an early stage of design. A single cost estimate of $5.65 billion becomes a range of $6.16 to $6.84 billion, with the confidence level attached. The reader is shown a central figure, a spread, and how sure anyone is about it.

That project is roughly one per cent the size of ALTO. On uncertainty, the manual ALTO cites tells its reader more about a subway extension than ALTO’s report tells its reader about a national railway.

The Missing Lower Number

The report concedes a range it never publishes

The two tables carrying the entire $49.5 billion case are both headed with the words upper estimate. Every figure in the narrative is prefixed the same way: up to 24 million riders, up to 9.3 billion hours saved, up to 400 fatalities avoided, up to 39.1 million tonnes of emissions.

An upper estimate is one end of a range. The other end does not appear anywhere in the document.

The claim built on top of those figures goes further still. The report states that the benefits hold across a wide range of scenarios, and repeats the point in its conclusion. But demonstrating that a result holds across a range of scenarios is exactly what the missing sensitivity analysis does, and exactly what the cited manual requires be reported at this scale. The scenarios may well have been run. Their results are not shown.

And the report clearly knows how to show them. Elsewhere in the same document, the ridership forecast comes with multiple scenarios and a published band around it. The economy-wide GDP figure rests on nearly a hundred separate model runs with the assumptions varied. Between a tested input and a tested output sits the largest single number in the report, presented as a single column of point estimates.

The Optimism Adjustment

A top-up the manual requires, and the report does not mention

Early cost estimates for big infrastructure projects are, as a matter of record, too low. Not occasionally — routinely. The Metrolinx manual is explicit about the evidence behind this: in an international sample of 258 rail projects, ninety per cent were undercosted, by an average of forty-five per cent.

The manual’s response is a mandatory top-up applied to the construction cost when it is compared with benefits, over and above whatever contingency is already in the estimate. The size of the top-up depends on how far the design has progressed. At the earliest stage — nought to ten per cent designed — it is 64 per cent.

ALTO’s cost estimate is described in its own report as an AACE Class 5 estimate, which is the earliest and least developed class there is. Applied as the manual directs, a cost of $60 to $90 billion would enter the comparison at roughly $98 to $148 billion, before any comparison with benefits is attempted. That range is our own arithmetic on ALTO’s published estimate at the manual’s stated uplift; ALTO publishes no uplifted figure.

The report applies no such adjustment and does not mention the concept. It is worth noting where this reasoning comes from: the manual grounds the adjustment in the research on transport megaproject cost overruns that this Initiative has drawn on since its first publication. That reasoning is already embedded in the appraisal manual ALTO chose to cite.

The Central Inversion

Too early to divide, but not too early to multiply

The report declines to publish a benefit-cost ratio — benefits divided by costs, the single number a reader would most want. Its stated reason is that the cost estimate is too immature to support one.

Under the framework ALTO cites, that reasoning runs backwards. The manual sets out what is required at each stage of a project’s life. At the earliest stage, the very stage ALTO is at, the requirement is a single line: conduct sensitivity testing to understand the key drivers and the level of uncertainty in each option.

Early-stage uncertainty is not an exemption from testing. It is the reason testing is required. The report treats it the other way round: immaturity on the cost side is given as grounds for publishing nothing, while single-point figures are published on the benefit side of the same ledger. The same uncertainty is treated as decisive for one number and immaterial for the other.

And a business case for this corridor has already done it. In December 2021 the Joint Project Office — VIA Rail and the Canada Infrastructure Bank — published a benefit-cost ratio for High Frequency Rail, the cheaper predecessor to ALTO, at a comparable stage of development: about 0.13, or roughly 0.4 on an expanded basis counting fare revenue and agglomeration as benefits. It published a net present value of minus $21.1 billion and a thirty-year public subsidy of $37.1 to $42.2 billion alongside it. Its economic parameters were drawn from Metrolinx and Ministère des Transports du Québec guidance — the same two sources ALTO cites. Immaturity did not prevent a ratio then. The companion explainer Hours Are Not Dollars sets out those figures in full, including why 0.13 rather than 0.4 is the anchor.

A related point arises elsewhere in the report. In explaining why one set of results is excluded from the welfare account, it refers to those results as therefore not being included in the benefit-cost ratio — speaking of it as a thing with a settled boundary about what enters it. One page says a meaningful ratio cannot yet be produced. Another treats the ratio as already drawn up. The two are difficult to read together, and the report does not reconcile them.

Limits of This Analysis

What this brief does not say

Stated here rather than left for others to find.

On the analysis

The rate is not wrong3.5 per cent is a defensible choice, used by the United Kingdom Treasury and by Metrolinx, and well supported for long-horizon public investment. This brief does not argue that ALTO’s rate is too low or too high.

Metrolinx does not bind ALTOA provincial agency’s manual has no legal force over a federal Crown corporation. The argument is about the coherence of a citation, not about jurisdiction.

One choice runs in ALTO’s favourThe 3.5 per cent rate is applied flat across sixty years. The UK Treasury, whose Social Time Preference Rate this figure matches, steps its rate down to 3.0 per cent after year 30. Applying that schedule would have made ALTO’s benefit total larger, not smaller.

One cited source was not reviewedGuidance from the Ministère des Transports du Québec is cited separately for the value of time. The Initiative has not reviewed it and takes no position on what it requires.

On the report and its source

The report does apply conservatism in placesAccident reductions are capped after twenty years, and car emission factors are assumed to improve to 2050, which the report notes limits the emissions benefit. These are the two smallest monetised lines. No equivalent constraint is disclosed for travel time, which is 78 per cent of the total.

The manual itself is datedMetrolinx said in 2021 that a revised version with updated values would follow in 2022. Five years on, it has not. That is a limitation of the source document, not a fault of ALTO’s — but a reader assessing where a federal appraisal input came from is entitled to know it.

Which figures are whoseEvery figure attributed to ALTO, Metrolinx, the Joint Project Office, HM Treasury or Statistics Canada is quoted from the sources listed below and can be checked there. Three figures are our own arithmetic and are marked as such where they appear: the $98 to $148 billion uplifted capital range, the $21.40 inflation-escalated value of time, and the five per cent effect of the declining Green Book schedule. Where the report does not state something, we say so rather than inferring it, and we make no claim about why any requirement was or was not carried across.

This is a public report, not a formal submissionA business case submitted to Cabinet in 2029 may well contain material this document does not. The claims examined here are the claims ALTO has chosen to put in public.

What Would Settle It

Two questions ALTO can answer without releasing a model

Both are answerable from work ALTO has already done. Neither requires disclosure of a model, cooperation from staff, or agreement about what the correct discount rate for a national railway ought to be.

1. Was the calculation ever run at a rate other than 3.5 per cent?

And if so, what were the results? A negative answer is itself informative — it would mean the required test was never performed. An affirmative answer is the sensitivity table the report does not contain.

2. Which parts of the cited guidance were applied, and which were departed from?

The Metrolinx document requires that any variation from its parameters be agreed and clearly justified. The report records no variations at all — while, on the evidence above, departing from several.

Where Things Stand · August 2026

Summary ledger

Measured against the requirements of the manual ALTO names as its authority:

Carried across

The 3.5 per cent discount rate, correctly cited to the manual.

Carried across

The single blended value of time, expressly justified by reference to the manual.

Partial

The thirty-year cap on benefit growth: applied to accident and emissions lines, not stated for travel time, which is 78 per cent of the benefits.

Partial

A single price year throughout: the appraisal is in 2024 dollars, the GDP result in 2019 dollars.

Left behind

Discount rate sensitivity test at 2.5 per cent.

Left behind

Value of time sensitivity test at 0.75 per cent real growth.

Left behind

Range analysis of costs and assumptions, reported with a confidence level.

Left behind

The probability that benefits exceed costs, and the benefit-cost ratio itself.

Left behind

The standard set of performance indicators: net present value, benefit-cost ratio, capital utilisation, return on investment, internal rate of return.

Left behind

The optimism-bias top-up on construction costs, 64 per cent at this level of design — not applied and not mentioned.

Left behind

The lower end of the range, on figures the report itself labels an upper estimate.

ALTO names an appraisal manual twice — once for its discount rate, once to justify a single blended value of time — and leaves behind the testing, the ranges, the optimism adjustment and the benefit-cost reporting that the same manual attaches to those figures at this project’s scale. What remains is a column of numbers labelled an upper estimate whose lower estimate is never shown, resting on parameters presented as facts rather than as selections, in a report that declines to divide that column by the cost while describing the benefits as holding across a wide range of scenarios.

Every document relied on here is public. Nothing in this analysis requires access to ALTO’s models, cooperation from its staff, or a view on what the correct discount rate for a national railway ought to be.

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Two Parameters, None of the Conditions (PDF)

Full research brief with page references, parameter tables, worked figures and sources

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If the terms in this brief are unfamiliar — what a discount rate actually does, why a benefit figure is not money, and who ends up paying — the companion explainer Hours Are Not Dollars covers the same ground in plain language, and sets out the 2021 business case figures in full.

Sources

Primary documents

ALTO, Canada’s Moment: The Economic Opportunity of High-Speed Rail, August 2026, 83 pp. Discount rate, appraisal period and price base in the Appendix A methodology box, sourced at footnote 65 to the Metrolinx Business Case Manual Volume 2; value of time and the single-parameter justification in the same appendix, with Ministère des Transports du Québec guidance at footnote 66. Direct-effects tables headed “upper estimate, $2024 CAD”; benefit-cost ratio discussion at p. 62 and reference to the benefit-cost ratio at p. 80; capital cost and AACE Class 5 at pp. 5 and 65; scenario-robustness claims at pp. 3 and 69.

Metrolinx, Business Case Manual Volume 2: Guidance, August 2021, 222 pp. Economic parameters at Table 5.8; sensitivity requirements at Tables 5.1 to 5.3; optimism bias at Tables 5.4 to 5.6; worked range example at Table 5.7; Economic Case lifecycle requirements and key performance indicators; business case principles at pp. 11 and 13; guidance revision cycle at p. 4. metrolinx.com

Metrolinx, “Business Cases — Resources,” accessed 21 August 2026. The Business Case Guidance link resolves to the Volume 2 file under an asset version token corresponding to 15 September 2022; no Volume 2 revision has been issued.

B. Flyvbjerg, Procedures for Dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning (UK Department for Transport, 2004), cited in the Metrolinx Guidance as the basis for the optimism-bias uplift.

Statistics Canada, Table 18-10-0004-01, consumer price index, used for the 2021 to 2024 escalation of the Metrolinx value of time. The comparison is arithmetic and is not an attribution of method.

August 21, 2026

Would an Alto stop help kingston

Would an ALTO Stop Help Kingston?

Kingston has one of the busiest stations on the network. The question that matters is not whether it gets a stop, but whether a stop would leave more people riding the train, or fewer.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Policy Brief · July 2026

⚠ What has been said, and what has not been published

On 22 July 2026 ALTO’s chief executive, Martin Imbleau, told CBC Radio’s Ottawa Morning that Kingston will probably get a station, and that most ALTO trains would pass through without stopping.1 Neither the timetable nor the location of the station has been published.

Those two missing facts are exactly the ones that decide the outcome. This brief therefore tests the range: today’s railway, a faster conventional railway using the existing station, and ALTO with a station either inside the city or a twenty‑seven‑minute drive north of it, at normal fares and at fares 25 per cent higher. Every number that goes into the model is listed, so any of them can be argued with.

The short answer

Of the options tested, only one leaves Kingston with more rail trips than it has today: a faster conventional railway serving the existing station, at about 12 per cent more. The best ALTO case — a station inside the city, at normal fares — roughly matches today. Every other ALTO case comes out below today’s service, by 8 to 17 per cent.

The reason is simple. Speed is only one part of what makes a train trip worth taking. ALTO’s faster run to Toronto is worth about 10 per cent more trips on its own. But cutting the number of daily stops from eighteen to eight gives that back. Charging 25 per cent more gives it back again. Moving the station twenty‑seven minutes north of the city costs another 6 to 8 points on top.

Running more trains cannot rescue it by itself. Even at eighteen stops a day, matching what Kingston has now, an out‑of‑town station at a premium fare still comes out around 9 per cent below today. And about 8 per cent of Kingston’s trips — Belleville, Brockville, Cobourg, Napanee, Oshawa — have no ALTO equivalent at any frequency, because high‑speed trains do not stop at those places.

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Kingston’s ALTO Ridership Analysis — Full Brief (PDF)

Full method, all parameters, sensitivity ranges and break‑even tables

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The Comparison

Six versions of Kingston’s railway

The table below is the whole brief in one place. The first row is what Kingston has today. The second is a faster conventional railway from the same station. The last four are ALTO, differing only in where the station sits and what the ticket costs.

+12%

faster conventional railway, existing station, same number of trains, normal fares

the only option that grows ridership

best ALTO case: station in town, normal fares, eight stops a day

matches today, does not beat it

−17%

ALTO station 27 minutes north, eight stops a day, fares 25% higher

central case for an out‑of‑town station

Table 1 · Headline comparison

Option	To Toronto	Stops a day	Fare premium	Annual trips	Change
Today’s service	135 min	18	none	450,000	—
Faster conventional railway, existing station	95 min	18	none	502,000	+12%
ALTO, station in town	80 min	8	none	449,000	0%
ALTO, station in town	80 min	8	+25%	403,000	−10%
ALTO, 27 min north	80 min	8	none	416,000	−8%
ALTO, 27 min north	80 min	8	+25%	376,000	−17%

All four ALTO rows assume eight stops a day and that today’s conventional service is withdrawn. They differ only in where the station is and what the ticket costs. No fare structure for intermediate stations has been published, so both possibilities are shown rather than assumed. The faster conventional railway is the 240 km/h new‑build line proposed under the High Performance Rail framework, serving the existing station.

Starting Point

Why Kingston already rides the train

Kingston’s place among the busiest stations on the network gets cited as the reason it should have a high‑speed stop. But what produces that ridership decides whether a different kind of station would reproduce it. Four things do most of the work, and a high‑speed alignment north of the city removes two of them.

It gets two sets of trains, not one

Kingston sits halfway along the Toronto–Montréal mainline, and the Toronto–Ottawa trains use the same track as far as Brockville. So Kingston collects two timetables instead of one, and ends up with a level of service beaten only by the three biggest cities on the corridor. Frequency matters to ridership on its own, quite apart from speed: in intercity rail, a 10 per cent increase in service typically brings 4 to 7 per cent more trips.

The station serves a region, not a city

Napanee, Gananoque, Amherstview and the western Thousand Islands have no intercity rail of their own, so people drive to Kingston to catch the train. Ridership credited to a city of 132,485 is actually generated by an area several times larger; the Kingston census metropolitan area is 172,546.6

The population is unusually inclined to take the train

Some thirty‑nine thousand post‑secondary students study in a city of 132,485: Queen’s enrols 32,585, St. Lawrence College about 4,000 full‑time equivalents at its Kingston campus, and the Royal Military College of Canada 2,418.5 That is about twenty‑nine students for every hundred residents — against roughly twenty‑three in Sherbrooke and twenty‑one in Guelph, the two Canadian cities most often set beside Kingston on this measure.7 Many come from the Toronto and Ottawa regions and travel without a car. Kingston also has a large retired population, for whom avoiding the highway is the point of the trip, and an unusually high share of hospital, university, military and public‑sector jobs where travel is expensed and defaults to rail.

But that ridership is hard to charge a premium for

This travel is not spread evenly. It piles up at term boundaries, Thursday and Sunday afternoons, reading weeks and holidays, and it creates a matching flow of families travelling to Kingston. These are the travellers most sensitive to how often trains run and how far the station is from where they are going, and the least able to just drive instead. They are also the least profitable: peaked, price‑sensitive, and largely outside the weekday business hours a high‑speed operation’s revenue depends on.

Two things worth being clear about

The ridership figure itself is not published. Kingston’s standing as one of the busiest stations rests on statements by the operator and the Minister, not on released station‑level data. That is the first item on the list of things that should be published, at the end of this brief.

Existing demand is not the same as new demand. Busy today proves Kingston already travels by train. It does not prove that a different station would generate additional trips. Only new trips add ridership to the corridor.

There is also no flight from Kingston to Toronto. Elsewhere, high‑speed rail wins its premium passengers off aircraft. In Kingston those passengers are already on the train, so there is nobody to convert. Extra trips can only come out of cars, or be created from nothing.

Both of the things that built Kingston’s ridership — frequent trains, and a station within the city, roughly ten minutes from the core and the university — are the two things a high‑speed alignment north of the city takes away. That is what the model is built to test.

Method

How the numbers were worked out

Every trip is priced in minutes. Add up the time on the train, the time getting to and from the station at each end, the waiting created by having fewer trains, and the fare converted into minutes using what an hour is worth to that kind of traveller. Time spent driving to a station or standing on a platform counts for more than time sitting on a moving train, because people dislike it more. Journeys that involve changing trains carry an allowance for the change. That matters for one market in particular: ALTO reaches Montréal from Kingston by way of Ottawa, so some of those journeys involve a change, where a direct lakeshore railway does not.

That total is the real cost of the trip. If it goes up, fewer people travel. If it goes down, more do. The response used here is roughly one for one: make the total 10 per cent better and you get about 10 per cent more trips.

Travellers are split into four destinations and four types, each divided by whether they have a car available: thirty‑two groups, each worked out separately and then added up. That matters because a student without a car and an expensed public‑sector traveller react to a distant station in completely different ways.

Table 2 · Everything the model assumes

Input	Value used
Trips today	450,000 a year through the station (tested from 400,000 to 550,000)
Where people go	Toronto 58%, Ottawa 22%, Montréal 12%, other corridor stations 8%
Who travels	Students 30%, seniors and leisure 25%, public sector 20%, other 25%
Share without a car	Students 85%, seniors and leisure 50%, public sector 15%, other 20%
Worth of an hour	$14, $20, $48 and $24 respectively, in the same order
Time on the train	Today 135 / 120 / 160 min; ALTO 80 / 45 / 105 min (Toronto / Ottawa / Montréal)
Getting to the station	Existing station 10 min by car, 20 by transit; ALTO 27 by car, 35 by shuttle
How that time is weighted	1.5 times if a car is available, 2.0 times if not
Waiting	Half the gap between trains, weighted at 0.5, across a fifteen‑hour day
ALTO fare premium	25% in the central case; 0% and 40% also tested
Sensitivity of demand	One for one in the central case (tested from 0.8 to 1.2)

Far‑end access time is held identical in every scenario, which is a conservative choice: it gives ALTO the benefit of the doubt at the Toronto and Ottawa ends.

Two possible futures for today’s trains

Every service level is tested twice, because the answer depends less on ALTO than on what happens to the service Kingston already has.

Replacement

ALTO becomes Kingston’s rail service to Toronto, Ottawa and Montréal, and conventional service is withdrawn or cut below a useful level. Trips to Belleville, Brockville, Cobourg, Napanee and Oshawa lose their train altogether.

Both together

Today’s service keeps running at present frequency and ALTO is added on top. Travellers pick whichever is cheaper in total, and only the improvement over the better of the two creates new trips.

What is assumed rather than known

Four inputs are estimates, not published data: the number of trips today, where those trips go, ALTO’s journey times (the alignment for this stretch has not been published), and where the station would be. All four appear on the list at the end of this brief. The model also applies a constant response to a very large change in trip cost, which is at the outer edge of where this method behaves well. The direction of the results is solid. The exact sizes are indicative.

Result One

Where the speed gain goes

Start with today’s service and change one thing at a time. This is the clearest way to see why a faster train can still end up with fewer passengers.

Table 3 · One change at a time

Step	Annual trips	Change	Effect of this step
Today’s service, as it runs	450,000	—	—
Cut the Toronto run to 80 minutes, change nothing else	496,000	+10%	+10 pts
Cut stops from 18 a day to 8	449,000	0%	−10 pts
Add a 25 per cent fare premium	403,000	−10%	−10 pts
Move the station 27 minutes north	376,000	−17%	−6 pts

The second row is the entire value of high‑speed running time at Kingston: about 10 per cent. Each of the three things that come with it takes back as much or more. This calculation already leaves out trips to other corridor stations, which a high‑speed line cannot serve at any frequency.

Result Two

More trains cannot fix it on its own

Suppose the number of stops is the thing that gets negotiated. Hold the station twenty‑seven minutes north and the fare 25 per cent higher, and vary how often ALTO calls.

Table 4 · ALTO at a station 27 minutes north

Stops a day	Annual trips	Change	Range	If today’s trains stay
6	359,000	−20%	−17% to −24%	0%
8	376,000	−17%	−13% to −21%	0%
10	387,000	−14%	−10% to −18%	+0.2%
18	408,000	−9%	−4% to −14%	+1.6%
12 (six each way)	394,000	−12%	−9% to −17%	+0.5%
16 (eight each way)	404,000	−10%	−6% to −15%	+1.3%
20 (ten each way)	411,000	−9%	−3% to −14%	+1.9%

The range covers the whole plausible span of the model’s assumptions, at a 25 per cent fare premium. The bottom three rows read six, eight and ten as stops each way, which is the most generous reading available. It improves the result without changing the sign. The last column is the “both together” case, where today’s service survives: ALTO then adds almost nothing, because travellers only switch when it is genuinely better for them.

The fare premium matters more than the timetable

Table 5 · What moves the answer

Stops a day	Normal fares	Fares +25%	Fares +40%	Station 25 min out	Station 45 min out
6	−12%	−20%	−24%	−17%	−23%
8	−8%	−17%	−21%	−13%	−20%
10	−5%	−14%	−19%	−10%	−17%

The last two columns hold the fare premium at 25 per cent and vary the drive from the station to downtown; the central case is 27 minutes. Notice that going from normal fares to a 25 per cent premium costs more than doubling the distance to the station.

How many trains would it actually take?

The more useful question is what it would take for an out‑of‑town ALTO station to be no worse for Kingston than the service it already has. At normal fares the answer is nine stops a day for everyone. At a 25 per cent premium, the answer falls apart.

Table 6 · Daily stops needed just to match today, Toronto trips

Who is travelling	At normal fares	At a 25% premium
Public sector and institutional (expensed)	9	13
Other business and leisure	9	27
Seniors, leisure, visiting family	9	48
Students and young adults	9	no number works

Forty‑eight stops a day is a train every twenty minutes all day. For students, no frequency at all makes up for a distant station plus a premium ticket, because their time is worth less than the fare increase costs them.

One case runs the other way and should be said plainly: expensed public‑sector travel between Kingston and Ottawa is better off under ALTO in every scenario tested, because today’s service on that pair is slow and indirect. It is a real gain, and it is a small share of the total.

Under the friendliest assumptions available — normal fares, a station twenty‑five minutes out, today’s trains kept running alongside, ten stops a day — the best figure the model will produce for an out‑of‑town Kingston station is about +8 per cent. Getting there means giving up the premium pricing the revenue case depends on everywhere else.

Result Three

What if you just made today’s trains faster?

Now reverse the test. Keep the existing station, keep eighteen stops a day, keep normal fares, and change nothing but speed on the existing route.

Table 7 · Speed alone, from the existing station

Toronto journey time	Time saved	Annual trips	Change
135 min, as it runs today	—	450,000	—
118 min, reliable 160 to 177 km/h	13%	471,000	+4.6%
95 min, a 240 km/h conventional railway	30%	502,000	+11.6%
80 min, upper bound for this station	41%	525,000	+16.6%

The last row applies high‑speed running time to the existing station. It is there to separate speed from station location, frequency and fare, not as a proposal.

The comparison that matters

Eighty minutes to Toronto from the existing station, eighteen stops a day, normal fares: about +17 per cent. The same eighty minutes from a station twenty‑seven minutes out of town, eight stops a day, fares 25 per cent higher: about −17 per cent.

The time on the train is identical. The two outcomes are thirty‑four points apart, and every one of those points is station location, frequency and fare.

Speed gives diminishing returns

Roughly speaking, every 1 per cent cut in journey time buys about 0.4 per cent more trips. A 30 per cent time saving buys about 12 per cent more passengers. For most of Kingston’s travellers, time on the train is a minority of what the trip really costs them — fare, getting to the station and waiting make up the rest, and speed does nothing about any of those. The gain concentrates where an hour is worth most: on a 95‑minute conventional railway, public‑sector travel grows about 17 per cent, business and leisure 13, seniors and leisure 12, students 10.

A conservative figure, and a warning

These figures are cautious. The response to journey time implied here is weaker than the rail literature usually finds, because the fare term in the calculation dampens it. Using a more standard figure, the same 30 per cent time saving would give about +22 per cent rather than +12. Table 7 should be read as a floor, with the 95‑minute case plausibly worth anywhere from +10 to +25 per cent. The comparisons earlier in the brief are unaffected, because they compare like with like.

The warning is that fares erode the gain fast in either direction. Raising tickets 10 per cent to help pay for an upgrade cuts the benefit from about +12 per cent to about +7 — two‑fifths of the speed gain eaten by a 10 per cent fare rise. That is the same mechanism that sinks the high‑speed cases, working here on the alternative. It is an argument for funding an upgrade from capital rather than from the farebox.

What It Means

A stop is not the same as service

Three things set whether Kingston gains or loses, and speed is not one of them: how far the station is from where people are actually going, what the ticket costs, and whether today’s trains survive. Frequency cannot rescue the result on its own. At eighteen stops a day, matching today, an out‑of‑town station at a premium fare still comes out around 9 per cent down.

A public debate about whether Kingston gets a station, and how many trains stop there, is a debate about the wrong variables.

The two things ALTO has said do not fit together

A station justified by strong ridership, but served by a minority of trains, has its timetable set by the express service rather than by the demand used to justify it. Table 6 shows why that is not a workable compromise: the frequency needed to make the station work at a premium fare is far above what an express pattern tolerates. The usual international answer is two tiers, express and semi‑fast, which needs somewhere for fast trains to overtake at the intermediate station. Whether the cost estimate includes that overtaking capacity is a question with two possible answers, and both are informative.

A conventional railway does better here

A new conventional railway built for 240 km/h, running typically at 200, serves Kingston without moving the station, without the fare premium high‑speed operation needs, and without cutting the number of trains that stop. It captures a smaller share of the theoretical time saving and a larger share of the ridership. That is the trade the tables above quantify.

What Would Change the Answer

Three commitments, and four documents

None of this is a prediction that a Kingston station must fail. The results turn on assumptions, and those assumptions are all things the project could settle.

Would help

A station much closer to the core, or a frequent connection to it that is committed and timed to the trains rather than hoped for.

Would help most

Normal fares on Kingston journeys. Table 6 shows this is the single decisive variable. A premium fare is what makes the arithmetic unrecoverable for students, seniors and leisure travellers.

Would help

A binding commitment that service on the existing line is maintained, which turns the replacement case into the both‑together case, plus a published timetable, so frequency becomes a fact instead of an assumption.

Four things that should be published

Before any of these figures are treated as more than an order of magnitude, four inputs should be replaced with real data:

Not published

Station‑level boardings and destinations. This alone would settle both the number of trips today and where they go. A matter for the operator.

Not published

The calling pattern assumed for the Toronto–Ottawa segment — how many trains actually stop, and where.

Not published

The fare structure for intermediate stations. On the evidence above, this matters more than anything else on the list.

Not published

The station location, with the assumed travel time from it to downtown Kingston.

The first sits with the operator. The other three sit with the project and its joint project office, whose report and business case remain unpublished.

The finding that matters

It is not that a Kingston station would fail. It is that the service Kingston already has is the benchmark the project has never been asked to beat — and on the assumptions set out here, it does not beat it.

How to read the numbers on this page

Every number here other than the two quoted statements is output from our own model, built on the parameters listed in the full brief. Those parameters are assumptions, not measurements, and the four listed above as needing publication are the ones that move the result. The model is set out so that any parameter can be replaced and the arithmetic re-run: the direction of the findings holds across the ranges tested, the exact magnitudes are indicative.

Where ALTO has not published something — a timetable, a station location, a fare — we say so rather than inferring it, and we make no claim about why it has not been published.

Sources

CBC News, “Kingston probably getting high-speed rail stop, says Alto CEO,” 22 July 2026 — interview with Martin Imbleau on CBC Radio’s Ottawa Morning. He says Kingston will probably receive a station, citing ridership, and that most ALTO trains would pass through without stopping, along with Laval and Trois-Rivières, to preserve express service between the larger cities. cbc.ca

City of Kingston, Council Meeting Minutes 2026-06, 17 February 2026, Resolution 2026-73, carried as amended 9–2 — support for a southern route contingent on Highway 401 corridor development and on a stop being added in Kingston, as close to the urban core as possible. Examined in the companion brief Which Trains Stop in Kingston?

Elasticity ranges: intercity frequency elasticities of +0.4 to +0.7 and journey-time elasticities of −0.6 to −0.9 are the conventional ranges in the rail demand literature, used here as reference values rather than as findings of this brief. The generalised-cost elasticity of −1.0 central, banded −0.8 to −1.2, is our own choice and is tested across that band throughout.

Current journey times are as timetabled by VIA Rail. ALTO journey times are our assumption, since no alignment has been published for the Toronto–Ottawa segment.

Queen’s University, 2025–26 Enrolment Report, as at 1 November 2025 — 28,561 full-time students, plus 1,704 part-time undergraduate, 1,389 part-time graduate and 931 online undergraduate, giving 32,585 in total. St. Lawrence College reports about 4,000 full-time equivalents at its Kingston campus. Royal Military College of Canada: 1,209 full-time and 587 part-time undergraduate, 276 full-time and 346 part-time graduate students, giving 2,418 in total. RMC’s part-time and graduate enrolment includes serving officers studying at a distance, so it is counted here on the same all-enrolment basis as Queen’s rather than as a resident population; on full-time enrolment alone the city total is about 38,000, and the ratio is about twenty-nine per hundred either way. macleans.ca queensu.ca (PDF)

Statistics Canada, 2021 Census of Population — City of Kingston (census subdivision) 132,485; Kingston census metropolitan area 172,546, comprising the City of Kingston, South Frontenac, Frontenac Islands and Loyalist Township. statcan.gc.ca

Comparators, on the same all-institutions basis where the data allow. Sherbrooke: about 40,000 students across eight institutions in a city of 172,950, roughly twenty-three per hundred residents. Guelph: 29,617 full-time equivalents at the University of Guelph in a city of 143,740, roughly twenty-one per hundred — a figure that excludes the Conestoga College campus and is therefore a floor. ocul.on.ca

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Full method, all thirty‑two market segments, sensitivity bands and break‑even calculations

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July 26, 2026

Two point two trillion

Also in this site

Two Point Two Trillion

ALTO’s headline economic claim is true of the Canada that existed in 2019. It is presented to the public as today’s.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Economics Brief · Published July 2026

⚠ Two studies, two summaries

ALTO has commissioned two economic studies and published both. Aviseo Consulting produced a computer model of the effect of high-speed rail on the whole Canadian economy. CPCS, working with HDR, produced a study of its effect on tourism. Both reports are careful. Both state their limits plainly. Both are free to download from ALTO’s website.

This brief is not about those studies. It is about the difference between what they say and what ALTO says they say. That difference is where the public numbers come from — and it is what a travel trade article repeated to a wide audience on July 20, 2026, without opening either report.

What we found, in one minute

The famous 1.1 per cent is 1.1 per cent of Canada’s 2019 economy. The Aviseo report says so on page 13, in those words. ALTO’s public pages drop the year and call the money “today’s value.” Canada’s economy is now about a third bigger than it was in 2019, so the same claim in today’s money would be about $36.5 billion, not $24.5 billion — or, if you keep the dollar figure, about 0.74 per cent, not 1.1.

Almost all of it is one assumption. Of the $24.4 billion the model produces, $21.0 billion comes from assuming businesses in and around Toronto, Montréal, Ottawa and Québec City become 3 per cent more productive. Change that one dial to 2 per cent and the answer is $13.8 billion. Change it to 5 per cent and it is $34.5 billion. ALTO publishes the middle figure and not the range.

The two studies disagree with each other about tourism. Aviseo counts international visitors only and says domestic tourism is mostly people spending money they would have spent anyway. CPCS builds its headline on domestic travel within the corridor. The two use different methods that cannot be added together. Neither of ALTO’s summaries mentions the other study.

And in the tourism study’s base case, the small towns get nothing at all. Under the scenario where no extra tourism policy is put in place, Peterborough and Trois-Rivières receive zero additional visitor spending and zero additional GDP. The blog post announcing that study is titled “How High-Speed Rail Will Boost Tourism from Big Cities to Small Towns.”

The Arithmetic

1.1 per cent of which year?

ALTO’s website puts the claim in one line: a “1.1% increase in Canada’s GDP ($24.5 billion in today’s value)”. GDP means the total size of the economy — everything the country produces in a year.

Work backwards from those two numbers and you can calculate how big the economy would have to be for both to be right at once.

$24.4B

the benefit the study actually reports

Aviseo report, Table 1

1.1%

the share of the economy that represents

Aviseo report, page 13

$2.22T

the size of economy where both are true

$24.4 billion divided by 1.1 per cent

Statistics Canada measures the economy every three months. In the first quarter of 2026 it came to $3,321,588 million — about $3.32 trillion. That is roughly $1.1 trillion more than the figure the two numbers imply. Statistics Canada

Two notes on these figures. Nobody has claimed that Canada’s economy is $2.22 trillion. That number is our own division of the two figures ALTO publishes together, and it is here because it is what those two figures imply about each other. And the benefit appears on this page as both $24.4 billion and $24.5 billion: the first is the number in Aviseo’s own table, the second the rounded form ALTO uses on its benefits page. They are the same estimate.

The study explains why, and it is not hiding anything. The Aviseo model is built on Statistics Canada’s 2019 picture of the economy, chosen because 2020 and 2021 were pandemic years and the data from them is not reliable. Page 13 then states the result carefully: the gain is about $24.4 billion, which is roughly 1.1 per cent of Canada’s 2019 GDP.

That is the whole finding. The study says 2019. ALTO’s website says “today’s value.”

If you use the 1.1 per cent

Applied to today’s economy, the benefit would be about $36.5 billion a year. ALTO’s published dollar figure understates its own claim by roughly a third.

If you use the $24.4 billion

Measured against today’s economy, that is about 0.74 per cent — not 1.1. The headline percentage is too high for the dollar figure beside it.

There is a further wrinkle worth knowing. The model is what economists call static. It does not project forward year by year. It asks a single question: what would 2019 have looked like if the railway had already been running? The report says so directly. That means there is no discounting and no present-value calculation anywhere in it — so the phrase “in today’s value” describes a piece of arithmetic the study never performed.

Where The Number Comes From

Almost all of it is a single dial

The model adds up three separate effects. The report breaks them out, so we can see exactly how much each one contributes to the $24.4 billion.

Channel	Contribution	Share of total
Productivity — businesses getting more done because cities are better connected	$21.0B	86%
Labour supply — people working more hours because commuting is quicker	$2.7B	11%
Tourism — extra spending by international visitors	$0.8B	3%
Total	$24.4B	100%

Nearly nine tenths of the headline comes from the productivity line. So it is worth knowing exactly how that number was produced.

The modellers picked a figure from the international research for how much more productive businesses become when a fast rail link arrives. The research offers a range. They chose 3 per cent for their middle case, then applied it to the economies of four metropolitan areas: Toronto, Montréal, Ottawa and Québec City.

Those four metros produce roughly a third of Canada’s economy. Three per cent of a third is about one per cent. The headline is close to being arithmetic from the assumption rather than a discovery about railways.

What happens when you move the dial

The report tests three settings. At 2 per cent, the total is about $13.8 billion. At 3 per cent, it is $24.4 billion. At 5 per cent, it is $34.5 billion. Across everything the report tests, the full range runs from $14.8 billion to $41.0 billion. ALTO’s blog post and website give one number from the middle of that range and no range at all.

And note which places are in the calculation

Toronto, Montréal, Ottawa and Québec City. Not Peterborough. Not Trois-Rivières. Not Laval. The model gives the productivity benefit — nearly nine tenths of the whole claim — to the four largest cities on the line and to nowhere else.

The research the modellers drew on says these effects concentrate within about 30 kilometres of a station. Because nobody knows yet where the stations will be, the study used each city’s whole metropolitan area as a stand-in for that 30-kilometre circle. The report is open about this. It means the 3 per cent boost is applied to every business in those metros, including the great many that will never go near the train.

Study Versus Summary

What the reports say, and what the blog posts say

Both studies are honest about their limits. Both blog posts announcing them are not. This is the pattern at the centre of this brief.

What the report says	What ALTO’s summary says
Aviseo: the gain is roughly 1.1 per cent of Canada’s 2019 GDP.	ALTO’s blog: the analysis concludes ALTO will permanently uplift Canada’s GDP by 1.1 per cent. No year. ALTO’s benefits page: $24.5 billion in today’s value.
Not carried:The base year
Aviseo: results run from $14.8B to $41.0B depending on which assumptions are used.	One figure, from the middle. The range appears in neither the blog post nor any public ALTO page.
Not carried:The range
Aviseo: the study deliberately excludes construction and operating costs, looking only at long-term effects.	Presented as the economic case for building the railway. A study that excludes costs cannot tell you whether a project is worth its price.
Not carried:The scope limit
CPCS: the scenarios are illustrative, order-of-magnitude, and “should not be interpreted as forecasts.”	ALTO’s blog: CPCS developed forecasts, and the report includes tangible projections giving real-world, objective results.
Contradicted:The report’s own caution
CPCS: three scenarios — $177M, $1.0B, $3.9B in added GDP, depending on how much tourism policy is coordinated.	The middle figure only. The low scenario, roughly six times smaller, is not mentioned.
Not carried:The low case
Both reports: commissioned and paid for by ALTO. Aviseo’s cover states the work was undertaken on ALTO’s behalf. CPCS notes the opinions are the authors’ own.	Both blog posts describe the consultants as independent — in the same passage that says ALTO engaged them.
As stated:The word “independent”

To be clear about who did what

Neither consultancy has done anything wrong here. Aviseo tested six different sets of economic assumptions and two labour-market conditions, ran close to a hundred simulations, reported ranges throughout, and stated its base year. CPCS labelled its scenarios illustrative and warned against reading them as forecasts. The reports are the careful part. The summaries are where the caution disappears.

Two Studies, One Question

The two reports disagree about tourism

Both studies estimate how much extra economic activity tourism would bring. They arrive at similar-looking numbers by opposite routes, and the two cannot simply be added together or compared.

Aviseo — $0.8 billion	CPCS — $1.0 billion
Counts international visitors only. The report says domestic tourism is largely people spending money they would have spent somewhere else in Canada anyway, so it has limited effect on the national total. Uses a model of the whole economy, which subtracts activity drawn away from elsewhere.	Its middle scenario is driven mostly by travel within the corridor — exactly the domestic tourism Aviseo set aside. Uses a simpler method that adds up ripple effects through suppliers and wages without subtracting what was displaced. This produces larger figures by design.
Result:Two numbers that cannot be combined

There is a third figure in circulation. ALTO’s FAQ page advertises $800 million a year in tourism revenue. That matches Aviseo’s contribution-to-GDP figure, which is not the same thing as revenue — and it matches no revenue figure in either report.

So ALTO’s public materials carry a tourism benefit that is variously $0.8 billion of national output, $1.0 billion of national output, and $800 million of revenue, drawn from two studies using incompatible methods, one of which discounts the category the other relies on. Neither blog post mentions that the other study exists.

The Small Towns

In the base case, two station cities get zero

The CPCS tourism study models three futures. The railway is identical in all three. What differs is how much extra tourism policy governments put in place around it — last-mile transit, regional shuttles, coordinated visitor information. The low coordination scenario is the one where the railway gets built and nothing else changes.

City	Low coordination	High coordination
Toronto	$37M	up to $1,500M
Québec City	$50M	up to $500M
Montréal (incl. Laval)	$44M	up to $900M
Ottawa-Gatineau	$21M	up to $560M
Trois-Rivières	$0	up to $25M
Peterborough	$0	up to $35M

Zero. Not a small amount — nothing. The report’s GDP table records the same: Peterborough unchanged at $475 million, Trois-Rivières unchanged at $318 million.

Even under full corridor-wide coordination, Peterborough reaches up to $35 million against Toronto’s $1.5 billion — roughly 43 to 1. The blog post announcing this study is titled “How High-Speed Rail Will Boost Tourism from Big Cities to Small Towns.”

The Initiative has examined this study in full elsewhere — its scope, the conditions attached to its scenarios, the rural corridor regions left outside its frame, and the cost side it does not count. Benefits for Stations, Costs for the Corridor

The Missing Side

A study that cannot tell you if it is worth it

The Aviseo report states in its introduction that it deliberately leaves out construction and operating costs, in order to focus on long-term effects. That is a reasonable choice for the study. It has a consequence.

A benefit figure with no cost beside it cannot answer the only question that matters: is this worth building? The report never claims to answer it. ALTO’s summary presents it as though it does, and the trade coverage went further still, running the entire economic case without a single dollar of cost anywhere in it.

The cost side is not a mystery. It is simply somewhere else. ALTO’s published figure is $60 to $90 billion — a range its own chief executive has described as a working assumption rather than an estimate, with real numbers not expected until 2027 or 2028, after the route is chosen. The Initiative’s analysis of the full ledger puts ALTO’s central benefit-cost ratio at about 0.11, against the 1.0 that marks a project paying its way. Financial Analysis

The shape of the published record

The benefit is modelled in detail by two consultancies, published to two significant figures, and repeated by every outlet covering the project. The cost is a range spanning $30 billion, described by the proponent as an assumption, and resolvable only after the decision it is meant to inform has been taken. That asymmetry is the finding, not the individual numbers.

This is the pattern the Oxford researcher Bent Flyvbjerg documents across large infrastructure projects worldwide: benefits arrive early, precisely, and in dollars; costs arrive late, as ranges, after commitment.

The Chain

Six weeks, and the reports were not cited

The article that prompted this brief promised readers what others are missing about ALTO’s economics, and led on tourism. Here is what had already been published.

2019

The year of the economy the Aviseo model is built on. Everything downstream is expressed in this year’s terms.

2024

Aviseo runs the model. ALTO supplies its passenger forecasts in May and June.

June 8, 2026

ALTO publishes “How High-Speed Rail Will Boost Tourism from Big Cities to Small Towns,” with the full CPCS tourism report attached for download.

June 2026

The Aviseo report is uploaded to ALTO’s website.

July 13, 2026

ALTO publishes “How Alto Will Reshape Canada’s Economy,” with the full Aviseo report attached for download. It states the 1.1 per cent without the year, the range, or the cost exclusion.

July 20, 2026

A travel trade site publishes a long article on ALTO’s economics and tourism benefits under a headline promising what others are missing. Its two themes are the two blog posts. It cites neither report, calls the analysis independent, and contains no cost figure of any kind.

Seven days after one blog post and six weeks after the other. The tourism angle presented as the overlooked discovery had been the subject of an entire ALTO blog post and a 42-page commissioned report, both freely available, for a month and a half.

Why this matters more than one bad article

Each outlet in a chain like this can be cited by the next as confirmation. A figure that has never been independently checked ends up looking like something everybody agrees on, purely because it has been repeated. In this case the answer was not hidden. It was a click away from the two blog posts the article’s themes are drawn from.

What the article contains, and what it does not

The article cites neither report. It describes the analysis as independent. It contains no cost figure of any kind. Its two themes are the subjects of two ALTO blog posts published seven days and six weeks earlier, each with the full commissioned report attached for download on the same page.

Summary · July 2026

Where things stand

Wrong year

“$24.5 billion in today’s value.” The study says 1.1 per cent of Canada’s 2019 GDP. In today’s economy the same claim is either $36.5 billion or 0.74 per cent, not $24.5 billion and 1.1 per cent.

Wrong kind

“Today’s value” describes a calculation the study never did. The model is static and contains no discounting. Its results are annual, not a one-time total.

Not carried

The range. Aviseo reports $14.8B to $41.0B. CPCS reports $177M, $1.0B and $3.9B. ALTO publishes one figure from the middle of each.

Not carried

The scope limit. Aviseo excludes costs by design. The study is presented as the economic case for a project whose price it never considered.

Contradicted

“Should not be interpreted as forecasts.” CPCS’s words. ALTO’s summary calls the same scenarios forecasts, tangible projections and objective results.

At odds

Benefits for small towns. Under the scenario where only the railway is built, Peterborough and Trois-Rivières receive $0. The blog announcing that report is titled “from Big Cities to Small Towns.”

Unreconciled

Two tourism figures. $0.8B from one study counting international visitors, $1.0B from another counting domestic travel, by methods that cannot be combined — plus $800M of “revenue” on the FAQ that matches neither.

As stated

“Independent.” Both consultancies were engaged and paid by ALTO. Both blog posts state this in the same passage that calls the firms independent, so a reader who takes the word to mean “not commissioned by the proponent” is reading it in a sense the passage itself rules out.

Fragile

Eighty-six per cent of the claim rests on one assumption — a 3 per cent productivity gain applied to four metropolitan economies. At 2 per cent the total is $13.8B; at 5 per cent, $34.5B.

Sound

The studies themselves. Both are careful, both state their limits, both are published in full and free to download. Our argument is with the summaries, not the analysis.

What we are and are not saying

We are not saying high-speed rail cannot bring economic benefits, and we are not criticising the consultants who did this work.

We are saying that ALTO commissioned two careful studies and then published summaries that removed the base year, the ranges, the scope limits and the warnings — and that the resulting figures now circulate as settled facts. On the arithmetic, the position is narrow and easy to check: 1.1 per cent and $24.5 billion cannot both describe today’s Canada, and the study says which year they describe.

ALTO could correct this in a sentence. Adding the words “of 2019 GDP” to its benefits page would make the claim accurate.

How to read the numbers on this page

Every figure attributed to Aviseo, CPCS, ALTO or Statistics Canada is quoted from the source listed below and can be checked there. Every other figure is our own calculation from those published inputs: the $2.22 trillion implied economy, the $36.5 billion and 0.74 per cent restatements in current terms, the observation that 3 per cent of roughly a third of national output is about 1 per cent, the 43-to-1 Toronto-to-Peterborough ratio, and the benefit-cost ratio of about 0.11, which comes from our own financial analysis and not from either commissioned study.

Where a study or a summary does not state something, we say so rather than inferring it, and we make no claim about why any particular qualification was or was not reproduced.

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Two Point Two Trillion — Full Brief (PDF)

The complete analysis, with all figures, tables and sources

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Sources

Where our figures come from

1.Aviseo Consulting, An Overview of the Structural Economic Impacts of Alto: Computable General Equilibrium Modelling Approach, June 2026. Prepared on behalf of ALTO. Source of the 2019 calibration, the $24.4 billion figure, the 1.1 per cent of 2019 GDP statement (page 13), the $14.8B–$41.0B range, the channel breakdown, and the productivity settings of 0.02, 0.03 and 0.05. altotrain.ca (PDF)

2.ALTO, “How Alto Will Reshape Canada’s Economy,” blog post, July 13, 2026. States the 1.1 per cent without the base year or range, and describes the commissioned report as independent. Links the Aviseo report. altotrain.ca

3.CPCS, in association with HDR, Tourism in the Alto Corridor: Current Conditions and Potential Impacts, June 2026. Prepared for ALTO. Source of the three coordination scenarios, the per-city spending and GDP tables, the statement that the scenarios should not be interpreted as forecasts, and the finding on business spending declines. altotrain.ca (PDF)

4.ALTO, “How High-Speed Rail Will Boost Tourism from Big Cities to Small Towns,” blog post, June 8, 2026. Reports the medium scenario only, and describes the scenarios as forecasts and tangible projections. Links the CPCS report. altotrain.ca

5.ALTO, “Discover Alto’s Many Benefits,” project benefits page. Source of the “$24.5 billion in today’s value” phrasing and the construction and operational jobs figures. altotrain.ca

6.ALTO, “Answering your questions.” Source of the $800 million annual tourism revenue claim. altotrain.ca

7.Statistics Canada, Gross domestic product, income and expenditure, first quarter 2026, released May 29, 2026. Table 1 gives gross domestic product at market prices, seasonally adjusted at annual rates, of $3,321,588 million for the first quarter of 2026. Underlying series: Table 36-10-0103-01. Table 1 · Table 36-10-0103-01

8.Rituparna Dutta Choudhury, “Canada’s Toronto–Québec City High-Speed Rail Could Unlock GDP Growth: What Others Are Missing About Alto’s Billion Dollar Economic Transformation,” Travel and Tour World, July 20, 2026. travelandtourworld.com

9.ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, ALTO Financial Analysis. Source of the benefit-cost ratio of approximately 0.11, the cost-per-kilometre model, and the achievable ridership frontier of 5 to 12 million annual trips against ALTO’s 24 million target. citizenresearch.ca

10.ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative, Tourism Study brief, June 2026. Examines the scope of the CPCS study, including the exclusion of rural corridor regions. citizenresearch.ca

11.Bent Flyvbjerg, on optimism bias and reference-class forecasting in the appraisal of large infrastructure projects.

July 23, 2026

Bound before briefed

City of Kingston: Bound Before Briefed

Britain spent a decade learning what happens when councils sign confidentiality agreements with a high-speed rail promoter. The lessons were on the record. Kingston signed on 10 July, three days before this brief reached councillors.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Governance and Transparency Brief · Published July 2026 · Updated following the July 10 signing

⚠ Update · The agreement has been signed

This brief sets out the questions Kingston City Council should have asked before entering a non-disclosure agreement with ALTO. By the time it reached councillors, on Monday, July 13, the agreement had already been signed — the Whig-Standard reported that the City signed on Friday, July 10, and the signing became public on July 14. Whig-Standard

The document’s title turns out to be literal. Councillors were bound on the Friday and briefed on the Monday — bound by an agreement the City says applies to them personally, three days before the questions below were put in front of them. The brief did not arrive too early to matter. It arrived after the decision it was meant to inform.

Two facts from that reporting change the picture materially. First, a City spokesperson confirmed that the agreement binds city staff and councillors alike — every person who receives technical information from ALTO. Second, asked whether the City had a choice, the same spokesperson said: “This is not optional.”

The analysis below is the brief as sent to councillors, unchanged. The questions it raises were answerable before Friday. That they are printed here after the signing, rather than asked before it, is the point.

Critical Finding

Of the five questions this brief puts to Council, one has already been answered, and answered badly. The agreement binds elected members, not merely officers. A councillor who receives technical information about the corridor cannot discuss it with the constituents whose land that corridor may cross. The remaining four — whether the agreement expires, what precisely it covers, whether MFIPPA and open-meeting obligations are expressly preserved, and what ALTO would actually have withheld without it — remain unanswered on the public record.

A second finding sits underneath the first. ALTO describes these agreements as instruments that enable two-way data sharing and productive collaboration. HS2 Ltd, facing the same criticism in Britain, said its agreements were mutual and entered into by consent. The City of Kingston says the agreement was not optional. A contract that one party had no choice but to sign is not a collaboration. Both characterisations cannot be true, and it is the City — not the critics — that has contradicted the promoter.

Kingston’s neighbours faced the identical request and treated it as a decision. Two eastern Ontario counties have now refused ALTO’s confidentiality agreement outright, both unanimously, both on the public record — the United Counties of Prescott and Russell in May, and the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry on June 15. Frontenac County voted formally on April 15 to oppose the proposed corridors through the county. Whether Kingston’s agreement was ever put to its own elected representatives — by motion, in open or closed session — has not been established on the public record.

The most important fact in this brief is the one that follows from that. SDG refused the agreement and then published ALTO’s presentation to the public. The choice Kingston was offered — sign and be informed, or refuse and be ignorant — is not a real choice. A council next door declined to sign and released the material anyway.

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City of Kingston: Bound Before Briefed — Full Brief (PDF)

The briefing note circulated to Kingston City Council, reproduced as issued, with a dated note recording that the agreement was signed before it arrived. Ten-minute read.

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What was signed

“This is not optional”

The agreement was executed on Friday, July 10, between the City of Kingston and ALTO, the Crown corporation developing the corridor. ALTO’s account of why is straightforward and, in its own terms, reasonable: planning work is not final; early concepts, technical analysis and emerging ideas are still being refined; and sharing preliminary material without its full context could give the impression that decisions have already been made. Confidentiality agreements, the corporation says, are used widely in the infrastructure industry and structure these discussions so that evolving information can be shared. Whig-Standard

The Mayor’s defence follows the same line. Such agreements are common in major infrastructure planning; they allow technical information to be shared so that municipalities can provide informed input; the agreement is not an endorsement of any particular route or station location; and the City remains committed to transparency and will share information publicly when it is able to.

Set against that framing, the City spokesperson’s own words do a great deal of work. The agreement applies to all city staff and councillors who receive technical information from ALTO. It was required in order for the City to receive any technical information at all. And it was not optional.

A confidentiality agreement that one party had no choice but to sign is not a collaboration. It is a condition of entry.

This is the distinction the British record turns on, and it is worth being precise about it. The objection is not that confidential material was shared confidentially. It is that information was withheld until silence was promised — that access to the facts was made conditional on a commitment not to use them. That is not a description of HS2. It is now, on the City’s own account, a description of Kingston.

Part One · The mechanism

Access conditioned on silence

In Britain, councils were not handed material and then asked to protect the commercially sensitive parts of it. They were told they could see nothing at all unless they signed first. Many were required to sign before they could engage with HS2 Ltd on the questions that mattered most locally — where stations might go, how they would be designed, and which route the promoter preferred. Warwickshire County Council could not receive early design updates until it had signed. New Civil Engineer Warwickshire World

A council’s capacity to scrutinise the promoter is made conditional on a promise not to tell the people it represents what that scrutiny has revealed.

The council does not become better informed in any way it can act upon. It becomes better informed and simultaneously disabled from using the information in the one forum where a council is supposed to act: in public, on the record, in front of the residents whose homes and farms lie in the corridor.

That is the general case. In Kingston it now has a specific and uncomfortable form. Because the agreement binds councillors rather than officers alone, a member of Council who is briefed on the alignment cannot discuss what they have learned with the constituent whose property it crosses. The representative becomes an insider. Whatever else the agreement achieves, it removes from thirteen elected people the ability to do the thing they were elected to do.

Part Two · The scale, and the creep

Four agreements became three hundred and thirty-nine

Freedom of Information disclosures eventually forced HS2 Ltd to reveal how far the practice had spread. The progression was four agreements in 2012–13, ten in 2014, twenty-seven in 2015, thirty-four in 2016, seventy-one in 2017, and one hundred and twelve in 2018. New Civil Engineer

confidentiality agreements signed in 2012–13, at the outset

HS2 Ltd, via FOI

112

signed in 2018 alone, as the practice took hold

HS2 Ltd, via FOI

339

bodies bound, by the figure cited in the House of Lords

Hansard

HS2 Ltd then resisted disclosing who had signed for eighteen months, releasing the list of 253 organisations only after the Information Commissioner intervened. A further thirty-eight agreements with individuals were never named. By the end, the signatories included dozens of councils, the Health and Safety Executive, the National Trust, Historic England, and five universities.

The circle of people who could speak freely about a public project — funded by the public, running through the public’s communities — had been drawn so tightly that supporters of the scheme in the House of Lords questioned why so many organisations needed to be bound at all.

The creep has already begun here

Reporting on the Prescott and Russell decision confirms that ALTO requires every landholder who permits field survey access to sign a non-disclosure agreement, not only municipalities. The first agreement is never the last. It establishes the template, the precedent, and the expectation — for this municipality, for the next one down the corridor, for landowners, consultants and agencies, and for every subsequent phase of the project. Tribune-Express

Part Three · The terms

Twenty-six of twenty-eight had no end date

Of the twenty-eight English local authorities identified, the Town and Country Planning Association found that twenty-six had agreements with no end date. New Civil Engineer

No sunset clause. No automatic release on publication of the environmental assessment. No expiry when the route was confirmed and the commercial sensitivity had evaporated. Silence in perpetuity, over material that in most cases became public anyway — simply later, and on the promoter’s timetable rather than the community’s.

This is the single most consequential drafting failure in the entire British record, and it is also the easiest to prevent. An officer negotiating in good faith, focused on getting the data flowing, will not necessarily notice that the agreement never expires. Whether Kingston’s agreement contains an expiry date is not, at the time of writing, on the public record. It is a one-word answer, and the City can give it today.

Part Four · Both sides, fairly stated

The promoter’s case, and what the record shows

Nothing in this brief argues that no confidentiality is ever warranted. The argument is narrower: the terms matter enormously, the English terms were bad, and they were bad in ways that were entirely avoidable if identified in advance.

What the promoter says	What the British record shows
The agreements are mutual and entered into by consent. ALTO describes instruments that enable two-way data sharing and support productive collaboration on planning.	The City of Kingston’s own spokesperson says the agreement was not optional and was required to receive any technical information at all. HS2 Ltd made the identical “mutual and consensual” claim about agreements that councils could not decline without being cut off.
Confidentiality protects residents from unnecessary blight and confusion. Sharing early information without full context could suggest decisions have been made.	Note the shape of the argument: the secrecy is offered as a protection for the affected. It is worth asking whether residents in the corridor, given the choice, would prefer to be protected from knowing. In Britain, the discovery of the agreements produced anger, not relief.
These agreements are common in major infrastructure. They allow municipalities to give informed input.	They are common. That is the finding, not the defence. The Raynsford Review examined precisely this common practice and concluded that it corroded public trust in the project it was meant to protect.
The agreement is not an endorsement of any route or station. The City will share information publicly when it is able to.	“When we are able to” is the operative phrase, and its meaning is set by a document the public has not seen. If the agreement has no expiry, the answer is: at the promoter’s discretion, indefinitely.

The most honest defence of signing came, in Britain, from Doncaster. The council signed because it relied on HS2’s data to scrutinise and challenge the design; without signing, exposing the route’s damaging effects would have been harder still and might have produced more blight rather than less. Doncaster Free Press That is not a foolish argument, and it should not be caricatured. It is the argument of a body that has accepted the promoter’s framing of the available choices — sign and be informed, or refuse and be ignorant. Whether that framing was tested is not something the public record shows.

Prescott and Russell tested it. So did Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry. Both refused — and neither is, on the available evidence, less informed about ALTO than Kingston is. One of them has published the promoter’s presentation. Kingston cannot.

Part Five · The independent verdicts

What Britain concluded, in public, before Kingston signed

The Raynsford Review (Town and Country Planning Association, 2018)

Led by a former construction minister, this review of the English planning system found that the agreements undermine public trust in major infrastructure. It criticised the widespread use of confidentiality agreements by the HS2 company and identified a corrosive public sense that planning no longer protects people’s interests. It found that the agreements created real anger among local politicians and deeper resentment in affected communities once their existence came to light.

Raynsford’s line — the most useful distinction in the literature

Raynsford did not oppose confidentiality as such. He accepted the case for it where competing route options are under assessment and public knowledge could inflate land prices — and opposed it where it undermines public trust or may shield inappropriate relationships between developers and those making decisions. The test is not whether confidentiality is ever justified. It is whether this confidentiality, on these terms, for this long, is.

The House of Lords — criticism from the project’s own supporters

Baroness Kramer, a consistent advocate of HS2, argued that the presumption must always be transparency, with confidentiality as the exception, and that the slow release of information on cost, land and compensation had harmed the project and generated suspicion. Lord Berkeley proposed an independent assessor to review every HS2 confidentiality agreement against a presumption of public accountability. The people who most wanted HS2 built were among the loudest voices warning that the secrecy was destroying its public licence.

The culture did not stay in its lane

HS2 Ltd paid roughly £1.67 million in settlement agreements to forty-eight former employees from April 2016, with confidentiality clauses written in; a number of whistleblowers were among them. The company also redacted the names of attendees from its board minutes, against the Information Commissioner’s stated presumption in favour of naming those acting in a professional capacity. In the English record, confidentiality practice did not stay confined to route data. New Civil Engineer

Part Six · The neighbours

The same request, refused twice next door

ALTO has made materially the same approach to municipalities across the corridor: access to technical material, in exchange for a confidentiality agreement, plus permission to enter municipal land for field survey. What distinguishes Kingston is not the request. It is the response, and the process by which the response was reached.

United Counties of Prescott and Russell — refused, May 2026

All eight mayors on the UCPR council voted against a resolution that would have granted ALTO access to counties’ land for survey work and committed the Counties to a non-disclosure agreement. Each mayor declared their position on a registered vote. Warden Mario Zanth, mayor of Clarence-Rockland, directed the CAO to inform ALTO that the council did not want the corporation on its territory, having refused both the confidentiality agreement and land access. Zanth’s stated objection was that the corporation demanded secrecy before it would disclose the technical details municipalities were asking about — the chemistry of de-icing fluids and the risk to wells, the electricity supply, and other questions of direct local consequence. Tribune-Express ONFR

United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry — refused, June 15, 2026

SDG Counties Council unanimously rejected both ALTO’s request to access counties-owned land for environmental and technical study and its request that SDG sign a non-disclosure agreement — an agreement that would have prohibited councillors and staff from discussing with the public any details of their meetings and communications with the corporation. Council was given three options: full access, partial access, or none. It chose none, without further debate. North Glengarry Mayor Jamie MacDonald grounded his objection in accountability, saying of the agreement: “Here they’re telling us we can’t share any information in them.” The Review

Frontenac County — a formal, public vote on the corridor, April 15, 2026

Frontenac County Council formally voted to oppose the proposed high-speed rail corridors through the county, favouring routes along existing rail lines or the Highway 401 corridor. The resolution cited disruption to residential areas, agricultural lands and environmentally sensitive features; impacts on municipal infrastructure including road closures; risks to emergency response times; and uncertainty about the long-term financial implications for municipalities. Council supported a Kingston stop and called for no expropriation west of Ottawa until the Ottawa–Montreal segment nears completion. County of Frontenac

City of Kingston — signed July 10; the authorising process is not on the public record

Whether the agreement was authorised by a motion of Council — in open session, or in closed session with a reporting-out resolution — or executed by staff under delegated signing authority without coming to Council at all, has not been established. The distinction is not academic. An agreement authorised by a recorded vote is a decision residents can argue with. One signed under delegated authority means the City bound itself, and its councillors, on a matter of plain public interest without the body accountable for that interest ever recording a view.

The choice Kingston was offered is not a real choice

The case for signing rests entirely on a premise: that a council which refuses the agreement is left in the dark. The City spokesperson put it plainly — the agreement was required in order to receive any technical information at all, and it was not optional.

That premise has been tested next door, and it failed. SDG refused the agreement, refused land access, and then shared ALTO’s presentation with the public. From that published material, residents of SDG can now learn what ALTO intends: that field sampling across the corridor is scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2026 and will feed the impact assessment; that the surveys cover wetlands, forests, avian wildlife, and fish and wildlife habitat; that archaeology, cultural heritage, and “sensitive receptors” such as parks, schools and hospitals are treated as socio-economic components; and that noise, vibration, hydrogeology, soil quality and surface water are the physical components under examination. The Review

A council that refused to sign has told its residents more about ALTO’s plans than a council that signed is now permitted to.

This is not a rhetorical point. It is the whole argument, and it can be verified by anyone with a browser. The bargain Kingston accepted — silence in exchange for information — was offered on the premise that there was no alternative. Two neighbouring counties declined it, and one of them proceeded to put the promoter’s own material on the public record. The alternative existed. Kingston did not take it, and has not explained why.

One further detail of timing deserves an answer. The Eastern Ontario Wardens’ Caucus — the body through which these counties have been coordinating their response — was scheduled to discuss ALTO at a meeting in Kingston, in July. Kingston signed on July 10.

The Initiative has written to Kingston city councillors asking a single question, answerable in one sentence: was the agreement authorised by resolution of Council, and if so, what is the resolution number and date — or was it executed under delegated authority, and under which by-law? We will publish the answer when we receive it, whatever it is.

Part Seven · Where things stand

Five questions, one answered

These are the five questions the brief puts to Council. None is hostile. Each was answerable by staff in a sentence — before Friday. This is their status as of publication.

Answered

Who is bound — officers, or members? Both. The City confirms the agreement applies to all staff and councillors who receive technical information. This is the outcome the brief identifies as the most serious: an agreement that binds elected members converts representatives into insiders.

Unanswered

Does it expire? No sunset date has been disclosed. Twenty-six of the twenty-eight English councils signed agreements with no end date at all.

Unanswered

What, exactly, is covered? Whether the agreement is confined to genuinely commercial and personal information, or reaches route alignment, station siting, cost and community impact, has not been disclosed.

Unanswered

Are the statutory carve-outs express? Whether the agreement expressly preserves the City’s obligations under MFIPPA and the open-meeting provisions of the Municipal Act has not been disclosed. A municipality cannot lawfully contract out of those duties — but a poorly drafted agreement can create a chilling effect that operates as though it had.

Unanswered

What was actually being withheld without it? ALTO is a federal entity subject to the Access to Information Act. If the material behind the agreement is disclosable in due course regardless, the agreement is not buying confidentiality. It is buying delay.

Outstanding

How many of these has ALTO already signed? With municipalities, agencies, consultants and landowners — and on what terms? In Britain, that number was the story. It went from four to more than three hundred while nobody was counting.

Every question above can be answered without disclosing a single confidential fact. The terms of an agreement are not the contents of an agreement.

This is the point on which the whole matter turns, and it is worth stating without heat. Publishing the agreement — its duration, its scope, whom it binds, what it carves out — discloses nothing ALTO has a legitimate interest in protecting. It reveals no alignment, no cost, no property. A city genuinely committed to transparency, and unable to say more about the substance, can nonetheless say everything about the instrument. That it has not yet done so is a choice, and it is a choice the City can reverse this week.

Download Full Brief

City of Kingston: Bound Before Briefed (PDF)

The briefing note as circulated to Kingston City Council — the full British record, the Ontario statutory overlay and the five questions in their original form, prefaced by a dated note on the 10 July signing

Download PDF

The English record

The confidentiality did not protect HS2

Refusal was never the only alternative to signature, and this brief did not urge it. An agreement that would survive scrutiny is time-limited — expiring on a defined public milestone; scope-limited — confined to genuinely commercial and personal information, with alignment, cost and impact data expressly excluded; statute-preserving — with explicit carve-outs for MFIPPA and open-meeting duties; officer-bound, not member-bound; and publicly disclosed — the agreement itself, if not its contents, placed on the public record.

Every one of those five terms exists because HS2 lacked it. None of them costs the promoter anything to which it is entitled. Four of the five can still be secured by amendment, and the fifth — publication of the instrument — requires nothing from ALTO at all.

The English record offers one final observation, and it is not a partisan one. The confidentiality did not protect the project. It corroded HS2’s public licence, hardened the opposition, and left even the scheme’s allies defending a company against the impression that it had something to conceal. Kingston has signed. It has not yet explained. Those are different things, and only one of them is now beyond recall.

How to read this brief

Every figure and finding about HS2 is quoted from the sources listed below and can be checked there: the yearly counts of confidentiality agreements, the 253 organisations named after the Information Commissioner intervened, the 26 of 28 English councils with no end date, the settlement figures, and the Raynsford Review and House of Lords findings. The Kingston facts — the 10 July signing, that the agreement binds councillors as well as staff, and the City’s statement that it was not optional — are as reported by the Whig-Standard.

The statutory points about MFIPPA, the Municipal Act and the Access to Information Act are research, not legal advice, and are offered as questions for the City Solicitor rather than as conclusions. Where something has not been published or answered, this brief says so rather than inferring it, and makes no claim about anyone’s motives in signing.

Sources

Primary documents and reporting

Elliot Ferguson, “Kingston signs non-disclosure agreement for high-speed rail talks,” The Kingston Whig-Standard, July 14, 2026. thewhig.com

“UCPR denies ALTO access to lands, rejects request for NDA,” Tribune-Express, reporting the United Counties of Prescott and Russell council session of May 27, 2026. tribune-express.ca

“TGV : Prescott-Russell bloque Alto et refuse de signer une entente de confidentialité,” ONFR / TFO, May 2026 — carries Warden Mario Zanth’s directive to the CAO and his stated reasons. onfr.tfo.org

James Morgan, “SDG Council rejects Alto request for land access and NDA,” The Review, June 23, 2026 — reporting the unanimous SDG Counties Council decision of June 15, the terms of the proposed agreement, and the public release of ALTO’s presentation. thereview.ca

County of Frontenac, “Council votes to oppose Alto routes through Frontenac County,” April 15, 2026. frontenaccounty.ca

“Exclusive: HS2 ramps up use of gagging orders,” New Civil Engineer, July 1, 2019 — the year-by-year progression of agreements and the TCPA finding that 26 of 28 local authority agreements had no end date. newcivilengineer.com

“Revealed: the 253 companies and public bodies to sign HS2 gagging orders,” New Civil Engineer, November 16, 2020 — the signatory list released after the Information Commissioner’s intervention. newcivilengineer.com

“Exclusive: HS2 paid £1.67m to silence ex-employees,” New Civil Engineer, October 14, 2019. newcivilengineer.com

Nick Raynsford, Planning 2020: Final Report of the Raynsford Review of Planning in England, Town and Country Planning Association, November 2018. Reported context on the HS2 confidentiality agreements: Warwickshire World

10.

Christian Wolmar, “HS2 likes to keep things secret,” December 2020 — carries the Raynsford distinction between legitimate and illegitimate confidentiality, and the board-minute redactions. christianwolmar.co.uk

11.

House of Lords debate on HS2 confidentiality agreements — contributions of Baroness Kramer and Lord Berkeley, Hansard. Hansard record

12.

“Doncaster Council signed non-disclosure agreement with HS2 bosses,” Doncaster Free Press — the fullest published statement of a council’s reasons for signing. doncasterfreepress.co.uk

13.

Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56; Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s. 239 (open meetings); Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1. Statutory points in this brief are offered as questions for the City Solicitor, not as legal conclusions.

July 14, 2026

Sign first, see later

Sign First, See Later

A confidentiality precondition runs through ALTO’s field studies and corridor maps — for municipalities and for Indigenous rightsholders alike.

ALTO HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Research Brief · Published June 2026

The finding in brief

Two of ALTO’s own June 2026 reports, read together, reveal a pattern. To let ALTO’s crews onto its land for field studies, the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry would first have had to sign a non-disclosure agreement; they declined. And to see the early corridor maps for their own territories, Indigenous communities were asked to sign a collaboration or confidentiality agreement first.

In both cases the information came with the same condition attached: silence. This is a question of public trust, not of whether the trains are a good idea.

“The most basic question — where might the line go? — was answered only after a confidentiality agreement was signed.”
— the pattern across ALTO’s own June 2026 reports

The Evidence

What the documents show

The pattern is set out not in commentary but in ALTO’s own records and a municipal council package — the same condition appearing in two separate processes, applied to two different kinds of party.

The municipal case	The rightsholder case
Set out in the United Counties of SDG’s June 15, 2026 council package. ALTO sought a Permission to Enter agreement for environmental field study and geotechnical work — boreholes, test pits, and tree clearing — on county-owned parcels, with the Counties required to sign a non-disclosure agreement as a condition of access. Council declined the request.	Set out in ALTO’s Indigenous Consultation What We Heard Report. Initial corridor maps, prepared in November 2025, were shared only with communities that had signed a collaboration agreement or a non-disclosure agreement. For the others, ALTO worked to secure non-disclosure agreements to share maps as early as possible (p. 14). A community could not see the corridor maps for its own territory until it accepted a confidentiality undertaking. View ALTO’s report

The municipal case

The rightsholder case

Set out in the United Counties of SDG’s June 15, 2026 council package. ALTO sought a Permission to Enter agreement for environmental field study and geotechnical work — boreholes, test pits, and tree clearing — on county-owned parcels, with the Counties required to sign a non-disclosure agreement as a condition of access. Council declined the request.

Set out in ALTO’s Indigenous Consultation What We Heard Report. Initial corridor maps, prepared in November 2025, were shared only with communities that had signed a collaboration agreement or a non-disclosure agreement. For the others, ALTO worked to secure non-disclosure agreements to share maps as early as possible (p. 14). A community could not see the corridor maps for its own territory until it accepted a confidentiality undertaking. View ALTO’s report

A confidentiality clause is ordinary between two private companies. It is a different matter when the other party is a public body, or an Indigenous community being consulted about its rights.

The Municipal Case

What was actually requested

ALTO sought a “Permission to Enter” (PTE) agreement covering two kinds of work. The first is environmental field study — wetland and habitat assessment, wildlife and bird surveys, and the collection of noise, vibration, hydrology, soil and archaeological data, described as largely non-invasive. The second is geotechnical investigation: boreholes, test pits and other ground disturbance to characterise what lies beneath the surface. The County’s own report notes that this second category would require clearing trees to bring in heavy equipment, with the land to be “restored” afterward.

The agreement also runs in favour of the private developer consortium, Cadence, not only the Crown corporation — so a landowner’s signature binds them to both. And it requires the landowner to keep the arrangement confidential.

The request and its supporting materials are on the public record in the United Counties’ June 15, 2026 council package: the CAO Key Information Report, the ALTO presentation of May 5, 2026, and the Map of Impacted SDG Properties.

“It tells you nothing about the route”

ALTO’s presentation states, more than once, that a Permission to Enter does not indicate the final alignment and is not proof that a property sits on the route. Yet the same council package includes a map that identifies specific “Subject Lands,” and the geotechnical work is targeted at named parcels. You do not drill boreholes everywhere; you drill where you expect to build.

On the public record

In March 2026 the Mayor of North Glengarry said the alignment had shifted from the existing rail line through town to the township’s “far northeast corner” — the area, next to Highway 417, where the identified study parcels sit. The claim that the studies reveal nothing about the route, and the targeted footprint of the work, do not sit easily together.

“A municipality holds and shares information on behalf of its residents. A non-disclosure agreement is the one condition it cannot quietly accept.”
— the transparency question the request puts to a public body

The Analysis

A pattern, not an exception

A municipality holds and shares information on behalf of its residents; an Indigenous community is being consulted toward its free, prior and informed consent. In both settings, the value of the process depends on people being able to know — and to discuss — what is proposed for their land. A precondition of silence cuts against that.

What makes this a pattern rather than a one-off is that the same condition appears in two separate processes, applied to two different kinds of party, documented in the same set of reports. It is part of how the project is being run.

Why confidentiality changes the calculus

A public body that signs a non-disclosure agreement narrows what it can tell residents about studies on public land, and narrows what is reachable under freedom-of-information law. A rightsholder asked to sign before seeing a map is asked to accept a constraint before it has the information needed to weigh the project. Informed consent and an informed public both depend on having the information first.

Consent and Transparency

The tension the precondition creates

ALTO states that it consults Indigenous communities with the aim of securing their free, prior and informed consent. Consent is harder to call fully informed when the information is released only after a confidentiality agreement, and harder to call fully free when seeing the map requires signing first. None of this is to say that any community objected to the agreements — the report does not say so, and this brief does not speak for any community. The observation is narrower, and is about ALTO’s process: the condition it attaches to its own information.

For municipalities, the duty runs the other way — toward openness. Ontario’s freedom-of-information regime exists precisely so residents can learn what public bodies know. An access agreement that forecloses disclosure sits in tension with that duty, which is part of why the United Counties declined.

The Decision

What the municipalities decided

The refusals were not isolated. The body that owns the land said no; the host township and a regional caucus were already on record against the project; and a neighbouring county refused the very same non-disclosure agreement.

United Counties of SDG — the landowner

The Counties, which own the land, voted down the access request (By-Law No. 5538). Councillors pointed to the impact on agriculture and were wary that granting access would itself be read as support for the project.

North Glengarry — the host township

The township where the parcels sit had already endorsed the regional resolution opposing the project in its current form, and its mayor and council have continued to speak against it.

Prescott-Russell — the neighbour

On May 27, 2026 the neighbouring United Counties of Prescott and Russell unanimously refused to sign a non-disclosure agreement and declined access for surveys, with the warden framing it as a stand for transparency and local autonomy. Council minutes

Eastern Ontario Wardens’ Caucus

The regional caucus opposes the project in its current form — the resolution North Glengarry endorsed in April 2026.

What To Watch

What happens next

The field studies are active and, by ALTO’s own account, will continue through 2026 and beyond. The southern route now under study — through Kingston and the Frontenac Arch — will not reach public consultation until 2027. Access to the ground, and the agreements that come with it, can arrive well before the public conversation does.

The next test is a willing host. Kingston has asked for a station and wants its staff to work directly with ALTO. A municipality that wants the outcome may accept terms a reluctant one refused. Whether the confidentiality precondition travels south, and whether it has already been signed anywhere, can be tested directly: through freedom-of-information requests to the municipalities along the route.

Anticipated Objection

“Isn’t this just opposition to high-speed rail dressed up as a complaint about process?”

No. The concern is the terms on offer, not the existence of a railway. The refusing councils have not asked for no rail; they have asked that the project coordinate with existing passenger service and existing corridors, and that decisions be made in the open. The question is not whether ALTO may protect commercially sensitive information — firms do that routinely.

It is whether the public’s information about a public project, on public land and on the territories of rightsholders, should be available only to those who first agree not to share it. Better passenger rail and an open process are not in conflict.

The bottom line

The question is not whether ALTO may protect commercially sensitive information — firms do that routinely. It is whether the public’s information about a public project, on public land and on the territories of rightsholders, should be available only to those who first agree not to share it.

A reasonable standard would be simple: the corridor maps, field-study scopes, and access terms that affect a community should be available to that community without a confidentiality precondition. Better passenger rail and an open process are not in conflict.

Read the full brief offline or share it.

Download the brief (PDF)

Sources

Primary documents and statements

ALTO, Indigenous Consultation What We Heard Report (June 2026), incl. p. 14 — initial corridor maps shared only with communities that had signed a collaboration or non-disclosure agreement; ALTO describes the agreements as a means of sharing maps as early as possible. altotrain.ca

ALTO, Public Consultation What We Heard Report (June 2026).

United Counties of SDG council package, June 15, 2026 — CAO Key Information Report; ALTO presentation, May 5, 2026; Map of Impacted SDG Properties; and By-Law No. 5538.

The SDG access vote and councillor statements as reported by the Morrisburg Leader, June 18, 2026.

North Glengarry’s April 13, 2026 endorsement of the regional (EOWC) resolution, and its mayor’s continued public opposition — The Review, April 16, 2026, and Cornwall Seaway News.

United Counties of Prescott and Russell, Regular Council Meeting, May 27, 2026 — council declined to sign a non-disclosure agreement and refused access for surveys. Meeting agendas and minutes

Transport Canada announcement, Kingston, June 22, 2026.

June 28, 2026

Heard not counted
CRI analysis · June 2026

Heard, Not Counted

Alto’s What We Heard report is precise about how many people it reached and silent about what they said. That silence is not an omission — it is the design.

Alto HSR Citizen Research Initiative · Independent & non-partisan

What Alto counts, exactly

324,026 unique online visits

24,142 questionnaires completed

19,903 map pins dropped

14,503 media mentions

What Alto leaves uncounted

— how many raised each theme

— concerns by category

— any sentiment split

— which issues mattered most

The same report, two standards of precision: six significant figures for the inputs, no number at all for the outputs.

The argument

The report is accountability-shaped but accountability-proof. It maximizes the visible evidence that consultation happened while removing every element that would let anyone test what it produced — so that hearing is decoupled from consequence.

1
The smoking gun: asymmetric precision

The clearest evidence isn’t interpretive — it’s on the page. Alto reports its inputs to six significant figures and its outputs with no number at all (see the ledger above).

The qualitative colouring is asymmetric in the same breath. In adjacent sentences of the executive summary, support gets intensifiers and active voice — nation-building “viewed positively, alongside strong enthusiasm,” supporters who “expressed a desire” to move forward. Opposition gets neutral process-verbs and passive voice — land-acquisition opposition “was voiced,” concerns “raised… on many occasions.” Both are unquantified; one is painted warm and active, the other cool and passive. That asymmetry, in a single paragraph, is the legitimation machine in miniature.

2
A report that cannot be wrong

The report says its themes were produced by “Artificial intelligence tools… semantic clustering, multi-label classification,” which also “were used to support report writing.” Add the absence of magnitude, the absence of attribution, and the instruction that the themes “are not presented in a specific order and they are all significant” — and the report becomes structurally unfalsifiable.

There is no figure to check against the inputs, no ranking to dispute, no claim that could be shown false. “All significant” is not a finding; it is a flattening — it pre-emptively denies that overwhelming, concentrated opposition would look any different from a scatter of mild concerns. A report that cannot be wrong is not a record. It is a position statement wearing a record’s clothes.

3
The frame was set before the room opened

The corridor that was consulted on was drawn first — from technical and financial criteria (“the straightest possible route,” “minimizing construction costs”) and the three 2025 RFP submissions — and then presented for feedback. The exercise is explicitly “corridor refinement”: consultation on the width of a band already drawn from cost-minimization, not on whether or where. The seven “project outcomes” are stated as fixed premises the consultation serves, never as propositions it could test.

The consultation’s frame excludes the project’s own justification. A participant could object to a curve; they could not put on the record that the stated outcomes might be better met by upgrading existing lines — the question the public itself kept raising as “improve VIA first.” The frame did the foreclosing; the consultation only refined inside it.

4
Consent invoked, consent disclaimed

Both reports invoke “Free, Prior, and Informed Consent” — and the word doing the work is consent. Yet the report never claims consent was obtained; it says Alto consults “with the aim of securing” it, then states flatly the process “is not a rights determination process.” It wears the standard as a credential while disclaiming the thing the standard names.

Its own numbers undercut the credential: of 40 Indigenous communities contacted, 29 held meetings and 12 made further submissions — a thinning base for a report it calls “validated.” And corridor maps were shared only with communities that had signed a collaboration or non-disclosure agreement. Consultation conducted under NDA is a contradiction in terms for a public, rights-bearing process: you could only see what you were consulted on by signing away the ability to discuss it.

5
Responsiveness, staged

The report — which documents Kingston-area demand — was released the same day, at Queen’s University, alongside the Minister’s direction to study a southern route through Kingston. The sequence manufactures a narrative of listening and responding. But the response is a direction to study, hedged twice (“potential,” “subject to technical feasibility”), and the real consultation on that segment is pushed to 2027. The report stages responsiveness in the present while deferring the substance past the next news cycle.
6
What this argument does not claim

A sharper critique is also a more honest one. Naming what Alto can rebut makes the rest land harder.

Not that Alto ignored concerns. It didn’t — the southern-corridor section names farmland, the Frontenac Arch, karst and groundwater specifically. The defensible claim is narrower and deadlier: Alto records concerns in a form that cannot be acted on or audited.

Not that the comment counts are bad faith. The public-facing range (“nearly 20,000” vs “nearly 45,000”) is two framings and partly an artifact of windowing and de-duplication. The fair point is rhetorical: Alto’s own site reaches for the smaller number.

Not that using AI is the flaw. The flaw is that the taxonomy is undisclosed and the outputs unquantified. The target is the opacity, not the method.

Not that this was a representative poll. Neither report claims it was. The platform measures the intensity of the concerned — which is exactly why the absence of any sentiment or geographic breakdown is the tell.
The line that holds

Alto published a 134-page account of a consultation that is precise about how many people it reached and silent about what they said — and that silence is the product, not an omission.
Download the full brief (PDF)
Sources

Alto, Public Consultation — What We Heard Report, Corridor Study Area (134 pp), June 2026.

Alto, Indigenous Consultation — What We Heard Report, Corridor Study Area (24 pp), June 2026.

Transport Canada, news release on the What We Heard report and Kingston as a potential stop, June 22, 2026. canada.ca

Quoted phrases are taken directly from the reports named above. The Alto HSR Citizen Research Initiative is an independent, non-partisan research project examining the proposed high-speed rail corridor through Eastern Ontario. This analysis addresses how the consultation was reported; it takes no position here for or against the project itself.
June 22, 2026

Tag: transparency

Where do 50,000 jobs come from?

What Alto says

What the report actually says

How we checked it

What the check found

The question the report leaves open

Two more things in the tables

Upper, not central

The comparison figures have no source

This has been released before

What we are asking Alto to publish

How to read the numbers on this page

Sources and notes

Procured, and Then?

ALTO commissioned the outside view

Buying the instrument is not the same as letting it bind

The record will arrive after the decision has moved on

Two studies, no cost side

The scenario range has a floor and no ceiling on the downside

Adverse mechanisms are identified but do not reach the total

The two studies disagree, and each resolves the disagreement upward

The studies import the literature’s upside but not its realisation record

Publish the comparison

Documents relied on

Hours Are Not Dollars

What a discount rate is, in ordinary words

How much the answer moves

A number with a family tree

What the federal government uses, and the gap where a manual should be

The last time anyone published these numbers for this corridor

Three different rates, and only one of them is in the report

1. The appraisal rate — 3.5 per cent

2. What it costs the government to borrow

3. What a private partner needs to earn

How the Montréal REM is actually funded

What this does not claim

On the rate

On the comparisons

Two questions, answerable without releasing a model

1. Who absorbs it if the passengers do not come?

2. What fare, and what revenue?

Primary documents

ALTO Used the Rulebook’s Numbers. It Left the Rules Behind.

Why this matters

What the report gives you

What its own cited source requires

What that leaves a reader with

What the report borrowed, and from where

The numbers come as a set, not a menu

What a project this size is supposed to publish

Re-run the numbers at a different discount rate

Re-run the numbers with a rising value of time

Run the costs and assumptions through a range analysis

Report the odds that the project is worth doing

Publish the standard indicators

Model low, medium and high growth scenarios

This is not a theoretical requirement

The report concedes a range it never publishes

A top-up the manual requires, and the report does not mention

Too early to divide, but not too early to multiply

What this brief does not say

On the analysis

On the report and its source

Two questions ALTO can answer without releasing a model

1. Was the calculation ever run at a rate other than 3.5 per cent?

2. Which parts of the cited guidance were applied, and which were departed from?

Summary ledger

Primary documents

Would an ALTO Stop Help Kingston?

Six versions of Kingston’s railway

Why Kingston already rides the train

It gets two sets of trains, not one

The station serves a region, not a city

The population is unusually inclined to take the train

But that ridership is hard to charge a premium for

Two things worth being clear about

How the numbers were worked out

Two possible futures for today’s trains

Replacement